MINISTERIAL, DIPLOMATIC, AND CONSULAR FAILINGS
AMBASSADORS SELECTED BY INFLUENCE, NOT MERIT--GERMAN EMBASSIES
HEADQUARTERS OF ESPIONAGE--HOW ENGLISH EMBASSIES HAMPERED SECRET
SERVICE WORK--BERNHARDI ON THE BLOCKADE--ENGLAND'S OPEN DOORS--A
MINISTER'S FAILINGS--BRITISH VICE-CONSUL'S SCANDALOUS
REMUNERATION--ALIEN CONSULS--HOW ITALY WAS BROUGHT INTO THE
WAR--HOW THE SYMPATHIES OF TURKEY AND GREECE WERE LOST--THE FAILURE
OF SIR EDWARD GREY--ASQUITH'S PROCRASTINATION.
The Press, it will be remembered, was during the first few years of the
war periodically almost unanimous in its outcry against the Government,
particularly the Foreign Office. Having regard to the facts quoted, well
might it be so. But the Foreign Office is somewhat in the hands of its
Ambassadors and Ministers abroad, who unfortunately sometimes appear to
put their personal dignity before patriotism, and threaten to resign
unless some ridiculous, possibly childish, whim is not forthwith
complied with. It seems hard to believe such things can be in war-time;
yet it was so. If our Ambassadors and Ministers were selected by merit,
and not by influence, a vast improvement would at once become apparent,
and such things as were complained of would not be likely to occur or be
repeated.
One Press writer pointed out that "Great Britain lacked a watchful
policeman in Scandinavia." Perhaps he will be surprised to learn that
about the most active non-sleeping watchmen that could be found were
there soon after war started. But these watch-dogs smelt out much too
much, and most of them were caught and muzzled, or driven away, or
chained up at the instigation of the Embassies. The heaviest chains,
however, get broken, whilst the truth will ever out.
Naturally one Embassy would keep in constant touch with another, and
with regard to this question of supplying the enemy all three
Scandinavian Embassies knew, or should have known to a nicety, precisely
what was doing in each country.
We in the Secret Service had been impressively warned before leaving
England to avoid our Ambassadors abroad as we would disciples of the
devil. In so far as we possibly could we religiously remembered and
acted upon this warning. But the cruel irony of it was, our own
Ministers would not leave us alone. They seemed to hunt us down, and as
soon as one of us was located, no matter who, or where, or how, a
protest was, we were told, immediately sent to the Foreign Office,
followed by hints or threats of resignation unless the Secret Service
agent in question was instantly put out of action or recalled to
England.
I was informed that several of my predecessors had been very unlucky in
Denmark. One had been located and pushed out of the country within a few
hours of arrival. Another I heard was imprisoned for many months. I was
further very plainly told by an English official of high degree that if
the British Minister at ---- became aware of my presence and that I was
in Secret Service employ, if I did not then leave the country within a
few hours of the request which would with certainty be made, I would be
handed over to the police to be dealt with under their newly-made
espionage legislation.
Considering that the German legations in Scandinavia increased their
secretaries from the two or three employed before the war to twenty or
thirty each after its outbreak; considering that it was a well-known
fact, although difficult to prove, that every German Embassy was the
local headquarters of their marvellously clever organisation of Secret
Service[15] against which our Legations possessed rarely more than one
over-worked secretary, whilst the British Embassies were a menace rather
than a help to our Secret Service, it did seem to us, working on our own
in England's cause, a cruel shame that these men, who posed not only as
Englishmen but also as directly representing our own well-beloved King,
should hound us about in a manner which made difficult our attempts to
acquire the knowledge so important for the use of our country in its
agony and dire peril. Dog-in-the-manger-like, they persisted in putting
obstacles in the way of our doing work which they could not do
themselves and probably would not have done if they could.
If unearthing the deplorable details of the leakage of supplies to
Germany evoked disgust and burning anger in the breast of Mr. Basil
Clarke, the Special Commissioner of the _Daily Mail_, surely I, and
those patriotically working in conjunction with me, always at the risk
of our liberty and often at the risk of our lives, might be permitted to
feel at least a grievance against the Foreign Office for its weakness in
listening to the protests of men like these, his Britannic Majesty's
Ministers abroad; real or imaginary aristocrats appointed to exalted
positions of great dignity and possibly pushed into office by the
influence of friends at Court, or perhaps because, as the possessors of
considerable wealth, they could be expected to entertain lavishly
although their remuneration might not be excessive. Had they remembered
the patriotism and devotion to their King and country which the immortal
Horatio Nelson showed at Copenhagen a hundred years previously, they too
could just as easily have applied the sighting glass to a blind eye, and
have ignored all knowledge of the existence of any Secret Service work
or agents; unless, of course, some unforeseen accident or circumstance
had forced an official notice upon them.
The Foreign Office would have lost none of its efficiency or its
dignity, had it hinted as much when these protests arrived; whilst
England would to-day have saved innumerable lives and vast wealth had
some of the British Ministers in the north of Europe resigned or been
removed, and level-headed, common-sensed, patriotic business men placed
in their stead as soon after war was declared with Germany as could
possibly have been arranged.
