to the Senate with a number of amendments and reservations. The
Committee declared that the League was an alliance, and that it would
"breed wars instead of securing peace." They also declared that the
Covenant demanded "sacrifices of American independence and sovereignty
which would in no way promote the world's peace," and that the
amendments and reservations which they proposed were intended "to guard
American rights and American sovereignty." The following day the
minority members of the Committee submitted a report opposing both
amendments and reservations. A few days later Senator McCumber
presented a third report representing the views of the "mild
reservationists." It objected to the phraseology of the Committee's
reservations as unnecessarily severe and recommended substitute
reservations. The treaty then became the regular order in the Senate
and was read section by section and debated each day for over two
months. The amendments of the text of the treaty were all rejected by
substantial majorities for the reason that their adoption would have
made it necessary to resubmit the treaty not only to the Allies but
also to Germany. The majority of the senators were opposed to such a
course. The Committee, therefore, decided to substitute reservations
for amendments, and Senator Lodge finally submitted, on behalf of the
Committee, fourteen reservations preceded by a preamble, which declared
that the ratification of the treaty was not to take effect or bind the
United States until these reservations had been accepted as a condition
of ratification by at least three of the four principal Allied and
associated powers, namely, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.
The first reservation provided that in case of withdrawal from the
League the United States should be the sole judge as to whether its
international obligations under the Covenant had been fulfilled. This
reservation was adopted by a vote of 50 to 35.
The second reservation declared that the United States assumed no
obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political
independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies
between nations under the provisions of Article X "or to employ the
military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the
treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress,
which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or
authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United
States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide." This reservation
was adopted by a vote of 46 to 33.
Reservation Number 3, providing that no mandate under the treaty should
be accepted by the United States except by action of Congress, was
adopted by a vote of 52 to 31.
Number 4, excluding domestic questions from consideration by the
Council or the Assembly of the League, was adopted by a vote of 59 to
26.
Number 5, declaring the Monroe Doctrine "to be wholly outside the
jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any
provision contained in said treaty of peace with Germany," and
reserving to the United States the sole right to interpret the Monroe
Doctrine, was adopted by a vote of 55 to 34.
Number 6, withholding the assent of the United States from the
provisions of the treaty relating to Shantung and reserving full
liberty of action with respect to any controversy which might arise
under said articles between China and Japan, was adopted by a vote of
53 to 41.
Number 7, reserving to Congress the right to provide by law for the
appointment of the representatives of the United States in the Assembly
and Council of the League and members of commissions, committees or
courts under the League, and requiring the confirmation of all by the
Senate, was adopted by a vote of 53 to 40.
Number 8, declaring that the Reparations Commission should not be
understood as having the right to regulate or interfere with exports
from the United States to Germany or from Germany to the United States
without an act or joint resolution of Congress, was adopted by a vote
of 54 to 40.
Number 9, declaring that the United States should not be under any
obligation to contribute to any of the expenses of the League without
an act of Congress, was adopted by a vote of 56 to 39.
Number 10, providing that if the United States should at any time adopt
any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of the
League, it reserved "the right to increase such armaments without the
consent of the Council whenever the United States is threatened with
invasion or engaged in war," was adopted by a vote of 56 to 39.
Number 11, reserving the right of the United States to permit the
nationals of a Covenant-breaking State residing within the United
States to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations
with the nationals of the United States, was adopted by a vote of 53 to
41.
Number 12, relating to the very complicated question of private debts,
property rights and interests of American citizens, was adopted by a
vote of 52 to 41.
Number 13, withholding the assent of the United States from the entire
section of the treaty relating to international labor organization
until Congress should decide to participate, was adopted by a vote of
54 to 35.
Number 14 declared that the United States would not be bound by any
action of the Council or Assembly in which any member of the League and
its self-governing dominions or colonies should cast in the aggregate
more than one vote. This reservation was adopted by a vote of 55 to 38.
