was the attempt of Louis Napoleon during the American Civil War to
establish the empire of Maximilian in Mexico under French auspices. He
was clever enough to induce England and Spain to go in with him in 1861
for the avowed purpose of collecting the claims of their subjects
against the government of Mexico. Before the joint intervention had
gone very far, however, these two powers became convinced that Napoleon
had ulterior designs and withdrew their forces. Napoleon's Mexican
venture was deliberately calculated on the success of the Southern
Confederacy. Hence, his friendly relations with the Confederate
commissioners and the talk of an alliance between the Confederacy and
Maximilian backed by the power of France. Against each successive step
taken by France in Mexico Mr. Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State,
protested. As the Civil War drew to a successful conclusion his
protests became more and more emphatic. Finally, in the spring of
1866, the United States Government began massing troops on the Mexican
border and Mr. Seward sent what was practically an ultimatum to the
French Emperor; he requested to know when the long-promised withdrawal
of the French troops would take place. Napoleon replied, fixing the
dates for their withdrawal in three separate detachments.
American historians have usually attributed Napoleon's backdown to
Seward's diplomacy supported by the military power of the United
States, which was, of course, greater then than at any previous time in
our history. All this undoubtedly had its effect on Napoleon's mind,
but it appears that conditions in Europe just at that particular moment
had an even greater influence in causing him to abandon his Mexican
scheme. Within a few days of the receipt of Seward's ultimatum
Napoleon was informed of Bismarck's determination to force a war with
Austria over the Schleswig-Holstein controversy. Napoleon realized
that the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia, without any
corresponding gains by France, would be a serious blow to his prestige
and in fact endanger his throne. He at once entered upon a long and
hazardous diplomatic game in which Bismarck outplayed him and
eventually forced him into war. In order to have a free hand to meet
the European situation he decided to yield to the American demands. As
the European situation developed he hastened the final withdrawal of
his troops and left Maximilian to his fate. Thus the Monroe Doctrine
was vindicated!
Let us take next President Cleveland's intervention in the Venezuelan
boundary dispute. Here surely was a clear and spectacular vindication
of the Monroe Doctrine which no one can discount. Let us briefly
examine the facts. Some 30,000 square miles of territory on the border
of Venezuela and British Guiana were in dispute. Venezuela, a weak and
helpless state, had offered to submit the question to arbitration.
Great Britain, powerful and overbearing, refused. After Secretary
Olney, in a long correspondence ably conducted, had failed to move the
British Government, President Cleveland decided to intervene. In a
message to Congress in December, 1895, he reviewed the controversy at
length, declared that the acquisition of territory in America by a
European power through the arbitrary advance of a boundary line was a
clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and asked Congress for an
appropriation to pay the expenses of a commission which he proposed to
appoint for the purpose of determining the true boundary, which he said
it would then be our duty to uphold. Lest there should be any
misunderstanding as to his intentions he solemnly added: "In making
these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred
and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow." Congress
promptly voted the appropriation.
Here was a bold and unqualified defiance of England. No one before had
ever trod so roughly on the British lion's tail with impunity. The
English-speaking public on both sides of the Atlantic was stunned and
amazed. Outside of diplomatic circles few persons were aware that any
subject of controversy between the two countries existed, and no one
had any idea that it was of a serious nature. Suddenly the two nations
found themselves on the point of war. After the first outburst of
indignation the storm passed; and before the American boundary
commission completed its investigation England signed an arbitration
agreement with Venezuela. Some persons, after looking in vain for an
explanation, have concluded that Lord Salisbury's failure to deal more
seriously with Mr. Cleveland's affront to the British Government was
due to his sense of humor.
But here again the true explanation is to be found in events that were
happening in another quarter of the globe. Cleveland's Venezuelan
message was sent to Congress on December 17th. At the end of the year
came Dr. Jameson's raid into the Transvaal and on the third of January
the German Kaiser sent his famous telegram of congratulation to Paul
Kruger. The wrath of England was suddenly diverted from America to
Germany, and Lord Salisbury avoided a rupture with the United States
over a matter which after all was not of such serious moment to England
in order to be free to deal with a question involving much greater
interests in South Africa. The Monroe Doctrine was none the less
effectively vindicated.