That the Germans themselves never believed England would be so weak as
to give her open doors for imports is expressed by General Bernhardi in
his "Germany and the Next War." He writes: "It is unbelievable that
England would not prevent Germany receiving supplies through neutral
countries." The following extract is from p. 157:
"It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the
importation from abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own
communications will be completely cut off by the English. The
simplest and cheapest way would be if we obtained foreign goods
through Holland, or perhaps neutral Belgium, and could export some
part of our products through the great Dutch and Flemish
harbours.... Our own overseas commerce would remain suspended, but
such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation of trade. It is,
however, very unlikely that England would tolerate such
communications through neutral territory, since in that way the
effect of her war on our trade would be much reduced.... That
England would pay much attention to the neutrality of weaker
neighbours when such a stake was at issue is hardly credible."
To understand what was actually permitted to happen the reader is
referred to the succeeding chapter. What possible excuse is there which
any man, that is a man, would listen to, that could be urged in
extenuation of this deplorable state of affairs and of its having been
permitted to exist and to continue so long without drastic alteration?
Our Foreign Office, hence presumably the Government, were fully informed
and knew throughout exactly what was going on. Every Secret Service
agent sent in almost weekly reports from October, 1914, onwards,
emphasising the feverish activity of German agents, who were everywhere
buying up supplies of war material and food at ridiculously high prices
and transferring them to Germany with indecent haste.
Cotton[16] and copper were particularly mentioned. Imploring appeals
were sent home by our Secret Service agents for these to be placed on
the contraband list; but no Minister explained to the nation why, if it
were feasible to make them contraband a year after the war commenced, it
was not the right thing to have done so the day after war was declared.
German buyers openly purchased practically the whole product of the
Norwegian cod fisheries _at retail prices_; also the greater part of the
herring harvests. Germany absorbed every horse worth the taking, and
never before in the history of the country had so much export trade been
done, nor so much money been made by her inhabitants.
The same may be said of Sweden, with the addition that her trading with
Germany was even larger.
The British Ministers in Scandinavia seemed to carry no weight with
those with whom they were brought in contact. Their prestige had been
terribly shaken by reason of the decision to ignore entirely the
Casement affair. An Ambassador of a then powerful neutral country
referred to one of them as "what you English call a damned fool." It was
only the extraordinary ability and excellent qualities of some of the
subordinates at the Chancelleries which saved the situation.
All this had its effect in these critical times. I, who was merely a
civilian Britisher and not permanently attached to either the Army or
the Navy, and hence was not afraid to refer to a spade as a spade, was
called upon continually by others in the Service to emphasise the true
state of affairs with the Foreign Office.
Those with whom I associated in the Secret Service agreed that if the
Ministers in Scandinavia could be removed and good business men
instated at these capitals it would make a vast amount of difference to
Germany and considerably hasten along the advent of peace. But by reason
of circumstances which cannot well be revealed in these pages, my hands
were tied until such time as I could get to London in person.
In March, 1915, I attended Whitehall, where I in no unmeasured terms
stated hard convincing facts and explained the exact position in the
north of Europe. I strongly emphasised the vital importance of stopping
the unending stream of supplies to Germany and of making a change at the
heads of the Legations mentioned. Direct access to Sir Edward Grey was
denied me, but an official of some prominence assured me the essential
facts should be conveyed to proper quarters without delay, although the
same complaints had previously been made _ad nauseam_.
But facts have proved that no notice whatever of these repeated warnings
was taken, and matters went from bad to worse.
On June 21st, 1915, I had returned again to England, and I wrote direct
to Sir Edward Grey, at the Foreign Office, a letter, material extracts
from which are as follows:
"SIR,
"Being now able to speak without disobedience to orders, I am
reporting a serious matter direct to you from whom my
recommendation for Government service originates.
* * * * *
"It is exceedingly distasteful having to speak in the semblance of
disparagement concerning anyone in His Majesty's service, and I am
only anxious to do what I believe to be right and helpful to my
country, whilst I am more than anxious to avoid any possibility of
seemingly doing the right thing in the wrong way. But it is
inconceivable that any Englishman should push forward his false
pride, or be permitted to place his personal egoism, before his
country's need; more particularly so at the present crisis, when
every atom of effort is appealed for.
"---- now being _a centre and a key to so many channels through
which vast quantities of goods_ (as well as information) _daily
leak to Germany_, the head of our Legation has become a position of
vital importance. Much of the present leakage is indirectly due to
the present Minister, in whom England is indeed unfortunate.
"I therefore feel that, knowing how much depends upon even little
things, it is my bounden duty to place the plain truth clearly
before you. I have often before reported on this, so far as I
possibly could, but those whom I could report to were all so
fearful of the influences or opinions of the all-too-powerful
gentleman in question, that none of them dare utter a syllable
concerning his status or his foolish actions--although in secret
they sorrowfully admit the serious effects.
"1. Since the commencement of the war ---- has committed a series
of indiscretions and mistakes, entailing a natural aftermath of
unfortunate and far-reaching consequences.
"2. Since February, 1915, he has stood discredited by the entire
---- nation, and in other parts of Scandinavia.
"3. He is bitterly opposed to the Secret Service and paralyses its
activities, although he states that his objections lie against the
department and not individuals.
