delivered in Edinburgh on the evening of Sunday, the 8th of November,
1868--being the first of a series of Sunday evening addresses upon
non-theological topics, instituted by the Rev. J. Cranbrook. Some
phrases, which could possess only a transitory and local interest, have
been omitted; instead of the newspaper report of the Archbishop of
York's address, his Grace's subsequently-published pamphlet "On the
Limits of Philosophical Inquiry" is quoted; and I have, here and there,
endeavoured to express my meaning more fully and clearly than I seem to
have done in speaking--if I may judge by sundry criticisms upon what I
am supposed to have said, which have appeared. But in substance, and, so
far as my recollection serves, in form, what is here written corresponds
with what was there said.
[11] "The Limits of Philosophical Inquiry," pp. 4 and 5.
[12] Hume's Essay "Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy," in the
"Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding."
VIII.
THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF POSITIVISM.
It is now some sixteen or seventeen years since I became acquainted with
the "Philosophic Positive," the "Discours sur l'Ensemble du
Positivisme," and the "Politique Positive" of Auguste Comte. I was led
to study these works partly by the allusions to them in Mr. Mill's
"Logic," partly by the recommendation of a distinguished theologian, and
partly by the urgency of a valued friend, the late Professor Henfrey,
who looked upon M. Comte's bulky volumes as a mine of wisdom, and lent
them to me that I might dig and be rich. After due perusal, I found
myself in a position to echo my friend's words, though I may have laid
more stress on the "mine" than on the "wisdom." For I found the veins of
ore few and far between, and the rock so apt to run to mud, that one
incurred the risk of being intellectually smothered in the working.
Still, as I was glad to acknowledge, I did come to a nugget here and
there; though not, so far as my experience went, in the discussions on
the philosophy of the physical sciences, but in the chapters on
speculative and practical sociology. In these there was indeed much to
arouse the liveliest interest in one whose boat had broken away from
the old moorings, and who had been content "to lay out an anchor by the
stern" until daylight should break and the fog clear. Nothing could be
more interesting to a student of biology than to see the study of the
biological sciences laid down, as an essential part of the prolegomena
of a new view of social phenomena. Nothing could be more satisfactory to
a worshipper of the severe truthfulness of science than the attempt to
dispense with all beliefs, save such as could brave the light, and seek,
rather than fear, criticism; while, to a lover of courage and
outspokenness, nothing could be more touching than the placid
announcement on the title-page of the "Discours sur l'Ensemble du
Positivisme," that its author proposed
"Réorganiser, sans Dieu ni roi,
Par le culte systématique de l'Humanité,"
the shattered frame of modern society.
In those days I knew my "Faust" pretty well, and, after reading this
word of might, I was minded to chant the well-known stanzas of the
"Geisterchor"--
"Weh! Weh!
Die schöne welt.
Sie stürzt, sie zerfällt
Wir tragen
Die Trümmern ins Nichts hinüber.
Mächtiger
Der Erdensöhne,
Prächtiger,
Baue sie wieder
In deinem Busen baue sie auf."
Great, however, was my perplexity, not to say disappointment, as I
followed the progress of this "mighty son of earth" in his work of
reconstruction. Undoubtedly "Dieu" disappeared, but the "Nouveau
Grand-Être Suprême," a gigantic fetish, turned out bran-new by M.
Comte's own hands, reigned in his stead. "Roi" also was not heard of;
but, in his place, I found a minutely-defined social organization,
which, if it ever came into practice, would exert a despotic authority
such as no sultan has rivalled, and no Puritan presbytery, in its
palmiest days, could hope to excel. While, as for the "culte
systématique de l'Humanité," I, in my blindness, could not distinguish
it from sheer Popery, with M. Comte in the chair of St. Peter, and the
names of most of the saints changed. To quote "Faust" again, I found
myself saying with Gretchen,--
"Ungefähr sagt das der Pfarrer auch
Nur mit ein bischen andern Worten."
Rightly or wrongly, this was the impression which, all those years ago,
the study of M. Comte's works left on my mind, combined with the
conviction, which I shall always be thankful to him for awakening in me,
that the organization of society upon a new and purely scientific basis
is not only practicable, but is the only political object much worth
fighting for.
