Produced by Al Haines
FROM ISOLATION TO LEADERSHIP
REVISED
A Review of American Foreign Policy
BY
JOHN HOLLADAY LATANE, PH.D., LL.D.
PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY AND DEAN OF THE
COLLEGE FACULTY IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Author of
"The United States and Latin America"
"America as a World Power"
Etc.
GARDEN CITY ------ NEW YORK
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
1922
COPYRIGHT, 1918, 1922, BY
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, INCLUDING THAT OF
TRANSLATION INTO FOREIGN LANGUAGES,
INCLUDING THE SCANDINAVIAN
PREFACE
The first edition of this book appeared in October, 1918, a few weeks
before the signing of the Armistice, when the United States was at the
high tide of its power and influence. In view of the subsequent course
of events, some of my readers may question the propriety of the
original title. In fact, one of my friends has suggested that a more
appropriate title for the new edition would be "From Isolation to
Leadership, and Back." But I do not regard the verdict of 1920 as an
expression of the final judgment of the American people. The world
still waits on America, and sooner or later we must recognize and
assume the responsibilities of our position as a great world power.
The first nine chapters are reprinted with only a few verbal changes.
Chapter X has been rewritten, and chapters XI and XII have been added.
JOHN H. LATANÉ.
Baltimore, June 10, 1922.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I. ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION
II. FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
III. THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER
IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF FORCE
V. THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY
VI. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
VII. IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
VIII. THE NEW PAN-AMERICANISM
IX. THE FAILURE OF NEUTRALITY AND ISOLATION
X. THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES
XI. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES
XII. THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
INDEX
From Isolation to Leadership
I
ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF ISOLATION
The Monroe Doctrine and the policy of political isolation are two
phases of American diplomacy so closely related that very few writers
appear to draw any distinction between them. The Monroe Doctrine was
in its origin nothing more than the assertion, with special application
to the American continents, of the right of independent states to
pursue their own careers without fear or threat of intervention,
domination, or subjugation by other states. President Monroe announced
to the world that this principle would be upheld by the United States
in this hemisphere. The policy of isolation was the outgrowth of
Washington's warning against _permanent_ alliances and Jefferson's
warning against _entangling_ alliances. Both Washington and Jefferson
had in mind apparently the form of European alliance common in their
day, which bound one nation to support another both diplomatically and
by force in any dispute that might arise no matter whether it concerned
the interests of the first state or not. Such alliances were usually
of the nature of family compacts between different dynasties, or
between different branches of the same dynasty, rather than treaties
between nations. In fact, dynastic aims and ambitions were frequently,
if not usually, at variance with the real interests of the peoples
affected. It will be shown later that neither Washington nor Jefferson
intended that the United States should refrain permanently from the
exercise of its due influence in matters which properly concern the
peace and welfare of the community of nations. Washington did not
object to temporary alliances for special emergencies nor did Jefferson
object to special alliances for the accomplishment of definite objects.
Their advice has, however, been generally interpreted as meaning that
the United States must hold aloof from world politics and attend
strictly to its own business.
The Monroe Doctrine was a perfectly sound principle and it has been
fully justified by nearly a century of experience. It has saved South
America from the kind of exploitation to which the continents of Africa
and Asia have, during the past generation, fallen a prey. The policy
of isolation, on the other hand, still cherished by so many Americans
as a sacred tradition of the fathers, is in principle quite distinct
from the Monroe Doctrine and is in fact utterly inconsistent with the
position and importance of the United States as a world power. The
difference in principle between the two policies can perhaps best be
illustrated by the following supposition. If the United States were to
sign a permanent treaty with England placing our navy at her disposal
in the event of attack from Germany or some other power, on condition
that England would unite with us in opposing the intervention of any
European power in Latin America, such a treaty would not be a violation
of the Monroe Doctrine, but a distinct recognition of that principle.
Such a treaty would, however, be a departure from our traditional
policy of isolation. Of the two policies, that of avoiding political
alliances is the older. It was announced by Washington under
circumstances that will be considered in a moment.
