urged a 10-10-7 ratio as more in accord with existing strength. The
American proposal included the scrapping of the _Mutsu_, the pride of
the Japanese navy, which had been launched but not quite completed.
The sacrifices voluntarily proposed by the United States for its navy
were much greater than those which England or Japan were called upon to
make, and in this lay the strength of the American position. The
Japanese refused, however, to give up the _Mutsu_, and they were
finally permitted to retain it, but in order to preserve the 5-5-3
ratio, it was necessary to increase the tonnage allowance of the United
States and Great Britain. In the treaty as finally agreed upon, Japan
was allowed 315,000 tons of capital ships and the United States and
Great Britain each 525,000 tons.
In his address at the opening session, Secretary Hughes said: "In view
of the extraordinary conditions due to the World War affecting the
existing strength of the navies of France and Italy, it is not thought
to be necessary to discuss at this stage of the proceedings the tonnage
allowance of these nations, but the United States proposes that this
subject be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference."
This somewhat blunt, matter-of-fact way of stating the case gave
unexpected offense to the French delegation. During the next four or
five weeks, while Great Britain, the United States, and Japan were
discussing the case of the _Mutsu_ and the question of fortifications
in the Pacific, the French delegates were cherishing their resentment
at being treated as the representatives of a second-class power.
Hughes's failure to regard the susceptibilities of a great nation like
France undoubtedly had a good deal to do with the upsetting of that
part of the naval program relating to subsidiary craft and submarines.
When, after the agreement on the 5-5-3 ratio, the question of the
allowance of capital ship tonnage for France and Italy was taken up in
committee, the other powers were wholly unprepared for France's demand
of 350,000 tons of capital ships. According to Hughes's figures based
on existing strength, she was entitled to 175,000 tons. It is not
probable that the French delegates intended to insist on such a large
tonnage. It is more likely that they put forth this proposal in the
committee in order to give the other delegates to understand that
France could not be ignored or dictated to with impunity and in order
to pave the way for their submarine proposal. Unfortunately the French
demands were given to the press through some misunderstanding and
caused an outburst of criticism in the British and American papers. In
the committee the relations between the British and French delegates
became very bitter over the refusal of the latter to abandon the
submarine, or even agree to a moderate proposal as to submarine
tonnage. On December 16 Secretary Hughes cabled an appeal, over the
heads of the French delegation, to Briand, who had returned to Paris.
As a result, the French finally agreed to accept the 1.75 ratio for
capital ships, but refused to place any reasonable limits upon
cruisers, destroyers, submarines, or aircraft. Italy accepted the same
ratio as France.
Thus an important part of the Hughes program failed. As a result, the
treaty leaves the contracting parties free to direct their energies, if
they so desire, to the comparatively new fields of submarine and aerial
warfare. As is well known, many eminent naval authorities, such as Sir
Percy Scott in England and Admiral Sims in this country, believe that
the capital ship is an obsolete type, and that the warfare of the
future will be carried on by submarines, aircraft, and lighter surface
ships. The unfortunate feature of the situation created by the naval
treaty is, therefore, that those who regard the capital ship as
obsolete will now have an opportunity to bring forward and press their
submarine and aircraft programs. There is no limitation upon the
building of cruisers, provided they do not exceed 10,000 tons
displacement or carry guns with a calibre exceeding eight inches.
By Article 19 of the naval treaty the United States, Great Britain, and
Japan agreed to maintain the _status quo_ as regards fortifications and
naval bases in the islands of the Pacific with certain exceptions,
notably the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, and New Zealand. This
agreement relieves Japan of all fear of attack from us, and let us hope
that it may prove as beneficent and as enduring as the agreement of
1817 between the United States and Great Britain for disarmament on the
Great Lakes.
The 5-5-3 ratio puts the navies of Great Britain, the United States,
and Japan, for the present at least, on a strictly defensive basis.
