THE SHAM BLOCKADE
SECRET SERVICE PROTEST AGAINST THE OPEN DOOR TO GERMANY--ACTIVITY
OF OUR NAVAL ARM NULLIFIED--LORD NORTHCLIFFE'S PATRIOTISM--BLOCKADE
BUNKUM--POSITION OF DENMARK--HUGE CONSIGNMENTS FOR GERMANY--THE
DECLARATION FIASCO--BRITISH MINISTERS' GULLIBILITY IN
COPENHAGEN--GERMAN BANK GUARANTEEING THE BRITISH AGAINST GOODS
GOING TO GERMANY--BRITISH NAVY PARALYSED BY DIPLOMATIC AND
POLITICAL FOLLY--STATISTICS EXTRAORDINARY--FLOUTING THE DECLARATION
OF LONDON--SIR EDWARD GREY'S DILATORINESS AND PUERILE
APOLOGIA--LORD HALDANE PUSHED OUT--LORD FISHER'S EFFICIENCY
UNRECOGNISED--LORD DEVONPORT'S AMAZING FIGURES ON GERMAN
IMPORTS--FURTHER STARTLING STATISTICS--BRITISH THE GREATEST
MUDDLERS ON EARTH--NOBLE SERVICE BY AUSTRALIAN PREMIER, W. H.
HUGHES--HOLLOW SHAM OF THE DANISH AGREEMENT AND THE NETHERLANDS
OVERSEAS TRUST--BLOCKADE MINISTER, LORD ROBERT CECIL, AND HIS
FEEBLE FUTILE EFFORTS--MORE STATISTICS--THE TRIUMVIRATE--ASQUITH
THE UNREADY, SIR EDWARD GREY THE IRRESOLUTE, AND LORD HALDANE THE
FRIEND OF THE KAISER--DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, THE SAVIOUR OF THE
SITUATION--HOW HE PROVED HIMSELF A MAN--A NEGLECTED OPPORTUNITY.
During the first year of the war Secret Service agents busied themselves
much concerning the vast stream of goods, necessities and munitions in
the raw state which poured into Germany direct and through neutral
countries like the waters of a rising flood over weirs on the Thames.
Night and day these ever-restless beings flitted as shadows along the
secretly or openly favoured trade routes. Persistently and energetically
they followed up clues and signs of the trails of enemy traders, from
ports of entry to original sources. Week by week, almost day by day,
they flashed home news of then present and future consignments of such
importance and value to the enemy that he paid exorbitant prices and
ridiculous commissions to help rush them over his frontiers. Seemingly
all was in vain. These efforts were but wasted. The work was apparently
unappreciated and unresponsively received. England, to all intents and
purposes, was slumbering too soundly to be awakened. Meanwhile, during
every hour of the twenty-four, unending processions of trade ships of
every shape, make and rig sneaked along the coasts of neutral waters, as
near to land as safety permitted, on their way to the receiving ports of
Germany.
Observers, stationed in lighthouses or on promontories, who watched this
abnormal freighting activity, could not but help noticing that, whenever
smoke showed itself upon the horizon seawards, consternation at once
became manifest on the decks of these cargo carriers. They would squeeze
dangerously inshore, lay to, or drop anchors, bank up their fires and
damp down every curl of smoke which it was possible to suppress; in
short, they adopted every conceivable ruse to conceal their presence and
identity.
If this trade was honest and legitimate, why should these tactics be
followed, and these precautions taken? _Res ipsa loquitur._
As the year 1915 progressed and the inertia of the British Government
became more and more realised abroad, the captains of freighters grew
bolder and bolder, and the confidence of the thousands upon thousands of
get-rich-quick-anyhow dealers ashore increased and multiplied
accordingly. No one, except the Germans themselves, knew or could get to
know the actual extent of this enormous volume of their import trade.
The chattels came from so many different countries and were consigned
through so many channels that accurate records were rendered impossible;
whilst the greater part was shipped in direct.
The English Press, which had been so self-denying and loyal to the
Government in spite of the shameful manner in which it had been gagged
and bound down, until the Censor's blue-pencilling amounted almost to an
entire suppression of news, began to grumble and to hint very broadly
that the bombastic utterances of our Ministers regarding the
effectiveness of our blockade and the starvation of the Central Powers
were exaggerations and not facts. Men who had always put their country
before any other consideration began to proclaim that the so-called
blockade was a delusion; whilst they quoted figures of imports to
neutral countries which were embarrassing to the Government. Something
therefore had to be done. The notorious Danish Agreement[19] was
accordingly framed in secret (in secret only from the British public),
and a very highly-coloured and altogether misleading interpretation of
its limitations and effectiveness was hinted at in Parliament. In spite
of terrific pressure upon Ministers by members of both Houses, not a
clause of this extraordinary document was permitted to be published,
although its context was freely circulated or commented upon in the
Press of neutral countries and the whole Agreement was printed _in
extenso_ on December 12th, 1915, in the _Borsen_, at Copenhagen. What a
sham and a farce this whole arrangement turned out to be will be seen
later.