In the struggle for independence the colonies deliberately sought
foreign alliances. In fact, the first treaty ever signed by the United
States was the treaty of alliance with France, negotiated and ratified
in 1778. The aid which France extended under this treaty to our
revolutionary ancestors in men, money, and ships enabled them to
establish the independence of our country. A few years later came the
French Revolution, the establishment of the French Republic followed by
the execution of Louis XVI, and in 1793 the war between England and
France. With the arrival in this country of Genet, the minister of the
newly established French Republic, there began a heated debate in the
newspapers throughout the country as to our obligations under the
treaty of alliance and the commercial treaty of 1778. President
Washington requested the opinions in writing of the members of his
cabinet as to whether Genet should be received and the new government
which had been set up in France recognized, as to whether the treaties
were still binding, and as to whether a proclamation of neutrality
should be issued. Hamilton and Jefferson replied at great length,
taking as usual opposite sides, particularly on the question as to the
binding force of the treaties. Hamilton took the view that as the
government of Louis XVI, with which the treaties had been negotiated,
had been overthrown, we were under no obligations to fulfill their
stipulations and had a perfect right to renounce them. Jefferson took
the correct view that the treaties were with the French nation and that
they were binding under whatever government the French people chose to
set up. This principle, which is now one of the fundamental doctrines
of international law, was so ably expounded by Jefferson that his words
are well worth quoting.
"I consider the people who constitute a society or nation as the source
of all authority in that nation, as free to transact their common
concerns by any agents they think proper, to change these agents
individually, or the organization of them in form or function whenever
they please: that all the acts done by those agents under the authority
of the nation, are the acts of the nation, are obligatory on them, and
enure to their use, and can in no wise be annulled or affected by any
change in the form of the government, or of the persons administering
it. Consequently the Treaties between the United States and France
were not treaties between the United States and Louis Capet, but
between the two nations of America and France, and the nations
remaining in existence, tho' both of them have since changed their
forms of government, the treaties are not annulled by these changes."
The argument was so heated that Washington was reluctant to press
matters to a definite conclusion. From his subsequent action it
appears that he agreed with Jefferson that the treaties were binding,
but he held that the treaty of alliance was purely defensive and that
we were under no obligation to aid France in an offensive war such as
she was then waging. He accordingly issued his now famous proclamation
of neutrality, April, 1793. Of this proclamation W. E. Hall, a leading
English authority on international law, writing one hundred years
later, said: "The policy of the United States in 1793 constitutes an
epoch in the development of the usages of neutrality. There can be no
doubt that it was intended and believed to give effect to the
obligations then incumbent upon neutrals. But it represented by far
the most advanced existing opinions as to what those obligations were;
and in some points it even went farther than authoritative
international custom has up to the present time advanced. In the main,
however, it is identical with the standard of conduct which is now
adopted by the community of nations." Washington's proclamation laid
the real foundations of the American policy of isolation.
The very novelty of the rigid neutrality proclaimed by Washington made
the policy a difficult one to pursue. In the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic wars, which lasted for nearly a quarter of a century, the
United States was the principal neutral. The problems to which this
situation gave rise were so similar to the problems raised during the
early years of the World War that many of the diplomatic notes prepared
by Jefferson and Madison might, with a few changes of names and dates,
be passed off as the correspondence of Wilson and Lansing.
Washington's administration closed with the clouds of the European war
still hanging heavy on the horizon. Under these circumstances he
delivered his famous Farewell Address in which he said:
"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in
extending our commercial relations to have with them as little
_political_ connection as possible. So far as we have already formed
engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us
stop.
"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very
remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies,
the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence,
therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial
ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary
combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.
"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a
different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient
government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury
from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will
cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously
respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making
acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us
provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided
by justice, shall counsel.
"Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our
own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny
with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in
the toils of European ambitions, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?
"It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any
portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty
to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing
infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less
applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the
best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in
their genuine sense. But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be
unwise to extend them.
"Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a
respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary
alliances for extraordinary emergencies."
It will be observed that Washington warned his countrymen against
_permanent_ alliances. He expressly said that we might "safely trust
to _temporary_ alliances for extraordinary emergencies." Further than
this many of those who are continually quoting Washington's warning
against alliances not only fail to note the limitations under which the
advice was given, but they also overlook the reasons assigned. In a
succeeding paragraph of the Farewell Address he said:
"With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our
country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to
progress without interruption to that degree of strength and
consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the
command of its own fortunes."
The expression "entangling alliances" does not occur in the Farewell
Address, but was given currency by Jefferson. In his first inaugural
address he summed up the principles by which he proposed to regulate
his foreign policy in the following terms: "Peace, commerce, and honest
friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."
