the powers, the United States threw the weight of its influence on the
side of moderation, urging the powers not to impose too many burdens on
China and declaring that the only hope for the future lay in a strong,
independent, responsible Chinese government. Contrary to the terms of
the final protocol, however, Russia retained in Manchuria the troops
concentrated there during the Boxer movement with a view to exacting
further concessions from China. The open-door policy was again
ignored. The seriousness of the situation led England and Japan to
sign a defensive agreement January 30, 1902, recognizing England's
interest in China and Japan's interest in Korea, and providing that if
either party should be attacked in defense of its interest, the other
party would remain neutral, unless a third power joined in, in which
event the second party would come to the assistance of the first. A
formal protest made by the United States, February 1, against some of
the demands Russia was making on China led Russia to conclude that the
American government had an understanding with England and Japan, but
Mr. Hay gave the assurance that he had known nothing about the
Anglo-Japanese agreement until it was made public. He succeeded in
securing from Russia, however, a definite promise to evacuate
Manchuria, but as the time for the withdrawal of her troops drew near,
Russia again imposed new conditions on China, and deliberately
misrepresented to the United States the character of the new proposals.
After the suppression of the Boxer uprising, China had agreed to extend
the scope of her commercial treaties with the powers. When the
negotiation of a new treaty with the United States was begun, our
representative demanded that at least two new ports in Manchuria be
opened to foreign trade and residence. The Chinese commissioners
declined to discuss the subject on the alleged ground that they had no
instructions to do so. It was evident that there was secret opposition
somewhere, and after considerable difficulty Mr. Hay finally secured
evidence that it came from Russia. When confronted with the evidence
the Russian Government finally admitted the facts. We were told that
we could not be admitted to one of the ports that we had designated
because it was situated within the Russian railway zone, and therefore
not under the complete jurisdiction of China, but that another port
would be substituted for it. Secretary Hay and President Roosevelt
were helpless. They accepted what they could get and kept quiet. "The
administrative entity" of China was again utterly ignored. The
difficulty was that we did not have a strong enough navy in the Pacific
to fight Russia alone, and President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay
realized that neither the Senate nor public opinion would consent to an
alliance with England and Japan. Had these three powers made a joint
declaration in support of the open-door policy, the exploitation of
China would have ceased, there would have been no Russo-Japanese war,
and the course of world history during the period that has since
intervened might have been very different.
When we backed down and abandoned Manchuria to Russian exploitation
Japan stepped into the breach. After long negotiations the Japanese
Government finally delivered an ultimatum to Russia which resulted in
the rupture of diplomatic relations and war. After a series of notable
victories on land and sea Japan was fast approaching the end of her
resources, and it is now an open secret that the Emperor wrote a
personal letter to President Roosevelt requesting him to intervene
diplomatically and pave the way for peace. The President was quick to
act on the suggestion and the commissioners of Russia and Japan met at
Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Here President Roosevelt's intervention
should have ceased. The terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth were a
bitter disappointment to the Japanese people and the Japanese
commissioners undertook to shift the burden from their shoulders by
stating that President Roosevelt had urged them to surrender their
claim to the Island of Saghalien and to give up all idea of an
indemnity. Japanese military triumph had again, as at the close of the
Chino-Japanese War, been followed by diplomatic defeat, and for this
defeat Japanese public opinion held President Roosevelt responsible.
From the days of Commodore Perry and Townsend Harris to the Treaty of
Portsmouth, relations between the United States and Japan had been
almost ideal. Since the negotiations at Portsmouth there has been a
considerable amount of bad feeling, and at times diplomatic relations
have been subjected to a severe strain.
Having fought a costly war in order to check the Russian advance in
Manchuria, the Japanese naturally felt that they had a paramount
interest in China. They consequently sharply resented the attempts
which the United States subsequently made, particularly Secretary
Knox's proposal for the neutralization of the railways of Manchuria, to
formulate policies for China. They took the position that we had had
our day and that we must henceforth remain hands off so far as China
was concerned. This attitude of mind was not unnatural and during the
World War the United States, in order to bind the Japanese government
more closely to the Allied Cause, agreed to recognize, in the
Lansing-Ishii agreement, the "special interests" of Japan in China.
