February 28, 1916, carries the new Caribbean policies of the United
States to the farthest limits short of actual annexation. It provides
for the establishment of a receivership of Haitian customs under the
control of the United States similar in most respects to that
established over the Dominican Republic. It provides further for the
appointment, on the nomination of the President of the United States,
of a financial adviser, who shall assist in the settlement of the
foreign debt and direct expenditures of the surplus for the development
of the agricultural, mineral, and commercial resources of the republic.
It provides further for a native constabulary under American officers
appointed by the President of Haiti upon nomination by the President of
the United States. It further extends to Haiti the main provisions of
the Platt amendment. By controlling the internal financial
administration of the government the United States hopes to remove all
incentives for those revolutions which have in the past had for their
object a raid on the public treasury, and by controlling the customs
and maintaining order the United States hopes to avoid all possibility
of foreign intervention. The treaty is to remain in force for a period
of ten years and for another period of ten years if either party
presents specific reasons for continuing it on the ground that its
purpose has not been fully accomplished.
Prior to the Roosevelt administration the Monroe Doctrine was regarded
by the Latin-American states as solely a protective policy. The United
States did not undertake to control the financial administration or the
foreign policy of any of these republics. It was only after their
misconduct had gotten them into difficulty and some foreign power, or
group of foreign powers, was on the point of demanding reparation by
force that the United States stepped in and undertook to see to it that
foreign intervention did not take the form of occupation of territory
or interference in internal politics. The Monroe Doctrine has always
been in principle a policy of American intervention for the purpose of
preventing European intervention, but American intervention always
awaited the threat of immediate action on the part of some European
power. President Roosevelt concluded that it would be wiser to
restrain the reckless conduct of the smaller American republics before
disorders or public debts should reach a point which gave European
powers an excuse for intervening. In a message to Congress in 1904 he
laid down this new doctrine, which soon became famous as the Big Stick
policy. He said: "If a nation shows that it knows how to act with
reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if
it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference
from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which
results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in
America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some
civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the
United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States,
however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence,
to the exercise of an international police power." In other words,
since we could not permit European powers to restrain or punish
American states in cases of wrongdoing, we must ourselves undertake
that task. As long as the Monroe Doctrine was merely a policy of
benevolent protection which Latin-American states could invoke after
their unwise or evil conduct had brought European powers to the point
of demanding just retribution, it was regarded with favor and no
objection was raised to it; but the Roosevelt doctrine, that if we were
to continue to protect Latin-American states against European
intervention, we had a right to demand that they should refrain from
conduct which was likely to provoke such intervention, was quite a
different thing, and raised a storm of criticism and opposition.
The Roosevelt application of the Monroe Doctrine was undoubtedly a
perfectly logical step. It was endorsed by the Taft administration and
further extended by the Wilson administration and made one of our most
important policies in regard to the zone of the Caribbean. President
Roosevelt was right in drawing the conclusion that we had arrived at a
point where we had either to abandon the Monroe Doctrine or to extend
its application so as to cover the constantly increasing number of
disputes arising from the reckless creation of public debts and loose
financial administration. It was absurd for us to stand quietly by and
witness the utterly irresponsible creation of financial obligations
that would inevitably lead to European intervention and then undertake
to fix the bounds and limits of that intervention. It is interesting
to note that President Wilson did not hesitate to carry the new policy
to its logical conclusion, and that he went so far as to warn
Latin-American countries against granting to foreign corporations
concessions which, on account of their extended character, would be
certain to give rise to foreign claims which would, in turn, give an
excuse for European intervention. In discussing our Latin-American
policy shortly after the beginning of his administration, President
Wilson said: "You hear of 'concessions' to foreign capitalists in Latin
America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the
United States. They are not granted concessions. They are invited to
make investments. The work is ours, though they are welcome to invest
in it. We do not ask them to supply the capital and do the work. It
is an invitation, not a privilege; and states that are obliged, because
their territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise
and action, to grant concessions are in this condition, that foreign
interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs--a condition of
affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable. . . . What
these states are going to seek, therefore, is an emancipation from the
subordination, which has been inevitable, to foreign enterprise and an
assertion of the splendid character which, in spite of these
difficulties, they have again and again been able to demonstrate."
These remarks probably had reference to the oil concession which
Pearson and Son of London had arranged with the president of Colombia.