During the brief interval of peace following the treaty of Amiens in
1801, Napoleon undertook the reëstablishment of French power in Santo
Domingo as the first step in the development of a colonial empire which
he determined upon when he forced Spain to retrocede Louisiana to
France by the secret treaty of San Ildefonso in 1800. Fortunately for
us the ill-fated expedition to Santo Domingo encountered the opposition
of half a million negroes and ultimately fell a prey to the ravages of
yellow fever. As soon as Jefferson heard of the cession of Louisiana
to France, he instructed Livingston, his representative at Paris, to
open negotiations for the purchase of New Orleans and West Florida,
stating that the acquisition of New Orleans by a powerful nation like
France would inevitably lead to friction and conflict. "The day that
France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to
restrain her forever within her low water mark. It seals the union of
two nations who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the
ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet
and nation. We must turn all our attentions to a maritime force, for
which our resources place us on very high grounds: and having formed
and cemented together a power which may render reinforcement of her
settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon, which
shall be fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any settlement she
may have made, and for holding the two continents of America in
sequestration for the common purposes of the united British and
American nations. This is not a state of things we seek or desire. It
is one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us, as
necessarily as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on its
necessary effect."
Monroe was later sent to Paris to support Livingston and he was
instructed, in case there was no prospect of a favorable termination of
the negotiations, to avoid a rupture until the spring and "in the
meantime enter into conferences with the British Government, through
their ambassador at Paris, to fix principles of alliance, and leave us
in peace until Congress meets." Jefferson had already informed the
British minister at Washington that if France should, by closing the
mouth of the Mississippi, force the United States to war, "they would
throw away the scabbard." Monroe and Livingston were now instructed,
in case they should become convinced that France meditated hostilities
against the United States, to negotiate an alliance with England and to
stipulate that neither party should make peace or truce without the
consent of the other. Thus notwithstanding his French proclivities and
his warning against "entangling alliances," the author of the immortal
Declaration of Independence was ready and willing in this emergency to
form an alliance with England. The unexpected cession of the entire
province of Louisiana to the United States made the contemplated
alliance with England unnecessary.
The United States was no more successful in its effort to remain
neutral during the Napoleonic wars than it was during the late war,
though the slow means of communication a hundred years ago caused the
struggle for neutral rights to be drawn out for a much longer period of
time. Neither England nor France regarded us as having any rights
which they were bound to respect, and American commerce was fairly
bombarded by French decrees and British orders in council. There was
really not much more reason why we should have fought England than
France, but as England's naval supremacy enabled her to interfere more
effectually with our commerce on the sea and as this interference was
accompanied by the practice of impressing American sailors into the
British service, we finally declared war against her. No effort was
made, however, to form an alliance or even to coöperate with Napoleon.
The United States fought the War of 1812 without allies, and while we
gained a number of single-ship actions and notable victories on Lake
Erie and Lake Champlain, we failed utterly in two campaigns to occupy
Canada, and the final result of the conflict was that our national
capitol was burned and our commerce absolutely swept from the seas.
Jackson's victory at New Orleans, while gratifying to our pride, took
place two weeks after the treaty of Ghent had been signed and had,
consequently, no effect on the outcome of the war.
II
FORMULATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
The international situation which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine was
the most unusual in some respects that modern history records. The
European alliance which had been organized in 1813 for the purpose of
bringing about the overthrow of Napoleon continued to dominate the
affairs of Europe until 1823. This alliance, which met at the Congress
of Vienna in 1815 and held later meetings at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818,
at Troppau in 1820, at Laybach in 1821, and at Verona in 1822,
undertook to legislate for all Europe and was the nearest approach to a
world government that had ever been tried. While this alliance
publicly proclaimed that it had no other object than the maintenance of
peace and that the repose of the world was its motive and its end, its
real object was to uphold absolute monarchy and to suppress every
attempt at the establishment of representative government. As long as
England remained in the alliance her statesmen exercised a restraining
influence, for England was the only one of the allies which professed
to have a representative system of government. As Castlereagh was
setting out for the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle Lord Liverpool, who was
then prime minister, warned him that, "The Russian must be made to feel
that we have a parliament and a public, to which we are responsible,
and that we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into views of policy
which are wholly incompatible with the spirit of our government."