* * * * *
"In conclusion, please understand that I am in no way related to
that hopeless individual, 'the man with a grievance,' but, being
merely a civilian and having nothing whatever to expect, nor to
seek for, beyond my country's ultimate good, I can and dare speak
out; whilst the fact that in the course of my duty I went to Kiel
Harbour (despite the German compliment of a price on my head),
should be sufficient justification of my patriotism and give some
weight to my present communication.
"I have the honour to remain,
"Your obedient servant,
"NICHOLAS EVERITT.
"('JIM' of the B.F.S.S.)"
* * * * *
It seems hard to believe, but this letter was passed unheeded, not even
acknowledged.
A week later, on June 28th, I wrote again, pointing out the importance
to the State of my previous communication and emphasising further the
danger of letting matters slide.
Both these letters were received at Whitehall or they would have been
returned through the Dead Letter Office. What possible reason could
there be behind the scenes that ordered and upheld such a creed as _Ruat
coelum supprimatur veritas_? Or can it be ascribed to the
much-talked-of mysterious Hidden Hand?
My letters pointed only too plainly to the obvious fact that I had
information to communicate vital to the welfare of the State, which was
much too serious to commit to paper; serious information which
subservients in office dared not jeopardise their paid positions by
repeating or forwarding; information which affected the prestige of our
own King; information which might involve other countries in the war, on
one side or the other; information which it was the plain duty of the
Foreign Secretary to lose no time in making himself acquainted with. Yet
not a finger was lifted in any attempt to investigate or follow up the
grave matters which I could have unfolded, relating to the hollowness of
the Sham Blockade with its vast leakages, which the Government had taken
such pains to conceal, and to other matters equally vital which I
foreshadowed in my letter, and which might have made enormous
differences to the tide of battle and to the welfare of nations.
No wonder the Press of all England made outcry against the Foreign
Office, as and when some of the facts relating to its dilatoriness, its
extreme leniency to all things German, and its muddle and inefficiency
in attending _in time_ to detail gradually began to become known.
Abroad I had heard the F.O. soundly cursed in many a Consulate and
elsewhere. I had, however, hitherto looked upon Sir Edward Grey as a
strong man in a very weak Government, a man who deserved the gratitude
of all Englishmen and of the whole Empire for great acts of diplomacy;
the man who had saved England from war more than once; and the man who
had done most to strive for peace when the Germans insisted upon
bloodshed. I would have wagered my soul that Sir Edward Grey was the
last man in England, when his country was at war, who would have
neglected his duty, or who would have passed over without action or
comment such a communication as I had sent him.
I waited a time before I inquired. Then I heard that Sir Edward Grey was
away ill, recuperating his health salmon-fishing in N.B. But there were
others. Upon them perhaps the blame should fall.
The Foreign Office knew of, and had been fully advised, that the
so-called Blockade of Germany by our fleet was a hollow sham and a
delusion from its announced initiative. It was also fully aware that the
leakages to Germany, instead of diminishing, increased so enormously as
to create a scandal which it could hardly hope to hide from the British
public. Why, then, were these Ministers abroad allowed to remain in
office, where they had been a laughing-stock and were apparently worse
than useless? It can only be presumed that they also had been ordered to
"wait and see."
Perhaps our Ministers, particularly at the Foreign Office, believed that
they could collect, through the medium of our Consulate abroad,
practically all the information that it was necessary for our Government
to know. In peace times this might have been probable. These
self-deluded mortals seemed to have forgotten entirely that we were at
war. Furthermore, it must be admitted to our shame that our English
Consular Service in some places abroad is the poorest paid and the least
looked-after branch of Government service of almost any nation.
Sir George Pragnell, speaking only a few days before his lamentably
sudden and untimely end, at the great meeting called by the Lord Mayor
of London at the Guildhall on January 31st, 1916, a meeting of the
representatives of Trade and Commerce from all parts of the British
Empire, said:
"Our business men maintained that our Consular Service should
consist of the best educated and the most practical business men we
could turn out. Not only should these men be paid high salaries,
but I would recommend that they should be paid a commission or
bonus on the increase of British Trade in the places they had to
look after."
If this sound, practical wisdom had only been propounded and acted upon
years ago the benefits that England would have derived therefrom would
have been incalculable. But look at the facts regarding the countries
where efficient and effective Consular Service was most wanted during
the war. In Scandinavia there were gentlemen selected to represent us as
British _Vice-Consuls_ who received a _fixed salary of £5 per annum_, in
return for which they had to _provide office_, _clerks_, _telephone_,
and other incidentals. Although the fees paid to them by virtue of their
office and the duties they performed may have amounted to several
hundred pounds per annum, they were compelled to hand over the whole of
the fruits of their labours to the English Government, which thus made a
very handsome profit out of its favours so bestowed. Our Foreign Office
apparently considered that the honour of the title "British Vice-Consul"
was quite a sufficient recompense for the benefits it demanded in
return, the laborious duties which it required should be constantly
attended to, and the £20 to £50 or more per annum which their
representatives were certain to find themselves out of pocket at the end
of each year. Soon after the war commenced one or two members of the
service were removed from the largest centres and other men introduced,
presumably on a special rate of pay; but in almost all the
Vice-Consulates the disgracefully mean and unsatisfactory system above
mentioned seemed to have been continued without any attempt at
reformation.