Each navy is strong enough to defend its home territory, but no one of
them will be able to attack the home territory of the others. Of
course it is possible that the development of aircraft and submarines,
together with cruisers and other surface craft, may eventually alter
the situation. Hitherto navies have existed for two purposes: national
defense and the enforcement of foreign policies. The new treaty means
that as long as it lasts the navies of the ratifying powers can be used
for defense only and not for the enforcement of their policies in
distant quarters of the globe. In other words, when disputes arise,
British policies will prevail in the British area, American policies in
the American area, and Japanese policies in the Japanese area. Having
agreed to place ourselves in a position in which we cannot attack
Japan, the only pressure we can bring to bear upon her in China or
elsewhere is moral pressure. Through what was considered by some a
grave strategical error, the naval treaty was completed before any
settlement of the Chinese and Siberian questions had been reached.
The French insistence on the practically unlimited right to build
submarines caused much hard feeling in England. The British delegates
had proposed the total abolition of submarines, and this proposal had
been ably supported by the arguments of Mr. Balfour and Lord Lee.
Unfortunately the United States delegation stood for the submarine,
proposing merely certain limits upon its use. The five naval powers
finally signed a treaty reaffirming the old rules of international law
in regard to the search and seizure of merchant vessels, and declaring
that "any person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of
those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a
governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war
and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy
and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of
any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found." By the
same treaty the signatory powers solemnly bound themselves to prohibit
the use in war of poisonous gases.
The attempt to limit by treaty the use of the submarine and to prohibit
altogether the use of gases appears to many to be utterly futile.
After the experience of the late war, no nation would readily trust the
good faith of another in these matters. Each party to a war would
probably feel justified in being prepared to use the submarine and
poison gases, contrary to law, in case the other party should do so.
We would thus have the same old dispute as in the late war in regard to
floating mines as to which party first resorted to the outlawed
practice. What is the use in solemnly declaring that a submarine shall
not attack a merchant vessel, and that the commander of a submarine who
violates this law shall be treated as a pirate, when the contracting
parties found it utterly impossible to agree among themselves upon a
definition of a merchant vessel?
But the reader may ask, what is the use in signing any treaty if
nations are so devoid of good faith? The answer is that the vast
majority of treaties are faithfully kept in time of peace, but that
very few treaties are fully observed in time of war. Had these five
powers signed a treaty pledging themselves not to build or maintain
submarines of any kind or description, we would have every reason to
expect them to live up to it. But when a nation is engaged in war and
has a large flotilla of submarines which it has agreed to use only for
certain purposes, there is apt to come a time when the temptation to
use them for wholly different purposes will be overwhelming.
The Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions held its first
meeting November 16. This committee was primarily concerned with the
very delicate situation created by the aggressive action and expansion
of Japan during the past twenty years. In 1905, by the Treaty of
Portsmouth, Japan succeeded to the Russian rights in southern
Manchuria; in 1910 she annexed Korea; in 1911, during the Chinese
Revolution, she stationed troops at Hankow and later constructed
permanent barracks; in 1914, after the defeat of the Germans at
Kiao-chau, she took over all the German interests in the Shantung
peninsula; in 1915 she presented the Twenty-one Demands to China and
coerced that power into granting most of them; and in 1918, in
conjunction with the United States, Great Britain, and France, she
landed a military force in the Maritime Province of Siberia for the
definite purpose of rescuing the Czecho-Slovak troops who had made
their way to that province and of guarding the military stores at
Vladivostok. The other powers had all withdrawn their contingents, but
Japan had increased her force from one division to more than 70,000
troops. The eastern coast of Asia was thus in the firm grip of Japan,
and she had secured concessions from China which seriously impaired the
independence of that country.
It was commonly supposed that the United States delegation had prepared
a program on the Far Eastern question, and that this would be presented
in the same way that Hughes had presented the naval program. If this
was the intention there was a sudden change of plan, for between one
and two o'clock at night the Chinese delegates were aroused from their
slumbers and informed that there would be an opportunity for them to
present China's case before the committee at eleven o'clock that
morning. They at once went to work with their advisers, and a few
minutes before the appointed hour they completed the drafting of the
Ten Points, which Minister Sze read before the committee. These Points
constituted a Chinese declaration of independence, and set forth a
series of general principles to be applied in the determination of
questions relating to China. Several days later the committee adopted
four resolutions, presented by Mr. Root, covering in part some of the
Chinese principles. By these resolutions the powers agreed to respect
the independence and territorial integrity of China, to give China the
fullest opportunity to develop and maintain an effective and stable
government, to recognize the principle of equality for the commerce and
industry of all nations throughout the territory of China, and to
refrain from taking advantage of present conditions in order to seek
special rights or privileges. This somewhat vague and general
declaration of principles appeared to be all that China was likely to
get. Had Mr. Hughes presented a Far Eastern program and gotten nothing
more than this, it would have been a serious blow to the prestige of
the United States. That is probably why he decided at the last moment
to let China present her own case.