It has ever been the proud boast of Englishmen that Britannia rules the
waves. Until this war the British Navy had been supreme mistress of the
seas, and no loyal person within the Empire whereon the sun never sets
has grudged a penny of the very heavy taxation which has been necessary
to keep up the efficiency of our Fleet. From the commencement of the
war, however, our Fleet was tied up body and soul, shackled in the
intricacies of red tape entanglements woven round its keels, guns, and
propellers by lawyer politicians who never could leave the management of
naval affairs to the Navy, any more than they could leave the management
of military affairs to the Army. In theory these pedantic illusionists
may be superb, whilst some of them even stated (1915-16) that if they
were removed from office during the continuance of the war it would be a
calamity. But in practice the British public has seen proved too
vividly--and at what a cost!--only an incessant stream of terrible
disasters and mishaps; "milestones" in their policy of makeshift, dawdle
and defeat.
The first chapter in this book shows that our party system Government
was probably directly responsible for the war itself, or at least for
our being precipitated unprepared into it. Without a shadow of a doubt
it is solely accountable for the wild and riotously extravagant waste,
for our colossal supererogation, and for our excessive losses.
What would have happened to the Mother Country and to her extensive
Colonial Possessions had not Lord Northcliffe, through the powerful
newspapers he controls, stepped in from time to time and torn off the
scales which had been plastered and bandaged upon the eyes of an
all-too-confiding British public, and just in the nick of time to save
disaster upon disaster too awful to contemplate?
It is not necessary to enumerate the many and vital matters which Lord
Northcliffe helped an indignant and a deluded public to consider and
discuss, whereby the Government was roused from its torpor and pushed
into reluctant activity, but the greatest of all canards which it had
attempted to foist upon Europe does very much concern the subject-matter
of this volume, hence it must be separately dealt with. It is this
so-called blockade, which amongst Teuton traders in Northern neutral
countries was looked upon as the best of all "war jokes"!
It seems to be universally believed that had the British Fleet been
given a free hand and its direction left to the discretion of a good,
business-like, fighting Sea Lord, the war would have been over within
eighteen months from the first declaration. As it has happened, the
freedom of action of our Fleet has been so hampered that our enemies
have actually been permitted to draw certain food supplies not only from
our own Colonies, but from the United Kingdom itself. How can it be
argued that this suicidal policy has not helped to drag out the war and
add to its terrible and unnecessary wastage of life and wealth, with the
aftermath of woe and misery consequent thereon?
For our Ministers to affirm that Germany has been starved by our
blockade is as untrue as it is ridiculous. The bunkum which has filled
the thousands upon thousands of Press columns in different countries on
this subject has been mere chimerical effort, in great part subsidised
from indirect pro-German sources of more or less remote origin in
accordance with the value of the publication used.
Now for a dissection of the facts concerning the main subject.
Passing over innumerable paragraphs in the Press which hinted at much
more than they disclosed, attention should be given to an article which
appeared in the January (1916) number of the _National Review_ (pp.
771-780), in which a naval correspondent gives record of a startling
amount of supplies of cotton, copper, oils, foodstuffs and other
commodities that were permitted to pass into Germany by permission of
our benevolent Government.
The _Edinburgh Review_ of the same month also contains an article worthy
of perusal upon the same subject. Many other periodicals directly and
indirectly touched upon it, but for proof positive and authentic
evidence the reader is referred to the files of the _Daily Mail_. That
paper, in its persistent and praiseworthy patriotism, by pushing forward
everything it honestly believed to be for the Empire's good, or which it
hoped might help shorten the war, determined to get to the bottom of the
matter. In order to ascertain how far this alleged supplying of Germany
was permitted it arranged for one of its Special Commissioners to visit
Scandinavia for the express purpose of collecting evidence on the spot
and for publication in its columns. The author has taken the liberty of
extracting freely therefrom. On January 12th, 1916, the special series
of articles commenced as follows:
"In setting out the facts I will try hard to keep from my
presentation of them any distortion due to the disgust and burning
anger that they evoked in me, as they must do in every patriot of
this Empire.
"Lest even for a moment a wrong and cruel suspicion rest upon
little Denmark--namely, that she is unfriendly towards the Allies
and has been 'two-faced' in the many tokens of friendliness and
respect she has shown us, I say with conviction that there is not a
truer or deeper love for England and the English than exists
to-day in Denmark. These Danes, forefathers of so many of our race,
warm still to Britain and the British. Their hearts glow to our
successes, yearn to our reverses. Deep down they are for us through
and through. The best Danes revolt at the work Denmark is now
forced to do. A big and greedy German fist hangs over
her--threatening, bullying, driving. 'So far as in you lies,' says
the bully behind that fist, 'you must be useful to us--as useful at
least as you are to our enemy'--(aside, 'even more useful if we can
make you so')--'and should you fail by one iota to yield us such
surplus food commodities as you produce and such food commodities
as you can get'--(aside, 'by hook or by crook')--'from abroad, then
the consequences for you will be serious. We shall seize Denmark.'"
Here follow several columns of statistics relating to the importation of
foodstuffs to Denmark, showing increases in some instances of upwards of
1,000 per cent. upon her normal supplies.