In 1902 Germany made a carefully planned and determined effort to test
out the Monroe Doctrine and see whether we would fight for it. In that
year Germany, England, and Italy made a naval demonstration against
Venezuela for the purpose of forcing her to recognize as valid certain
claims of their subjects. How England was led into the trap is still a
mystery, but the Kaiser thought that he had her thoroughly committed,
that if England once started in with him she could not turn against
him. But he had evidently not profited by the experience of Napoleon
III in Mexico. Through the mediation of Herbert Bowen, the American
minister, Venezuela agreed to recognize in principle the claims of the
foreign powers and to arbitrate the amount. England and Italy accepted
this offer and withdrew their squadrons. Germany, however, remained
for a time obdurate. This much was known at the time.
A rather sensational account of what followed next has recently been
made public in Thayer's "Life and Letters of John Hay." Into the
merits of the controversy that arose over Thayer's version of the
Roosevelt-Holleben interview it is not necessary to enter. The
significant fact, that Germany withdrew from Venezuela under pressure,
is, however, amply established. Admiral Dewey stated publicly that the
entire American fleet was assembled at the time under his command in
Porto Rican waters ready to move at a moment's notice. Why did Germany
back down from her position? Her navy was supposed to be at least as
powerful as ours. The reason why the Kaiser concluded not to measure
strength with the United States was that England had accepted
arbitration and withdrawn her support and he did not dare attack the
United States with the British navy in his rear. Again the nicely
adjusted European balance prevented the Monroe Doctrine from being put
to the test of actual war.
While England has from time to time objected to some of the corollaries
deduced from the Monroe Doctrine, she has on the whole been not
unfavorably disposed toward the essential features of that policy. The
reason for this is that the Monroe Doctrine has been an open-door
policy, and has thus been in general accord with the British policy of
free trade. The United States has not used the Monroe Doctrine for the
establishment of exclusive trade relations with our southern neighbors.
In fact, we have largely neglected the South American countries as a
field for the development of American commerce. The failure to
cultivate this field has not been due wholly to neglect, however, but
to the fact that we have had employment for all our capital at home and
consequently have not been in a position to aid in the industrial
development of the Latin-American states, and to the further fact that
our exports have been so largely the same and hence the trade of both
North and South America has been mainly with Europe. There has,
therefore, been little rivalry between the United States and the powers
of Europe in the field of South American commerce. Our interest has
been political rather than commercial. We have prevented the
establishment of spheres of influence and preserved the open door.
This situation has been in full accord with British policy. Had Great
Britain adopted a high tariff policy and been compelled to demand
commercial concessions from Latin America by force, the Monroe Doctrine
would long since have gone by the board and been forgotten. Americans
should not forget the fact, moreover, that at any time during the past
twenty years Great Britain could have settled all her outstanding
difficulties with Germany by agreeing to sacrifice the Monroe Doctrine
and give her rival a free hand in South America. In the face of such a
combination our navy would have been of little avail.
IV
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE
President Monroe's declaration had a negative as well as a positive
side. It was in effect an announcement to the world that we would not
use force in support of law and justice anywhere except in the Western
Hemisphere, that we intended to stay at home and mind our own business.
Washington and Jefferson had recommended a policy of isolation on
grounds of expediency. Washington, as we have seen, regarded this
policy as a temporary expedient, while Jefferson upon two separate
occasions was ready to form an alliance with England. Probably neither
one of them contemplated the possibility of the United States shirking
its responsibilities as a member of the family of nations. Monroe's
message contained the implied promise that if Europe would refrain from
interfering in the political concerns of this hemisphere, we would
abstain from all intervention in Europe. From that day until our
entrance into the World War it was generally understood, and on
numerous occasions officially proclaimed, that the United States would
not resort to force on any question arising outside of America except
where its material interests were directly involved. We have not
refrained from diplomatic action in matters not strictly American, but
it has always been understood that such action would not be backed by
force. In the existing state of world politics this limitation has
been a serious handicap to American diplomacy. To take what we could
get and to give nothing in return has been a hard rule for our
diplomats, and has greatly circumscribed their activities. Diplomatic
action without the use or threat of force has, however, accomplished
something in the world at large, so that American influence has by no
means been limited to the western hemisphere.