VI
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
A few years ago George L. Beer, one of our leading students of British
colonial policy, said "It is easily conceivable, and not at all
improbable, that the political evolution of the next centuries may take
such a course that the American Revolution will lose the great
significance that is now attached to it, and will appear merely as the
temporary separation of two kindred peoples whose inherent similarity
was obscured by superficial differences resulting from dissimilar
economic and social conditions." This statement does not appear as
extravagant to-day as it did ten years ago. As early as 1894, Captain
Mahan, the great authority on naval history, published an essay
entitled "Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion," in which he
pointed out that these two countries were the only great powers which
were by geographical position exempt from the burden of large armies
and dependent upon the sea for intercourse with the other great nations.
In a volume dealing with questions of American foreign policy,
published in 1907, the present writer concluded the last paragraph with
this statement: "By no means the least significant of recent changes is
the development of cordial relations with England; and it seems now
that the course of world politics is destined to lead to the further
reknitting together of the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race
in bonds of peace and international sympathy, in a union not cemented
by any formal alliance, but based on community of interests and of
aims, a union that will constitute the highest guarantee of the
political stability and moral progress of the world."
The United States has very naturally had closer contact with England
than with any other European power. This has been due to the fact that
England was the mother country, that after independence was established
a large part of our trade continued to be with the British Isles, that
our northern boundary touches British territory for nearly four
thousand miles, and that the British navy and mercantile marine have
dominated the Atlantic Ocean which has been our chief highway of
intercourse with other nations. Having had more points of contact we
have had more disputes with England than with any other nation. Some
writers have half jocularly attributed this latter fact to our common
language. The Englishman reads our books, papers, and magazines, and
knows what we think of him, while we read what he writes about us, and
in neither case is the resulting impression flattering to the national
pride.
Any one who takes the trouble to read what was written in England about
America and the Americans between 1820 and 1850 will wonder how war was
avoided. A large number of English travellers came to the United
States during this period and published books about us when they got
home. The books were bad enough in themselves, but the great English
periodicals, the _Edinburgh Review_, _Blackwood's_, the _British
Review_, and the _Quarterly_, quoted at length the most objectionable
passages from these writers and made malicious attacks on Americans and
American institutions. American men were described as "turbulent
citizens, abandoned Christians, inconstant husbands, unnatural fathers,
and treacherous friends." Our soldiers and sailors were charged with
cowardice in the War of 1812. It was stated that "in the southern
parts of the Union the rites of our holy faith are almost never
practised. . . . Three and a half millions enjoy no means of religious
instruction. The religious principle is gaining ground in the northern
parts of the Union; it is becoming fashionable among the better orders
of society to go to church . . . The greater number of states declare
it to be unconstitutional to refer to the providence of God in any of
their public acts." The _Quarterly Review_ informed its readers that
"the supreme felicity of a true-born American is inaction of body and
inanity of mind." Dickens's _American Notes_ was an ungrateful return
for the kindness and enthusiasm with which he had been received in this
country. De Tocqueville's _Democracy in America_ was widely read in
England and doubtless had its influence in revising opinion concerning
America. Richard Cobden was, however, the first Englishman to
interpret correctly the significance of America as an economic force.
His essay on America, published in 1835, pointed out that British
policy should be more concerned with economic relations with America
than with European politics. As Professor Dunning says, "Cobden made
the United States the text of his earliest sermon against militarism
and protectionism."
Notwithstanding innumerable disputes over boundaries, fisheries, and
fur seals, trade with the British West Indies and Canada, and questions
of neutral rights and obligations, we have had unbroken peace for more
than a hundred years. Upon several occasions, notably during the
Canadian insurrection of 1837 and during our own Civil War,
disturbances along the Canadian border created strained relations, but
absence of frontier guards and forts has prevented hasty action on the
part of either government. The agreement of 1817, effecting
disarmament on the Great Lakes, has not only saved both countries the
enormous cost of maintaining navies on these inland waters, but it has
prevented hostile demonstrations in times of crisis.
During the Canadian rebellion of 1837 Americans along the border
expressed openly their sympathy for the insurgents who secured arms and
munitions from the American side. In December a British force crossed
the Niagara River, boarded and took possession of the _Caroline_, a
vessel which had been hired by the insurgents to convey their cannon
and other supplies. The ship was fired and sent over the Falls. When
the _Caroline_ was boarded one American, Amos Durfee, was killed and
several others wounded. The United States at once demanded redress,
but the British Government took the position that the seizure of the
_Caroline_ was a justifiable act of self-defense against people whom
their own government either could not or would not control.
The demands of the United States were still unredressed when in 1840 a
Canadian named Alexander McLeod made the boast in a tavern on the
American side that he had slain Durfee. He was taken at his word,
examined before a magistrate, and committed to jail in Lockport.
McLeod's arrest created great excitement on both sides of the border.
