with fact than the first; but I cannot think it is a just or adequate
account of the growth of intelligence, either in the individual man, or
in the human species. Any one who will carefully watch the development
of the intellect of a child will perceive that, from the first, its mind
is mirroring nature in two different ways. On the one hand, it is merely
drinking in sensations and building up associations, while it forms
conceptions of things and their relations which are more thoroughly
"positive," or devoid of entanglement with hypotheses of any kind, than
they will ever be in after-life. No child has recourse to imaginary
personifications in order to account for the ordinary properties of
objects which are not alive, or do not represent living things. It does
not imagine that the taste of sugar is brought about by a god of
sweetness, or that a spirit of jumping causes a ball to bound. Such
phænomena, which form the basis of a very large part of its ideas, are
taken as matters of course--as ultimate facts which suggest no
difficulty and need no explanation. So far as all these common, though
important, phænomena are concerned, the child's mind is in what M. Comte
would call the "positive" state.
But, side by side with this mental condition, there rises another. The
child becomes aware of itself as a source of action and a subject of
passion and of thought. The acts which follow upon its own desires are
among the most interesting and prominent of surrounding occurrences; and
these acts, again, plainly arise either out of affections caused by
surrounding things, or of other changes in itself. Among these
surrounding things, the most interesting and important are mother and
father, brethren and nurses. The hypothesis that these wonderful
creatures are of like nature to itself is speedily forced upon the
child's mind; and this primitive piece of anthropomorphism turns out to
be a highly successful speculation, which finds its justification at
every turn. No wonder, then, that it is extended to other similarly
interesting objects which are not too unlike these--to the dog, the cat,
and the canary, the doll, the toy, and the picture-book--that these are
endowed with wills and affections, and with capacities for being "good"
and "naughty." But surely it would be a mere perversion of language to
call this a "theological" state of mind, either in the proper sense of
the word "theological," or as contrasted with "scientific" or
"positive." The child does not worship either father or mother, dog or
doll. On the contrary, nothing is more curious than the absolute
irreverence, if I may so say, of a kindly-treated young child; its
tendency to believe in itself as the centre of the universe, and its
disposition to exercise despotic tyranny over those who could crush it
with a finger.
Still less is there anything unscientific, or anti-scientific, in this
infantile anthropomorphism. The child observes that many phænomena are
the consequences of affections of itself; it soon has excellent reasons
for the belief that many other phænomena are consequences of the
affections of other beings, more or less like itself. And having thus
good evidence for believing that many of the most interesting
occurrences about it are explicable on the hypothesis that they are the
work of intelligences like itself--having discovered a _vera causa_ for
many phænomena--why should the child limit the application of so
fruitful an hypothesis? The dog has a sort of intelligence, so has the
cat; why should not the doll and the picture-book also have a share,
proportioned to their likeness to intelligent things?
The only limit which does arise is exactly that which, as a matter of
science, should arise; that is to say, the anthropomorphic
interpretation is applied only to those phænomena which, in their
general nature, or their apparent capriciousness, resemble those which
the child observes to be caused by itself, or by beings like itself. All
the rest are regarded as things which explain themselves, or are
inexplicable.
It is only at a later stage of intellectual development that the
intelligence of man awakes to the apparent conflict between the
anthropomorphic, and what I may call the physical,[22] aspect of
nature, and either endeavours to extend the anthropomorphic view over
the whole of nature--which is the tendency of theology; or to give the
same exclusive predominance to the physical view--which is the tendency
of science; or adopts a middle course, and taking from the
anthropomorphic view its tendency to personify, and from the physical
view its tendency to exclude volition and affection, ends in what M.
Comte calls the "metaphysical" state--"metaphysical," in M. Comte's
writings, being a general term of abuse for anything he does not like.