As I have said, that part of M. Comte's writings which deals with the
philosophy of physical science appeared to me to possess singularly
little value, and to show that he had but the most superficial, and
merely second-hand, knowledge of most branches of what is usually
understood by science. I do not mean by this merely to say that Comte
was behind our present knowledge, or that he was unacquainted with the
details of the science of his own day. No one could justly make such
defects cause of complaint in a philosophical writer of the past
generation. What struck me was his want of apprehension of the great
features of science; his strange mistakes as to the merits of his
scientific contemporaries; and his ludicrously erroneous notions about
the part which some of the scientific doctrines current in his time were
destined to play in the future. With these impressions in my mind, no
one will be surprised if I acknowledge that, for these sixteen years, it
has been a periodical source of irritation to me to find M. Comte put
forward as a representative of scientific thought; and to observe that
writers whose philosophy had its legitimate parent in Hume, or in
themselves, were labelled "Comtists" or "Positivists" by public writers,
even in spite of vehement protests to the contrary. It has cost Mr. Mill
hard rubbings to get that label off; and I watch Mr. Spencer, as one
regards a good man struggling with adversity, still engaged in eluding
its adhesiveness, and ready to tear away skin and all, rather than let
it stick. My own turn might come next; and, therefore, when an eminent
prelate the other day gave currency and authority to the popular
confusion, I took an opportunity of incidentally revindicating Hume's
property in the so-called "New Philosophy," and, at the same time, of
repudiating Comtism on my own behalf.[13]
The few lines devoted to Comtism in my paper on the "Physical Basis of
Life" were, in intention, strictly limited to these two purposes. But
they seem to have given more umbrage than I intended they should, to the
followers of M. Comte in this country, for some of whom, let me observe
in passing, I entertain a most unfeigned respect; and Mr. Congreve's
recent article gives expression to the displeasure which I have excited
among the members of the Comtian body.
Mr. Congreve, in a peroration which seems especially intended to catch
the attention of his readers, indignantly challenges me to admire M.
Comte's life, "to deny that it has a marked character of grandeur about
it;" and he uses some very strong language because I show no sign of
veneration for his idol. I confess I do not care to occupy myself with
the denigration of a man who, on the whole, deserves to be spoken of
with respect. Therefore, I shall enter into no statement of the reasons
which lead me unhesitatingly to accept Mr. Congreve's challenge, and to
refuse to recognise anything which deserves the name of grandeur of
character in M. Comte, unless it be his arrogance, which is undoubtedly
sublime. All I have to observe is, that if Mr. Congreve is justified in
saying that I speak with a tinge of contempt for his spiritual father,
the reason for such colouring of my language is to be found in the fact,
that, when I wrote, I had but just arisen from the perusal of a work
with which he is doubtless well acquainted, M. Littré's "Auguste Comte
et la Philosophic Positive."
Though there are tolerably fixed standards of right and wrong, and even
of generosity and meanness, it may be said that the beauty, or grandeur,
of a life is more or less a matter of taste; and Mr. Congreve's notions
of literary excellence are so different from mine that, it may be, we
should diverge as widely in our judgment of moral beauty or ugliness.
Therefore, while retaining my own notions, I do not presume to quarrel
with his. But when Mr. Congreve devotes a great deal of laboriously
guarded insinuation to the endeavour to lead the public to believe that
I have been guilty of the dishonesty of having criticised Comte without
having read him, I must be permitted to remind him that he has neglected
the well-known maxim of a diplomatic sage, "If you want to damage a man,
you should say what is probable, as well as what is true."
And when Mr. Congreve speaks of my having an advantage over him in my
introduction of "Christianity" into the phrase that "M. Comte's
philosophy, in practice, might be described as Catholicism _minus_
Christianity;" intending thereby to suggest that I have, by so doing,
desired to profit by an appeal to the _odium theologicum_,--he lays
himself open to a very unpleasant retort.