This concession is said to have covered practically all of the oil
interests in Colombia, and carried with it the right to improve harbors
and dig canals in the country. However, before the meeting of the
Colombian congress in November, 1913, which was expected to confirm the
concession, Lord Cowdray, the president of Pearson and Son, withdrew
the contract, alleging as his reason the opposition of the United
States.
Unfortunately President Roosevelt's assertion of the Big Stick policy
and of the duty of the United States to play policeman in the western
hemisphere was accompanied by his seizure of the Canal Zone. This
action naturally aroused serious apprehensions in Latin America and
gave color to the charge that the United States had converted the
Monroe Doctrine from a protective policy into a policy of selfish
aggression. Colombia felt outraged and aggrieved, and this feeling was
not alleviated by Mr. Roosevelt's speech several years later to the
students of the University of California, in which he boasted of having
taken the Canal Zone and said that if he had not taken it as he did,
the debate over the matter in Congress would still be going on. Before
the close of his administration President Roosevelt undertook to
placate Colombia, but the sop which he offered was indignantly
rejected. In January, 1909, Secretary Root proposed three treaties,
one between the United States and Panama, one between the United States
and Colombia, and one between Colombia and Panama. These treaties
provided for the recognition of the Republic of Panama by Colombia and
for the transference to Colombia of the first ten installments of the
annual rental of $250,000 which the United States had agreed to pay to
Panama for the lease of the Canal Zone. The treaties were ratified by
the United States and by Panama, but not by Colombia.
The Taft administration made repeated efforts to appease Colombia,
resulting in the formulation of a definite proposition by Secretary
Knox shortly before the close of President Taft's term. His proposals
were that if Colombia would ratify the Root treaties just referred to,
the United States would be willing to pay $10,000,000 for an exclusive
right of way for a canal by the Atrato route and for the perpetual
lease of the islands of St. Andrews and Old Providence as coaling
stations. These proposals were also rejected. The American minister,
Mr. Du Bois, acting, he said, on his own responsibility, then inquired
informally whether $25,000,000 without options of any kind would
satisfy Colombia. The answer was that Colombia would accept nothing
but the arbitration of the whole Panama question. Mr. Knox, in
reporting the matter to the President, said that Colombia seemed
determined to treat with the incoming Democratic administration.
Secretary Bryan took up the negotiations where Knox dropped them, and
concluded a treaty, according to the terms of which the United States
was to express regret at what had occurred and to pay Colombia
$25,000,000. The Senate of the United States refused to ratify this
treaty while Wilson was in the White House, but as soon as Harding
became president they consented to the payment and ratified the treaty
with a few changes in the preamble.
The facts stated above show conclusively that the two most significant
developments of American policy in the Caribbean during the last twenty
years have been the establishment of formal protectorates and the
exercise of financial supervision over weak and disorderly states. Our
protectorate over Cuba was clearly defined in the so-called Platt
amendment, which was inserted in the army appropriation bill of March
2, 1901, and directed the President to leave control of the island of
Cuba to its people so soon as a government should be established under
a constitution which defined the future relations with the United
States substantially as follows: (1) That the government of Cuba would
never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power
which would impair the independence of the island; (2) that the said
government would not contract any public debt which could not be met by
the ordinary revenues of the island; (3) that the government of Cuba
would permit the United States to exercise the right to intervene for
the preservation of Cuban independence, and for the protection of life,
property, and individual liberty; (4) that all acts of the United
States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof should be ratified
and validated; (5) that the government of Cuba would carry out the
plans already devised for the sanitation of the cities of the island;
and finally that the government of Cuba would sell or lease to the
United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain
specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United
States.
It is understood that these articles, with the exception of the fifth,
which was proposed by General Leonard Wood, were carefully drafted by
Elihu Root, at that time Secretary of War, discussed at length by
President McKinley's Cabinet, and entrusted to Senator Platt of
Connecticut, who offered them as an amendment to the army appropriation
bill. The Wilson administration, as already stated, embodied the first
three provisions of the Platt amendment in the Haitian treaty of 1916.
Prior to the World War, which has upset all calculations, it seemed
highly probable that the Platt amendment would in time be extended to
all the weaker states within the zone of the Caribbean. If the United
States is to exercise a protectorate over such states, the right to
intervene and the conditions of intervention should be clearly defined
and publicly proclaimed. Hitherto whatever action we have taken in
Latin America has been taken under the Monroe Doctrine--a policy
without legal sanction--which an international court might not
recognize. Action under a treaty would have the advantage of legality.
