through Motley, the American minister at London, but the latter was
unduly influenced by the extreme views of Sumner, chairman of the
Senate committee on foreign relations, to whose influence he owed his
appointment, and got things in a bad tangle. Fish then transferred the
negotiations to Washington, where a joint high commission, appointed to
settle the various disputes with Canada, convened in 1871. A few
months later the treaty of Washington was signed. Among other things
it provided for submitting the _Alabama_ Claims to an arbitration
tribunal composed of five members, one appointed by England, one by the
United States, and the other three by the rulers of Italy, Switzerland,
and Brazil. When this tribunal met at Geneva, the following year, the
United States, greatly to the surprise of everybody, presented not only
the direct claims for the damage inflicted by the Confederate cruisers,
but also indirect claims for the loss sustained through the transfer of
American shipping to foreign flags, for the prolongation of the war,
and for increased rates of insurance. Great Britain threatened to
withdraw from the arbitration, but Charles Francis Adams, the American
member of the tribunal, rose nobly to the occasion and decided against
the contention of his own government. The indirect claims were
rejected by a unanimous vote and on the direct claims the United States
was awarded the sum of $15,500,000. Although the British member of the
tribunal dissented from the decision his government promptly paid the
award. This was the most important case that had ever been submitted
to arbitration and its successful adjustment encouraged the hope that
the two great branches of the English-speaking peoples would never
again have to resort to war.
Between the settlement of the _Alabama_ Claims and the controversy over
the Venezuelan boundary, diplomatic intercourse between the two
countries was enlivened by the efforts of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to
convince the British Government that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was out
of date and therefore no longer binding, by the assertion of American
ownership in the seal herds of Bering Sea and the attempt to prevent
Canadians from taking these animals in the open sea, and by the summary
dismissal of Lord Sackville-West, the third British minister to receive
his passports from the United States without request.
President Cleveland's bold assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in the
Venezuelan boundary dispute, while the subject of much criticism at the
time both at home and abroad, turned out to be a most opportune
assertion of the intention of the United States to protect the American
continents from the sort of exploitation to which Africa and Asia have
fallen a prey, and, strange to say, it had a clarifying effect on our
relations with England, whose attitude has since been uniformly
friendly.
The Venezuelan affair was followed by the proposal of Lord Salisbury to
renew the negotiations for a permanent treaty of arbitration which had
been first entered into by Secretary Gresham and Sir Julian Pauncefote.
In the spring of 1890 the Congress of the United States had adopted a
resolution in favor of the negotiation of arbitration treaties with
friendly nations, and the British House of Commons had in July, 1893,
expressed its hearty approval of a general arbitration treaty between
the United States and England. The matter was then taken up
diplomatically, as stated above, but was dropped when the Venezuelan
boundary dispute became acute. Lord Salisbury's proposal was favorably
received by President Cleveland, and after mature deliberation the
draft of a treaty was finally drawn up and signed by Secretary Olney
and Sir Julian Pauncefote. This treaty provided for the submission of
pecuniary claims to the familiar mixed commission with an umpire or
referee to decide disputed points. Controversies involving the
determination of territorial claims were to be submitted to a tribunal
composed of six members, three justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States or judges of the Circuit Court to be nominated by the
president of the United States, and three judges of the British Supreme
Court of Judicature or members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council to be nominated by the British sovereign, and an award made by
a majority of not less than five to one was to be final. In case of an
award made by less than the prescribed majority, the award was also to
be final unless either power should within three months protest against
it, in which case the award was to be of no validity. This treaty was
concluded in January, 1897, and promptly submitted to the Senate. When
President Cleveland's term expired in March no action had been taken.
President McKinley endorsed the treaty in his inaugural address and
urged the Senate to take prompt action, but when the vote was taken,
May 5th, it stood forty-three for, and twenty-six against, the treaty.
It thus lacked three votes of the two thirds required for ratification.
The failure of this treaty was a great disappointment to the friends of
international arbitration. The opposition within his own party to
President Cleveland, under whose direction the treaty had been
negotiated, and the change of administration, probably had a good deal
to do with its defeat. Public opinion, especially in the Northern
States of the Union, was still hostile to England. Irish agitators
could always get a sympathetic hearing in America, and politicians
could not resist the temptation to play on anti-British prejudices in
order to bring out the Irish vote.