Denmark's total population is under 3,000,000, and to argue that she
would, or even could, use these commodities herself is mere foolishness.
Extracting further:
"The vast bulk of Denmark's pork goes to Germany--either directly,
by train or ship, or _via_ Sweden, where obliging workmen,
dignified _pro tem_. with the title 'merchant consignee' (but whose
whole stock-in-trade consists perhaps of a hammer, some nails and a
batch of labels), change the labels on the goods and perhaps turn
upside down the marked ends of the packing-cases, and then
re-consign the goods to Germany.
"And they may even leave Sweden in the very railway trucks and
cases in which they have arrived and travel to Germany back through
Denmark in sealed trucks over which the Danish Customs have no
control. Or there may be no need to trouble to send them to Sweden.
They may leave Copenhagen docks direct for Lübeck, Warnemunde,
Stettin, or Hamburg, in direct steamers, of which some 500 sailed
during the year. Or they may go by train. Huge trains leave every
day. The trains and ferries and boats connecting Denmark and
Germany are so full that there is competition for room. How often
may one see the Danish shippers, in advertising their sailings for
German ports, add the significant words, 'Cargo space already full'
days before the actual date of sailing!
"Now more Swedish traffic than ever crosses the water from Malmö or
Helsingborg and makes its way to Germany across Denmark by rail. I
have stood about the railways at many points in the two countries
and watched truck after truck go by--all to cross the German
frontier below Kolding, in Jutland. The great wagons were closed
and a little seal gleamed red on their black doors. I have stood,
too, on the quays at these ports and watched the dock cranes
lifting and lowering sack after sack, box after box, and barrel
after barrel, from the quays to German-bound steamers, to German
words of command, and on the main or mizzen-mast of the steamer
would be as often as not the gloomy little German flag, black and
white and red, still blacker and gloomier with the smoke drifting
from the funnel before it.
"On the quays at Copenhagen I watched the steamers _Hugo Stinnes_,
of Hamburg, _Esberg_, _Snare_, _Haeland_, _Hever_, and others, of
Sweden, loading wine from Spain and Portugal; oil, lard, coffee and
petroleum from America; meat from Denmark, and many other goods,
_all for German ports_. I travelled to Malmö, in Sweden, with a
cargo of oils and fats and iron and boxes with no marks on them,
and at Malmö saw these things put ready on the quay to await the
next German steamer. At the same port I saw pork in boxes,
meatstuffs in boxes and barrels labelled 'Armour and Co.,' oils and
fats bearing the names Swift or Morris or Harrison or Salzberger,
and some of them adding the information that the contents were
'guaranteed to contain 30 per cent. of pure neat's-foot oil'; also
petroleum of 'Best Standard White' and other brands; pork 'fat
backs,' and many other things besides, _all labelled 'Lübeck'_ and
going into lighters for transport thither. Fussing tugs, with a
litter of 400-ton lighters behind, may be seen travelling these
waters all hours of the day bound for Germany, and no one can say
what mysterious cargoes slip from country to country at night. The
glut of traffic at these link-points is tremendous. _At some ports
there is such a glut of stuff that Danish traders complain that
they cannot get their own Danish produce over to Germany 'because
of the amount of foreign stuff' there is to be ferried over._ A
pretty position, indeed!
"And it is we in Great Britain who are allowing all this 'foreign
stuff' to reach these countries. It is British licences and permits
and recommendations which make possible this pouring of the world's
goods into Germany. Little wonder the Danish merchants and other
onlookers less friendly to us look with wonder upon us. 'My word,
but you are truly a Christian people,' they say. 'You love your
enemies all right--well enough to feed them. And if you, England,
will allow the stuff over, it is not for us, little Denmark, to
stand in Germany's way.'
"But how is all this possible, you may ask, this feeding of Germany
through neutral Scandinavian countries? Are there not strict
undertakings and promises and guarantees given to England against
these goods, supplied from outside, ever reaching our enemy,
Germany?
"Our Navy does its part. Ships are hauled into ---- and searched.
Guarantees are exacted and forthcoming. And the whole performance,
admirably and bravely done, is so much waste of effort. _For the
guarantees are not worth the ink they are written with_; they are
not worth a single tinker's expletive. To show this will be a
little intricate, perhaps, but it is worth trouble to follow.
"Goods leave Great Britain and America, Spain and other countries
for Danish ports. The shipper, now wary of the British Fleet, which
has done wonderful police duty on the high seas, generally exacts a
declaration that the goods are not for export to an enemy country.
The declaration is signed right willingly, for the consignor can
quite easily believe, or pretend to believe, that his goods are
merely for Denmark. A British warship overhauls the boat, and
perhaps takes her into ---- (a certain British port) for
examination.
"The declaration with each consignment is in order. But, not
satisfied (the Navy all through have been suspicious, and rightly),
the officer communicates with London. 'The s.s. _so-and-so_ has big
consignments of foodstuffs for Copenhagen under the names
So-and-So. Can we release them?' London communicates with our
Legation at Copenhagen, in whose hands they are in this matter.
