Settlement of International Disputes, drew up a plan for an
International Prize Court, and attempted a codification of the rules of
international law on a number of subjects relating to the conduct of
war and the rights of neutrals. The American delegates, headed by Mr.
Choate, not only took a prominent part in these proceedings, but,
acting under instructions from Secretary Root, they proposed to the
Conference the creation of a permanent international court of justice.
The creation of an international court of justice whose decisions would
have the force of law, as distinguished from an international court of
arbitration whose decisions are usually arrived at by a compromise of
conflicting legal or political points of view, had long been advocated
by advanced thinkers, but the proposition had always been held by
practical statesmen to be purely academic. The serious advocacy of the
proposition at this time by a great nation like the United States and
the able arguments advanced by Mr. Choate marked an important step
forward and made a profound impression. There were two difficulties in
the way of establishing such a court at the second Hague Conference.
In the first place, the delegation of the United States was the only
one which had instructions on this subject, and in the second place it
was found to be impossible to agree upon a method of selecting the
judges. The great world powers, with the exception of the United
States, demanded permanent representation on the court. The smaller
nations, relying on the doctrine of the equality of states, demanded
likewise to be represented. If each nation could have been given the
right to appoint a judge, the court could have been organized, but
there would have been forty-four judges instead of fifteen, the number
suggested in the American plan. The Draft Convention for the
Establishment of the Court of Arbitral Justice, as it was agreed the
new court should be designated, was submitted to the Conference and its
adoption recommended to the signatory powers. This Draft contained
thirty-five articles and covered everything except the method of
appointing judges. This question was to be settled by diplomatic
negotiation, and it was agreed that the court should be established as
soon as a satisfactory agreement with regard to the choice of judges
could be reached. After the adjournment of the Conference the United
States continued its advocacy of the international court of justice
through the ordinary diplomatic channels. The proposal was made that
the method of selecting judges for the Prize Court be adopted for the
court of justice, that is, that each power should appoint a judge, that
the judges of the larger powers should always sit on the court while
the judges of the other powers should sit by a system of rotation for
limited periods. It was found, however, that many of the smaller
states were unwilling to accept this suggestion, and as difficulties
which we will mention presently prevented the establishment of the
Prize Court, the whole question of the court of justice was postponed.
Most of the conventions adopted by the second Hague Conference were
ratified by the United States without reservation. The fact, however,
that certain of these conventions were not ratified by all the powers
represented at the Conference, and that others were ratified with
important reservations, left the status of most of the conventions in
doubt, so that at the beginning of the World War there was great
confusion as to what rules were binding and what were not binding. The
Conference found it impossible to arrive at an agreement on many of the
most vital questions of maritime law. Under these circumstances the
powers were not willing to have the proposed International Prize Court
established without the previous codification of the body of law which
was to govern its decisions.
In order to supply this need the London Naval Conference was convened
in December, 1908, and issued a few months later the Declaration of
London. The London Naval Conference was attended by representatives of
the principal maritime powers including the United States, and the
Declaration which it issued was avowedly a codification of the existing
rules of international law. This was not true, however, of all the
provisions of the Declaration. On several of the most vital questions
of maritime law, such as blockade, the doctrine of continuous voyage,
the destruction of neutral prizes, and the inclusion of food stuffs in
the list of conditional contraband, the Declaration was a compromise
and therefore unsatisfactory. It encountered from the start the most
violent opposition in England. In Parliament the Naval Prize Bill,
which was to give the Declaration effect, was discussed at considerable
length. It passed the House of Commons by a small vote, but was
defeated in the House of Lords. It was denounced by the press, and a
petition to the king, drawn up by the Imperial Maritime League
protesting against it, was signed by a long list of commercial
associations, mayors, members of the House of Lords, general officers,
and other public officials. One hundred and thirty-eight naval
officers of flag rank addressed to the prime minister a public protest
against the Declaration. In the debate in the House of Lords the main
objections to the Declaration were (1) that it made food stuffs
conditional contraband instead of placing them on the free list, (2)
that the clause permitting the seizure of conditional contraband bound
for a fortified place or "other place serving as a base for the armed
forces of the enemy" would render all English ports liable to be
treated as bases by an enemy, and (3) that it permitted the destruction
of neutral prizes.
The refusal of England to ratify the Declaration of London sealed its
fate. The United States Senate formally ratified it, but this
ratification was, of course, conditional on the ratification of other
powers. At the beginning of the Great War the United States made a
formal proposal to the belligerent powers that they should agree to
adopt the Declaration for the period of the war in order that there
might be a definite body of law for all parties concerned. This
proposal was accepted by Germany and Austria, but England, France, and
Russia were not willing to accept the Declaration of London without
modifications. The United States, therefore, promptly withdrew its
proposal and stated that where its rights as a neutral were concerned
it would expect the belligerent powers to observe the recognized rules
of international law and existing treaties.