The Spanish War was the turning point in our relations with England as
in many other things. The question as to who were our friends in 1898
was much discussed at the time, and when revived by the press upon the
occasion of the visit of Prince Henry of Prussia to the United States
in February, 1902, even the cabinets of Europe could not refrain from
taking part in the controversy. In order to diminish the enthusiasm
over the Prince's visit the British press circulated the story that
Lord Pauncefote had checked a movement of the European powers to
prevent any intervention of the United States in Cuba; while the German
papers asserted that Lord Pauncefote had taken the initiative in
opposing American intervention. It is certain that the attitude of the
British Government, as well as of the British people, from the outbreak
of hostilities to the close of the war, was friendly. As for Germany,
while the conduct of the government was officially correct, public
sentiment expressed itself with great violence against the United
States. The conduct of the German admiral, Diederichs, in Manila Bay
has never been satisfactorily explained. Shortly after Dewey's victory
a German squadron, superior to the American in strength, steamed into
the Bay and displayed, according to Dewey, an "extraordinary disregard
of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse." Dewey finally sent his
flag-lieutenant, Brumby, to inform the German admiral that "if he wants
a fight he can have it right now." The German admiral at once
apologized. It is well known now that the commander of the British
squadron, which was in a position to bring its guns to bear on the
Germans, gave Dewey to understand that he could rely on more than moral
support from him in case of trouble. In fact, John Hay wrote from
London at the beginning of the war that the British navy was at our
disposal for the asking.
Great Britain's change of attitude toward the United States was so
marked that some writers have naïvely concluded that a secret treaty of
alliance between the two countries was made in 1897. The absurdity of
such a statement was pointed out by Senator Lodge several years ago.
England's change of attitude is not difficult to understand. For a
hundred years after the battle of Trafalgar, England had pursued the
policy of maintaining a navy large enough to meet all comers. With the
rapid growth of other navies during the closing years of the nineteenth
century, England realized that she could no longer pursue this policy.
Russia, Japan, and Germany had all adopted extensive naval programs
when we went to war with Spain. Our acquisition of the Philippines and
Porto Rico and our determination to build an isthmian canal made a
large American navy inevitable. Great Britain realized, therefore,
that she would have to cast about for future allies. She therefore
signed the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with us in 1901, and a defensive
alliance with Japan in 1902.
In view of the fact that the United States was bent on carrying out the
long-deferred canal scheme, Great Britain realized that a further
insistence on her rights under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty would lead to
friction and possible conflict. She wisely decided, therefore, to
recede from the position which she had held for half a century and to
give us a free hand in the construction and control of the canal at
whatever point we might choose to build it. While the Hay-Pauncefote
treaty was limited in terms to the canal question, it was in reality of
much wider significance. It amounted, in fact, to the recognition of
American naval supremacy in the West Indies, and since its signature
Great Britain has withdrawn her squadron from this important strategic
area. The supremacy of the United States in the Caribbean is now
firmly established and in fact unquestioned. The American public did
not appreciate at the time the true significance of the Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty, and a few years later Congress inserted in the Panama Tolls Act
a clause exempting American ships engaged in the coast-wise trade from
the payment of tolls. Great Britain at once protested against the
exemption clause as a violation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty and
anti-British sentiment at once flared up in all parts of the United
States. Most American authorities on international law and diplomacy
believed that Great Britain's interpretation of the treaty was correct.
Fortunately President Wilson took the same view, and in spite of strong
opposition he persuaded Congress to repeal the exemption clause. This
was an act of simple justice and it removed the only outstanding
subject of dispute between the two countries.
The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was by no means the only evidence of a change
of attitude on the part of Great Britain. As we have already seen,
Great Britain and the United States were in close accord during the
Boxer uprising in China and the subsequent negotiations. During the
Russo-Japanese war public sentiment in both England and the United
States was strongly in favor of Japan. At the Algeciras conference on
Moroccan affairs in 1905 the United States, in its effort to preserve
the European balance of power, threw the weight of its influence on the
side of England and France.
The submission of the Alaskan boundary dispute to a form of arbitration
in which Canada could not win and we could not lose was another
evidence of the friendly attitude of Great Britain. The boundary
between the southern strip of Alaska and British Columbia had never
been marked or even accurately surveyed when gold was discovered in the
Klondike. The shortest and quickest route to the gold-bearing region
was by the trails leading up from Dyea and Skagway on the headwaters of
Lynn Canal. The Canadian officials at once advanced claims to
jurisdiction over these village ports. The question turned on the
treaty made in 1825 between Great Britain and Russia. Whatever rights
Russia had under that treaty we acquired by the purchase of Alaska in
1867. Not only did a long series of maps issued by the Canadian
government in years past confirm the American claim to the region in
dispute, but the correspondence of the British negotiator of the treaty
of 1825 shows that he made every effort to secure for England an outlet
to deep water through this strip of territory and failed. Under the
circumstances President Roosevelt was not willing to submit the case to
the arbitration of third parties. He agreed, however, to submit it to
a mixed commission composed of three Americans, two Canadians, and Lord
Alverstone, chief justice of England. As there was little doubt as to
the views that would be taken by the three Americans and the two
Canadians it was evident from the first that the trial was really
before Lord Alverstone. In case he sustained the American contention
there would be an end of the controversy; in case he sustained the
Canadian view, there would be an even division, and matters would stand
where they stood when the trial began except that a great deal more
feeling would have been engendered and the United States might have had
to make good its claims by force. Fortunately Lord Alverstone agreed
with the three Americans on the main points involved in the
controversy. The decision was, of course, a disappointment to the
Canadians and it was charged that Lord Alverstone had sacrificed their
interest in order to further the British policy of friendly relations
with the United States.