Is it to be wondered at that so many Vice-Consuls who are not Englishmen
did not feel that strong bond of sympathy either with our Ministers
abroad or with our Ministers at home, which those who have no knowledge
of the conditions of their appointment or of their service might be led
to expect existed between them?
Further light is shown upon this rotten spot in our Governmental
diplomacy management abroad by an article entitled "Scrap our Alien
Consuls," written by T. B. Donovan and published in a London paper,
February 20th, 1916, short extracts from which read as follows:
"Look up in Whitaker's Almanack for 1914 our Consuls in the German
Empire before the war--and cease to wonder that we were not better
informed. Out of a total of forty old British Consuls more than
thirty bear German names! Other nations were not so blind....
Glance through the following astounding list. In Sweden,
twenty-four out of thirty-one British Consuls and Vice-Consuls are
non-Englishmen; in Norway, twenty-six out of thirty; in Denmark,
nineteen out of twenty-six; in Holland and its Colonies, fourteen
out of twenty-four; in Switzerland nine out of fourteen--and
several of the few Englishmen are stationed at holiday resorts
where there is no trade at all.
"And we are astonished that our blockade 'leaks at every seam'!...
"This type of British Consul must be replaced by keen Britishers
who have the interests of their country at heart and who are at the
same time acquainted with the needs of the districts to which they
are appointed. If we could only break with red tape, we could find
numerous men, not far beyond the prime of life, but who have
retired from an active part in business, who would gladly accept
such appointments and place their knowledge at the disposal of
their fellows....
"The state of things in our Consular Service is such as no business
man would tolerate for a moment."
Turning attention to our diplomacy on the shores of the Mediterranean
and the Near East, those in the Secret Service knew that during the
early days of the war at least our Foreign Office had nothing much to
congratulate itself upon with regard to its representatives in Italy.
For the first eight months of war an overwhelming volume of supplies and
commodities, so sought after and necessary to the Central Powers, was
permitted to be poured into and through that country from all sources.
Even the traders of the small northern neutral states became jealous of
the fortunes that were being made there. Daily almost they might be
heard saying: "Why should I not earn money by sending goods to Germany
when ten times the amount that my country supplies is being sent through
Italy?"
The tense anxiety, the long weary months of waiting for Italy to join
the Entente, are not likely to be forgotten. When at last she was
compelled to come in, it was not British cleverness in diplomacy that
caused her so to do, but the irresistible will of her own peoples, the
men in the streets and in the fields; the popular poems of Signor
D'Annunzio, which rushed the Italian Government along, against its will,
and as an overwhelming avalanche. The popular quasi-saint-like shade of
Garibaldi precipitated matters to a crisis.
"It is interesting as an object lesson in the ironies of fate to
compare the fevered enthusiasm of the Sonnino of 1881 for the
cultured Germans and Austrians, and his exuberant hatred of France,
with the cold logic of the disabused Sonnino of 1915, who suddenly
acquired widespread popularity by undoing the work he had so
laboriously helped to achieve a quarter of a century before.
European history, ever since Germany began to obtain success in
moulding it, has been full of these piquant Penelopean Activities,
some of which are fast losing their humorous points in grim
tragedy."
Thus wrote Dr. E. J. Dillon in his book of revelations, "From the Triple
to the Quadruple Alliance, or Why Italy Went to War." From cover to
cover it is full of solid, startling facts concerning the treachery and
double-dealing of the Central Powers. It shows how Italy was flattered,
cajoled and lured on to the very edge of the precipice of ruin, disaster
and disgrace; how she had been gradually hedged in, cut off from
friendly relationships with other countries, and swathed and pinioned by
the tentacles of economic plots and scheming which rendered her
tributary to and a slave of the latter-day Conquistadores; how for over
thirty years she was compelled to play an ignominious and contemptible
part as the cat's-paw of Germany; how Prince Bulow, the most
distinguished statesman in Germany, also the most resourceful
diplomatist, who by his marriage with Princess Camporeale, and the
limitless funds at his disposal, wielded extraordinary influence with
Italian senators and officials as well as at the Vatican, dominated
Italian people from the highest to the lowest; how, in fact, the
Kaiser's was the hand that for years guided Italy's destiny. The book is
a veritable mine of information of amazing interest at the present time,
given in minutest detail, authenticated by facts, date, proof, and
argument. But it is extraordinary that in this volume of nearly 100,000
words, written by a man who perhaps, for deep intimate knowledge of
foreign politics and the histories of secret Court intrigue, has no
equal living, not a word of commendation is devoted to the efforts made
by our own British diplomacy or to the parts played by His Britannic
Majesty's Ministers and Ambassadors. There is, however, a remote
allusion on his last page but one, as follows: "The scope for a complete
and permanent betterment of relations is great enough to attract and
satisfy the highest diplomatic ambition." This seems to be the one and
only reference.
As quoted in other pages of this book, the reader will perhaps gather
that Dr. Dillon, who has been brought much in contact with the
Diplomatic Service and who has exceptional opportunities of seeing
behind the scenes, believes in the old maxims revised; for example: _De
vivis nil nisi bonum_.