The Hague Conferences were concerned with questions of general
international interest, and had no bearing upon the internal affairs of
states. Such, however, was not the character of the conference which
convened at Algeciras, Spain, in December, 1905, for the purpose of
adjusting the very serious dispute that had arisen between France and
Germany over the status of Morocco. France had been engaged for some
years in the peaceful penetration of Morocco. By the terms of the
Entente of 1904 England recognized Morocco as being within the French
sphere of influence and France agreed to recognize England's position
in Egypt. The German Kaiser had no idea of permitting any part of the
world to be divided up without his consent. In March, 1905, while on a
cruise in the Mediterranean, he disembarked at Tangier and paid a visit
to the Sultan "in his character of independent sovereign." As the
Russian armies had just suffered disastrous defeats at the hands of the
Japanese, France could not count on aid from her ally and the Kaiser
did not believe that the recently formed Entente was strong enough to
enable her to count on English support. His object in landing at
Tangier was, therefore, to check and humiliate France while she was
isolated and to break up the Entente before it should develop into an
alliance. Delcassé, the French foreign minister, wanted to stand firm,
but Germany demanded his retirement and the prime minister accepted his
resignation. In recognition of this triumph, the German chancellor
Count von Bülow was given the title of Prince. Not satisfied with this
achievement, the Kaiser demanded a general European conference on the
Moroccan question, and, in order to avoid war, President Roosevelt
persuaded France to submit the whole dispute to the powers interested.
The Algeciras conference turned out to be a bitter disappointment to
Germany. Not only did France receive the loyal support of England, but
she was also backed by the United States and even by Italy--a warning
to Germany that the Triple Alliance was in danger. As the conference
was called nominally for the purpose of instituting certain
administrative reforms in Morocco, President Roosevelt decided, in view
of our rights under a commercial treaty of 1880, to take part in the
proceedings. The American delegates were Henry White, at that time
ambassador to Italy, and Samuel R. Gummeré, minister to Morocco. As
the United States professed to have no political interests at stake,
its delegates were instrumental in composing many of the difficulties
that arose during the conference and their influence was exerted to
preserve the European balance of power. The facts in regard to
America's part in this conference were carefully concealed from the
public. There was nothing in any published American document to
indicate that the participation of our representatives was anything
more than casual. André Tardieu, the well-known French publicist, who
reported the conference and later published his impressions in book
form, first indicated that President Roosevelt was a positive factor in
the proceedings. But it was not until the publication of Bishop's
"Theodore Roosevelt and His Time" that the full extent of Roosevelt's
activities in this connection became known.
There can be no doubt that our participation in the Moroccan conference
was the most radical departure ever made from our traditional policy of
isolation. Roosevelt's influence was exerted for preserving the
balance of power in Europe. As we look back upon the events of that
year we feel, in view of what has since happened, that he was fully
justified in the course he pursued. Had his motives for participating
in the conference been known at the time, they would not have been
upheld either by the Senate or by public opinion. There are many
serious objections to secret diplomacy, but it cannot be entirely done
away with even under a republican form of government until the people
are educated to a fuller understanding of international politics. The
German Kaiser was relentless in his attempt to score a diplomatic
triumph while France was isolated. He was thwarted, however, by the
moral support which England, Italy, and the United States gave to
France.
During the proceedings of the conference the American delegates
declared in open session that the United States had no political
interest in Morocco and that they would sign the treaty only with the
understanding that the United States would thereby assume no
"obligation or responsibility for the enforcement thereof." This
declaration did not satisfy the United States Senate, which no doubt
suspected the part that was actually played by America in the
conference. At any rate, when the treaty was finally ratified the
Senate attached to its resolution of ratification the following
declaration:
"Resolved further. That the Senate, as a part of this act of
ratification, understands that the participation of the United States
in the Algeciras conference and in the formation and adoption of the
general act and protocol which resulted therefrom, was with the sole
purpose of preserving and increasing its commerce in Morocco, the
protection as to life, liberty, and property of its citizens residing
or traveling therein, and of aiding by its friendly offices and
efforts, in removing friction and controversy which seemed to menace
the peace between powers signatory with the United States to the treaty
of 1880, all of which are on terms of amity with this Government; and
without purpose to depart from the traditional American foreign policy
which forbids participation by the United States in the settlement of
political questions which are entirely European in their scope."