A number of other reservations were offered and rejected. Under the
rules of the Senate, amendments and reservations to a treaty may be
adopted by a majority vote, while a treaty can be ratified only by a
two-thirds vote. A number of senators who were opposed to the treaty
voted for the Lodge reservations in order to insure its defeat. When
the vote on the treaty with the reservations was taken November 19, it
stood 39 for and 55 against. A motion to reconsider the vote was then
adopted, and Senator Hitchcock, the Democratic leader, proposed five
reservations covering the right of withdrawal, domestic questions, the
Monroe Doctrine, the right of Congress to decide on the employment of
the naval and military forces of the United States in any case arising
under Article X, and restrictions on the voting powers of
self-governing colonies or dominions. These reservations were
rejected, the vote being 41 to 50. Another vote was then taken on the
treaty with the Lodge reservations, the result being 41 for and 51
against. Senator Underwood then offered a resolution to ratify the
treaty without reservations of any kind. The vote on this resolution
was 38 for and 53 against.
It was now evident that there was little prospect of securing the
ratification of the treaty without compromise. On January 8, 1920, a
letter from the President was read at the Jackson Day dinner in
Washington, in which he refused to accept the decision of the Senate as
final and said: "There can be no reasonable objection to
interpretations accompanying the act of ratification itself. But when
the treaty is acted upon, I must know whether it means that we have
ratified or rejected it. We cannot rewrite this treaty. We must take
it without changes which alter its meaning, or leave it, and then,
after the rest of the world has signed it, we must face the unthinkable
task of making another and separate kind of treaty with Germany." In
conclusion he declared: "If there is any doubt as to what the people of
the country think on this vital matter, the clear and single way out is
to submit it for determination at the next election to the voters of
the nation, to give the next election the form of a great and solemn
referendum, a referendum as to the part the United States is to play in
completing the settlements of the war and in the prevention in the
future of such outrages as Germany attempted to perpetrate."
During the last week of January a compromise was discussed by an
informal by-partisan committee, and the President wrote a letter saying
he would accept the Hitchcock reservations, but Lodge refused to accept
any compromise. On February 9 the Senate again referred the treaty to
the Committee on Foreign Relations with instructions to report it back
immediately with the reservations previously adopted. After several
weeks of fruitless debate a fifteenth reservation, expressing sympathy
for Ireland, was added to the others, by a vote of 38 to 36. It was as
follows: "In consenting to the ratification of the treaty with Germany
the United States adheres to the principle of self-determination and to
the resolution of sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people for
a government of their own choice adopted by the Senate June 6, 1919,
and declares that when such government is obtained by Ireland, a
consummation it is hoped is at hand, it should promptly be admitted as
a member of the League of Nations."
With a few changes in the resolutions previously adopted and an
important change in the preamble, the ratifying resolution was finally
put to the vote March 19, 1920. The result was 49 votes for and 35
against. On the following day the secretary of the Senate was
instructed by a formal resolution to return the treaty to the President
and to inform him that the Senate had failed to ratify it.
The treaty thus became the leading issue in the presidential campaign,
but unfortunately it was not the only issue. The election proved to be
a referendum on the Wilson administration as a whole rather than on the
treaty. The Republican candidate, Senator Harding, attacked the Wilson
administration for its arbitrary and unconstitutional methods and
advocated a return to "normalcy." He denounced the Wilson League as an
attempt to set up a super-government, but said he favored an
association of nations and an international court. Governor Cox, the
Democratic candidate, came out strongly for the treaty, particularly
during the latter part of his campaign. The result was an overwhelming
victory for Harding. President Wilson had been too ill to take any
part in the campaign. His administration had been the chief issue, and
the people had, certainly for the time being, repudiated it. He
accepted the result philosophically and refrained from comments,
content, apparently, to leave the part he had played in world affairs
to the verdict of history. In December, 1920, the Nobel Peace Prize
was awarded to him as a foreign recognition of the services he had
rendered to humanity.
XII
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
After the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by the Senate,
President Wilson withdrew as far as possible from participation in
European affairs, and after the election of Harding he let it be known
that he would do nothing to embarrass the incoming administration. The
public had been led to believe that when Harding became President there
would be a complete reversal of our foreign policy all along the line,
but such was not to be the case. The new administration continued
unchanged the Wilson policy toward Mexico and toward Russia, and before
many months had passed was seeking from Congress the authority,
withheld from Wilson, to appoint a member on the Reparations
Commission. On the question of our rights in mandated areas, Secretary
Hughes adopted in whole the arguments which had been advanced by
Secretary Colby in his note to Great Britain of November 20, 1920, in
regard to the oil resources of Mesopotamia. By the San Remo agreement
of April 25, 1920, Great Britain and France had agreed upon a division
of the oil output of Mesopotamia by which France was to be allowed 25
per cent. and Great Britain 75 per cent. The British Government had
intimated that the United States, having declined to join the League of
Nations, had no voice in the matter. On this point Secretary Colby
took sharp issue in the following statement: "Such powers as the Allied
and Associated nations may enjoy or wield, in the determination of the
governmental status of the mandated areas, accrued to them as a direct
result of the war against the Central Powers. The United States, as a
participant in that conflict and as a contributor to its successful
issue, cannot consider any of the Associated Powers, the smallest not
less than herself, debarred from the discussion of any of its
consequences, or from participation in the rights and privileges
secured under the mandates provided for in the treaties of peace."