'Can we let through consignments to So-and-So in your capital?' And
our Copenhagen Legation replies with a list of the Danish people
whose consignments must be let through and a list of those (if any)
whose goods must be stopped or forwarded only on declaration that
the goods must not leave Copenhagen Harbour or Copenhagen City. It
all looks admirable--most businesslike; quite systematic and
thorough. _It is so much nonsense. For in point of fact the ideas
of our Legation at Copenhagen on the good faith of some Danish
traders and the bad faith of others are childish beyond words.
Their rulings are the laughing-stock of Denmark._ And the joke
would be all the more appreciable were it not that there is so much
anger caused by the arbitrariness of the Legation's trade rulings
and the baiting of some honest men, while less honest go free and
trade with impunity. Struck by the frequency with which one or two
names appeared in the Copenhagen importers' lists, I made some
calculations, then some personal inquiries. I found that 'X' alone
had imported during the year 4,000,000 lbs. pork, 3,000,000 lbs.
lard, 2,500,000 lbs. oleo, 1,000,000 lbs. other pork and meat. 'Y,'
another man, imported in September, October and November alone,
1,045,000 lbs. of cocoa. Neither of these men was engaged in these
trades before the war. They were men of quite humble business
attainments. _Yet both enjoyed the full confidence of our trusting
British Legation at Copenhagen_, who would have taken solemn
affidavits, no doubt, that neither of these men traded with
Germany. I would have done the same myself. But these men traded
with others who did trade with Germany, either directly or through
third and fourth and maybe fifth parties.
"What is the result? You have in Copenhagen that amazing modern war
phenomenon the trader of the _n_th degree. Plain Trader imports his
goods and basks and grows fat under the ægis of the British
Legation in Copenhagen. Trader 2 buys from Plain Trader under a
'guarantee' not to sell to Germany, and if he does not dare to
break that guarantee himself he sells to Trader 3 or Trader 4 or
Trader 5, one of whom will undoubtedly do it. And the less money
that Trader 5 has the better, because then, even if he is caught,
which is not likely, for nobody worries, no one can squeeze him for
the amount of the guarantee because he has not got it.
"The result is that every Tom, Dick and Harry of Copenhagen is a
trader--from the _bona fide_ merchant downwards. Your hotel porter
may be trading with a Hungarian for flour or rice or fat; the
"Boots" can get you a ton or two of meal. Imagine the amazement of
the Danish housewife when her maid came in one day and, with hands
clasped in enthusiasm, said, 'Oh, madam, I've got three wagon-loads
of marmalade to sell'! And that happened in Copenhagen not long
ago.
"The newspapers are daily blackened with great display
advertisements offering goods for sale. I have before me as I write
a whole sheaf of such advertisements, offering anything, from
American lard to potash and oil and cocoa and coffee. And not one
of these advertisements has a name or an address to it; nothing but
a telephone number. One or two of these I tracked down, only to
find as vendors simple, kindly souls, such as old shopwomen,
caretakers, porters, shop-girls, and the rest waiting for an offer
for their goods. _Per contra_, as the book-keepers say, there are
advertisements from those wanting goods, and these are often more
outspoken.
"Some of these nameless advertisements treat of great quantities.
'Ten thousand kilos fat, with permit to export; 20,000 kilos salted
half-pigs; 50,000 kilos salt meat'; and much more says one
advertisement alone. And the good soul answering to your inquiry
may prove a simple little typewriting girl--one of Copenhagen's new
traders to the _n_th degree.
"The machinery that has been established by Great Britain in
Denmark for preventing imported foodstuffs from reaching our enemy
might be very admirable--if only it worked.
"There has been little or no enforcement of the trading laws
imposed upon Danish traders by Great Britain. We have supplied them
with goods and have allowed them to help themselves to goods from
all the ends of the earth upon set conditions--namely, that those
goods should not go to Germany, our enemy. They go to Germany,
nevertheless, and _they go because we have no one in Denmark who
sees to it that they shall not go_. Great Britain, in short, lacks
a watchful policeman in Denmark. Great Britain also lacks a live
sergeant at home to see to it that her Denmark policeman does not
sleep on his beat. _The British Foreign Office_ is the sergeant I
mean; _the British Legation at Copenhagen_, or its commercial
department, is the policeman. _Theirs is the duty. And both have
failed us._
"Take the written declarations made by traders that goods supplied
to them by or through us shall not go to Germany. Without control
and enforcement they are perfectly useless. I myself found traders
who told me point-blank that they would consider such agreements as
this not morally binding upon them. 'Your Navy seizes our ships,'
said one, 'and your Foreign Office releases them only on condition
that the goods they contain shall be subject to your own
conditions. I sign those conditions, but they are exacted from me
by force, and I don't consider them as worth a snap of the fingers.
If you put a pistol to my head and said, "Sign that cheque," I'd
sign it, but I'd telephone to the bank the minute you'd gone and
stop payment. And I'll do the same thing with your British import
agreements.' These agreements are perhaps 'backed' by a money
penalty. The banks undertake this guarantee part of the business.
