Russia and the Bolsheviki came into power. They at once proposed a
general armistice and called upon all the belligerents to enter into
peace negotiations. The Central Powers accepted the invitation, and
early in December negotiations began at Brest-Litovsk. The Russian
peace proposals were: the evacuation of occupied territories,
self-determination for nationalities not hitherto independent, no war
indemnities or economic boycotts, and the settlement of colonial
questions in accordance with the above principles. The Austrian
minister, Count Czernin, replied for the Central Powers, accepting more
of the Russian program than had been expected, but rejecting the
principle of a free plebiscite for national groups not hitherto
independent, and conditioning the whole on the acceptance by the Allies
of the offer of general peace. The conference called on the Allies for
an answer by January 4. No direct reply was made to this demand, but
the Russian proposals had made a profound impression on the laboring
classes in all countries, and both Lloyd George and President Wilson
felt called on to define more clearly the war aims of the Allies.
In a speech delivered January 5, 1918, Lloyd George made the first
comprehensive and authoritative statement of British war aims. He had
consulted the labor leaders and Viscount Grey and Mr. Asquith, as well
as some of the representatives of the overseas dominions, and he was
speaking, he said, for "the nation and the Empire as a whole." He
explained first what the British were not fighting for. He disclaimed
any idea of overthrowing the German Government, although he considered
military autocracy "a dangerous anachronism"; they were not fighting to
destroy Austria-Hungary, but genuine self-government must be granted to
"those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it"; they
were not fighting "to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and
renowned lands of Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race," but
the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea must be
"internationalized and neutralized." The positive statement of aims
included the complete restoration of Belgium, the return of
Alsace-Lorraine to France, rectification of the Italian boundary, the
independence of Poland, the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the
occupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania, and a disposition of the
German colonies with "primary regard to the wishes and interests of the
native inhabitants of such colonies." He insisted on reparation for
injuries done in violation of international law, but disclaimed a
demand for war indemnity. In conclusion he declared the following
conditions to be essential to a lasting peace: "First, the sanctity of
treaties must be reëstablished; secondly, a territorial settlement must
be secured, based on the right of self-determination or the consent of
the governed; and lastly, we must seek, by the creation of some
international organization, to limit the burden of armaments and
diminish the probability of war."
On January 8, 1918, three days after Lloyd George's speech, President
Wilson appeared before both Houses of Congress and delivered the most
important of all his addresses on war aims. It contained the famous
Fourteen Points:
I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall
be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy
shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial
waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in
whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of
international covenants.
III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be
reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
V. A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all
colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that
in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims
of the Government whose title is to be determined.
VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of
all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest
coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an
unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent
determination of her own political development and national policy and
assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under
institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance
also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The
treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations will be the acid test
of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as
distinguished from their own interests and of their intelligent and
unselfish sympathy.
VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and
restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys
in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve
as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws
which they have themselves set and determined for the government of
their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole
structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.
VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions
restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter
of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for
nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once
more be made secure in the interest of all.
IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along
clearly recognizable lines of nationality.
X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we
wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest
opportunity of autonomous development.
XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated: occupied
territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the
sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another
determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of
allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the
political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the
several Balkan states should be entered into.
XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be
assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now
under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and
an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the
Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships
and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.
XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should
include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations,
which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose
political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be
guaranteed by international covenant.
XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific
covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.
In February negotiations at Brest-Litovsk were broken off as a result
of the excessive demands of the Germans and the armistice was declared
at an end. The Germans quickly overran Poland and the Baltic provinces
and occupied Ukraine under a treaty which virtually placed the material
resources of that country at the disposal of the Central Powers. In an
address at Baltimore, April 6, the anniversary of our entrance into the
war, President Wilson denounced the insincerity and perfidy of the
German rulers, who, he said, were "enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph
in which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride." He concluded
with these strong words: "Germany has once more said that force, and
force alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in the
affairs of men, whether right as America conceives it or dominion as
she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is,
therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, force to the
utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant
force which shall make right the law of the world and cast every
selfish dominion down in the dust."
Between the addresses of January 8 and the Armistice, the President
delivered other addresses in which he elaborated some of the principles
of the Fourteen Points. Of special significance were his speeches of
February 11, July 4, and September 27. In the last his mind centered
on the League of Nations. "There can be no leagues or alliances or
special covenants and understandings within the general and common
family of the League of Nations," he declared, and "there can be no
special selfish economic combinations within the League, and no
employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion, except as the
power of economic penalty, by exclusion from the markets of the world,
may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline
and control." In conclusion he said that the United States was
prepared "to assume its full share of responsibility for the
maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace
must henceforth rest."
We now know from the published memoirs of German and Austrian statesmen
that President Wilson's speeches made a profound impression on the
peoples of Central Europe. His utterances in behalf of the oppressed
nationalities, not only Belgium, Serbia, and Poland, but also the
Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, became stronger and more frequent
during the spring and summer of 1918, and solidified the opposition to
Germany at a critical period of the war. On September 3 he recognized
the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a belligerent government. This
meant the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had not been
contemplated at an earlier period, but, as he stated in his reply to
the Austrian request for an armistice in October, conditions had
changed since the announcement of the Fourteen Points, and these
peoples would no longer be satisfied with mere autonomy.