What if I were to suggest that Mr. Congreve had not read Comte's works;
and that the phrase "the context shows that the view of the writer
ranges--however superficially--over the whole works. This is obvious
from the mention of Catholicism," demonstrates that Mr. Congreve has no
acquaintance with the "Philosophie Positive"? I think the suggestion
would be very unjust and unmannerly, and I shall not make it. But the
fact remains, that this little epigram of mine, which has so greatly
provoked Mr. Congreve, is neither more nor less than a condensed
paraphrase of the following passage, which is to be found at page 344 of
the fifth volume of the "Philosophie Positive:"[14]--
"La seule solution possible de ce grand problème historique, qui
n'a jamais pu être philosophiquement posé jusqu'ici, consiste à
concevoir, en sens radicalement inverse des notions habituelles,
_que ce qui devait nécessairement périr ainsi, dans le
catholicisme, c'était la doctrine, et non l'organisation_, qui n'a
été passagèrement ruinée que par suite de son inévitable adhérence
élémentaire a la philosophie théologique, destinée à succomber
graduellement sous l'irrésistible émancipation de la raison
humaine; _tandis qu'une telle constitution, convenablement
reconstruite sur des bases intellectuelles à la fois plus étendues
et plus stables, devra finalement présider à l'indispensable
réorganisation spirituelle des sociétés modernes, sauf les
différences essentielles spontanément correspondantes à l'extrême
diversité des doctrines fondamentales_; à moins de supposer, ce qui
serait certainement contradictoire à l'ensemble des lois de notre
nature, que les immenses efforts de tant de grands hommes, secondés
par la persévérante sollicitude des nations civilisées, dans la
fondation séculaire de ce chef-d'oeuvre politique de la sagesse
humaine, doivent être enfin irrévocablement perdus pour l'élite de
l'humanité sauf les résultats, capitaux mais provisoires, qui s'y
rapportaient immédiatement. Cette explication générale, déjà
évidemment motivée par la suite des considérations propres à ce
chapitre, sera de plus en plus confirmée par tout le reste de
notre opération historique, _dont elle constituera spontanément la
principale conclusion politique."_
Nothing can be clearer. Comte's ideal, as stated by himself, is Catholic
organization without Catholic doctrine, or, in other words, Catholicism
_minus_ Christianity. Surely it is utterly unjustifiable to ascribe to
me base motives for stating a man's doctrines, as nearly as may be, in
his own words!
My readers would hardly be interested were I to follow Mr. Congreve any
further, or I might point out that the fact of his not having heard me
lecture is hardly a safe ground for his speculations as to what I do not
teach. Nor do I feel called upon to give any opinion as to M. Comte's
merits or demerits as regards sociology. Mr. Mill (whose competence to
speak on these matters I suppose will not be questioned, even by Mr.
Congreve) has dealt with M. Comte's philosophy from this point of view,
with a vigour and authority to which I cannot for a moment aspire; and
with a severity, not unfrequently amounting to contempt, which I have
not the wish, if I had the power, to surpass. I, as a mere student in
these questions, am content to abide by Mr. Mill's judgment until some
one shows cause for its reversal, and I decline to enter into a
discussion which I have not provoked.
The sole obligation which lies upon me is to justify so much as still
remains without justification of what I have written respecting
Positivism--namely, the opinion expressed in the following paragraph:--
"In so far as my study of what specially characterises the Positive
Philosophy has led me, I find therein little or nothing of any
scientific value, and a great deal which is as thoroughly
antagonistic to the very essence of science as any thing in
ultramontane Catholicism."
Here are two propositions: the first, that the "Philosophie Positive"
contains little or nothing of any scientific value; the second, that
Comtism is, in spirit, anti-scientific. I shall endeavour to bring
forward ample evidence in support of both.