For a modest 3 per cent. or so they will put up your money
guarantee against your goods ever reaching Germany and contravening
the agreement clause. And when the goods go on to Sweden the
Swedish banks relieve the Danish banks of their obligations. And
when the goods go on from Sweden to Germany, who relieves the
Swedish banks? I have it on the word of a man I believe to be
thoroughly honest and well informed that the North German Bank of
Hamburg alone has taken over from Swedish banks of late in one
transaction as much as £78,000 worth of guarantees--that the goods
will not reach Germany! _Was ever there such a comedy? A German
bank guaranteeing that much-needed goods will not reach Germany!_
"The Germans are not 'let down' by their diplomacy in Copenhagen. A
constant weight is poised carefully and with a silken brutality
over little Denmark's head and von Ranzau smiles and assures
Denmark he is really preserving her from his powerful master. And
he gets his way, of course. The little matter of a permit for
export? Well, perhaps it can be managed for you, Baron--_especially
as the British watchman is asleep just now_!
"So the great game goes on. If Denmark has goods that cannot obtain
a permit for direct export to Germany they can go _via_ Sweden.
_Vice versa_, if Sweden has goods about which our active British
Legation there is too curious, send them to Denmark and re-export
them. That is simple. And I have seen for myself at Denmark's port
of Copenhagen Swedish goods (casks of American oil) which had been
refused permits for shipment direct from Sweden to Germany, being
loaded into the steamer _Heinrich Hugo Stinnes_, of Hamburg, for
shipment to Hamburg. Also, on the quay at Malmö (Sweden) I have
seen goods for which Denmark had refused a direct export permit
being loaded into nameless lighters for shipment to German Lübeck.
"Thus agreements, promises, guarantees, and prohibitions--_the
whole commercial code that Great Britain has devised for regulating
imports into Denmark and for checking their re-export to Germany_
(and, incidentally, for displaying to us at home) _are so much
meaningless pantomime_. They have become so simply because the
honester traders of Denmark, and the dishonest parasites of all
nations who work under them and through them, have found that there
is no supervision, no punishment, no judge to answer. _Our
watchmen, both in London and in Copenhagen, have slept._"
On January 13th, 1916, Lord Sydenham in the House of Lords raised the
question of "Feeding the Germans," and in his speech stated that in
cocoa alone our exports for August-July, 1913-14, were 6,138 tons as
against 32,083 tons for 1914-15. For the sixteen months preceding the
war our exports were 8,883 tons, as against 33,357 tons during the first
sixteen months of the war.
Lord Lansdowne, following, admitted that "_there was an enormous balance
unaccounted for which it was reasonable to suppose found its way to
enemy countries_."
The following are the exports of cocoa to the countries named in the
years 1913, 1914, and up to December 30th, 1915:
COCOA EXPORTS
In lbs. to 1913. 1914. 1915.
(to Dec. 30.)
Holland 2,205,282 12,203,463 9,298,805
Denmark 50,782 1,853,948 10,615,873
Scandinavia 343,573 3,079,904 14,606,309
A leading article in the _Daily Mail_ of January 14th, 1916, stated:
"The strength of the greatest Navy in the world is being paralysed
by administrative feebleness and diplomatic weakness. Had our sea
power been used, as the sailors would have used it, from the
opening of the war, it is possible that Germany would before now
have collapsed. The mightiest weapon in our arsenal has been
blunted because our politicians imagined they could wage what
Napoleon called 'rosewater war,' and were more eager to please
everybody than to hurt the enemy, and because our diplomatists are
remiss.
"On December 29th the _Neue Freie Presse_,[20] a leading Austrian
newspaper, published for the benefit of the people of Vienna an
advertisement offering provisions from Holland. A list of the
articles which could be supplied at moderate prices followed. It
included cocoa, chocolate, potatoes, flour, sausages, sides of
bacon, butter, coffee, tea, sardines, oranges, lemons and figs.
"_And yet Mr. Runciman tells us that the Germans are on the verge
of starvation!_
"The cure for this state of affairs is to infuse greater energy and
insight into our diplomacy and to free the Navy from its paper
fetters. Much of the mischief is due to the want of capable
advisers at the British Legations in the neutral capitals and of
energy and vigilance on the part of the Foreign Office at home. The
Germans have been quick to realise the importance of stationing
active agents at the vital posts.
"_The present system of setting diplomatists who have lived all
their life in a world of formality to deal with the sharpest
business men in Europe in a matter where huge profits are at stake
is an immense blunder which may have the most serious
consequences._
"Our very gentleness with Denmark is being quoted in that country
to prove that we are not likely to win the war. This is undoubted
and dangerous fact."
On January 14th, 1916, the Special Commissioner in a further article,
headed, "The Sham Blockade: British tyres on German Cars," explained in
detail the tricks used by unscrupulous foreigners and others to acquire
stocks of rubber motor-tyres for German use. He complained, with reason,
that the broken promises, broken guarantees, and reckless manner in
which permits to trade were granted seemed to be almost entirely the
fault of the British Foreign Office representatives at the British
Legation. He concludes with the following paragraph:
"Is this soft-heartedness towards commercial shortcomings and
laxity characteristic of our British control in Copenhagen? On the
evidence that I have I honestly believe it to be so. But is this
attitude solely the individual attitude of Britain's
representatives in Copenhagen or is it merely a reflex of the
Foreign Office attitude at home?