The British minister at Washington called upon the Government of the
United States "to take prompt and effectual steps for the liberation of
Mr. McLeod." Secretary of State Forsyth replied that the offense with
which McLeod was charged had been committed within the State of New
York; that the jurisdiction of each State of the United States was,
within its proper sphere, perfectly independent of the Federal
Government; that the latter could not interfere. The date set for the
trial of McLeod was the fourth Monday in March, 1841. Van Buren's term
ended and Harrison's began on the 4th of March, and Webster became
Secretary of State. The British minister was given instructions by his
government to demand the immediate release of McLeod. This demand was
made, he said, because the attack on the _Caroline_ was an act of a
public character; because it was a justifiable use of force for the
defense of British territory against unprovoked attack by "British
rebels and American pirates"; because it was contrary to the principles
of civilized nations to hold individuals responsible for acts done by
order of the constituted authorities of the State; and because Her
Majesty's government could not admit the doctrine that the Federal
Government had no power to interfere and that the decision must rest
with the State of New York. The relations of foreign powers were with
the Federal Government. To admit that the Federal Government had no
control over a State would lead to the dissolution of the Union so far
as foreign powers were concerned, and to the accrediting of foreign
diplomatic agents, not to the Federal Government, but to each separate
State. Webster received the note quietly and sent the attorney-general
to Lockport to see that McLeod had competent counsel. After
considerable delay, during which Webster replied to the main arguments
of the British note, McLeod was acquitted and released.
In the midst of the dispute over the case of the _Caroline_ serious
trouble arose between the authorities of Maine and New Brunswick over
the undetermined boundary between the St. Croix River and the
Highlands, and there ensued the so-called "Aroostook War." During the
summer of 1838 British and American lumbermen began operating along the
Aroostook River in large numbers. The governor of Maine sent a body of
militia to enforce the authority of that State, and the New Brunswick
authorities procured a detachment of British regulars to back up their
position. Bloodshed was averted by the arrival of General Winfield
Scott, who managed to restrain the Maine authorities. The
administration found it necessary to take up seriously the settlement
of the boundary question, and for the next three years the matter was
under consideration, while each side had surveyors employed in a vain
attempt to locate a line which would correspond to the line of the
treaty. As soon as the McLeod affair was settled, Webster devoted
himself earnestly to the boundary question. He decided to drop the
mass of data accumulated by the surveyors and historians, and to reach
an agreement by direct negotiation.
In April, 1842, Alexander Baring, Lord Ashburton, arrived in Washington
and the following August the Webster-Ashburton treaty was signed. The
boundary fixed by the treaty gave Maine a little more than half the
area which she claimed and the United States appropriated $150,000 to
compensate Maine for the territory which she had lost.
The settlement of these matters did not, however, insure peace with
England. Settlers were crowding into Oregon and it was evident that
the joint occupation, established by the convention of 1818, would soon
have to be terminated and a divisional line agreed upon. Great Britain
insisted that her southern boundary should extend at least as far as
the Columbia River, while Americans finally claimed the whole of the
disputed area, and one of the slogans of the presidential campaign of
1844 was "Fifty-Four-Forty or Fight." At the same time Great Britain
actively opposed the annexation of Texas by the United States. Her
main reason for this course was that she wished to encourage the
development of Texas as a cotton-growing country from which she could
draw a large enough supply to make her independent of the United
States. If Texas should thus devote herself to the production of
cotton as her chief export crop, she would, of course, adopt a
free-trade policy and thus create a considerable market for British
goods.
As soon as it became evident that Tyler contemplated taking definite
steps toward annexation, Lord Aberdeen secured the coöperation of the
government of Louis Philippe in opposing the absorption of Texas by the
American republic. While the treaty for the annexation of Texas was
before the Senate, Lord Aberdeen came forward with a proposition that
England and France should unite with Texas and Mexico in a diplomatic
act or perpetual treaty, securing to Texas recognition as an
independent republic, but preventing her from ever acquiring territory
beyond the Rio Grande or joining the American union. While the United
States would be invited to join in this act, it was not expected that
the government of that country would agree to it. Mexico obstinately
refused to recognize the independence of Texas. Lord Aberdeen was so
anxious to prevent the annexation of Texas that he was ready, if
supported by France, to coerce Mexico and fight the United States, but
the French Government was not willing to go this far, so the scheme was
abandoned.
The two foremost issues in the campaign of 1844 were the annexation of
Texas and the occupation of Oregon. Texas was annexed by joint
resolution a few days before the inauguration of Polk. This act, it
was foreseen, would probably provoke a war with Mexico, so Polk's first
task was to adjust the Oregon dispute in order to avoid complications
with England. The fate of California was also involved. That province
was not likely to remain long in the hands of a weak power like Mexico.
