Whether in Christ There Were Two Wills As Regards the Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were two wills as
regards the reason. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that
there is a double will in man, viz. the natural will which is called
_thelesis_, and the rational will which is called _boulesis_. Now
Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of
human nature. Hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, the appetitive power is diversified in man by the
difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the
difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and
intellective appetite in man. But in the same way as regards man's
apprehension, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both of
which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double will in Him, one
intellectual and the other rational.
Obj. 3: Further, some [*Hugh of St. Victor, De Quat. Volunt. Christ.]
ascribe to Christ "a will of piety," which can only be on the part of
reason. Therefore in Christ on the part of reason there are several
wills.
_On the contrary,_ In every order there is one first mover. But the
will is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore in one
man there is only one will, properly speaking, which is the will of
reason. But Christ is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only one
human will.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), the will is sometimes
taken for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if the will is
taken for the act, it is necessary to place two wills, i.e. two
species of acts of the will in Christ on the part of the reason. For
the will, as was said in the I-II, Q. 8, AA. 2, 3, regards both the
end and the means; and is affected differently towards both. For
towards the end it is borne simply and absolutely, as towards what is
good in itself; but towards the means it is borne under a certain
relation, as the goodness of the means depends on something else.
Hence the act of the will, inasmuch as it is drawn to anything
desired of itself, as health, which act is called by Damascene
_thelesis_--i.e. simple will, and by the masters "will as nature," is
different from the act of the will as it is drawn to anything that is
desired only in order to something else, as to take medicine; and
this act of the will Damascene calls _boulesis_--i.e. counseling
will, and the masters, "will as reason." But this diversity of acts
does not diversify the power, since both acts regard the one common
ratio of the object, which is goodness. Hence we must say that if we
are speaking of the power of the will, in Christ there is but one
human will, essentially so called and not by participation; but if we
are speaking of the will as an act, we thus distinguish in Christ a
will as nature, which is called _thelesis_, and a will as reason,
which is called _boulesis_.
Reply Obj. 1: These two wills do not diversify the power but only the
act, as we have said.
Reply Obj. 2: The intellect and the reason are not distinct powers,
as was said in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 8).
Reply Obj. 3: The "will of piety" would not seem to be distinct from
the will considered as nature, inasmuch as it shrinks from another's
evil, absolutely considered.
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