As a result of the Russian collapse and the negotiations at
Brest-Litovsk, the Germans withdrew their divisions from the eastern
front and staked everything on the great western drive of March, 1918.
When this movement was finally checked and the Allied advance began,
the German military leaders knew that the game was up, but they did not
have the courage to face the facts, for an acknowledgment of defeat
meant the overthrow of the old system of government based on military
success. They waited in vain for some military advantage which would
give them an opportunity to open negotiations without openly
acknowledging defeat. Finally the state of demoralization at
Headquarters became so complete that there was no alternative but to
ask for an immediate armistice. In order to pave the way for this
step, the ministry resigned October 1, and Prince Max of Baden was
called on to form a new government. On the 4th he dispatched a note to
President Wilson through the Swiss Government, requesting him to call a
peace conference and stating that the German Government "accepts the
program set forth by the President of the United States in his message
to Congress of the 8th January, 1918, and in his later pronouncements,
especially his speech of the 27th September, as a basis for peace
negotiations."
In reply the President asked for a clearer understanding on three
points: (1) Did the Imperial Chancellor mean that the German Government
accepted the terms laid down in the President's addresses referred to,
and "that its object in entering into discussion would be only to agree
upon the practical details of their application?" (2) The President
would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Allied
Governments so long as the armies of the Central Powers were upon their
soil. (3) The President asked whether the Chancellor was speaking for
the constituted authorities of the Empire who had so far conducted the
war.
The German reply of October 12 was satisfactory on the first point.
With respect to the withdrawal of their troops from occupied territory
they proposed a mixed commission to arrange the details. On the third
point it was stated that the new government had been formed in
agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. Having
accomplished this much, the President's next step was skilfully taken.
He replied that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an
armistice were matters which must be left to the judgment of the
military advisers of the United States and the Allied Governments, but
that he would not agree to any arrangement which did not provide
"absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance
of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States
and of the Allies in the field." Referring next to submarine warfare,
he declared that the United States and the Allied Governments could not
consider an armistice "so long as the armed forces of Germany continue
the illegal and inhumane practices which they persist in." In
conclusion he referred to a clause contained in his speech of July 4,
now accepted by the German Government as one of the conditions of
peace, namely, "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that
can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of
the world." He added: "The power which has hitherto controlled the
German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice
of the German nation to alter it." He demanded that the United States
and the Allied Governments "should know beyond a peradventure" with
whom they were dealing.
In reply the Chancellor assured the President that a bill had been
introduced in the Reichstag to alter the constitution of the Empire so
as to give the representatives of the people the right to decide for
war or peace, but the President was not satisfied that there had been
any real change. "It may be that future wars have been brought under
the control of the German people, but the present war has not been; and
it is with the present war that we are dealing." He was not willing to
accept any armistice which did not make a renewal of hostilities on the
part of Germany impossible. If, he concluded, the United States "must
deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany
now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to
the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand not
peace negotiations but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving
this essential thing unsaid." This note was written October 23. Four
days later the Chancellor replied: "The President knows the deep-rooted
changes which have taken place and are still taking place in German
constitutional life. The peace negotiations will be conducted by a
People's Government, in whose hands the decisive legal power rests in
accordance with the Constitution, and to which the Military Power will
also be subject. The German Government now awaits the proposals for an
armistice which will introduce a peace of justice such as the President
in his manifestations has described."
The terms of the Armistice were drawn up by the Interallied Council at
Versailles and completed by November 5. They were much more severe
than the public had expected them to be. Germany was required
immediately to evacuate Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, and
Luxemburg; to withdraw her armies from the entire territory on the left
bank of the Rhine, and from Russia, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, and
Turkey; she was to surrender enormous quantities of heavy artillery and
airplanes, all her submarines, and most of her battleships, cruisers,
and destroyers. This was practically unconditional surrender.
Contrary to the general belief at the time, it is now known that Foch
and Haig considered these terms too severe and feared that Germany
would not accept them. They wanted an armistice that Germany would
accept. General Bliss, on the other hand, wanted to demand "the
complete disarmament and demobilization of the military and naval
forces of the enemy." In America there was much criticism of the
President for being willing to negotiate with Germany at all. "On to
Berlin" was a popular cry, and it was thought that the President was
preventing a complete military triumph. On October 10 Senator Lodge
declared in the Senate: "The Republican party stands for unconditional
surrender and complete victory, just as Grant stood. My own belief is
that the American people mean to have an unconditional surrender. They
mean to have a dictated, not a negotiated peace."
