behind him. His enemies promptly seized the opportunity to assail him.
Senator Sherman introduced a resolution declaring the presidency vacant
because the President had left the territory of the United States, and
Senator Knox offered another resolution declaring that the Conference
should confine itself solely to the restoration of peace, and that the
proposed league of nations should be reserved for consideration at some
future time.
While his enemies in the Senate were busily organizing all the forces
of opposition against him, the President was welcomed by the war-weary
peoples of Europe with demonstrations of genuine enthusiasm such as had
been the lot of few men in history to receive. Sovereigns and heads of
States bestowed the highest honors upon him, while great crowds of
working men gathered at the railroad stations in order to get a glimpse
of the man who had led the crusade for a peace that would end war and
establish justice as the rule of conduct between the nations of the
world, great and small nations alike.
No mortal man could have fulfilled the hopes and expectations that
centered in Wilson when he landed on the shores of France in December,
1918. The Armistice had been signed on the basis of his ideals, and
the peoples of Europe confidently expected to see those ideals embodied
in the treaty of peace. He still held the moral leadership of the
world, but the war was over, the German menace ended, and national
rivalries and jealousies were beginning to reappear, even among those
nations who had so recently fought and bled side by side. This change
was to be revealed when the Conference met. There was no sign of it in
the plaudits of the multitudes who welcomed the President in France, in
England, and in Italy. He returned on January 7, 1919, from Italy to
Paris, where delegates to the Conference from all the countries which
had been at war with Germany were gathering.
The first session of the Peace Conference was held January 18. The
main work of the Conference was carried on by the Supreme Council,
constituted at this meeting and composed of the two ranking delegates
of each of the five great powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, the
United States, and Japan. The decisions which this Council arrived at,
with the aid of the large groups of technical advisers which
accompanied the delegations of the great powers, were reported to the
Conference in plenary session from time to time and ratified. The
Supreme Council was, however, gradually superseded by the "Big Four,"
Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, while the "Five,"
composed of ministers of foreign affairs, handled much of the routine
business, and made some important decisions, subject to the approval of
the "Four." According to statistics compiled by Tardieu, the Council
of Ten held seventy-two sessions, the "Five" held thirty-nine, and the
"Four" held one hundred and forty-five. As one of the American experts
puts it: "The 'Ten' fell into the background, the 'Five' never emerged
from obscurity, the 'Four' ruled the Conference in the culminating
period when its decisions took shape."
At the plenary session of January 25, President Wilson made a notable
speech in which he proposed the creation of a league of nations, and a
resolution to organize such a league and make it an integral part of
the general treaty was unanimously adopted. A commission to draft a
constitution for the League was appointed with President Wilson as
chairman. On February 14 the first draft of the Covenant of the League
was presented by him to the Conference, and on the following day he
sailed for the United States in order to consider the bills passed by
Congress before the expiration of the session on March 4. The first
draft of the Covenant was hastily prepared, and it went back to the
commission for revision. As soon as the text was made known in the
United States, opposition to the Covenant was expressed in the Senate.
During the President's brief visit to Washington, he gave a dinner at
the White House to members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
and of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for the purpose of
explaining to them the terms of the Covenant. There was no official
report of what occurred at this dinner, but it was stated that some of
the senators objected to the Covenant on the ground that it was
contrary to our traditional policies and inconsistent with our
Constitution and form of government. On March 4, the day before the
President left New York to resume his duties at the Conference,
Senators Lodge and Knox issued a round robin, signed by thirty-seven
senators, declaring that they would not vote for the Covenant in the
form proposed, and that consideration of the League of Nations should
be postponed until peace had been concluded with Germany. That same
night the President made a speech at the Metropolitan Opera House in
New York City in which, after explaining and defining the Covenant, he
said: "When that treaty comes back gentlemen on this side will find the
Covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the
Covenant that you cannot dissect the Covenant from the treaty without
destroying the whole vital structure." In this same address he also
said: "The first thing I am going to tell the people on the other side
of the water is that an overwhelming majority of the American people is
in favour of the League of Nations. I know that this is true. I have
had unmistakable intimations of it from all parts of the country, and
the voice rings true in every case." The President was evidently quite
confident that public sentiment would compel the Senate to ratify the
peace treaty, including the Covenant of the League. A nation-wide
propaganda was being carried on by the League to Enforce Peace and
other organizations, and public sentiment for the League appeared to be
overwhelming. The President took back to Paris with him various
suggestions of changes in the Covenant, and later ex-President Taft,
Elihu Root, and Charles E. Hughes proposed amendments which were
forwarded to him and carefully considered by the commission. Some of
these suggestions, such as the reservation of the Monroe Doctrine and
the right of withdrawal from the League, were embodied in the final
draft.