A brief resumé of the material parts of this book which affect the
subject matter of the present one shows that on the outbreak of the
European war Italy's resolve to remain neutral provoked a campaign of
vituperation and calumny in the Turkish Press, whilst Italians in Turkey
were arrested without cause, molested by blackmailing police, hampered
in their business and even robbed of their property. But Prince von
Bulow worked hard to suppress all this and to diffuse an atmosphere of
brotherhood around Italians and Turks in Europe.
In Libya, however, Turkish machinations were not discontinued, although
they were carried on with greater secrecy. The Turks still despatched
officers, revolutionary proclamations, and Ottoman decorations to the
insurgents, and the Germans sent rifles in double-bottomed beer-barrels
_via_ Venice. Through an accident in transit on the railway one of
these barrels was broken and the subterfuge and treachery became
revealed. The rifles were new, and most of them bore the mark "St.
Etienne," being meant not only to arm the revolt against Italy but also
to create the belief that France was treacherously aiding and abetting
the Tripolitan insurgents. And to crown all, during the efforts of
fraternisation, in German fashion, Enver Bey's brother clandestinely
joined the Senoussi, bringing 200,000 Turkish pounds and the Caliph's
order "to purge the land of those Italian traitors."
The never-to-be-forgotten "Scrap of Paper," the violation of neutral
Belgium, the shooting and burning of civilians there, the slaying of the
wounded, the torturing of the weak and helpless, at first chilled the
warm blood of humane sentiment, then sent it boiling to the
impressionable brain of the Latin race. Every new horror, every fresh
crime in the scientific barbarians' destructive progress intensified the
wrath and charged the emotional susceptibility of the Italian nation
with explosive elements. The shrieks of the countless victims of
demoniac fury awakened an echo in the hearts of plain men and women, who
instinctively felt that what was happening to-day to the Belgians and
the French might befall themselves to-morrow. The heinous treason
against the human race which materialised in the destruction of the
_Lusitania_ completed the gradual awakening of the Italian nation to a
sense of those impalpable and imponderable elements of the European
problem which find expression in no Green Book or Ambassadorial
dispatch. It kindled a blaze of wrath and pity and heroic enthusiasm
which consumed the cobwebs of official tradition and made short work of
diplomatic fiction.
Rome at the moment was absorbed by rumours and discussions about
Germany's supreme efforts to coax Italy into an attitude of quiescence.
But these machinations were suddenly forgotten in the fiery wrath and
withering contempt which the foul misdeeds and culmination of crimes of
the scientific assassins evoked, and in pity for the victims and their
relatives.
The effect upon public sentiment and opinion in Italy, where emotions
are tensely strong, and sympathy with suffering is more flexible and
diffusive than it is even among the other Latin races, was
instantaneous. One statesman who is, or recently was, a partisan of
neutrality, remarked to Dr. Dillon that "German Kultur, as revealed
during the present war, is dissociated from every sense of duty,
obligation, chivalry, honour, and is become a potent poison, which the
remainder of humanity must endeavour by all efficacious methods to
banish from the International system. This," he went on, "is no longer
war; it is organised slaughter, perpetrated by a race suffering from
dog-madness. I tremble at the thought that our own civilised and
chivalrous people may at any moment be confronted with this lava flood
of savagery and destructiveness. Now, if ever, the opportune moment has
come for all civilised nations to join in protest, stiffened with a
unanimous threat, against the continuance of such crimes against the
human race. Europe ought surely to have the line drawn at the poisoning
of wells, the persecution of prisoners, and the massacre of women and
children."
The real cause of the transformation of Italian opinion was no mere
mechanical action; it was the inner promptings of the nation's soul.
The tide of patriotic passion was imperceptibly rising, and the cry of
completion of Italian unity was voiced in unison which culminated on the
day of the festivities arranged in commemoration of the immortal
Garibaldi. Signor D'Annunzio, the Poet Laureate of Italian Unity, was
the popular hero who set the torch to the mine of the peoples which,
when it exploded, instantly erupted parliamentary power, Ministers'
dictation, and the influences of the throne itself. It shattered the
foul system of political intrigue built up by the false Giolitti and
developed the overwhelming sentiment of an articulate nation burst into
bellicose action against the scientific barbarians; by which spontaneous
ebullition Italy took her place among the civilised and civilising
nations of Europe.
Most people who have followed events closely are convinced that Turkey
could, with judicious diplomacy, have been kept neutral throughout the
war. It was whispered in Secret Service circles that a very few millions
of money, lent or judiciously expended, would easily have acquired her
active support on the side of the Entente.
One need not probe further back in history than to the autumn of 1914 to
ascertain the blundering fiasco that was made in that sphere of our
alleged activities.
Sir Edwin Pears, who has spent a lifetime in the Turkish capital and who
can hardly be designated a censorious critic, because for many years he
was the correspondent of a Liberal newspaper in London, published, in
October, 1915, a book entitled "Forty Years in Constantinople." In that
book he describes how the Turks drifted into hostility with the Entente
because the British Embassy was completely out of touch with them. Sir
Louis Mallet, H.B.M. Ambassador, appointed in June, 1913, had never had
any experience of the country; he did not know a word of Turkish, whilst
he had under him three secretaries also ignorant of the language and of
the people. Sir Edwin Pears thus describes them:
"Mr. Beaumont, the Counsellor, especially during the days in August
before his chief returned from a visit to England, was busy almost
night and day on the shipping cases.... He also knew nothing of
Turkish, and had never had experience in Turkey. Mr. Ovey, the
First Secretary, also had never been in Turkey, and knew nothing of
Turkish. Unfortunately, also, he was taken somewhat seriously ill.