What is true of the individual is, _mutatis mutandis_, true of the
intellectual development of the species. It is absurd to say of men in a
state of primitive savagery, that all their conceptions are in a
theological state. Nine-tenths of them are eminently realistic, and as
"positive" as ignorance and narrowness can make them. It no more occurs
to a savage than it does to a child, to ask the why of the daily and
ordinary occurrences which form the greater part of his mental life. But
in regard to the more striking, or out-of-the-way, events, which force
him to speculate, he is highly anthropomorphic; and, as compared with a
child, his anthropomorphism is complicated by the intense impression
which the death of his own kind makes upon him, as indeed it well may.
The warrior, full of ferocious energy, perhaps the despotic chief of
his tribe, is suddenly struck down. A child may insult the man a moment
before so awful; a fly rests, undisturbed, on the lips from which
undisputed command issued. And yet the bodily aspect of the man seems
hardly more altered than when he slept, and, sleeping, seemed to himself
to leave his body and wander through dreamland. What then if that
something, which is the essence of the man, has really been made to
wander by the violence done to it, and is unable, or has forgotten, to
come back to its shell? Will it not retain somewhat of the powers it
possessed during life? May it not help us if it be pleased, or (as seems
to be by far the more general impression) hurt us if it be angered? Will
it not be well to do towards it those things which would have soothed
the man and put him in good humour during his life? It is impossible to
study trustworthy accounts of savage thought without seeing, that some
such train of ideas as this, lies at the bottom of their speculative
beliefs.
There are savages without God, in any proper sense of the word, but none
without ghosts. And the Fetishism, Ancestor-worship, Hero-worship, and
Demonology of primitive savages, are all, I believe, different manners
of expression of their belief in ghosts, and of the anthropomorphic
interpretation of out-of-the-way events, which is its concomitant.
Witchcraft and sorcery are the practical expressions of these beliefs;
and they stand in the same relation to religious worship as the simple
anthropomorphism of children, or savages, does to theology.
In the progress of the species from savagery to advanced civilization,
anthropomorphism grows into theology, while physicism (if I may so call
it) develops into science; but the development of the two is
contemporaneous, not successive. For each, there long exists an assured
province which is not invaded by the other; while, between the two, lies
a debateable land, ruled by a sort of bastards, who owe their complexion
to physicism and their substance to anthropomorphism, and are M. Comte's
particular aversions--metaphysical entities.
But, as the ages lengthen, the borders of Physicism increase. The
territories of the bastards are all annexed to science; and even
Theology, in her purer forms, has ceased to be anthropomorphic, however
she may talk. Anthropomorphism has taken stand in its last fortress--man
himself. But science closely invests the walls; and Philosophers gird
themselves for battle upon the last and greatest of all speculative
problems--Does human nature possess any free, volitional, or truly
anthropomorphic element, or is it only the cunningest of all Nature's
clocks? Some, among whom I count myself, think that the battle will for
ever remain a drawn one, and that, for all practical purposes, this
result is as good as anthropomorphism winning the day.
The classification of the sciences, which, in the eyes of M. Comte's
adherents, constitutes his second great claim to the dignity of a
scientific philosopher, appears to me to be open to just the same
objections as the law of the three states. It is inconsistent in itself,
and it is inconsistent with fact. Let us consider the main points of
this classification successively:--
"Il faut distinguer par rapport à tous les ordres des phénomènes,
deux genres de sciences naturelles; les unes abstraites,
générales, ont pour objet la découverte des lois qui régissent les
diverses classes de phénomènes, en considérant tous les cas qu'on
peut concevoir; les autres concrètes, particulières, descriptives,
et qu'on désigne quelquefois sous le nom des sciences naturelles
proprement dites, consistent dans l'application de ces lois à
l'histoire effective des différents êtres existants."[23]
The "abstract" sciences are subsequently said to be mathematics,
astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, and social physics--the
titles of the two latter being subsequently changed to biology and
sociology. M. Comte exemplifies the distinction between his abstract and
his concrete sciences as follows:--
"On pourra d'abord l'apercevoir très-nettement en comparant, d'une
part, la physiologie générale, et d'une autre part la zoologie et
la botanique proprement dites. Ce sont évidemment, en effet, deux
travaux d'un caractère fort distinct, que d'étudier, en général,
les lois de la vie, ou de déterminer le mode d'existence de chaque
corps vivant, en particulier. _Cette seconde étude, en outre, est
nécessairememt fondée sur la première._"--P. 57.