When the President returned to Paris he found that Secretary Lansing
and Colonel House had consented to the separation of the League from
the treaty of peace. He immediately reversed this decision, but the
final adoption of the Covenant was delayed by the demand of Japan that
a clause be inserted establishing "the principle of equality of nations
and just treatment of their nationals," which would have brought within
the jurisdiction of the League the status of Japan's subjects in
California and in the British dominions. France urged the inclusion of
a provision creating a permanent General Staff to direct the military
operations of the League, and Belgium insisted that Brussels rather
than Geneva should be the seat of the League. Meanwhile other national
aspirations were also brought forward which delayed the general treaty
of peace. France wanted the entire left bank of the Rhine; Italy put
forth a claim to Fiume; and Japan, relying on secret agreements with
England, France, and Italy, insisted on her claims to Shantung. No
economic settlement had as yet been agreed upon, and the question of
reparations was threatening the disruption of the Conference.
The most difficult problem that the Conference had to solve was the
establishment of a new Franco-German frontier. There was no question
about Alsace-Lorraine. That had been disposed of by the Fourteen
Points, and Germany had acquiesced in its return to France in the
pre-Armistice agreement. But no sooner was the Armistice signed than
Foch addressed a note to Clemenceau, setting forth the necessity of
making the Rhine the western frontier of Germany. The Left Bank,
extending from Alsace-Lorraine to the Dutch frontier, embraced about
10,000 square miles and 5,500,000 people. The debate on this question
continued at intervals for six months and at times became very
acrimonious. The French representatives did not demand the direct
annexation of the Left Bank, but they proposed an independent or
autonomous Rhineland and French, or inter-Allied, occupation of the
Rhine for an indefinite period, or at least until the full execution by
Germany of the financial clauses of the treaty. Both the British and
American delegates opposed the French proposals. Lloyd George
repeatedly said: "We must not create another Alsace-Lorraine." He also
remarked on one occasion: "The strongest impression made upon me by my
first visit to Paris was the statue of Strasburg veiled in mourning.
Do not let us make it possible for Germany to erect a similar statue."
This discussion was being carried on with great earnestness and
intensity of feeling when Wilson returned to Paris March 14. That very
afternoon he met Lloyd George and Clemenceau. The French argument was
set forth again at length and with great skill. The fact was again
pointed out that the destruction of the German fleet had relieved
England from all fear of German invasion, and that the Atlantic Ocean
lay between Germany and the United States, while France, which had
suffered two German invasions in half a century, had no safeguard but
the League of Nations, which she did not deem as good a guarantee as
the Rhine bridges. Finally Wilson and Lloyd George offered the
guarantee treaties, and Clemenceau agreed to take the proposal under
consideration. Three days later he came back with a counter
proposition and a compromise was reached. France gave up her demand
for a separate Rhineland, but secured occupation of the Left Bank,
including the bridge-heads, for a period of fifteen years as a
guarantee of the execution of the treaty. In return the United States
and Great Britain pledged themselves to come to the immediate aid of
France, in case of an unprovoked attack, by an agreement which was to
be binding only if ratified by both countries. This treaty the United
States Senate refused to ratify. Foch was opposed to this compromise,
and adopted a course of action which was very embarrassing to
Clemenceau. Fierce attacks on the French Government and on the
representatives of Great Britain and the United States, inspired by
him, appeared in the papers. When the treaty was finally completed, he
even went so far as to refuse to transmit the note summoning the German
delegates to Versailles to receive it. Wilson and Lloyd George finally
protested so vigorously to Clemenceau that Foch had to give way.
In view of the promises of Clemenceau and Lloyd George that Germany
should pay the cost of the war, the question of reparations was an
exceedingly difficult one to adjust. President Wilson stoutly opposed
the inclusion of war costs as contrary to the pre-Armistice agreement,
and Lloyd George and Clemenceau finally had to give in. The entire
American delegation and their corps of experts endeavored to limit the
charges imposed on Germany rigidly to reparation for damage done to
civilians in the occupied areas and on land and sea. Lloyd George,
remembering the promises which he had made prior to the December
elections, insisted that pensions paid by the Allied governments should
be included as damage done to the civilian population. This claim was
utterly illogical, for pensions fall properly into the category of
military expenses, but it was pressed with such skill and determination
by Lloyd George and General Smuts that President Wilson finally gave
his assent.