The determination of the United States not to interfere in the internal
politics of European States has not prevented occasional protests in
the name of humanity against the harsh treatment accorded the Jews in
certain European countries. On July 17, 1902, Secretary Hay protested
in a note to the Rumanian government against a policy which was forcing
thousands of Jews to emigrate from that country. The United States, he
claimed, had more than a philanthropic interest in this matter, for the
enforced emigration of the Jews from Rumania in a condition of utter
destitution was "the mere transplantation of an artificially produced
diseased growth to a new place"; and, as the United States was
practically their only place of refuge, we had a clearly established
right of remonstrance. In the case of Russia information has
repeatedly been sought through diplomatic channels as to the extent of
destitution among the Jewish population, and permission has been
requested for the distribution of relief funds raised in the United
States. Such inquiries have been so framed as to amount to diplomatic
protests. In his annual message of 1904 President Roosevelt went
further and openly expressed the horror of the nation at the massacre
of the Jews at Kishenef. These protests, however, were purely
diplomatic in character. There was not the slightest hint at
intervention. During the early stages of the Great War in Europe the
Government of the United States endeavored to adhere strictly to its
historic policy. The German invasion of Belgium with its attendant
horrors made a deep impression upon the American people and aroused
their fighting spirit even more perhaps than the German policy of
submarine warfare, but it was on the latter issue, in which the
interests and rights of the United States were directly involved, that
we finally entered the war.
V
THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY
In the Orient American diplomacy has had a somewhat freer hand than in
Europe. Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan in 1852-1854 was quite a
radical departure from the general policy of attending strictly to our
own business. It would hardly have been undertaken against a country
lying within the European sphere of influence. There were, it is true,
certain definite grievances to redress, but the main reason for the
expedition was that Japan refused to recognize her obligations as a
member of the family of nations and closed her ports to all intercourse
with the outside world. American sailors who had been shipwrecked on
the coast of Japan had failed to receive the treatment usually accorded
by civilized nations. Finally the United States decided to send a
naval force to Japan and to force that country to abandon her policy of
exclusion and to open her ports to intercourse with other countries.
Japan yielded only under the threat of superior force. The conduct of
the expedition, as well as our subsequent diplomatic negotiations with
Japan, was highly creditable to the United States, and the Japanese
people later erected a monument to the memory of Perry on the spot
where he first landed.
The acquisition of the Philippine Islands tended to bring us more fully
into the current of world politics, but it did not necessarily disturb
the balancing of European and American spheres as set up by President
Monroe. Various explanations have been given of President McKinley's
decision to retain the Philippine group, but the whole truth has in all
probability not yet been fully revealed. The partition of China
through the establishment of European spheres of influence was well
under way when the Philippine Islands came within our grasp. American
commerce with China was at this time second to that of England alone,
and the concessions which were being wrung from China by the European
powers in such rapid succession presented a bad outlook for us. The
United States could not follow the example of the powers of Europe, for
the seizure of a sphere of influence in China would not have been
supported by the Senate or upheld by public opinion. It is probable
that President McKinley thought that the Philippine Islands would not
only provide a market for American goods, which owing to the Dingley
tariff were beginning to face retaliatory legislation abroad, but that
they would provide a naval base which would be of great assistance in
upholding our interests in China.
Talcott Williams made public some years later another explanation of
President McKinley's decision which is interesting and appears to be
well vouched for. He was informed by a member of McKinley's cabinet
that while the President's mind was not yet made up on the question, a
personal communication was received from Lord Salisbury who warned the
President that Germany was preparing to take over the Philippine
Islands in case the United States should withdraw; that such a step
would probably precipitate a world war and that in the interests of
peace and harmony it would be best for the United States to retain the
entire group.
The famous open-door policy was outlined by Secretary Hay in notes
dated September 6, 1899, addressed to Great Britain, Germany, and
Russia. Each of these powers was requested to give assurance and to
make a declaration to the following effect: (1) that it would not
interfere with any treaty port or vested interests in its so-called
sphere of influence; (2) that it would permit the Chinese tariff to
continue in force in such sphere and to be collected by Chinese
officials; (3) that it would not discriminate against other foreigners
in the matter of port dues or railroad rates. Similar notes were later
addressed to France, Italy, and Japan. England alone expressed her
willingness to sign such a declaration. The other powers, while
professing thorough accord with the principles set forth by Mr. Hay,
avoided committing themselves to a formal declaration and no such
declaration was ever made. Mr. Hay made a skillful move, however, to
clinch matters by informing each of the powers to whom the note had
been addressed that in view of the favorable replies from the other
powers, its acceptance of the proposals of the United States was
considered "as final and definitive."