"I think the true answer is that the Copenhagen Legation attitude
is a reflex of our Foreign Office attitude. But _if London is mild,
Copenhagen is puny_; if London is a lamb, Copenhagen is a sucking
dove."
On January 13th, 1916, the following paragraph appeared in the _Globe_:
"We cannot disregard the startling and amazing figures collected in
Denmark by the Special Commissioner sent out by the _Daily Mail_.
"Of course, all these commodities are consigned to Danish
purchasers, under guarantees that they are not intended for the
enemy. What purposes these guarantees serve except to hold harmless
the vessels in which the articles are conveyed we are at a loss to
understand.
"No sane person will believe that the Danish people have suddenly
developed such a passion for pork that they must increase their
consumption by 1,300 per cent., or that every man, woman and child
in Denmark requires the daily bath in cocoa with which the 23,000
tons they now import would appear to be intended to provide them.
_The only possible inference from these figures is that we are
being deluded, and are feeding Germany_ in our own despite."
The _Pall Mall Gazette_ of January 18th, 1916, said:
"Revelations like these can only be described as heart-breaking to
the men and women who have given their sons and brothers and
husbands to the end that Germany may be brought to her knees. Now
they find that some malign spell has paralysed the Navy's arm so
that, instead of Germany's foreign supplies being cut off, they are
in some vital respects more abundant than ever."
The _Quarterly Review_, January, 1916, contains a powerful article on
"The Danish Agreement." It suggests how _some blight has been at work in
our Foreign Office for years steadily undermining our mastery of the
sea_. One paragraph bears particularly on the present point:
"No informed man doubts that the winter of 1916-17 must weaken to a
marked degree, through lack of food, Germany's armed resistance,
always assuming that she is not supplied through neutral countries.
The existence of England depends on her victory over Germany. Her
victory over Germany depends on the cutting off of neutral
supplies. Therefore the existence of England depends on the cutting
off of neutral supplies. But _when_, in August, 1914, _the Cabinet
and, above all, the Foreign Office, were confronted by this great
possibility of stratagem every psychological force was set in
motion against its adoption_."
A telegram from Washington, U.S.A., on January 17th, 1916, to the
_Morning Post_, set out the exports permitted to be poured into neutral
countries in spite of all the efforts and protests of our Navy by our
all-too-benevolent Foreign Office, and in face of Mr. Asquith's pledges
to the House of Commons in March and in November, 1915, when he
emphasised to loud cheering that _he would stick at nothing to prevent
commodities of any kind reaching or leaving Germany. That there was no
form of economic pressure to which he did not consider we were entitled
to win the war_.
EXPORTS TO NEUTRAL COUNTRIES
1913. 1915.
To Bushels. Bushels.
WHEAT Holland, Norway,
Sweden, Denmark 19,000,000 50,000,000
MAIZE Denmark 4,750,000 10,950,000
Holland 6,900,000 11,600,000
Other neutrals 2,100,000 6,400,000
---------- ----------
13,750,000 28,950,000
========== ==========
Barrels. Barrels.
WHEAT Holland 708,000 1,500,000
FLOUR Other neutrals 709,000 3,800,000
1,417,000 5,100,000
lbs. lbs.
BACON Holland 3,900,000 9,000,000
Other neutrals 27,000,000 82,500,000
---------- ----------
30,900,000 91,500,000
========== ==========
1914 1915
BOOTS Neutrals 462,000 pairs 4,800,000 pairs
COTTON Neutrals 53,000 bales 1,100,000 bales
MOTOR-}
CARS &} Neutrals £260,000 £4,000,000
PARTS }
The New York _Journal of Commerce_, quoting statistics of the U.S.A.
export trade for the first ten months of 1915 under a headline,
"Increase to Neutral Europe Equals German Loss," shows that "whilst
shipments to Germany fell away £31,400,000 for the period named, the
gain to the neutral nations on the north of Germany was £32,000,000."
What could give more confirmatory proof?
On January 24th, 1916, the _Morning Post_ received a further cablegram
from Washington, U.S.A., containing the elucidating facts that in the
ten months from January 1st to October 31st, 1913, Germany imported from
the U.S.A. 9,898,289 lbs. of cotton-seed oil, the Netherlands 31,867,327
lbs., and Norway 6,174,033 lbs.
In the corresponding ten months of 1915 the figures were: Germany, nil;
the Netherlands, 93,153,175 lbs.; and Norway 24,110,269 lbs.
Other statistics follow, such as cotton-seed, meal and cake, etc.,
proving beyond all shadow of doubt that neutral countries were importing
far more goods and foodstuffs, etc, than their usual average imports
plus the total previous imports of Germany in addition.
A careful analysis of the leading American exports showed, almost
without an exception, the striking fact that the prices of peace exports
were very much lower in 1915 than in 1913; whilst the prices of war
exports all showed large and heavy advances.