From the first the American delegates and experts were in favor of
fixing definitely the amount that Germany was to pay in the way of
reparations and settling this question once for all. They hoped to
agree upon a sum which it was within Germany's power to pay. But
Clemenceau and Lloyd George had made such extravagant promises to their
people that they were afraid to announce at this time a sum which would
necessarily be much less than the people expected. They, therefore,
insisted that the question should be left open to be determined later
by a Reparations Commission. They declared that any other course would
mean the immediate overthrow of their governments and the
reorganization of the British and French delegations. President Wilson
did not care to put himself in the position of appearing to precipitate
a political crisis in either country, so he finally gave way on this
point also. These concessions proved to be the most serious mistakes
that he made at Paris, for they did more than anything else to
undermine the faith of liberals everywhere in him.
The Italian delegation advanced a claim to Fiume which was inconsistent
both with the Treaty of London and the Fourteen Points. When
disagreement over this question had been delaying for weeks the
settlement of other matters, President Wilson finally made a public
statement of his position which was virtually an appeal to the Italian
people over the heads of their delegation. The entire delegation
withdrew from the Conference and went home, but Premier Orlando
received an almost unanimous vote of confidence from his parliament,
and he was supported by an overwhelming tide of public sentiment
throughout Italy. This was the first indication of Wilson's loss of
prestige with the peoples of Europe.
As already stated, the Japanese had insisted on the insertion in the
Covenant of the League of the principle of racial equality. It is very
doubtful whether they ever expected to succeed in this. The
probability is that they advanced this principle in order to compel
concessions on other points. Japan's main demand was that the German
leases and concessions in the Chinese province of Shantung should be
definitely confirmed to her by the treaty. Two weeks after the
outbreak of the World War, Japan had addressed an ultimatum to Germany
to the effect that she immediately withdraw all German vessels from
Chinese and Japanese waters and deliver not later than September 15 "to
the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or compensation the
entire leased territory of Kiao-chau with a view to the eventual
restoration of the same to China." In a statement issued to the press
Count Okuma said:
"As Premier of Japan, I have stated and I now again state to the people
of America and all the world that Japan has no ulterior motive or
desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or any
other peoples of anything which they now possess."
The Germans had spent about $100,000,000 in improving Tsing-tau, the
principal city of Kiao-chau, and they had no intention of surrendering.
After a siege of two months the city was captured by the Japanese army
and navy, assisted by a small force of British troops. This was the
first act in the drama. On January 8, 1915, Japan suddenly presented
to the Chinese government the now famous Twenty-one Demands,
deliberately misrepresenting to the United States and other powers the
nature of these demands. Among other things, Japan demanded not only
that China should assent to any agreement in regard to Shantung that
Japan and Germany might reach at the conclusion of the war, but that
she should also grant to her greater rights and concessions in Shantung
than Germany had enjoyed. China was finally forced to agree to these
demands.
Japan's next step was to acquire from the Allies the assurance that
they would support her claims to Shantung and to the islands in the
Pacific north of the equator on the conclusion of the war. This she
did in secret agreements signed in February and March, 1917, with
England, France, Italy, and Russia. England agreed to support Japan's
claim on condition that Japan would support her claims to the Pacific
islands south of the equator. France signed on condition that Japan
would use her influence on China to break relations with Germany and
place at the disposal of the Allies the German ships interned in
Chinese ports. The Allies were evidently uneasy about Japan, and were
willing to do anything that was necessary to satisfy her. This
uncertainty about Japan may also be the explanation of the
Lansing-Ishii agreement signed November 2, 1917, in which the United
States recognized the "special interests" of Japan in China.
The secret treaties of the Allies relating to the Japanese claims were
not revealed until the disposition of the German islands in the Pacific
was under discussion at the Peace Conference. When informed by Baron
Makino that the islands north of the equator had been pledged to Japan
by agreements signed two years before, President Wilson inquired
whether there were other secret agreements, and was informed that the
German rights in Shantung had also been promised to Japan. As the
other powers were pledged to support Japan's claims, President Wilson
found himself in a very embarrassing situation, especially as he had
also to oppose Japan's demand that a clause recognizing racial equality
be inserted in the Covenant of the League. This was a moral claim that
Japan urged with great strategic effect. In pushing her claims to
Shantung she ignored all moral considerations and relied entirely upon
her legal status, secured (1) by the secret treaties with the Allies,
(2) by the treaty of 1915 with China, and (3) by right of conquest.
When charged with having coerced China into signing the treaty of 1915,
Japan replied with truth that most of the important treaties with China
had been extorted by force. Japan declared, however, that she had no
intention of holding Shantung permanently, but that she would restore
the province in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic
privileges transferred from Germany. In view of this oral promise,
President Wilson finally acquiesced in the recognition of Japan's legal
status in Shantung.