Americans generally are under the impression that John Hay originated
the open-door policy and that it was successfully upheld by the United
States. Neither of these impressions is correct. A few months before
John Hay formulated his famous note Lord Charles Beresford came through
America on his return from China and addressed the leading chambers of
commerce from San Francisco to New York, telling Americans what was
actually taking place in China and urging this country to unite with
England and Japan in an effort to maintain the open door. Like the
Monroe Doctrine, the open-door policy was thus Anglo-American in
origin. There is little doubt that England and Japan were willing to
form an alliance with the United States for the purpose of maintaining
the open door in China, but our traditional policy of isolation
prevented our committing ourselves to the employment of force.
President McKinley, following the example of President Monroe,
preferred announcing our policy independently and requesting the other
powers to consent to it. Had John Hay been able to carry out the plan
which he favored of an alliance with England and Japan, the mere
announcement of the fact would have been sufficient to check the
aggressions of the powers in China. Instead of such an alliance,
however, we let it be known that while we favored the open door we
would not fight for it under any conditions.
The utter worthlessness of the replies that were made in response to
Hay's note of September 6, 1899, became fully apparent in the
discussions that soon arose as to the status of consuls in the various
spheres of influence. Japan claimed that sovereignty did not pass with
a lease and that even if China should surrender jurisdiction over her
own people, the lessee governments could not acquire jurisdiction over
foreigners in leased territory. This position was undoubtedly correct
if the territorial integrity of China was really to be preserved, but
after negotiations with Russia and the other powers concerned Mr. Hay
wrote to Minister Conger on February 3, 1900, that "The United States
consuls in districts adjacent to the foreign leased territories are to
be instructed that they have no authority to exercise extra-territorial
consular jurisdiction or to perform ordinary non-judicial consular acts
within the leased territory under their present Chinese exequaturs."
Application was then made to the European powers for the admission of
American consuls in the leased territories for the performance of the
ordinary consular functions, but in no case were they to exercise
extra-territorial jurisdiction within a leased territory.
The exploitation of China which continued at a rapid rate naturally
aroused an intense anti-foreign sentiment and led to the Boxer
uprising. Events moved with startling rapidity and United States
troops took a prominent part with those of England, France, Russia, and
Japan in the march to Peking for the relief of the legations. In a
note to the powers July 3, 1900, Secretary Hay, in defining the
attitude of the United States on the Chinese question, said: "The
policy of the government of the United States is to seek a solution
which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve
Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights
guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and
safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with
all parts of the Chinese empire." Mr. Hay's notes were skillfully
worded and had some influence in helping to formulate public opinion on
the Chinese question both in this country and abroad, but we know now
from his private letters which have recently been made public that he
realized only too fully the utter futility of his efforts to stay the
course of events. During the exciting days of June, 1900, when the
foreign legations at Peking were in a state of siege, Mr. Hay wrote to
John W. Foster as follows:
"What can be done in the present diseased state of the public mind?
There is such a mad-dog hatred of England prevalent among newspapers
and politicians that anything we should now do in China to take care of
our imperiled interests would be set down to 'subservience to Great
Britain'. . . . Every Senator I see says, 'For God's sake, don't let
it appear we have any understanding with England.' How can I make
bricks without straw? That we should be compelled to refuse the
assistance of the greatest power in the world, in carrying out our own
policy, because all Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are
fools--is enough to drive a man mad. Yet we shall do what we can."
A little later (September 20, 1900) in confidential letters to Henry
Adams, he exclaimed:
"About China, it is the devil's own mess. We cannot possibly publish
all the facts without breaking off relations with several Powers. We
shall have to do the best we can, and take the consequences, which will
be pretty serious, I do not doubt. 'Give and take'--the axiom of
diplomacy to the rest of the world--is positively forbidden to us, by
both the Senate and public opinion. We must take what we can and give
nothing--which greatly narrows our possibilities.
"I take it, you agree with us that we are to limit as far as possible
our military operations in China, to withdraw our troops at the
earliest day consistent with our obligations, and in the final
adjustment to do everything we can for the integrity and reform of
China, and to hold on like grim death to the Open Door. . . ."
Again, November 21, 1900:
"What a business this has been in China! So far we have got on by
being honest and naïf. . . . At least we are spared the infamy of an
alliance with Germany. I would rather, I think, be the dupe of China,
than the chum of the Kaiser. Have you noticed how the world will take
anything nowadays from a German? Bülow said yesterday in
substance--'We have demanded of China everything we can think of. If
we think of anything else we will demand that, and be d--d to you'--and
not a man in the world kicks."