The reactionary spirit of the continental members of the alliance was
soon thoroughly aroused by the series of revolutions that followed one
another in 1820. In March the Spanish army turned against the
government of Ferdinand VII and demanded the restoration of the
constitution of 1812. The action of the army was everywhere approved
and sustained by the people and the king was forced to proclaim the
constitution and to promise to uphold it. The Spanish revolution was
followed in July by a constitutional movement in Naples, and in August
by a similar movement in Portugal; while the next year witnessed the
outbreak of the Greek struggle for independence. Thus in all three of
the peninsulas of Southern Europe the people were struggling for the
right of self-government. The great powers at once took alarm at the
rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and proceeded to adopt measures for
the suppression of the movements to which these ideas gave rise. At
Troppau and Laybach measures were taken for the suppression of the
revolutionary movements in Italy. An Austrian army entered Naples in
March, 1821, overthrew the constitutional government that had been
inaugurated, and restored Ferdinand II to absolute power. The
revolution which had broken out in Piedmont was also suppressed by a
detachment of the Austrian army. England held aloof from all
participation in the conferences at Troppau and Laybach, though her
ambassador to Austria was present to watch the proceedings.
The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged for October, 1822,
at Verona. Here the affairs of Greece, Italy, and in particular Spain
came up for consideration. At this congress all five powers of the
alliance were represented. France was especially concerned about the
condition of affairs in Spain, and England sent Wellington out of
self-defense. The Congress of Verona was devoted largely to a
discussion of Spanish affairs. Wellington had been instructed to use
all his influence against the adoption of measures of intervention in
Spain. When he found that the other powers were bent upon this step
and that his protest would be unheeded, he withdrew from the congress.
The four remaining powers signed the secret treaty of Verona, November
22, 1822, as a revision, so they declared in the preamble, of the
Treaty of the Holy Alliance, which had been signed at Paris in 1815 by
Austria, Russia, and Prussia. This last mentioned treaty sprang from
the erratic brain of the Czar Alexander under the influence of Baroness
Krüdener, and is one of the most remarkable political documents extant.
No one had taken it seriously except the Czar himself and it had been
without influence upon the politics of Europe. The text of the treaty
of Verona was never officially published, but the following articles
soon appeared in the press of Europe and America:
"Article I.--The high contracting powers being convinced that the
system of representative government is equally as incompatible with the
monarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people
with the divine right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner, to
use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative
governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent
its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known.
"Article II.--As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the press is
the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights
of nations, to the detriment of those of Princes, the high contracting
parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppress
it, not only in their own states, but, also, in the rest of Europe.
"Article III.--Convinced that the principles of religion contribute
most powerfully to keep nations in the state of passive obedience which
they owe to their Princes, the high contracting parties declare it to
be their intention to sustain, in their respective states, those
measures which the clergy may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating their
own interests, so intimately connected with the preservation of the
authority of Princes; and the contracting powers join in offering their
thanks to the Pope, for what he has already done for them, and solicit
his constant coöperation in their views of submitting the nations.
"Article IV.--The situation of Spain and Portugal unite unhappily all
the circumstances to which this treaty has particular reference. The
high contracting parties, in confiding to France the care of putting an
end to them, engage to assist her in the manner which may the least
compromise them with their own people and the people of France, by
means of a subsidy on the part of the two empires, of twenty millions
of francs every year, from the date of the signature of this treaty to
the end of the war."
Such was the code of despotism which the continental powers adopted for
Europe and which they later proposed to extend to America. It was an
attempt to make the world safe for autocracy. Wellington's protest at
Verona marked the final withdrawal of England from the alliance which
had overthrown Napoleon and naturally inclined her toward a
rapprochement with the United States. The aim of the Holy Allies, as
the remaining members of the alliance now called themselves, was to
undo the work of the Revolution and of Napoleon and to restore all the
peoples of Europe to the absolute sway of their legitimate sovereigns.
After the overthrow of the constitutional movements in Piedmont,
Naples, and Spain, absolutism reigned supreme once more in western
Europe, but the Holy Allies felt that their task was not completed so
long as Spain's revolted colonies in America remained unsubjugated.
These colonies had drifted into practical independence while Napoleon's
brother Joseph was on the throne of Spain. Nelson's great victory at
Trafalgar had left England supreme on the seas and neither Napoleon nor
Joseph had been able to establish any control over Spain's American
colonies. When Ferdinand was restored to his throne in 1814, he
unwisely undertook to refasten on his colonies the yoke of the old
colonial system and to break up the commerce which had grown up with
England and with the United States. The different colonies soon
proclaimed their independence and the wars of liberation ensued. By
1822 it was evident that Spain unassisted could never resubjugate them,
and the United States after mature deliberation recognized the new
republics and established diplomatic intercourse with them. England,
although enjoying the full benefits of trade with the late colonies of
Spain, still hesitated out of regard for the mother country to take the
final step of recognition.