Japan likewise assumed that we had nothing to do with the disposition
of the former German islands in the Pacific. When the Supreme Council
at Paris decided to give Japan a mandate over the islands north of the
equator, President Wilson reserved for future consideration the final
disposition of the island of Yap, which lies between Guam and the
Philippines, and is one of the most important cable stations in the
Pacific. The entire question of cable communications was reserved for
a special conference which met at Washington in the autumn of 1920, but
this conference adjourned about the middle of December without having
reached any final conclusions, and the status of Yap became the subject
of a very sharp correspondence between the American and Japanese
governments. When Hughes became Secretary of State, he restated the
American position in a note of April 2, 1921, as follows:
"It will not be questioned that the right to dispose of the overseas
possessions of Germany was acquired only through the victory of the
Allied and Associated Powers, and it is also believed that there is no
disposition on the part of the Japanese Government to deny the
participation of the United States in that victory. It would seem to
follow necessarily that the right accruing to the Allied and Associated
Powers through the common victory is shared by the United States and
that there could be no valid or effective disposition of the overseas
possessions of Germany, now under consideration, without the assent of
the United States."
The discussion between the two governments was still in progress when
the Washington Conference convened, and at the close of the Conference
it was announced that an agreement had been reached which would be
embodied in a treaty. The United States recognized Japan's mandate
over the islands north of the equator on the condition that the United
States should have full cable rights on the island of Yap, and that its
citizens should enjoy certain rights of residence on the island. The
agreement also covered radio telegraphic service.
During the presidential campaign Harding's position on the League of
Nations had been so equivocal that the public knew not what to expect,
but when Hughes and Hoover were appointed members of the Cabinet, it
was generally expected that the new administration would go into the
League with reservations. This expectation was not to be fulfilled,
however, for the President persistently ignored the existence of the
League, and took no notice of the establishment of the permanent Court
of International Justice provided for in Article 14 of the Covenant.
Meanwhile Elihu Root, who as Secretary of State had instructed our
delegates to the Hague Conference of 1907 to propose the establishment
of such a court, had been invited by the Council of the League to be
one of a commission of distinguished jurists to draft the statute
establishing the court. This service he performed with conspicuous
ability. As another evidence of Europe's unwillingness to leave us
out, when the court was organized John Bassett Moore, America's most
distinguished authority on international law, was elected one of the
judges.
Meanwhile a technical state of war with Germany existed and American
troops were still on the Rhine. On July 2, 1921, Congress passed a
joint resolution declaring the war at an end, but undertaking to
reserve to the United States "all rights, privileges, indemnities,
reparations or advantages" to which it was entitled under the terms of
the Armistice, or by reason of its participation in the war, or which
had been stipulated for its benefit in the Treaty of Versailles, or to
which it was entitled as one of the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers, or to which it was entitled by virtue of any act or acts of
Congress. On August 25 the United States Government, through its
commissioner to Germany, signed at Berlin a separate treaty of peace
with Germany, reserving in detail the rights referred to in the joint
resolution of Congress. About the same time a similar treaty was
signed with Austria, and the two treaties were ratified by the Senate
of the United States October 18. The proclamation of peace produced no
immediate results of any importance. American troops continued on the
Rhine, and there was no apparent increase in trade, which had been
carried on before the signing of the treaty by special licenses.
If mankind is capable of learning any lessons from history, the events
leading up to the World War should have exploded the fallacy that the
way to preserve peace is to prepare for war. Competition in armament,
whether on land or sea, inevitably leads to war, and it can lead to
nothing else. And yet, after the terrible lessons of the recent war,
the race for armaments continued with increased momentum. France,
Russia, and Poland maintained huge armies, while the United States and
Japan entered upon the most extensive naval construction programs in
the history of the world. Great Britain, burdened with debt, was
making every effort to keep pace with the United States.