All the unreality and mere bookishness of M. Comte's knowledge of
physical science comes out in the passage I have italicised. "The
special study of living beings is based upon a general study of the laws
of life!" What little I know about the matter leads me to think, that,
if M. Comte had possessed the slightest practical acquaintance with
biological science, he would have turned his phraseology upside down,
and have perceived that we can have no knowledge of the general laws of
life, except that which is based upon the study of particular living
beings.
The illustration is surely unluckily chosen; but the language in which
these so-called abstract sciences are defined seems to me to be still
more open to criticism. With what propriety can astronomy, or physics,
or chemistry, or biology, be said to occupy themselves with the
consideration of "all conceivable cases" which fall within their
respective provinces? Does the astronomer occupy himself with any other
system of the universe than that which is visible to him? Does he
speculate upon the possible movements of bodies which may attract one
another in the inverse proportion of the cube of their distances, say?
Does biology, whether "abstract" or "concrete," occupy itself with any
other form of life than those which exist, or have existed? And, if the
abstract sciences embrace all conceivable cases of the operation of the
laws with which they are concerned, would not they, necessarily, embrace
the subjects of the concrete sciences, which, inasmuch as they exist,
must needs be conceivable? In fact, no such distinction as that which M.
Comte draws is tenable. The first stage of his classification breaks by
its own weight.
But granting M. Comte his six abstract sciences, he proceeds to arrange
them according to what he calls their natural order or hierarchy, their
places in this hierarchy being determined by the degree of generality
and simplicity of the conceptions with which they deal. Mathematics
occupies the first, astronomy the second, physics the third, chemistry
the fourth, biology the fifth, and sociology the sixth and last place in
the series. M. Comte's arguments in favour of this classification are
first--
"Sa conformité essentielle avec la co-ordination, en quelque sorte
spontanée, qui se trouve en effet implicitement admise par les
savants livrés à l'étude des diverse branches de la philosophie
naturelle."
But I absolutely deny the existence of this conformity. If there is one
thing clear about the progress of modern science, it is the tendency to
reduce all scientific problems, except those which are purely
mathematical, to questions of molecular physics--that is to, say, to the
attractions, repulsions, motions, and co-ordination of the ultimate
particles of matter. Social phænomena are the result of the interaction
of the components of society, or men, with one another and the
surrounding universe. But, in the language of physical science, which,
by the nature of the case, is materialistic, the actions of men, so far
as they are recognisable by science, are the results of molecular
changes in the matter of which they are composed; and, in the long run,
these must come into the hands of the physicist. _A fortiori_, the
phænomena of biology and of chemistry are, in their ultimate analysis,
questions of molecular physics. Indeed, the fact is acknowledged by all
chemists and biologists who look beyond their immediate occupations. And
it is to be observed, that the phænomena of biology are as directly and
immediately connected with molecular physics as are those of chemistry.
Molar physics, chemistry, and biology are not three successive steps in
the ladder of knowledge, as M. Comte would have us believe, but three
branches springing from the common stem of molecular physics.
As to astronomy, I am at a loss to understand how any one who will give
a moment's attention to the nature of the science can fail to see that
it consists of two parts: first, of a description of the phænomena,
which is as much entitled as descriptive zoology, or botany, is, to the
name of natural history; and, secondly, of an explanation of the
phænomena, furnished by the laws of a force--gravitation--the study of
which is as much a part of physics, as is that of heat, or electricity.