In fact, British consular agents and naval officers had for several
years been urging upon their government the great value of Upper
California. Aberdeen refused to countenance any insurrectionary
movement in California, but he directed his agents to keep vigilant
watch on the proceedings of citizens of the United States in that
province. Had England and Mexico arrived at an understanding and
joined in a war against the United States, the probabilities are that
England would have acquired not only the whole of Oregon, but
California besides. In fact, in May, 1846, just as we were on the
point of going to war with Mexico, the president of Mexico officially
proposed to transfer California to England as security for a loan.
Fortunately, the Oregon question had been adjusted and England had no
reason for wishing to go to war with the United States. Mexico's offer
was therefore rejected. Polk managed the diplomatic situation with
admirable promptness and firmness. Notwithstanding the fact that the
democratic platform had demanded "Fifty-Four-Forty or Fight," as soon
as Polk became President he offered to compromise with England on the
49th parallel. When this offer was declined he asked permission of
Congress to give England the necessary notice for the termination of
the joint occupation agreement, to provide for the military defense of
the territory in dispute, and to extend over it the laws of the United
States. A few months later notice was given to England, but at the
same time the hope was expressed that the matter might be adjusted
diplomatically. As soon as it was evident that the United States was
in earnest, England gracefully yielded and accepted the terms which had
been first proposed.
As war with Mexico was imminent the public generally approved of the
Oregon compromise, though the criticism was made by some in the North
that the South, having secured in Texas a large addition to slave
territory, was indifferent about the expansion of free territory. In
fact, Henry Cabot Lodge, in his recent little book, "One Hundred Years
of Peace," says: "The loss of the region between the forty-ninth
parallel and the line of 54-40 was one of the most severe which ever
befell the United States. Whether it could have been obtained without
a war is probably doubtful, but it never ought to have been said,
officially or otherwise, that we would fight for 54-40 unless we were
fully prepared to do so. If we had stood firm for the line of 54-40
without threats, it is quite possible that we might have succeeded in
the end; but the hypotheses of history are of little practical value,
and the fact remains that by the treaty of 1846 we lost a complete
control of the Pacific coast."
That the United States lived through what Professor Dunning calls "the
roaring forties" without a war with England seems now little less than
a miracle. During the next fifteen years relations were much more
amicable, though by no means free from disputes. The most important
diplomatic act was the signature in 1850 of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
which conceded to England a joint interest in any canal that might be
built through the isthmus connecting North and South America. One of
the interesting episodes of this period was the dismissal of Crampton,
the British minister, who insisted on enlisting men in the United
States for service in the Crimean War, an act which pales into
insignificance in comparison with some of the things which Bernstorff
did during the early stages of the Great War.
Relations between the United States and England during the American
Civil War involved so many highly technical questions that it is
impossible to do more than touch upon them in the present connection.
Diplomatic discussions centred about such questions as the validity of
the blockade established by President Lincoln, the recognition by
England of Confederate belligerency, the _Trent_ affair, and the
responsibility of England for the depredations committed by the
_Alabama_ and other Confederate cruisers. When the United States first
demanded reparation for the damage inflicted on American commerce by
the Confederate cruisers, the British Government disclaimed all
liability on the ground that the fitting out of the cruisers had not
been completed within British jurisdiction. Even after the close of
the war the British Government continued to reject all proposals for a
settlement. The American nation, flushed with victory, was bent on
redress, and so deep-seated was the resentment against England, that
the Fenian movement, which had for its object the establishment of an
independent republic in Ireland, met with open encouragement in this
country. The House of Representatives went so far as to repeal the law
forbidding Americans to fit out ships for belligerents, but the Senate
failed to concur. The successful war waged by Prussia against Austria
in 1866 disturbed the European balance, and rumblings of the
approaching Franco-Prussian war caused uneasiness in British cabinet
circles. Fearing that if Great Britain were drawn into the conflict
the American people might take a sweet revenge by fitting out
"Alabamas" for her enemies, the British Government assumed a more
conciliatory attitude, and in January, 1869, Lord Clarendon signed with
Reverdy Johnson a convention providing for the submission to a mixed
commission of all claims which had arisen since 1853. Though the
convention included, it did not specifically mention, the _Alabama_
Claims, and it failed to contain any expression of regret for the
course pursued by the British Government during the war. The Senate,
therefore, refused by an almost unanimous vote to ratify the
arrangement.