I. No one who possesses even a superficial acquaintance with physical
science can read Comte's "Leçons" without becoming aware that he was at
once singularly devoid of real knowledge on these subjects, and
singularly unlucky. What is to be thought of the contemporary of Young
and of Fresnel, who never misses an opportunity of casting scorn upon
the hypothesis of an ether--the fundamental basis not only of the
undulatory theory of light, but of so much else in modern physics--and
whose contempt for the intellects of some of the strongest men of his
generation was such, that he puts forward the mere existence of night as
a refutation of the undulatory theory?[15] What a wonderful gauge of his
own value as a scientific critic does he afford, by whom we are informed
that phrenology is a great science, and psychology a chimæra; that Gall
was one of the great men of his age, and that Cuvier was "brilliant but
superficial"![16] How unlucky must one consider the bold speculator who,
just before the dawn of modern histology--which is simply the
application of the microscope to anatomy--reproves what he calls "the
abuse of microscopic investigations," and "the exaggerated credit"
attached to them; who, when the morphological uniformity of the tissues
of the great majority of plants and animals was on the eve of being
demonstrated, treated with ridicule those who attempt to refer all
tissues to a "tissu générateur," formed by "le chimérique et
inintelligible assemblage d'une sorte de monades organiques, qui
seraient dès lors les vrais éléments primordiaux de tout corps
vivant;"[17] and who finally tells us, that all the objections against a
linear arrangement of the species of living beings are in their essence
foolish, and that the order of the animal series is "necessarily
linear,"[18] when the exact contrary is one of the best-established and
the most important truths of zoology. Appeal to mathematicians,
astronomers, physicists,[19] chemists, biologists, about the
"Philosophie Positive," and they all, with one consent, begin to make
protestation that, whatever M. Comte's other merits, he has shed no
light upon the philosophy of their particular studies.
To be just, however, it must be admitted that even M. Comte's most
ardent disciples are content to be judiciously silent about his
knowledge or appreciation of the sciences themselves, and prefer to base
their master's claims to scientific authority upon his "law of the three
states," and his "classification of the sciences." But here, also, I
must join issue with them as completely as others--notably Mr. Herbert
Spencer--have done before me. A critical examination of what M. Comte
has to say about the "law of the three states" brings out nothing but a
series of more or less contradictory statements of an imperfectly
apprehended truth; and his "classification of the sciences," whether
regarded historically or logically, is, in my judgment, absolutely
worthless.
Let us consider the law of "the three states" as it is put before us in
the opening of the first Leçon of the "Philosophie Positive:"--
"En étudiant ainsi le développement total de l'intelligence humaine
dans ses diverses sphères d'activité, depuis son premier essor le
plus simple jusqu'à nos jours, je crois avoir découvert une grande
loi fondamentale, à laquelle il est assujetti par une nécessité
invariable, et qui me semble pouvoir être solidement établie, soit
sur les preuves rationelles fournies par la connaissance de notre
organisation, soit sur les vérifications historiques résultant d'un
examen attentif du passé. Cette loi consiste en ce que chacune de
nos conceptions principales, chaque branche de nos connaissances,
passe successivement par trois états théoriques différents; l'état
théologique, ou fictif; l'état métaphysique, ou abstrait; l'état
scientifique, ou positif. En d'autres termes, l'esprit humain, par
sa nature, emploie successivement dans chacune de ses recherches
trois méthodes de philosopher, dont _le caractère est
essentiellement différent et même radicalement opposé_; d'abord la
méthode théologique, ensuite la méthode métaphysique, et enfin la
méthode positive. De là, trois sortes de philosophie, ou de
systèmes généraux de conceptions sur l'ensemble des phénomènes _qui
s'excluent mutuellement_; la première est le point de départ
nécessaire de l'intelligence humaine; la troisième, son état fixe
et définitif; la seconde est uniquement destinée à servir de
transition."[20]
Nothing can be more precise than these statements, which may be put into
the following propositions:--
(a) The human intellect is subjected to the law by an invariable
necessity, which is demonstrable, _à priori_, from the nature and
constitution of the intellect; while, as a matter of historical fact,
the human intellect has been subjected to the law.
(b) Every branch of human knowledge passes through the three states,
necessarily beginning with the first stage.
(c) The three states mutually exclude one another, being essentially
different, and even radically opposed.