This naval rivalry between powers which had so lately been united in
the war against Germany, led thoughtful people to consider the probable
outcome and to ask against whom these powers were arming. We had no
quarrel with England, but England was the ally of Japan, and relations
between Japan and the United States in the Pacific and in Eastern Asia
were far from reassuring. The question of the continuance of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was discussed at the British Imperial
Conference, which met at London in the early summer of 1921. The
original purpose of this compact was to check the Russian advance in
Manchuria. It was renewed in revised form in 1905 against Germany, and
again renewed in 1911 against Germany for a period of ten years. With
the removal of the German menace, what reasons were there for Great
Britain to continue the alliance? It bore too much the aspect of a
combination against the United States, and was of course the main
reason for the naval program which we had adopted. So long as there
were only three navies of importance in the world and two of them
united in a defensive alliance, it behooved us to safeguard our
position as a sea power.
One of the main objects of the formation of the League of Nations was
to bring about a limitation of armaments on land and sea, and a
commission was organized under the League to consider this question,
but this commission could not take any steps toward the limitation of
navies so long as a great naval power like the United States refused to
coöperate with the League of Nations or even to recognize its
existence. As President Harding had promised the American people some
substitute for the League of Nations, he decided, soon after coming
into office, to convene an international conference to consider the
limitation of armament on land and sea. By the time the Conference
convened it was evident that no agreement was possible on the subject
of land armament. It was recognized from the first that the mere
proposal to limit navies would be utterly futile unless effective steps
could be taken to remove some of the causes of international conflict
which make navies necessary. Therefore the formal invitation to the
Conference extended to the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy
and Japan, August 11, 1921, linked the subject of Limitation of
Armament with Pacific and Far Eastern Questions. The European powers
accepted the invitation without much enthusiasm, but Japan's answer was
held back for some time. She was reluctant to have the powers review
the course she had pursued in China and Siberia while they were at war
with Germany. After agreeing to attend the Conference, Japan
endeavored to confine the program to as narrow limits as possible, and
she soon entered into negotiations with China over the Shantung
question with the hope of arriving at a settlement which would prevent
that question from coming before the Conference. Invitations to the
Conference were later sent to the governments of Belgium, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and China. Portugal was interested because of
her settlement at Macao, the oldest European settlement in China.
Holland of course is one of the great colonial powers of the Pacific.
While Belgium has no territorial interests in the Orient, she has for
years been interested in Chinese financial matters.
The Washington Conference convened in plenary session November 12,
1921, in Memorial Continental Hall. Seats were reserved on the main
floor for press representatives, and the galleries were reserved for
officials and those individuals who were fortunate enough to secure
tickets of admission. The question of open diplomacy which had been
much discussed, was settled at the first session by Secretary Hughes,
who, in his introductory speech, boldly laid the American proposals for
the limitation of navies before the Conference. There were in all
seven plenary sessions, but the subsequent sessions did little more
than confirm agreements that had already been reached in committee.
The real work of the Conference was carried on by committees, and from
the meetings of these committees the public and press representatives
were as a matter of course excluded. There were two principal
committees, one on the Limitation of Armament, and the other on Pacific
and Far Eastern Questions. There were various sub-committees, in the
work of which technical delegates participated. Minutes were kept of
the meetings of the two principal committees, and after each meeting a
communiqué was prepared for the press. In fact, the demand for
publicity defeated to a large extent its own ends. So much matter was
given to the press that when it was published in full very few people
had time to read it. As a general rule, the less real information
there was to give out, the longer were the communiqués. Experienced
correspondents maintained that decisions on delicate questions were
made with as much secrecy in Washington as at Paris.
The plan of the United States for the limitation of armament presented
by Secretary Hughes at the first session proposed (1) that all programs
for the construction of capital ships, either actual or projected, be
abandoned; (2) that a large number of battleships of older types still
in commission be scrapped; and (3) that the allowance of auxiliary
combatant craft, such as cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and airplane
carriers, be in proportion to the tonnage of capital ships. These
proposals, it was claimed, would leave the powers under consideration
in the same relative positions. Under this plan the United States
would be allowed 500,000 tons of capital ships, Great Britain 500,000
tons, and Japan 300,000 tons.