Whether the Will Is Properly the Subject of Penance?
Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of penance is not
properly the will. For penance is a species of sorrow. But sorrow is
in the concupiscible part, even as joy is. Therefore penance is in
the concupiscible faculty.
Obj. 2: Further, penance is a kind of vengeance, as Augustine states
in _De Poenitentia_ [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of
which is unknown]. But vengeance seems to regard the irascible
faculty, since anger is the desire for vengeance. Therefore it seems
that penance is in the irascible part.
Obj. 3: Further, the past is the proper object of the memory,
according to the Philosopher (De Memoria i). Now penance regards the
past, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2, ad 3). Therefore penance is
subjected in the memory.
Obj. 4: Further, nothing acts where it is not. Now penance removes
sin from all the powers of the soul. Therefore penance is in every
power of the soul, and not only in the will.
_On the contrary,_ Penance is a kind of sacrifice, according to Ps.
50:19: "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit." But to offer a
sacrifice is an act of the will, according to Ps. 53:8: "I will
freely sacrifice to Thee." Therefore penance is in the will.
_I answer that,_ We can speak of penance in two ways: first, in so
far as it is a passion, and thus, since it is a kind of sorrow, it is
in the concupiscible part as its subject; secondly, in so far as it
is a virtue, and thus, as stated above (A. 3), it is a species of
justice. Now justice, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 56, A.
6), is subjected in the rational appetite which is the will.
Therefore it is evident that penance, in so far as it is a virtue, is
subjected in the will, and its proper act is the purpose of amending
what was committed against God.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers penance as a passion.
Reply Obj. 2: To desire vengeance on another, through passion,
belongs to the irascible appetite, but to desire or take vengeance on
oneself or on another, through reason, belongs to the will.
Reply Obj. 3: The memory is a power that apprehends the past. But
penance belongs not to the apprehensive but to the appetitive power,
which presupposes an act of the apprehension. Wherefore penance is
not in the memory, but presupposes it.
Reply Obj. 4: The will, as stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9,
A. 1), moves all the other powers of the soul; so that it is not
unreasonable for penance to be subjected in the will, and to produce
an effect in each power of the soul.
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