At the beginning of the Great War the interference of the British navy
with cargoes consigned to Germany at once aroused the latent
anti-British feeling in this country. Owing to the fact that cotton
exports were so largely involved the feeling against Great Britain was
even stronger in the Southern States than in the Northern. The State
Department promptly protested against the naval policy adopted by Great
Britain, and the dispute might have assumed very serious proportions
had not Germany inaugurated her submarine campaign. The dispute with
England involved merely property rights, while that with Germany
involved the safety and lives of American citizens. The main feature
of British policy, that is, her application of the doctrine of
continuous voyage, was so thoroughly in line with the policy adopted by
the United States during the Civil War that the protests of our State
Department were of little avail. In fact Great Britain merely carried
the American doctrine to its logical conclusions.
We have undertaken in this brief review of Anglo-American relations to
outline the more important controversies that have arisen between the
two countries. They have been sufficiently numerous and irritating to
jeopardize seriously the peace which has so happily subsisted for one
hundred years between the two great members of the English-speaking
family. After all, they have not been based on any fundamental
conflict of policy, but have been for the most part superficial and in
many cases the result of bad manners. In this connection Lord Bryce
makes the following interesting observations:
"There were moments when the stiff and frigid attitude of the British
foreign secretary exasperated the American negotiators, or when a
demagogic Secretary of State at Washington tried by a bullying tone to
win credit as the patriotic champion of national claims. But whenever
there were bad manners in London there was good temper at Washington,
and when there was a storm on the Potomac there was calm on the Thames.
It was the good fortune of the two countries that if at any moment
rashness or vehemence was found on one side, it never happened to be
met by the like quality on the other."
"The moral of the story of Anglo-American relations," Lord Bryce says,
"is that peace can always be kept, whatever be the grounds of
controversy, between peoples that wish to keep it." He adds that Great
Britain and the United States "have given the finest example ever seen
in history of an undefended frontier, along which each people has
trusted to the good faith of the other that it would create no naval
armaments; and this very absence of armaments has itself helped to
prevent hostile demonstrations. Neither of them has ever questioned
the sanctity of treaties, or denied that states are bound by the moral
law."
It is not strange that so many controversies about more or less trivial
matters should have obscured in the minds of both Englishmen and
Americans the fundamental identity of aim and purpose in the larger
things of life. For notwithstanding the German influence in America
which has had an undue part in shaping our educational methods, our
civilization is still English. Bismarck realized this when he said
that one of the most significant facts in modern history was that all
North America was English-speaking. Our fundamental ideals are the
same. We have a passion for liberty; we uphold the rights of the
individual as against the extreme claims of the state; we believe in
government through public opinion; we believe in the rule of law; we
believe in government limited by fundamental principles and
constitutional restraints as against the exercise of arbitrary power;
we have never been subjected to militarism or to the dominance of a
military caste; we are both so situated geographically as to be
dependent on sea power rather than on large armies, and not only do
navies not endanger the liberty of peoples but they are negligible
quantities politically. Great Britain had in 1914 only 137,500
officers and men in her navy and 26,200 reserves, a wholly
insignificant number compared to the millions that formed the army of
Germany and gave a military color to the whole life and thought of the
nation.
Not only are our political ideals the same, but in general our attitude
toward world politics is the same, and most people are surprised when
they are told that our fundamental foreign policies are identical. The
two most characteristic American foreign policies, the Monroe Doctrine
and the Open Door, were both, as we have seen, Anglo-American in origin.
VII
IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
In its original form the Monroe Doctrine was a direct defiance of
Europe, and it has never been favorably regarded by the nations of the
old world. Latterly, however, it has encountered adverse criticism in
some of the Latin-American states whose independence it helped to
secure and whose freedom from European control it has been instrumental
in maintaining. The Latin-American attacks on the Doctrine during the
last few years have been reflected to a greater or less extent by
writers in this country, particularly in academic circles. The
American writer who has become most conspicuous in this connection is
Professor Bingham of Yale, who has travelled extensively in South
America and who published in 1913 a little volume entitled "The Monroe
Doctrine, an Obsolete Shibboleth." The reasons why the Monroe Doctrine
has called forth so much criticism during the last few years are not
far to seek. The rapid advance of the United States in the Caribbean
Sea since 1898 has naturally aroused the apprehensions of the feebler
Latin-American states in that region, while the building of the Panama
Canal has rendered inevitable the adoption of a policy of naval
supremacy in the Caribbean and has led to the formulation of new
political policies in the zone of the Caribbean--what Admiral Chester
calls the larger Panama Canal Zone--that is, the West Indies, Mexico
and Central America, Colombia and Venezuela. Some of these policies,
which have already been formulated to a far greater extent than is
generally realized, are the establishment of protectorates, the
supervision of finances, the control of all available canal routes, the
acquisition of coaling stations, and the policing of disorderly
countries.