In other words, the recent treaties with Caribbean states have
converted American policy into law.
The charge that in establishing protectorates and financial supervision
over independent states we have violated the terms of the Monroe
Doctrine is one that has been frequently made. Those who have made it
appear to be laboring under the illusion that the Monroe Doctrine was
wholly altruistic in its aim. As a matter of fact, the Monroe Doctrine
has never been regarded by the United States as in any sense a
self-denying declaration. President Monroe said that we should
consider any attempt on the part of the European powers "to extend
their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our
peace and safety." The primary object of the policy outlined by
President Monroe was, therefore, the peace and safety of the United
States. The protection of Latin-American states against European
intervention was merely a means of protecting ourselves. While the
United States undertook to prevent the encroachment of European powers
in Latin America, it never for one moment admitted any limitation upon
the possibility of its own expansion in this region. The whole course
of American history establishes the contrary point of view. Since the
Monroe Doctrine was enunciated we have annexed at the expense of
Latin-American states, Texas, New Mexico, California, and the Canal
Zone. Upon other occasions we emphatically declined to bind ourselves
by treaty stipulations with England and France that under no
circumstance would we annex the island of Cuba. Shortly after the
beginning of his first term President Wilson declared in a public
address at Mobile that "the United States will never again seek one
additional foot of territory by conquest." This declaration introduces
a new chapter in American diplomacy.
VIII
THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM
When President Wilson assumed office March 4, 1913, there was nothing
but the Huerta revolution, the full significance of which was not then
appreciated, to suggest to his mind the forecast that before the close
of his term questions of foreign policy would absorb the attention of
the American people and tax to the limit his own powers of mind and
body. It seems now a strange fact that neither in his writings nor in
his public addresses had President Wilson ever shown any marked
interest in questions of international law and diplomacy. He had, on
the contrary, made a life-long study of political organization and
legislative procedure. Those who knew him had always thought that he
was by nature fitted to be a great parliamentary leader and it soon
appeared that he had a very definite legislative program which he
intended to put through Congress. The foreign problems that confronted
him so suddenly and unexpectedly were doubtless felt to be annoying
distractions from the work which he had mapped out for himself and
which was far more congenial to his tastes. As time went by, however,
he was forced to give more and more thought to our relations with Latin
America on the one hand and to the European war on the other. His
ideas on international problems at first cautiously set forth, soon
caught step with the rapid march of events and guided the thought of
the world.
The Mexican situation, which reached a crisis a few days before Mr.
Wilson came into office, at once demanded his attention and led to the
enunciation of a general Latin-American policy. He had scarcely been
in office a week when he issued a statement which was forwarded by the
secretary of state to all American diplomatic officers in Latin
America. In it he said:
"One of the chief objects of my administration will be to cultivate the
friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of
Central and South America, and to promote in every proper and honorable
way the interests which are common to the peoples of the two
continents. . . .
"The United States has nothing to seek in Central and South America
except the lasting interests of the peoples of the two continents, the
security of governments intended for the people and for no special
group or interest, and the development of personal and trade
relationships between the two continents which shall redound to the
profit and advantage of both, and interfere with the rights and
liberties of neither.
"From these principles may be read so much of the future policy of this
government as it is necessary now to forecast, and in the spirit of
these principles I may, I hope, be permitted with as much confidence as
earnestness, to extend to the governments of all the republics of
America the hand of genuine disinterested friendship and to pledge my
own honor and the honor of my colleagues to every enterprise of peace
and amity that a fortunate future may disclose."
The policy here outlined, and elaborated a few months later in an
address before the Southern Commercial Congress at Mobile, Alabama, has
been termed the New Pan-Americanism. The Pan-American ideal is an old
one, dating back in fact to the Panama Congress of 1826. The object of
this congress was not very definitely stated in the call, which was
issued by Simon Bolivar, but his purpose was to secure the independence
and peace of the new Spanish republics through either a permanent
confederation or a series of diplomatic congresses. President Adams
through Henry Clay, who was at that time Secretary of State, promptly
accepted the invitation to send delegates. The matter was debated at
such length, however, in the House and Senate that the American
delegates did not reach Panama until after the congress had adjourned.