On May 7 the completed treaty was presented to the German delegates who
had been summoned to Versailles to receive it. When the text was made
public in Berlin there was an indignant outcry against the alleged
injustice of certain provisions which were held to be inconsistent with
the pledges given by President Wilson in the pre-Armistice
negotiations, and the Germans made repeated efforts to draw the Allies
into a general discussion of principles. They were, however, finally
given to understand that they must accept or reject the treaty as it
stood, and on June 28 it was signed in the Hall of Mirrors at
Versailles--the same hall in which William I had been crowned Emperor
of Germany forty-eight years before.
The next day President Wilson sailed for the United States, and on July
10 personally presented the treaty to the Senate with an earnest appeal
for prompt ratification. The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which
the treaty was referred, proceeded with great deliberation, and on July
31 began a series of public hearings which lasted until September 12.
The Committee called before it Secretary Lansing and several of the
technical advisors to the American delegation, including B. M. Baruch,
economic adviser, Norman H. Davis, financial adviser, and David Hunter
Miller, legal adviser. The Committee also called before it a number of
American citizens who had had no official connection with the
negotiations but who wished to speak in behalf of foreign groups,
including Thomas F. Millard for China, Joseph W. Folk for Egypt, Dudley
Field Malone for India, and a large delegation of Americans of Irish
descent, who opposed the League of Nations on the ground that it would
stand in the way of Ireland's aspiration for independence. The rival
claims of Jugo-Slavs and Italians to Fiume, the demand of Albania for
self-determination, the claims of Greece to Thrace, and arguments for
and against the separation of Austria and Hungary were all presented at
great length to the Committee. On August 19 the President received the
Committee at the White House, and after submitting a written statement
on certain features of the Covenant, he was questioned by members of
the Committee and a general discussion followed.
Meanwhile, the treaty was being openly debated in the Senate. The
President had been an advocate of publicity in diplomacy as well as in
other things, and the Senate now undertook to use his own weapon
against him by a public attack on the treaty. Although the opposition
to the treaty was started in the Senate by Lodge, Borah, Johnson,
Sherman, Reed, and Poindexter, it was not confined to that body.
Throughout the country there were persons of liberal views who favored
the League of Nations but objected to the severe terms imposed on
Germany, and charged the President with having proved false to the
principles of the Fourteen Points. There were others who did not
object to a severe peace, but who were bound fast by the tradition of
isolation and thought membership in the League of Nations would involve
the sacrifice of national sovereignty. The main object of attack was
Article X, which guaranteed the territorial integrity and political
independence of all the members of the League. President Wilson stated
to the Senate Committee that he regarded Article X as "the very
backbone of the whole Covenant," and that "without it the League would
be hardly more than an influential debating society." The opponents of
the League declared that this article would embroil the United States
in the internal affairs of Europe, and that it deprived Congress of its
constitutional right to declare war.
In the Senate there were three groups: the small number of
"irreconcilables" who opposed the ratification of the treaty in any
form; a larger group who favored ratification without amendments, but
who finally expressed their willingness to accept "interpretative
reservations"; and a large group composed mainly of Republicans who
favored the ratification of the treaty only on condition that there
should be attached to it reservations safeguarding what they declared
to be the fundamental rights and interests of the United States. This
group differed among themselves as to the character of the reservations
that were necessary, and some of them became known as "mild
reservationists."
It is probable that at the outset only the small group of
"irreconcilables" hoped or intended to bring about the defeat of the
treaty, but as the debate proceeded and the opposition to the treaty
received more and more popular support, the reservationists determined
to defeat the treaty altogether rather than to accept any compromise.
The Republican leaders were quick to realize that the tide of public
opinion had turned and was now running strongly against the President.
They determined, therefore, to ruin him at all hazards, and thus to
bring about the election of a Republican president.
When President Wilson realized that the treaty was really in danger of
defeat, he determined to go on an extended tour of the country for the
purpose of explaining the treaty to the people and bringing pressure to
bear on the Senate. Beginning at Columbus, Ohio, on September 4, he
proceeded through the northern tier of states to the Pacific coast,
then visited California and returned through Colorado. He addressed
large audiences who received him with great enthusiasm. He was
"trailed" by Senator Hiram Johnson, who was sent out by the opposition
in the Senate to present the other side. Johnson also attracted large
crowds. On the return trip, while delivering an address at Wichita,
Kansas, September 26, the President showed signs of a nervous breakdown
and returned immediately to Washington. He was able to walk from the
train to his automobile, but a few days later he was partially
paralyzed. The full extent and seriousness of his illness was
carefully concealed from the public. He was confined to the White
House for five months, and had to abandon all efforts in behalf of the
treaty.