In the late summer of 1823 circular letters were issued inviting the
powers to a conference at Paris to consider the Spanish-American
question. George Canning, the British foreign secretary, at once
called into conference Richard Rush, the American minister, and
proposed joint action against the schemes of the Holy Alliance. Rush
replied that he was not authorized to enter into such an agreement, but
that he would communicate the proposal at once to his government. As
soon as Rush's dispatch was received President Monroe realized fully
the magnitude of the issue presented by the proposal of an
Anglo-American alliance. Before submitting the matter to his cabinet
he transmitted copies of Rush's dispatch to ex-Presidents Jefferson and
Madison and the following interesting correspondence took place. In
his letter to Jefferson of October 17th, the President said:
"I transmit to you two despatches, which were receiv'd from Mr. Rush,
while I was lately in Washington, which involve interests of the
highest importance. They contain two letters from Mr. Canning,
suggesting designs of the holy alliance, against the Independence of
So. America, & proposing a co-operation, between G. Britain & the U
States, in support of it, against the members of that alliance. The
project aims, in the first instance, at a mere expression of opinion,
somewhat in the abstract, but which, it is expected by Mr. Canning,
will have a great political effect, by defeating the combination. By
Mr. Rush's answers, which are also enclosed, you will see the light in
which he views the subject, & the extent to which he may have gone.
Many important considerations are involved in this proposition. 1st
Shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European politicks, & wars, on
the side of any power, against others, presuming that a concert, by
agreement, of the kind proposed, may lead to that result? 2d If a case
can exist in which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is
not the present instance, precisely that case? 3d Has not the epoch
arriv'd when G. Britain must take her stand, either on the side of the
monarchs of Europe, or of the U States, & in consequence, either in
favor of Despotism or of liberty & may it not be presum'd that, aware
of that necessity, her government has seiz'd on the present occurrence,
as that, which it deems, the most suitable, to announce & mark the
commenc'ment of that career?
"My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British
govt. & to make it known, that we would view an interference on the
part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies,
by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded
with them, they would extend it to us. I am sensible however of the
extent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy to have yours, &
Mr. Madison's opinions on it."
Jefferson's reply dated Monticello, October 24th, displays not only a
profound insight into the international situation, but a wide vision of
the possibilities involved. He said:
"The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most
momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of
Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points
the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on
us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more
auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to
entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to
suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North
and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and
peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own,
separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to
become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make
our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturb
us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in
it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the bands,
bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and
emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long
in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us
the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side we
need not fear the whole world. With her then, we should most
sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to
knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the
same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of
taking part in her wars. But the war in which the present proposition
might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but
ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of
keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those
of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to
maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. And if, to
facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European
powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we
should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will
prevent instead of provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn from
their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe
combined would not undertake such a war. For how would they propose to
get at either enemy without superior fleets? Nor is the occasion to be
slighted which this proposition offers, of declaring our protest
against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations, by the
interference of any one in the internal affairs of another, so
flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally
lawless Alliance, calling itself Holy."
Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as to the wisdom of accepting
the British proposal of some form of joint action, but he went even
further and suggested that the declaration should not be limited to the
American republics, but that it should express disapproval of the late
invasion of Spain and of any interference with the Greeks who were then
struggling for independence from Turkey. Monroe, it appears, was
strongly inclined to act on Madison's suggestion, but his cabinet took
a different view of the situation. From the diary of John Quincy
Adams, Monroe's secretary of state, it appears that almost the whole of
November was taken up by cabinet discussions on Canning's proposals and
on Russia's aggressions in the northwest. Adams stoutly opposed any
alliance or joint declaration with Great Britain. The composition of
the President's message remained in doubt until the 27th, when the more
conservative views of Adams were, according to his own statement of the
case, adopted. He advocated an independent course of action on the
part of the United States, without direct reference to Canning's
proposals, though substantially in accord with them. Adams defined his
position as follows: "The ground that I wish to take is that of earnest
remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force
with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with
Europe; to make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that."