The next Secretary was Lord Gerald Wellesley, a young man who will
probably be a brilliant and distinguished diplomatist twenty years
hence, but who, like his colleagues, had no experience in Turkey.
The situation of our Embassy under the circumstances was
lamentable.... It was made worse than it might have been from the
mischievous general rule of our Foreign Office which erects an
almost impassable barrier between the Consular and Diplomatic
Services.... There were three men in the Consular Service whose
help would have been invaluable."
It thus seems to be implied that this help, which would have meant so
much in the saving of valuable lives and the wasted millions in gold,
was absolutely barred by the false dignity or inefficiency of someone at
the Foreign Office. England's only chance of attaining any success with
the wily Turks apparently rested upon one man. According to Sir Edwin
Pears:
"Nine months before the outbreak of war we had at the British
Embassy a Dragoman (interpreter), Mr. Fitzmaurice, whose general
intelligence, knowledge of Turkey, of its Ministers and people, and
especially of the Turkish language, was, to say the least, equal to
that of the best Dragoman whom Germany ever possessed. His health
had run down and he had been given a holiday, but when, I think in
the month of February, 1914, Sir Louis Mallet (the British
Ambassador) returned to Constantinople, Mr. Fitzmaurice did not
return with him, and was never in Constantinople until after the
outbreak of war with England.
"It is said that he did not return because the Turkish Ambassador
in London made a request to that effect.... I think it probable
that if such a request was made it was because Mr. Fitzmaurice did
not conceal his dislike of the policy which the Young Turks were
pursuing.
"As his ability and loyalty to his chief are beyond question, and
as he possesses a quite exceptional knowledge of the Turkish
Empire, and has proved himself a most useful public servant ... it
was nothing less than a national misfortune that he did not return
with Sir Louis Mallet."
Baron von Wangenheim, the German Ambassador, possessed a superbly
equipped staff. It is known that he distributed money, favours, and
distinctions broadcast with a free and bountiful hand. He played upon
the weaknesses and characteristics of the Orientals with such diplomatic
skill and cunning that he entirely won over the Young Turkish party to
his way of thinking. And the Young Turkish party ruled and dictated to
the whole country.
The blame and responsibility for this extraordinary state of affairs
has been put by our indignant Press upon our Foreign Office at home,
which sent out, organised, and controlled such a representation. The
terrible defeat we suffered at the Dardanelles has also been referred to
as the natural aftermath to such a sowing; for proof of culpability as
to this see further on.
Our position in Turkey, says Sir Edwin Pears,
"was made worse than it might have been from the mischievous
general rule of our Foreign Office, which erects an almost
impassable barrier between the Consular and Diplomatic Services, a
barrier which I have long desired to see broken down. When, some
months afterwards, I returned to England, I received a copy of the
'Appendix to the Fifth Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil
Service,' published on July 16th, 1914, in which (on p. 321) there
is a letter written by me two years earlier in which I made two
recommendations. The first was adopted, the second unfortunately
was not. I claimed that the Consular and Diplomatic Services should
be so co-ordinated that a good man in the Consular Service in
Turkey might be promoted into the Diplomatic Service, and I
instanced the case of Sir William White, one of the ablest
Ambassadors we ever had in Constantinople, who had risen from being
a consular clerk to the Embassy. The facts under my notice from
July to the end of October, 1914, afforded strong proof of the
common sense of my recommendation. The inexperience of the
Ambassador and his staff heavily handicapped British diplomacy in
Turkey: yet there were three men who had been or were in the
Consular Service whose help would have been invaluable. They had
each proved themselves able Dragomans and each had many years'
experience in Turkey. The only explanation that I can give of why
their services were not at once made available in the absence of
Fitzmaurice was the absurd restriction to which I have alluded."
The Press has also stated that the unsatisfactory precedent exhibited by
the Embassy at Constantinople typified the British Legations at the
Balkan capitals. We know how badly we were disappointed, deceived, and
let down in the whole of that theatre of war. The best resumé may be
found in an admirable series of articles, published, February 3rd to
8th, 1916, in the London _Daily Telegraph_, by that most brilliant and
experienced of Continental correspondents, Dr. E.J. Dillon. They reveal
the pitiful failings, weaknesses and miscalculations of our Balkan
Diplomatists in such glaring vividness that the reader wonders at the
marvels performed by our gallant troops and Navy in the face of the
difficulties and obstructions they had to contend with.
Dr. Dillon wrote:
"High praise is due to the intentions of Entente diplomatists,
which were truly admirable. They did their best according to their
lights during the campaign as they had done their best before it
was undertaken. That the best was disastrous was not the result of
a lack of goodwill. What they were deficient in was insight and
foresight. Their habit is not to study the mental and psychical
caste of the peoples with whom they have to deal, but to watch and
act upon the shifts of the circumstances. Amateurism is the curse
of the British nation. Their vision of the political situation in
the Balkans was roseate and blurred, and their moral maxims were
better fitted for use in the Society of Friends than in intercourse
with a hard-headed people whose morality begins where self-interest
ends. By these methods, which, unhappily, are still in vogue, the
diplomacy of Great Britain, France, and Russia lost the key to
Constantinople, and contributed unwittingly to deliver over the
Serbian people to the tender mercies of the Bulgar and the Teuton.