During the first half of the nineteenth century the subject of slavery
absorbed a large part of the attention of American statesmen. The fact
that they were not concerned with foreign problems outside of the
American hemisphere probably caused them to devote more time and
attention to this subject than they would otherwise have done. Slavery
and isolation had a very narrowing effect on men in public life,
especially during the period from 1830 to 1860. As the movement
against slavery in the early thirties became world-wide, the retention
of the "peculiar institution" in this country had the effect of
increasing our isolation. The effort of the American Colonization
Society to solve or mitigate the problem of slavery came very near
giving us a colony in Africa. In fact, Liberia, the negro republic
founded on the west coast of Africa by the Colonization Society, was in
all essentials an American protectorate, though the United States
carefully refrained in its communications with other powers from doing
more than expressing its good will for the little republic. As Liberia
was founded years before Africa became a field for European
exploitation, it was suffered to pursue its course without outside
interference, and the United States was never called upon to decide
whether its diplomatic protection would be backed up by force.
The slave trade was a subject of frequent discussion between the United
States and England during the first half of the nineteenth century, and
an arrangement for its suppression was finally embodied in Article VIII
of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. The only reason why the two
countries had never been able to act in accord on this question before
was that Great Britain persistently refused to renounce the right of
impressment which she had exercised in the years preceding the War of
1812. The United States therefore refused to sign any agreement which
would permit British naval officers to search American vessels in time
of peace. In 1820 the United States declared the slave trade to be a
form of piracy, and Great Britain advanced the view that as there was
no doubt of the right of a naval officer to visit and search a ship
suspected of piracy, her officers should be permitted to visit and
search ships found off the west coast of Africa under the American flag
which were suspected of being engaged in the slave trade. The United
States stoutly refused to acquiesce in this view. In the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 it was finally agreed that each of the
two powers should maintain on the coast of Africa a sufficient squadron
"to enforce, separately and respectively, the laws, rights, and
obligations of each of the two countries for the suppression of the
slave trade." It was further agreed that the officers should act in
concert and coöperation, but the agreement was so worded as to avoid
all possibility of our being drawn into an entangling alliance.
The United States has upon various occasions expressed a humanitarian
interest in the natives of Africa. In 1884 two delegates were sent to
the Berlin conference which adopted a general act giving a recognized
status to the Kongo Free State. The American delegates signed the
treaty in common with the delegates of the European powers, but it was
not submitted to the Senate for ratification for reasons stated as
follows by President Cleveland in his annual message of December 8,
1885:
"A conference of delegates of the principal commercial nations was held
at Berlin last winter to discuss methods whereby the Kongo basin might
be kept open to the world's trade. Delegates attended on behalf of the
United States on the understanding that their part should be merely
deliberative, without imparting to the results any binding character so
far as the United States were concerned. This reserve was due to the
indisposition of this Government to share in any disposal by an
international congress of jurisdictional questions in remote foreign
territories. The results of the conference were embodied in a formal
act of the nature of an international convention, which laid down
certain obligations purporting to be binding on the signatories,
subject to ratification within one year. Notwithstanding the
reservation under which the delegates of the United States attended,
their signatures were attached to the general act in the same manner as
those of the plenipotentiaries of other governments, thus making the
United States appear, without reserve or qualification, as signatories
to a joint international engagement imposing on the signers the
conservation of the territorial integrity of distant regions where we
have no established interests or control.
"This Government does not, however, regard its reservation of liberty
of action in the premises as at all impaired; and holding that an
engagement to share in the obligation of enforcing neutrality in the
remote valley of the Kongo would be an alliance whose responsibilities
we are not in a position to assume, I abstain from asking the sanction
of the Senate to that general act."
The United States also sent delegates to the international conference
held at Brussels in 1890 for the purpose of dealing with the slave
trade in certain unappropriated regions of Central Africa. The
American delegates insisted that prohibitive duties should be imposed
on the importation of spirituous liquors into the Kongo. The European
representatives, being unwilling to incorporate the American proposals,
framed a separate tariff convention for the Kongo, which the American
delegates refused to sign. The latter did, however, affix their
signatures to the general treaty which provided for the suppression of
the African slave trade and the restriction of the sale of firearms,
ammunition, and spirituous liquors in certain parts of the African
continent. In ratifying the treaty the Senate reaffirmed the American
policy of isolation in the following resolution:
"That the United States of America, having neither possessions nor
protectorates in Africa, hereby disclaims any intention, in ratifying
this treaty, to indicate any interest whatsoever in the possessions or
protectorates established or claimed on that Continent by the other
powers, or any approval of the wisdom, expediency or lawfulness
thereof, and does not join in any expressions in the said General Act
which might be construed as such a declaration or acknowledgement; and,
for this reason, that it is desirable that a copy of this resolution be
inserted in the protocol to be drawn up at the time of the exchange of
the ratifications of this treaty on the part of the United States."