Two questions present themselves. Is M. Comte consistent with himself in
making these assertions? And is he consistent with fact? I reply to both
questions in the negative; and, as regards the first, I bring forward as
my witness a remarkable passage which is to be found in the fourth
volume of the "Philosophic Positive" (p. 491), when M. Comte had had
time to think out, a little more fully, the notions crudely stated in
the first volume:--
"A proprement parler, la philosophie théologique, même dans notre
première enfance, individuelle ou sociale, n'a jamais pu être
rigoureusement universelle, c'est-à-dire que, pour les ordres
quelconques de phénomènes, _les faits les plus simples et les plus
communs ont toujours été regardés comme essentiellement assujettis
à des lois naturelles, au lieu d'être attribués à l'arbitraire
volonté des agents surnaturels_. L'illustre Adam Smith a, par
example, très-heureusement remarqué dans ses essais philosophiques,
qu'on ne trouvait, en aucun temps ni en aucun pays, un dieu pour la
pesanteur. _Il en est ainsi, en général, même à l'égard des sujets
les plus compliqués, envers tous les phénomènes assez élémentaires
et assez familiers pour que la parfaite invariabilité de leurs
relations effectives ait toujours dû frapper spontanément
l'observateur le moins préparé_. Dans l'ordre moral et social,
qu'une vaine opposition voudrait aujourd'hui systématiquement
interdire à la philosophie positive, il y a eu nécessairement, en
tout temps, la pensée des lois naturelles, relativement aux plus
simples phénomènes de la vie journalière, comme l'exige évidemment
la conduite générale de notre existence réelle, individuelle ou
sociale, qui n'aurait pu jamais comporter aucune prévoyance
quelconque, si tous les phénomènes humains avaient été
rigoureusement attribués à des agents surnaturels, puisque dès lors
la prière aurait logiquement constitué la seule ressource
imaginable pour influer sur le cours habituel des actions humaines.
_On doit même remarquer, à ce sujet, que c'est, au contraire,
l'ébauche spontanée des premières lois naturelles propres aux
actes individuels ou sociaux qui, fictivement transportée à tous
les phénomènes du monde extérieur, a d'abord fourni, d'après nos
explications précédentes, le vrai principe fondamental de la
philosophie théologique. Ainsi, le germe élémentaire de la
philosophie positive est certainement tout aussi primitif au fond
que celui de la philosophie théologique elle-même, quoi qu'il n'ait
pu se développer que beaucoup plus tard._ Une telle notion importe
extrêmement à la parfaite rationalité de notre théorie
sociologique, puisque la vie humaine ne pouvant jamais offrir
aucune véritable création quelconque, mais toujours une simple
évolution graduelle, l'essor final de l'esprit positif deviendrait
scientifiquement incompréhensible, si, dès l'origine, on n'en
concevait, à tous égards, les premiers rudiments nécessaires.
Depuis cette situation primitive, à mesure que nos observations se
sont spontanément étendues et généralisées, cet essor, d'abord à
peine appréciable, a constamment suivi, sans cesser longtemps
d'être subalterne, une progression très-lente, mais continue, la
philosophie théologique restant toujours réservée pour les
phénomènes, de moins en moins nombreux, dont les lois naturelles ne
pouvaient encore être aucunement connues."
Compare the propositions implicitly laid down here with those contained
in the earlier volume. (a) As a matter of fact, the human intellect
has _not_ been invariably subjected to the law of the three states, and
therefore the necessity of the law _cannot_ be demonstrable _à priori_.
(b) Much of our knowledge of all kinds has _not_ passed through the
three states, and more particularly, as M. Comte is careful to point
out, not through the first, (c) The positive state has more or less
co-existed with the theological, from the dawn of human intelligence.
And, by way of completing the series of contradictions, the assertion
that the three states are "essentially different and even radically
opposed," is met a little lower on the same page by the declaration that
"the metaphysical state is, at bottom, nothing but a simple general
modification of the first;" while, in the fortieth Leçon, as also in the
interesting early essay entitled "Considérations philosophiques sur les
Sciences et les Savants (1825)," the three states are practically
reduced to two. "Le véritable esprit général de toute philosophie
théologique ou métaphysique consiste à prendre pour principe, dans
l'explication des phénomènes du monde extérieur, notre sentiment
immédiat des phénomènes humains; tandis que au contraire, la philosophie
positive est toujours caractérisée, non moins profondément, par la
subordination nécessaire et rationnelle de la conception de l'homme à
celle du monde."[21]
I leave M. Cointe's disciples to settle which of these contradictory
statements expresses their master's real meaning. All I beg leave to
remark is, that men of science are not in the habit of paying much
attention to "laws" stated in this fashion.