At the fourth plenary session of the Conference the treaty relating to
the Pacific islands, generally known as the Four-Power Treaty, was
presented by Senator Lodge. By the terms of this treaty, the United
States, Great Britain, France, and Japan agreed "to respect their
rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions
in the region of the Pacific Ocean," and in case of any dispute arising
out of any Pacific question to refer the matter to a joint conference
for consideration and adjustment. This article appeared harmless
enough, but Article 2 seemed to lay the foundations of an alliance
between these powers. It was as follows: "If the said rights are
threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High
Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and
frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient
measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of
the particular situation." This treaty is to remain in force for ten
years, after which it may be terminated by any of the High Contracting
Parties on twelve months' notice. It supersedes the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance which, it expressly provided, should terminate on the exchange
of ratifications.
In presenting the treaty, Senator Lodge assured his hearers that "no
military or naval sanction lurks anywhere in the background or under
cover of these plain and direct clauses," and Secretary Hughes in
closing the discussion declared that it would probably not be possible
to find in all history "an international document couched in more
simple or even briefer terms," but he added, "we are again reminded
that the great things are the simple ones." In view of these
statements the members of the Conference and the public generally were
completely flabbergasted some days later when Secretary Hughes and the
President gave out contradictory statements as to whether the treaty
included the Japanese homeland. Hughes stated to the correspondents
that it did, the President said it did not. Whereupon some wag
remarked that at Paris President Wilson did not let the American
delegation know what he did, while at Washington the delegates did not
let President Harding know what they were doing. In deference to the
President's views and to criticisms of the treaty in the Japanese press
a supplementary treaty was later signed expressly declaring that the
term "insular possessions and insular dominions" did not include the
Japanese homeland.
Meanwhile the Shantung question was being discussed by China and Japan
outside of the Conference, but with representatives of the British and
American governments sitting as observers ready to use their good
offices if called on. The reason for not bringing the question before
the Conference was that Great Britain, France, and Italy were parties
to the Treaty of Versailles, which gave Japan a legal title to the
German leases in Shantung. The restoration of the province to China
was vital to a satisfactory adjustment of Chinese affairs generally.
Japan, however, was in no hurry to reach an agreement with China,
wishing for strategical purposes to keep the matter in suspense to the
last, if not to avoid a settlement until after the adjournment of the
Conference and continue negotiations under more favorable conditions at
Peking or Tokio.
By Christmas it seemed that the Conference had accomplished about all
that was possible, and that it would adjourn as soon as the agreements
already reached could be put into treaty form and signed. At the end
of the first week in January it looked as if the Chinese and Japanese
had reached a deadlock, and that the Conference would adjourn without a
satisfactory adjustment of any of the Chinese problems. Mr. Balfour
and other important delegates had engaged return passage, and all
indications pointed to an early dissolution of the Conference. But the
unexpected happened. At an informal gathering of Administration
leaders at the White House on Saturday night, January 7, stock was
taken of the work of the Conference, and some of the senators present
expressed the opinion that if it adjourned without doing more for
China, there would be little hope of getting the treaties ratified. As
a result Secretary Hughes persuaded the British and Japanese delegates
to cancel their sailings, and with characteristic energy and
determination took personal charge of the Far Eastern situation, which
up to this time had been left mainly to Mr. Root. After a little
pressure had been brought to bear on the Chinese by President Harding,
and probably on the Japanese by Mr. Balfour, Secretary Hughes was
finally able to announce at the plenary session of February 1 that
China and Japan had reached an agreement as to the terms on which
Shantung was to be restored. At the same session the agreements in
regard to China reached by the Committee on Far Eastern Affairs were
announced. These agreements were finally embodied in two treaties, one
dealing with the tariff and the other with the open door, and a series
of ten resolutions.