Adams's dissent from Monroe's position was, it is claimed, due partly
to the influence of Clay who advocated a Pan-American system, partly to
the fact that the proposed coöperation with Great Britain would bind
the United States not to acquire some of the coveted parts of the
Spanish possessions, and partly to the fear that the United States as
the ally of Great Britain would be compelled to play a secondary part.
He probably carried his point by showing that the same ends could be
accomplished by an independent declaration, since it was evident that
the sea power of Great Britain would be used to prevent the reconquest
of South America by the European powers. Monroe, as we have seen,
thought that the exigencies of the situation justified a departure from
the sound maxim of political isolation, and in this opinion he was
supported by his two predecessors in the presidency.
The opinions of Monroe, Jefferson, and Madison in favor of an alliance
with Great Britain and a broad declaration against the intervention of
the great powers in the affairs of weaker states in any part of the
world, have been severely criticised by some historians and ridiculed
by others, but time and circumstances often bring about a complete
change in our point of view. After the beginning of the great world
conflict, especially after our entrance into it, several writers raised
the question as to whether, after all, the three elder statesmen were
not right and Adams and Clay wrong. If the United States and England
had come out in favor of a general declaration against intervention in
the concerns of small states and established it as a world-wide
principle, the course of human history during the next century might
have been very different, but Adams's diary does not tell the whole
story. On his own statement of the case he might be justly censured by
posterity for persuading the president to take a narrow American view
of a question which was world-wide in its bearing. An important
element in the situation, however, was Canning's change of attitude
between the time of his conference with Rush in August and the
formulation of the president's message. Two days after the delivery of
his now famous message Monroe wrote to Jefferson in explanation of the
form the declaration had taken: "Mr. Canning's zeal has much abated of
late." It appears from Rush's correspondence that the only thing which
stood in the way of joint action by the two powers was Canning's
unwillingness to extend immediate recognition to the South American
republics. On August 27th, Rush stated to Canning that it would
greatly facilitate joint action if England would acknowledge at once
the full independence of the South American colonies. In communicating
the account of this interview to his government Mr. Rush concluded:
"Should I be asked by Mr. Canning, whether, in case the recognition be
made by Great Britain without more delay, I am on my part prepared to
make a declaration, in the name of my government, that it will not
remain inactive under an attack upon the independence of those states
by the Holy Alliance, the present determination of my judgment is that
I will make such a declaration explicitly, and avow it before the
world." About three weeks later Canning, who was growing restless at
the delay in hearing from Washington, again urged Rush to act without
waiting for specific instructions from his government. He tried to
show that the proposed joint declaration would not conflict with the
American policy of avoiding entangling alliances, for the question at
issue was American as much as European, if not more. Rush then
indicated his willingness to act provided England would "immediately
and unequivocally acknowledge the independence of the new states."
Canning did not care to extend full recognition to the South American
states until he could do so without giving unnecessary offense to Spain
and the allies, and he asked if Mr. Rush could not give his assent to
the proposal on a promise of future recognition. Mr. Rush refused to
accede to anything but immediate acknowledgment of independence and so
the matter ended.
As Canning could not come to a formal understanding with the United
States, he determined to make a frank avowal of the views of the
British cabinet to France and to this end he had an interview with
Prince Polignac, the French ambassador at London, October 9, 1823, in
which he declared that Great Britain had no desire to hasten
recognition, but that any foreign interference, by force, or by menace,
would be a motive for immediate recognition; that England "could not go
into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish America upon an
equal footing with other powers, whose opinions were less formed upon
that question." This declaration drew from Polignac the admission that
he considered the reduction of the colonies by Spain as hopeless and
that France "abjured in any case, any design of acting against the
colonies by force of arms." This admission was a distinct victory for
Canning, in that it prepared the way for ultimate recognition by
England, and an account of the interview was communicated without delay
to the allied courts. The interview was not communicated to Rush until
the latter part of November, and therefore had no influence upon the
formation of Monroe's message.
The Monroe Doctrine is comprised in two widely separated paragraphs
that occur in the message of December 2, 1823. The first, relating to
Russia's encroachments on the northwest coast, and occurring near the
beginning of the message, was an assertion to the effect that the
American continents had assumed an independent condition and were no
longer open to European colonization. This may be regarded as a
statement of fact. No part of the continent at that time remained
unclaimed. The second paragraph, relating to Spanish America and
occurring near the close of the message, was a declaration against the
extension to the American continents of the system of intervention
adopted by the Holy Alliance for the suppression of popular government
in Europe.