In view of the opposition which the whole scheme encountered in
Congress, the instructions to the American delegates were very
carefully drawn and their powers were strictly limited. They were
cautioned against committing their government in any way to the
establishment of "an amphictyonic council, invested with power fully to
decide controversies between the American states or to regulate in any
respect their conduct." They were also to oppose the formation of an
offensive and defensive alliance between the American powers, for, as
Mr. Clay pointed out, the Holy Alliance had abandoned all idea of
assisting Spain in the reconquest of her late colonies. After
referring to "the avoidance of foreign alliances as a leading maxim" of
our foreign policy, Mr. Clay continued: "Without, therefore, asserting
that an exigency may not occur in which an alliance of the most
intimate kind between the United States and the other American
republics would be highly proper and expedient, it may be safely said
that the occasion which would warrant a departure from that established
maxim ought to be one of great urgency, and that none such is believed
now to exist."
The British Government sent a special envoy to reside near the Congress
and to place himself in frank and friendly communication with the
delegates. Canning's private instructions to this envoy declared that,
"Any project for putting the U. S. of North America at the head of an
American Confederacy, as against Europe, would be highly displeasing to
your Government. It would be felt as an ill return for the service
which has been rendered to those States, and the dangers which have
been averted from them, by the countenance and friendship, and public
declarations of Great Britain; and it would probably, at no distant
period, endanger the peace both of America and of Europe."
The Panama Congress was without practical results and it was more than
half a century before the scheme for international coöperation on the
part of American states was again taken up. In 1881 Secretary Blaine
issued an invitation to the American republics to hold a conference at
Washington, but the continuance of the war between Chile and Peru
caused an indefinite postponement of the proposed conference. Toward
the close of President Cleveland's first administration the invitation
was renewed and the First International Conference of American States
convened at Washington in 1890. It happened that when the Conference
met Mr. Blaine was again Secretary of State and presided over its
opening sessions. The most notable achievement of this Conference was
the establishment of the Bureau of American Republics, now known as the
Pan-American Union. The Second International Conference of American
States, held in the City of Mexico in 1901, arranged for all American
states to become parties to the Hague Convention of 1899 for the
pacific settlement of international disputes and drafted a treaty for
the compulsory arbitration, as between American states, of pecuniary
claims. The Third Conference, held at Rio Janeiro in 1906, extended
the above treaty for another period of five years and proposed that the
subject of pecuniary claims be considered at the second Hague
Conference. Added significance was given to the Rio Conference by the
presence of Secretary Root who, although not a delegate, made it the
occasion of a special mission to South America. The series of notable
addresses which he delivered on this mission gave a new impetus to the
Pan-American movement. The Fourth Conference, held at Buenos Ayres in
1910, was occupied largely with routine matters. It extended the
pecuniary claims convention for an indefinite period.
The conferences above referred to were political or diplomatic in
character. There have been held two Pan-American Scientific Congresses
in which the United States participated, one at Chile in 1908 and one
at Washington, December, 1915, to January, 1916. A very important
Pan-American Financial Congress was held at Washington in May, 1915.
These congresses have accomplished a great deal in the way of promoting
friendly feeling as well as the advancement of science and commerce
among the republics of the Western Hemisphere.
The American Institute of International Law, organized at Washington in
October, 1912, is a body which is likely to have great influence in
promoting the peace and welfare of this hemisphere. The Institute is
composed of five representatives from the national society of
international law in each of the twenty-one American republics. At a
session held in the city of Washington, January 6, 1916, the Institute
adopted a Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations. This
declaration, designed to give a solid legal basis to the new
Pan-Americanism, was as follows:
I. Every nation has the right to exist and to protect and to conserve
its existence; but this right neither implies the right nor justifies
the act of the state to protect itself or to conserve its existence by
the commission of unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending states.
II. Every nation has the right to independence in the sense that it has
a right to the pursuit of happiness and is free to develop itself
without interference or control from other states, provided that in so
doing it does not interfere with or violate the rights of other states.
III. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every other
nation belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have the
right to claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence of the
United States, "to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate
and equal station to which the laws of nature and of Nature's God
entitle them."
IV. Every nation has the right to territory within defined boundaries,
and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, and all
persons whether native or foreign found therein.