Turkey is still fighting us in Europe and Asia. Roumania is
neutral, and mistrustful, and the war is prolonged indefinitely.
The facts on which our statesmen relied turned out to be fancies;
their expectations proved to be illusions; and their solemn
negotiations a humiliating farce devised by the Coburger, who moved
the representatives of the Allied Powers hither and thither like
figures on a chess-board."
Mr. Crawford Price, the Balkan war correspondent, writing in the
_Sunday Pictorial_ of February 27th, 1916, alleges that the Greeks
wanted to join the Allies in active aggression on several occasions, but
the Hellens were effectively snubbed by our Diplomats. Although the
General Staff and the King were both willing at one time to intercede,
they opposed unconditional participation in the Dardanelle enterprise,
because they believed our ill-considered plans would end in disaster.
Mr. Price says that our Diplomatists refused to consider their matured
ideas based upon a lifelong study of local conditions and the adoption
of which would probably have given us possession of Constantinople in a
month. Again, after we had failed, the Greek Government submitted a plan
on April 14th, 1915, for co-operation, but we would have nothing to do
with it. Finally, when in May following King Constantine offered to join
forces with us upon no other condition than that we should guarantee the
integrity of his country (surely the least he could ask!), he received a
belated intimation to the effect that we could not do so, as we did not
wish to discourage Bulgaria.
After this, it will be remembered, England offered to bribe Bulgaria
with the Cavalla district belonging to Greece.
No wonder Greece refused to be bribed with Cyprus when Bulgaria had
declined to be moved by the blind and incomprehensible enthusiasm which
seems to have dominated English diplomacy in the Near East. Or was a
certain Continental wag, well known in Diplomatic circles, nearer the
mark when he facetiously lisped, "Your English Government is said to be
slow and sure, which is quite true, in that it is slow to act and sure
to be too late"?
It is a matter for consideration that the British Minister at Sofia was
changed during the war, whilst almost his whole staff were only
short-timers in Bulgaria, where such a gigantic failure was proved by
the subsequent actions of that misguided and unfortunate country. What
small advantages were once obtained in this sphere of action seem all to
have been lost through our everlasting and repeated procrastinations
and unpardonable delay. Had the permission of Venezelos to land troops
at Salonica been immediately acted upon and the proffered co-operation
of the Hellens accepted with the cordiality it deserved, and half a
million men been marched to the centre of Serbia, that country would
never have been conquered by the enemy, whilst Bulgaria and Roumania
would have come in upon the side of the Entente, and Turkey would have
been beaten at the outset; thereby saving hundreds of thousands of
valuable lives, and hundreds of millions of pounds sterling.
What a difference this would have made to the length of the war!
Our diplomacy failed.
Our then Government showed an utter lack of possessing the art of
foreseeing. The fruits of its policy, "Wait and see," materialised into
muddle, humiliation, slaughter, and defeat.
Just criticism fell from Lord Milner, who, speaking at Canterbury on
October 31st, 1915, said:
"If the worst of our laches and failures, like the delay in the
provision of shells and the brazen-faced attempts to conceal it, or
the way we piled blunder upon blunder in the Dardanelles, or the
phenomenal failure of our policy in the Balkans--if the nation was
induced to regard these as just ordinary incidents of war, then we
could never expect and should not deserve to see our affairs better
managed in the future. Truth all round and clearness of vision were
necessary to enable us to win through."
A few days later Mr. Rudyard Kipling in the _Daily Telegraph_ wrote:
"No man likes losing his job, and when at long last the inner
history of this war comes to be written we may find that the people
we mistook for principals and prime agents were only average
incompetents moving all hell to avoid dismissal."
History repeats itself, and George Borrow was not very wide of the mark
when he wrote in 1854: "Why does your (English) Government always send
fools to represent it at Vienna?"[17]
The work of all foreign Ministers should consist in providing for
contingencies long foreseen and patiently awaited. Surely we must have
some good and able men who do or can serve us abroad? Or does the fault
lie with the Foreign Office at home?
The _English Review_ of February, 1916, contained a serious article
entitled "The Failure of Sir Edward Grey," the logic of which causes one
to reflect. Its author, Mr. Seton-Watson, argues as follows:
"From the moment that the mismanagement of the Dardanelles
Expedition became apparent to the Bulgarians (and it must be
remembered that the whole Balkan Peninsula was ringing with the
details at a time when the British public was still allowed to know
nothing) only one thing could have prevented them from joining the
Central Powers, and that was the prompt display of military force,
as a practical proof that we should not allow our ally to be
crushed.... Prince George of Greece was sent to Paris by his
brother, the King, with a virtual offer of intervention in return
for the Entente Powers guaranteeing the integrity of Greek
territory. The French were inclined to consider the offer, but it
was rejected by London on the ground that no attention could be
paid to 'unauthorised amateur diplomacy.'
"This astonishing phrase was allowed to reach the King of Greece,
and having been applied to his own brother on a mission which was
anything but unauthorised, naturally gave the greatest possible
offence.