Since the middle of the last century Chinese tariffs have been
regulated by treaties with foreign powers, the customs service
organized and administered by foreigners, and the receipts mortgaged to
meet the interest on foreign loans. China has never been permitted to
levy duties in excess of 5 per cent., and, in fact, as a result of the
methods of valuation the duties have not averaged above 3 1/2 per cent.
This has been an unjust state of affairs, and has deprived the Chinese
Government of what would naturally be one of its main sources of
revenue. By the new agreement there is to be an immediate revision of
tariff valuations so as to make the 5 per cent. effective. China is
also to be allowed to levy a surtax on certain articles, mainly
luxuries, which will yield an additional revenue. It is estimated that
the total annual increase in revenue derived from maritime customs will
be about $150,000,000 silver. It is claimed by some, with a certain
degree of truth, that any increase in Chinese customs duties will be
immediately covered by liens to secure new loans, and that putting
money into the Chinese treasury just now is like pouring it into a rat
hole. As soon as China is able to establish a stable and honest
government, she should, without question, be relieved of all treaty
restrictions on her tariffs.
The Conference also took certain steps to restore to China other
sovereign rights long impaired by the encroachments of foreign powers.
A commission is to be appointed to investigate the administration of
justice with a view to the ultimate extinction of extraterritorial
rights now enjoyed by foreigners. The powers also agreed to abandon
not later than January 1, 1923, their existing postal agencies in
China, provided an efficient Chinese postal service be maintained. The
system of foreign post offices in China has been the subject of great
abuses, as through these agencies goods of various kinds, including
opium and other drugs, have been smuggled into China. The powers
further made a general promise to aid the Chinese Government in the
unification of railways into a general system under Chinese control.
They also agreed to restore to China all radio stations other than
those regulated by treaty or maintained by foreign governments within
their legation limits.
In the treaty relating to the open door, the Contracting Powers other
than China pledged themselves to the following principles:
"(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial
and administrative integrity of China;
"(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China
to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
"(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing
and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and
industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
"(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order
to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of
subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action
inimical to the security of such States."
China on her part accepted fully the principle of the open door, and
pledged herself for the first time to respect it. Pledges to respect
the open door in China have been made by foreign powers upon various
occasions in the past and broken as often as made. The expression
"equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations" is not
new. It occurs in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, in the
Root-Takahira agreement of 1908, and in numerous other documents. In
recent years, however, the United States has been the only power which
has tried to preserve the open door in China. Most of the other powers
have regarded the Chinese situation as hopeless, and have believed that
the only solution was to let foreign powers come in and divide and rule
the territory of the empire. In view of the new treaty the open door
is no longer merely an American policy, but an international policy,
and responsibility for its enforcement rests not on the United States
alone but on all nine parties to the treaty.
The agenda or program of the Conference offered as one of the subjects
to be considered the status of existing commitments in China. When
Secretary Hughes brought this subject up before the Far Eastern
Committee, Japan entered an emphatic objection to its consideration,
and the matter was dropped immediately without argument. The treaty,
therefore, is not retroactive, for it recognizes the status quo in
Manchuria and to a less extent in other parts of China. The saving
clause of the new agreement is, however, a resolution providing for the
establishment of an international board of reference, to which
questions arising in regard to the open door may be referred.
Will Japan respect the pledges she has made and live up to the spirit
of her promises? If she does, the Washington Conference will prove to
be a great success. If, on the contrary, Japan does not intend to live
up to her pledges or intends to fulfill them only in part, her position
in Asia has been greatly strengthened. She is more firmly intrenched
in Manchuria than ever. She holds the Maritime Province of Siberia
under a promise to get out, which she has repeatedly made and
repeatedly broken, as was plainly stated by Secretary Hughes before the
full Committee on Far Eastern Affairs, and repeated at a plenary
session of the Conference. His statement was one of the most
remarkable, by reason of its directness and unvarnished truth, in the
history of American diplomacy. After reviewing the correspondence
between the two governments and the reiterated assurances of Japan of
her intention to withdraw from Siberia, assurances which so far had not
been carried out, Mr. Hughes expressed his gratification at the renewal
of these assurances before the Conference in plenary session. Unless
Japan is utterly devoid of moral shame, she will have to make good her
word this time.