Deducing from these figures, leader-writers came to the obvious
conclusion that _Germany was enjoying unrestricted imports for which
Great Britain directly or indirectly paid_.
Returns from other parts of the world merely corroborated, adding proof
upon proof. By way of example the Brazilian official trade returns
during the first nine months of 1913, compared with 1915, show the
following exports to the countries named:
1913. 1915.
£ £
Sweden 389,475 2,844,787
Norway 63,562 594,900
Denmark 105,637 715,387
In addition to the export figures given and those quoted from the U.S.A.
should be added the enormous quantities of corn, etc, re-exported from
Liverpool and other British ports under special license issued by our
Government.
It is therefore reasonably arguable that _our Government has used our
Fleet to convoy our Merchantmen in freighting foodstuffs, at our
expense, to feed the Germans_. By this incomprehensible tolerance home
prices of food in the United Kingdom were directly raised to a high
figure and neutral countries were directly helped to pile up fortunes by
_bleeding and pinching our own peoples in order to feed their enemies_.
On January 21st, 1916, in the House of Commons Major Rowland Hunt asked
the Foreign Secretary "whether the Foreign Office had been aware of the
state of things demonstrated by the American trade statistics and if so
could he say how much longer our Navy was to be crippled by the Foreign
Office, the war prolonged, and many more thousands of our men
sacrificed?"
Sir E. Grey: "I understand that the subject is to be discussed next
week. I must, however, say that the statements in the question are
grossly unfair and entirely misrepresent the facts of the case. I
reserve any further statement I have to make until next week."
From December 16th to 30th, 1915, just on 25,000 tons of iron ore were
openly _consigned to Germany_ through Rotterdam and Holland; as to which
see further on.
Here is a sample report of the sales one day at Esbjerg (Denmark) cattle
market, December, 1915:
"Cattle sold to-day numbered 1,450 head, of which Street, of Hamburg,
bought 141; Dar Neilsen, of Kiel, 330; Franck of Berlin, 440; an
Austrian buyer, 327."
This leaves 212 for Danish buyers. No wonder best beef was then half a
crown a pound in Denmark!
Incidentally great quantities of the fodder with which these cattle for
Germany are fed come from British ports and possessions.
Our Government was fully, persistently, and impressively advised by the
Secret Service agents of this continual and enormous export of cattle
and beef direct to Germany in January and February, 1915. Yet it
apparently did not lift a finger to attempt to stop or divert it
throughout the year following, or at any time.
Sweden, which normally imports 734,720 lbs. of meat in November and
exports 2,961,280 lbs., imported during November, 1915, 8,016,960 lbs.
Holland, which usually imports in November 1,843,520 lbs. of meat and
exports 11,874,240 lbs., imported in November, 1915, no less than
17,973,760 lbs.
In the light of these figures it seems idle to say that our blockade was
tightened or in any degree effectual.
In the House of Commons on January 19th, 1916, Mr. Booth put the
following question to Lord Robert Cecil in reference to these exports.
Mr. Booth: "Is the noble Lord aware that the Germans in New York toasted
the health of the Foreign Office at Christmas time?"
No answer was returned.
On January 26th, 1916, Sir Edward Grey delivered his promised reply in
the House of Commons. It was brilliant oratory, but it was not argument.
It was a defence of the Navy, which needed no defence. It was a
masterpiece of forensic jurisprudence, but it revealed between the
chinks of polished sentences and high-sounding declamation, in startling
nakedness, the weaknesses, the unwarrantable hesitating caution, or the
downright cowardice of the Cabinet. With such grace and skill did the
speaker unfold his case that a reader, unaware of the facts concealed
behind it, would believe the policy and actions of the Government had
been hitherto faultless, flawless, and blameless. Reading it at a later
date brought to my mind the story of a poacher's wife, who with tears of
grateful joy streaming down her countenance, thanked a learned junior
counsel for his able and successful defence of her husband, who had been
charged with stealing a certain shot-gun.
"My good woman," replied her modest advocate, "it was only a mistake.
The judge truly said that your good husband left the Court without a
stain upon his character. It was only _alleged_ that he stole the gun."
"Alleged be bothered," said the woman; "why, we've got the gun at home
now!"
If this speech of Sir Edward Grey, as a speech, had a fault at all, it
was that the defence he made was too good to ring true. At the time of
its utterance it appeared to appease the House. No one wished to hamper
the Government, which, like the energetic but painfully inefficient
pianist at a certain Western mining camp, was protected by proclamation:
"Please don't shoot. He's doing his best." But outside the House the
underlying effect of the speech upon thinking people was very different.
It created satisfaction in Germany and amongst neutral Governments. It
caused great jubilation amongst the vast army of mushroom traders and
adventurers abroad who were piling up fortunes by illicit trading. But
it left Englishmen and our true sympathisers in this tragic war
irritable, indignant, and unsatisfied; smouldering in their just wrath
at the confessed weak-kneed policy of politicians, who, however good
their intentions, proved that they had not yet grasped the difference
between a quarrel at law and a quarrel at war.