The long-delayed advance of the United States in the Caribbean Sea
actually began with the Spanish War. Since then we have made rapid
strides. Porto Rico was annexed at the close of the war, and Cuba
became a protectorate; the Canal Zone was a little later leased on
terms that amounted to practical annexation, and the Dominican Republic
came under the financial supervision of the United States; President
Wilson went further and assumed the administration of Haitian affairs,
leased from Nicaragua for a term of ninety-nine years a naval base on
Fonseca Bay, and purchased the Danish West Indies. As a result of this
rapid extension of American influence the political relations of the
countries bordering on the Caribbean will of necessity be profoundly
affected. Our Latin-American policy has been enlarged in meaning and
limited in territorial application so far as its newer phases are
concerned.
In 1904 President Roosevelt made a radical departure from our
traditional policy in proposing that we should assume financial
supervision over the Dominican Republic in order to prevent certain
European powers from forcibly collecting debts due their subjects.
Germany seemed especially determined to force a settlement of her
demands, and it was well known that Germany had for years regarded the
Monroe Doctrine as the main hindrance in the way of her acquiring a
foothold in Latin America. The only effective method of collecting the
interest on the foreign debt of the Dominican Republic appeared to be
the seizure and administration of her custom houses by some foreign
power or group of foreign powers. President Roosevelt foresaw that
such an occupation of the Dominican custom houses would, in view of the
large debt, constitute the occupation of American territory by European
powers for an indefinite period of time, and would, therefore, be a
violation of the Monroe Doctrine. He had before him also the results
of a somewhat similar financial administration of Egypt undertaken
jointly by England and France in 1878, and after Arabi's revolt
continued by England alone, with the result that Egypt soon became a
possession of the British crown to almost as great a degree as if it
had been formally annexed, and during the World War it was in fact
treated as an integral part of the British Empire. President Roosevelt
concluded, therefore, that where it was necessary to place a bankrupt
American republic in the hands of a receiver, the United States must
undertake to act as receiver and take over the administration of its
finances. He boldly adopted this policy and finally forced a reluctant
Senate to acquiesce. The arrangement has worked admirably. In spite
of the criticism that this policy encountered, the Taft administration
not only continued it in Santo Domingo, but tried to extend it to
Nicaragua and Honduras. In January, 1911, a treaty placing the
finances of Honduras under the supervision of the United States was
signed by Secretary Knox, and in June a similar treaty was signed with
Nicaragua. These treaties provided for the refunding of the foreign
debt, in each case through loans made by American bankers and secured
by the customs duties, the collector in each case to be approved by the
United States and to make an annual report to the Department of State.
These treaties were not ratified by the Senate.
Secretary Knox then tried another solution of the question. On
February 26, 1913, a new treaty with Nicaragua was submitted to the
Senate by the terms of which Nicaragua agreed to give the United States
an exclusive right of way for a canal through her territory and a naval
base in Fonseca Bay, in return for the payment of three millions of
dollars. The Senate failed to act on this treaty, as the close of the
Taft administration was then at hand. The Wilson administration
followed the same policy, however, and in July, 1913, Mr. Bryan
submitted to the Senate a third treaty with Nicaragua containing the
provisions of the second Knox treaty and in addition certain provisions
of the Platt amendment, which defines our protectorate over Cuba. This
treaty aroused strong opposition in the other Central American states,
and Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras filed formal protests with the
United States Government against its ratification on the ground that it
would convert Nicaragua into a protectorate of the United States and
thus defeat the long-cherished plan for a union of the Central American
republics. The Senate of the United States objected to the
protectorate feature of the treaty and refused to ratify it, but the
negotiations were renewed by the Wilson administration and on February
18, 1916, a new treaty, which omits the provisions of the Platt
amendment, was accepted by the Senate. This treaty grants to the
United States in perpetuity the exclusive right to construct a canal by
way of the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua, and leases to the United
States for ninety-nine years a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca, and
also the Great Corn and Little Corn islands as coaling stations. The
consideration for these favors was the sum of three millions of dollars
to be expended, with the approval of the Secretary of State of the
United States, in paying the public debt of Nicaragua and for other
public purposes to be agreed on by the two contracting parties.