Whether There Was Free-will in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no free-will. For
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that _gnome_, i.e. opinion,
thinking or cogitation, and _proairesis_, i.e. choice, "cannot
possibly be attributed to our Lord, if we wish to speak with
propriety." But in the things of faith especially we must speak with
propriety. Therefore there was no choice in Christ and consequently
no free-will, of which choice is the act.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is
"a desire of something after taking counsel." Now counsel does not
appear to be in Christ, because we do not take counsel concerning
such things as we are certain of. But Christ was certain of
everything. Hence there was no counsel and consequently no free-will
in Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, free-will is indifferent. But Christ's will was
determined to good, since He could not sin; as stated above (Q. 15,
AA. 1, 2). Hence there was no free-will in Christ.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 7:15): "He shall eat butter
and honey, that He may know to refuse the evil and to choose the
good," which is an act of the free-will. Therefore there was
free-will in Christ.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 3), there was a twofold act of
the will in Christ; one whereby He was drawn to anything willed in
itself, which implies the nature of an end; the other whereby His
will was drawn to anything willed on account of its being ordained to
another--which pertains to the nature of means. Now, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) choice differs from will in this,
that will of itself regards the end, while choice regards the means.
And thus simple will is the same as the "will as nature"; but choice
is the same as the "will as reason," and is the proper act of
free-will, as was said in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 3). Hence, since
"will as reason" is placed in Christ, we must also place choice, and
consequently free-will, whose act is choice, as was said in the First
Part (Q. 83, A. 3; I-II, Q. 13, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 1: Damascene excludes choice from Christ, in so far as he
considers that doubt is implied in the word choice. Nevertheless
doubt is not necessary to choice, since it belongs even to God
Himself to choose, according to Eph. 1:4: "He chose us in Him before
the foundation of the world," although in God there is no doubt. Yet
doubt is accidental to choice when it is in an ignorant nature. We
may also say the same of whatever else is mentioned in the passage
quoted.
Reply Obj. 2: Choice presupposes counsel; yet it follows counsel only
as determined by judgment. For what we judge to be done, we choose,
after the inquiry of counsel, as is stated (Ethic. iii, 2, 3). Hence
if anything is judged necessary to be done, without any preceding
doubt or inquiry, this suffices for choice. Therefore it is plain
that doubt or inquiry belong to choice not essentially, but only when
it is in an ignorant nature.
Reply Obj. 3: The will of Christ, though determined to good, is not
determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even as
to the blessed, to choose with a free-will confirmed in good.
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