The language used by President Monroe is as follows:
1. "At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through
the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and
instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States
at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective
rights and interests of the two nations on the north-west coast of this
continent. A similar proposal had been made by His Imperial Majesty to
the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to.
The Government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly
proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably
attached to the friendship of the Emperor and their solicitude to
cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the
discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the
arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged
proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests
of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the
free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain,
are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization
by any European powers."
2. "In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to
themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our
policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously
menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense.
With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more
immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all
enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the
allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of
America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their
respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been
achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the
wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have
enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it,
therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the
United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any
attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing
colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered
and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared
their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have,
on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could
not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or
controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in
any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition
toward the United States."
The message made a profound impression on the world, all the more
profound for the fact that Canning's interview with Polignac was known
only to the chancelleries of Europe. To the public at large it
appeared that the United States was blazing the way for democracy and
liberty and that Canning was holding back through fear of giving
offense to the allies. The governments of Europe realized only too
well that Monroe's declaration would be backed by the British navy, and
all thought of intervention in Latin America was therefore abandoned.
A few months later England formally recognized the independence of the
Spanish-American republics, and Canning made his famous boast on the
floor of the House of Commons. In a speech delivered December 12,
1826, in defense of his position in not having arrested the French
invasion of Spain, he said: "I looked another way--I sought for
compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our
ancestors had known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, it
should not be Spain _with the Indies_. I called the New World into
existence to redress the balance of the Old."
III
THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER
President Monroe said in effect that the western hemisphere must be
made safe for democracy. It was reserved for our own generation and
for President Wilson to extend the declaration and to say that the
world must be made safe for democracy. President Monroe announced that
we would uphold international law and republican government in this
hemisphere, and as _quid pro quo_ he announced that it was the settled
policy of the United States to refrain from all interference in the
internal affairs of European states. He based his declaration,
therefore, not mainly on right and justice, but on the doctrine of the
separation of the European and American spheres of politics. The
Monroe Doctrine and the policy of isolation thus became linked together
in the public mind as compensating policies, neither one of which could
stand without the other. Even Secretary Olney as late as 1895 declared
that "American non-intervention in Europe implied European
non-intervention in America." It is not strange, therefore, that the
public at large should regard the policy of isolation as the sole
justification for the Monroe Doctrine. There is, however, neither
logic nor justice in basing our right to uphold law and freedom in this
hemisphere on our promise not to interfere with the violation of law
and humanity in Europe. The real difficulty is that the Monroe
Doctrine as interpreted in recent years has developed certain
imperialistic tendencies and that the imperialistic implications of the
policy resemble too closely the imperialistic aims of the European
powers.
For three quarters of a century after Monroe's declaration the policy
of isolation was more rigidly adhered to than ever, the principal
departure from it being the signature and ratification of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in 1850. By the terms of this treaty we
recognized a joint British interest in any canal that might be built
through the isthmus connecting North and South America, undertook to
establish the general neutralization of such canal, and agreed to
invite other powers, European and American, to unite in protecting the
same. Owing to differences that soon arose between the United States
and England as to the interpretation of the treaty, the clause
providing for the adherence of other powers was never carried out.
For nearly a hundred years we have successfully upheld the Monroe
Doctrine without a resort to force. The policy has never been
favorably regarded by the powers of continental Europe. Bismarck
described it as "an international impertinence." In recent years it
has stirred up rather intense opposition in certain parts of Latin
America. Until recently no American writers appear to have considered
the real nature of the sanction on which the doctrine rested. How is
it that without an army and until recent years without a navy of any
size we have been able to uphold a policy which has been described as
an impertinence to Latin America and a standing defiance to Europe?
Americans generally seem to think that the Monroe Doctrine has in it an
inherent sanctity which prevents other nations from violating it. In
view of the general disregard of sanctities, inherent or acquired,
during the early stages of the late war, this explanation will not hold
good and some other must be sought. Americans have been so little
concerned with international affairs that they have failed to see any
connection between the Monroe Doctrine and the balance of power in
Europe. The existence of a European balance of power is the only
explanation of our having been able to uphold the Monroe Doctrine for
so long a time without a resort to force. Some one or more of the
European powers would long ago have stepped in and called our bluff,
that is, forced us to repudiate the Monroe Doctrine or fight for it,
had it not been for the well-grounded fear that as soon as they became
engaged with us some other European power would attack them in the
rear. A few illustrations will be sufficient to establish this thesis.