"As a matter of fact, the Treaty was much more comprehensive than
is generally supposed. Under its provisions the _casus foederis_
arises not merely in the event of a Bulgarian attack on Serbia, but
also of an attack from any other quarter also; and therefore
Greece, in not coming to Serbia's aid against Austria-Hungary in
1914, had already broken her pledge. Hence Sir Edward Grey, who
must have been well aware of this fact, was surely running a very
grave risk when he relied upon Greek constancy in a situation which
his own diplomatic failures had rendered infinitely less
favourable. On September 23rd Bulgaria mobilised against Serbia;
yet on September 27th Sir Edward Grey practically vetoed Serbia's
proposal to take advantage of her own military preparedness and to
attack Bulgaria before she could be ready. Next day (September
28th) in the House of Commons he uttered his famous pledge that, in
the event of Bulgarian aggression, 'We are prepared to give to our
friends in the Balkans all the support in our power, in the manner
that would be most welcome to them, in concert with our Allies
without reserve and without qualification.' At the moment everyone
in England, and above all in Serbia, took this to mean that we were
going to send Serbia the military help for which she was
clamouring; but on November 3rd Sir Edward Grey explained to an
astonished world that he merely meant to convey that after Bulgaria
had joined Germany 'there would be no more talk of concessions from
Greece or Serbia.' The _naïveté_ which could prompt such an
explanation is only equalled by the confusion of mind which could
read this interpretation into a phrase so explicit and unequivocal.
Greece's failure in her Treaty obligations towards Serbia alone
saved Britain from the charge of failure to fulfil her pledge to
Greece. Nothing can exonerate Greece's desertion of her ally, but
in view of our tergiversation and irresolution, some allowance must
be made for King Constantine's attitude towards the Entente. Sir
Edward Grey, throwing to the winds all his public pledges to
Serbia, definitely urged upon the French Generalissimo complete
withdrawal from Salonica and the abandonment of the Serbs to their
fate. General Joffre replied with the historic phrase: 'You are
deserting us on the field of battle and we shall have to tell the
world.' General Joffre carried his point, and in the biting phrase
of Sir Edward Carson, 'the Government decided that what was too
late three weeks before was in time three weeks after.' But those
three weeks, which might have transformed the fortune of the
campaign, had been irretrievably lost through Sir Edward Grey's
lack of a Balkan policy. Even then our hesitation continued. In
Paris the question is being asked on all sides why Sir Edward Grey,
after such repeated fiascoes, did not follow his late colleague, M.
Delcasse, into retirement, and what everyone is saying in Paris,
from the Quai d'Orsay to the Academie Française, surely need no
longer be concealed from London. The German Chancellor was unwise
enough to hint this in his speech, when he ascribed Germany's
Balkan success in large measure to our mistakes. The fall of Sir
Edward Grey, as the result of a demand for a more energetic conduct
of the war and for still closer co-operation with our Allies, and
the substitution of a man of energy and first-rate ability, would
be far the most serious and disconcerting blow which the Germans
had yet received."
The halting, hesitating, vacillating "wait-and-see" policy which seems
to be revealed in such startling vividness by Mr. Seton-Watson causes a
deep thinker to ponder further. Is it not possible that Sir Edward Grey,
like the late Lord Kitchener, may not have been his own master? That he
in turn may have been held down and dictated to by the one man whose own
valuation of his personal services so greatly exceeded the worth put
upon them by the nation at large?
It is easy to state in the House of Commons, "I accept entire
responsibility," as Mr. Asquith did when the Gallipoli disaster was
questioned, but he surely ought then to have been the questioner! _His
statement_, which the members of the House were bound down by national
loyalty not to attack as they would have liked to have done, _proved_
that the Prime Minister had been _meddling with military matters_ which
should have been left absolutely and entirely to military experts. Hence
it was that the nation learnt that the halting, hesitating, vacillating
"wait-and-see" policy had paralysed not only the whole Gallipoli
campaign, but particularly the Suvla Bay expedition, which if properly
exploited would undoubtedly have given our arms one of the greatest
victories of the war.[18]
FOOTNOTES:
[15] As evidence in support of this, see the papers seized from von
Papen at Falmouth, December, 1915; the papers seized at Salonika,
January, 1916; the reports from Washington, U.S.A., 1915-6; and the
numerous paragraphs in the Press to date since November, 1914.
[16] Cotton was not made absolute contraband until 381 days after the
war had broken out, August 20th, 1915. Sir Edward Grey, speaking in the
House of Commons on January 7th, 1915, said: "His Majesty's Government
have never put cotton on the list of contraband; they have throughout
the war kept it on the free list; and on every occasion when questioned
on the point they have stated their intention of adhering to this
practice."
[17] "Romany Rye," chapter 39.
[18] It has been said by those who were there that the English troops
were kept back and permitted to play about on the beach bathing and
building camp, etc., for three days after the first landing, thus giving
the Turks more than sufficient time to bring up opposing forces and
successfully dig themselves in where required, whereas it was but nine
miles across the peninsula, which could presumably have been straddled
in a few hours with little, if any, opposition at the time of landing.
Was this the suppressed episode "within a few hours of the greatest
victory of the war," which the Right Hon. Winston Churchill referred to
in his memorable speech, and which has been the subject of so much
surmise and comment?