It would be just as reasonable to make the study of the heat of the sun
a science preliminary to the rest of thermotics, as to place the study
of the attraction of the bodies, which compose the universe in general,
before that of the particular terrestrial bodies, which alone we can
experimentally know. Astronomy, in fact, owes its perfection to the
circumstance that it is the only branch of natural history, the
phænomena of which are largely expressible by mathematical conceptions,
and which can be, to a great extent, explained by the application of
very simple physical laws.
With regard to mathematics, it is to be observed, in the first place,
that M. Comte mixes up under that head the pure relations of space and
of quantity, which are properly included under the name, with rational
mechanics and statics, which are mathematical developments of the most
general conceptions of physics, namely, the notions of force and of
motion. Relegating these to their proper place in physics, we have left
pure mathematics, which can stand neither at the head, nor at the tail,
of any hierarchy of the sciences, since, like logic, it is equally
related to all; though the enormous practical difficulty of applying
mathematics to the more complex phænomena of nature removes them, for
the present, out of its sphere.
On this subject of mathematics, again, M. Comte indulges in assertions
which can only be accounted for by his total ignorance of physical
science practically. As for example:--
"C'est donc par l'étude des mathématiques, _et seulement par elle_,
que l'on peut se faire une idée juste et approfondie de ce que
c'est qu'une _science_. C'est là _uniquement_ qu'on doit chercher à
connaître avec précision _la méthode générale que l'esprit humain
emploie constamment dans toutes ses recherches positives_, parce
que nulle part ailleurs les questions ne sont résolues d'une
manière aussi complète et les déductions prolongées aussi loin avec
une sévérité rigoureuse. C'est là également que notre entendement a
donné les plus grandes preuves de sa force, parce que les ideés
qu'il y considère sont du plus haut degré d'abstraction possible
dans l'ordre positif. _Toute éducation scientifique qui ne commence
point par une telle étude pèche donc nécessairement par sa
base._"[24]
That is to say, the only study which can confer "a just and
comprehensive idea of what is meant by science," and, at the same time,
furnish an exact conception of the general method of scientific
investigation, is that which knows nothing of observation, nothing of
experiment, nothing of induction, nothing of causation! And education,
the whole secret of which consists in proceeding from the easy to the
difficult, the concrete to the abstract, ought to be turned the other
way, and pass from the abstract to the concrete.
M. Comte puts a second argument in favour of his hierarchy of the
sciences thus:--
"Un second caractère très-essentiel de notre classification, c'est
d'être nécessairement conforme à l'ordre effectif du développement
de la philosophie naturelle. C'est ce que vérifie tout ce qu'on
sait de l'histoire des sciences."[25]
But Mr. Spencer has so thoroughly and completely demonstrated the
absence of any correspondence between the historical development of the
sciences, and their position in the Comtean hierarchy, in his essay on
the "Genesis of Science," that I shall not waste time in repeating his
refutation.
A third proposition in support of the Comtean classification of the
sciences stands as follows:--
"En troisième lieu cette classification présente la propriété
très-remarquable de marquer exactement la perfection relative des
différentes sciences, laquelle consiste essentiellement dans le
degré de précision des connaissances et dans leur co-ordination
plus ou moins intime."[26]
I am quite unable to understand the distinction which M. Comte
endeavours to draw in this passage in spite of his amplifications
further on. Every science must consist of precise knowledge, and that
knowledge must be co-ordinated into general proportions, or it is not
science. When M. Comte, in exemplification of the statement I have
cited, says that "les phénomènes organiques ne comportent qu'une étude à
la fois moins exacte et moins systématique que les phénomènes des corps
bruts," I am at a loss to comprehend what he means. If I affirm that
"when a motor nerve is irritated, the muscle connected with it becomes
simultaneously shorter and thicker, without changing its volume," it
appears to me that the statement is as precise or exact (and not merely
as true) as that of the physicist who should say, that "when a piece of
iron is heated, it becomes simultaneously longer and thicker and
increases in volume;" nor can I discover any difference, in point of
precision, between the statement of the morphological law that "animals
which suckle their young have two occipital condyles," and the
enunciation of the physical law that "water subjected to electrolysis
is replaced by an equal weight of the gases, oxygen and hydrogen." As
for anatomical or physiological investigation being less "systematic"
than that of the physicist or chemist, the assertion is simply
unaccountable. The methods of physical science are everywhere the same
in principle, and the physiological investigator who was not
"systematic" would, on the whole, break down rather sooner than the
inquirer into simpler subjects.