The United States has always stood for legality in international
relations and has always endeavored to promote the arbitration of
international disputes. Along these lines we have achieved notable
success. It is, of course, sometimes difficult to separate questions
of international law from questions of international politics. We have
been so scrupulous in our efforts to keep out of political
entanglements that we have sometimes failed to uphold principles of law
in the validity of which we were as much concerned as any other nation.
We have always recognized international law as a part of the law of the
land, and we have always acknowledged the moral responsibilities that
rested on us as a member of the society of nations. In fact, the
Constitution of the United States expressly recognizes the binding
force of the law of nations and of treaties. As international law is
the only law that governs the relations between states, we are, of
course, directly concerned in the enforcement of existing law and in
the development of new law. When the Declaration of Paris was drawn up
by the European powers at the close of the Crimean War in 1856, the
United States was invited to give its adherence. The four rules
embodied in the declaration, which have since formed the basis of
maritime law, are as follows: First, privateering is, and remains,
abolished. Second, the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the
exception of contraband of war. Third, neutral goods, with the
exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the
enemy's flag. Fourth, blockades, in order to be binding, must be
effective. The United States Government was in thorough accord with
the second, third, and fourth rules but was unwilling, as matters then
stood, to commit itself to the first rule. It had never been our
policy to maintain a large standing navy. In the War of 1812, as in
the Revolution, we depended upon privateers to attack the commerce of
the enemy. In reply to the invitation to give our adherence to the
declaration, Secretary Marcy made a counter proposition, namely, that
the powers of Europe should agree to exempt all private property,
except of course contraband of war, from capture on the high seas in
time of war. He said that if they would agree to this, the United
States would agree to abolish privateering. The powers of Europe
refused to accept this amendment. We refrained from signing the
Declaration of Paris, therefore, not because it went too far, but
because it did not go far enough.
During the Civil War the United States Government used its diplomatic
efforts to prevent the recognition of the independence of the
Confederacy and the formation of hostile alliances. It made no effort
to form any alliance itself and insisted that the struggle be regarded
as an American question. The dispute with England over the _Alabama_
Claims came near precipitating war, but the matter was finally adjusted
by the Treaty of Washington. The most significant feature of this
treaty, as far as the present discussion is concerned, was the formal
adoption of three rules which were not only to govern the decision of
the "Alabama Claims," but which were to be binding upon England and the
United States for the future. It was further agreed that these rules
should be brought to the knowledge of other maritime powers who should
be invited to accede to them. The rules forbade the fitting out,
arming, or equipping within neutral jurisdiction of vessels intended to
cruise or carry on war against a power with which the neutral is at
peace; they forbade the use of neutral ports or waters as a base of
naval operations; and they imposed upon neutrals the exercise of due
diligence to prevent these things from being done. While these rules
have never been formally adopted by the remaining powers, they are
generally recognized as embodying obligations which are now incumbent
upon all neutrals.
When the United States decided to accept the invitation of the Czar of
Russia to attend the first peace conference at The Hague in 1899, grave
misgivings were expressed by many of the more conservative men in
public life. The participation of the United States with the powers of
Europe in this conference was taken by many Americans to mark the end
of the old order and the beginning of a new era in American diplomacy.
The conference, however, was concerned with questions of general
international interest, and had no bearing upon the internal affairs of
any state, European or American. Lest there should be any
misapprehension as to the historic policy of the United States, the
final treaty was signed by the American delegation under the express
reservation of a declaration previously read in open session. This
declaration was as follows:
"Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to
require the United States of America to depart from its traditional
policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in
the political questions or policy or internal administration of any
foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be
construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of
its traditional attitude toward purely American questions." The
establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague which
resulted from the first conference was a notable achievement, although
the Court has accomplished less than its advocates hoped. This was the
most important occasion on which American delegates had sat together
with European diplomats in a general conference. Our delegation was
the object of considerable interest and was not without influence in
shaping the provisions of the final treaty. It was through the
personal influence of Andrew D. White that the Emperor of Germany was
persuaded to permit his delegation to take part in the proceedings
establishing the Court of Arbitration.