After reviewing the Armistice negotiations André Tardieu, a member of
the French Cabinet and delegate to the Peace Conference, says:
"What remains of the fiction, believed by so many, of an armistice
secretly determined upon by an American dictator; submitted to by the
European governments: imposed by their weakness upon the victorious
armies, despite the opposition of the generals? The Armistice was
discussed in the open light of day. President Wilson only consented to
communicate it to his associates on the triple condition that its
principle be approved by the military authorities and its clauses would
be drawn up by them; that it be imposed upon the enemy and not
discussed with him; that it be such as to prevent all resumption of
hostilities and assure the submission of the vanquished to the terms of
peace. So it was that the discussion went on with Berlin till October
23, and in Paris from that date till November 5. It was to the
Commander-in-Chief [Foch] that final decision was left not only on the
principle of the Armistice but upon its application. He it was who
drew up the text. And it was his draft that was adopted. The action
of the governments was limited to endorsing it and making it more
severe. That is the truth:--it is perhaps less picturesque but
certainly more in accord with common sense."
The terms of the Armistice were delivered to the Germans by Marshal
Foch November 7, and they were given seventy-two hours to accept or
reject them. Meanwhile Germany's allies were rapidly deserting her.
Bulgaria surrendered September 30, and on October 30 Turkey signed an
armistice. Finally on November 4, the rapidly disintegrating
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy also signed an armistice. On October 28
there had been a naval mutiny at Kiel which spread rapidly to the other
ports. On the 31st the Emperor departed for Army Headquarters, leaving
Berlin on the verge of revolution. On the 7th of November the Social
Democrats demanded the abdication of the Emperor and the Crown Prince.
On the 9th Prince Max resigned the Chancellorship, and the Kaiser
abdicated and ignominiously fled across the border into Holland. On
the 11th at 5 A. M. the Armistice was signed by the German delegates
and Marshal Foch, and it went into effect at 11 o'clock that day.
In two particulars the Wilson principles had been modified by the
Allies. In the American note to Germany of November 5 Secretary
Lansing stated that the President had submitted his correspondence with
the German authorities to the Allied Governments and that he had
received in reply the following memorandum:
"The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the
correspondence which has passed between the President of the United
States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which
follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the
Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the
President's Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles
of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses. They must point
out, however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as
the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of
which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves
complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference.
Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his Address to
Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that the invaded
territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, and the
Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as
to what this provision implies. By it they understand that
compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the
civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression
of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." In transmitting this
memorandum Secretary Lansing stated that he was instructed by the
President to say that he agreed with this interpretation.
With these modifications the Wilson principles were accepted by all
parties as the legal basis of the peace negotiations.
XI
THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES
It was agreed that the Peace Conference should meet at Paris, and
President Wilson considered the issues involved of such magnitude that
he decided to head the American delegation himself. Great Britain,
France, and Italy were to be represented by their premiers, and it was
fitting that the United States should be represented by its most
responsible leader, who, furthermore, had been the chief spokesman of
the Allies and had formulated the principles upon which the peace was
to be made. But the decision of the President to go to Paris was
without precedent in our history and, therefore, it met with criticism
and opposition. When he announced the names of the other members of
the delegation, the criticism became even more outspoken and severe.
They were Secretary of State Lansing, Henry White, former ambassador to
France, Colonel Edward M. House, and General Tasker H. Bliss. There
had been a widespread demand for a non-partisan peace commission, and
many people thought that the President should have taken Root, or
Roosevelt, or Taft. Mr. White was a Republican but he had never been
active in party affairs or in any sense a leader. In the Senate there
was deep resentment that the President had not selected any members of
that body to accompany him. President McKinley had appointed three
senators as members of the commission of five that negotiated the
treaty of peace at the close of the Spanish War. With that exception,
senators had never taken part directly in the negotiation of a treaty.
The delegation was attended by a large group of experts on military,
economic, geographical, ethnological, and legal matters, some of whom
were men of great ability, and in their selection no party lines were
drawn.
But just before the signing of the Armistice, the President had
suffered a serious political defeat at home. There had been severe
criticism of Democratic leadership in Congress and growing
dissatisfaction with some of the members of the Cabinet. In response
to the appeals of Democratic Congressmen, the President issued a
statement from the White House on October 25, asking the people, if
they approved of his leadership and wished him to continue to be their
"unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and abroad," to vote for
the Democratic candidates for Congress. He acknowledged that the
Republicans in Congress had loyally supported his war measures, but he
declared that they were hostile to the administration and that the time
was too critical for divided leadership. This statement created a
storm of criticism, and did more than any other act in his
administration to turn the tide of public opinion against the
President. The elections resulted in a Republican majority of
thirty-nine in the House and two in the Senate. The President had
followed the practice of European premiers in appealing to the people,
but under our constitutional system he could not very well resign. Had
he not issued his appeal, the election would have been regarded as a
repudiation of the Democratic Congress, but not necessarily as a
repudiation of the President. The situation was most unfortunate, but
the President made no comments and soon after announced his intention
of going to Paris. In December Lloyd George went to the country, and
on pledging himself to make Germany pay for the war and to hang the
Kaiser, he was returned by a substantial majority. These pledges were
unnecessary and had a most unfortunate influence on the subsequent
negotiations at Paris.