Thus M. Comte's classification of the sciences, under all its aspects,
appears to me to be a complete failure. It is impossible, in an article
which is already too long, to inquire how it may be replaced by a
better; and it is the less necessary to do so, as a second edition of
Mr. Spencer's remarkable essay on this subject has just been published.
After wading through pages of the long-winded confusion and second-hand
information of the "Philosophic Positive," at the risk of a _crise
cérébrale_--it is as good as a shower-bath to turn to the
"Classification of the Sciences," and refresh oneself with Mr. Spencer's
profound thought, precise knowledge, and clear language.
II. The second proposition to which I have committed myself, in the
paper to which I have been obliged to refer so often, is, that the
"Positive Philosophy" contains "a great deal which is as thoroughly
antagonistic to the very essence of science as is anything in
ultramontane Catholicism."
What I refer to in these words, is, on the one hand, the dogmatism and
narrowness which so often mark M. Comte's discussion of doctrines which
he does not like, and reduce his expressions of opinion to mere
passionate puerilities; as, for example, when he is arguing against the
assumption of an ether, or when he is talking (I cannot call it arguing)
against psychology, or political economy. On the other hand, I allude to
the spirit of meddling systematization and regulation which animates
even the "Philosophic Positive," and breaks out, in the latter volumes
of that work, into no uncertain foreshadowing of the anti-scientific
monstrosities of Comte's later writings.
Those who try to draw a line of demarcation between the spirit of the
"Philosophic Positive," and that of the "Politique" and its successors,
(if I may express an opinion from fragmentary knowledge of these last,)
must have overlooked, or forgotten, what Comte himself labours to show,
and indeed succeeds in proving, in the "Appendice Général" of the
"Politique Positive." "Dès mon début," he writes, "je tentai de fonder
le nouveau pouvoir spirituel que j'institue aujourd'hui." "Ma politique,
loin d'être aucunement opposée à ma philosophie, en constitue tellement
la suite naturelle que celle-ci fut directement instituée pour servir de
base à celle-là, comme le prouve cet appendice."[27]
This is quite true. In the remarkable essay entitled "Considérations sur
le Pouvoir spirituel," published in March 1826, Comte advocates the
establishment of a "modern spiritual power," which, he anticipates, may
exercise an even greater influence over temporal affairs, than did the
Catholic clergy, at the height of their vigour and independence, in the
twelfth century. This spiritual power is, in fact, to govern opinion,
and to have the supreme control over education, in each nation of the
West; and the spiritual powers of the several European peoples are to be
associated together and placed under a common direction or "souveraineté
spirituelle."
A system of "Catholicism _minus_ Christianity" was therefore completely
organized in Comte's mind, four years before the first volume of the
"Philosophie Positive" was written; and, naturally, the papal spirit
shows itself in that work, not only in the ways I have already
mentioned, but, notably, in the attack on liberty of conscience which
breaks out in the fourth volume:--
"Il n'y a point de liberté de conscience en astronomie, en
physique, en chimie, en physiologie même, en ce sens que chacun
trouverait absurde de ne pas croire de confiance aux principes
établis dans les sciences par les hommes compétents."
"Nothing in ultramontane Catholicism" can, in my judgment, be more
completely sacerdotal, more entirely anti-scientific, than this dictum.
All the great steps in the advancement of science have been made by just
those men who have not hesitated to doubt the "principles established in
the sciences by competent persons;" and the great teaching of
science--the great use of it as an instrument of mental discipline--is
its constant inculcation of the maxim, that the sole ground on which any
statement has a right to be believed is the impossibility of refuting
it.