It left the nation disappointed. The people felt we had been fooling
with the war too long; that the time had arrived for some strong and
decisive action. That politics and patronage should be shelved and the
Navy given a free hand. It remembered how the Government had hesitated,
procrastinated, and vacillated in this so-called blockade, as in other
matters. It remembered that Parliament had refused to pass a code of
international rules called the Declaration of London because that code,
made largely to please Germany, weakened the hands of the Navy. It
remembered that _the Government had gone behind the back of Parliament
and illegally put that very code into operation after war began_. It had
not forgotten that this proved such a scandalous weakening of our right
and our strength that soon after the Coalition Government came into
being that code was said to have been scrapped. Even as to this doubts
arose for long afterwards.[21]
It had not forgotten the seventeen long months of public pressure and
the trouble there had been to force cotton as contraband; nor the
seventeen months of "wait and see" before the Navy was permitted to
examine mails and extract (_inter alia_) parcels of rubber. It had not
forgotten Sir Edward Grey's declaration that "he had no intention of
making cotton contraband"; nor Lord Haldane's contention that "it was
useless stopping the import of cotton to Germany, because if we did
Germany could find a substitute for it."
The nation had been deceived and lulled to sleep before by soft words
and gentle assurances. It had been told, "we decline to be bound by
judicial niceties." It had been promised "to prevent commodities of any
kind from entering or leaving the enemy's country"; "to stick at
nothing." It remembered with some misgiving how these promises had been
kept.[22]
What, it reasoned, were the disappointments of a few Dutch and
Scandinavian adventurers from making fortunes out of a war which to
ourselves was a tragedy? The country had unbounded confidence in the
Navy. It had not unbounded confidence in either the Government or the
Foreign Office. It hungered with an overwhelming desire to know why the
Navy should not be given a free and unhampered hand.
The speaker skilfully evaded too much information on that point, and the
nation was compelled to nurse its resentment.
At the outset of his speech, Sir Edward Grey attempted to deal with the
mass of statistics and evidence of direct importation of goods into
Germany accumulated by the Press. He selected wheat and flour only,
whilst he casually referred to a list of figures issued by the Press
Bureau from the War Trade Department of the Government the day before
the debate, which members in the House rightly complained had not been
supplied to themselves. This list was stated to have been compiled
officially in this country from true copies of the ships' manifests,
and it alleged the figures given by the Danish _Borsen_ were in many
cases wrong and unduly inflated. For instance, the increase in rice
imports should have been only 480 per cent. as against 580 per cent.;
lard, 275 per cent. instead of 375 per cent.; pork only 1,216 per cent.
instead of 1,300 per cent.; and so on. Now everyone knows that
statistics are not infallible and a generous allowance should always be
made by a careful calculator. But when all circumstances are taken into
consideration it can safely be concluded that the majority of the
increases alleged by the various Press writers, as having percolated
into Germany, were, if anything, under rather than over the mark.
As to the reliability of the _Borsen_, it is edited by a Government
statistician, and considered by Danish traders as official.
So far as Norway is concerned, H.B.M. Minister at Christiania had
difficulty in obtaining official statistics regarding imports and
exports after the Casement affair remained unanswered; certain it is
that Government assistance was denied to various Consuls acting under
him; whilst I, when in that country, was informed (by British
authorities) I must not collect these figures, although to me and others
working with me they were comparatively easy of access.
So far as Foreign Office knowledge is concerned, it is hardly a credit
to the ability or even sanity of the British Legations in Scandinavia if
they have denied knowledge of these colossal imports of goods into
Germany, which were known to almost every inhabitant of seaport towns.
If they deliberately shut their eyes to the evidence all around them,
they presumably obeyed orders. One could then only wonder as to the
reason for such suicidal policy.
As before mentioned, at the commencement of his speech Sir Edward Grey
laid stress upon the fact that part of the stated increased import,
namely, 2,000,000 barrels of flour were allowed to be exported to
Belgium; whilst a little later in his speech he admitted that "She
[Germany] had requisitioned the food supplies of the civil population
of Poland and Belgium." Almost immediately afterwards Lord Robert Cecil
strove hard to back up the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, but he could
not give the House any positive assurance that the Belgian Relief
distribution was absolutely independent of German control. The
disposition of this is therefore obvious.
Sir Edward Grey attempted to whittle down the U.S.A. exports of wheat by
stating that nearly half went to Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta; but
he did not refer to the corn, etc., exported to Northern neutrals from
Liverpool and other British ports, nor did he make any allowances for
the stream of mysterious ships sailing round far northern seas (many of
them choosing the passage north of Iceland), which sighted land on the
north-western coast of Norway and carried their course inside neutral
waters into the Baltic; which heavily-laden cargo-boats I and others in
the Secret Service had watched and reported week by week and month by
month with heart-rending persistency. The majority of these ships
probably sailed direct to German ports, and no records of their cargoes
were likely to be made, or returned from any country concerning them.
Nor did Sir Edward Grey make reference to the grain ships, which
although nominally bound for Scandinavian ports, were intercepted by
their owners' or consignees' agents in the Baltic, for the purpose of
varying orders for their ultimate port of destination; nor to the ships
which were held up in the Baltic by German war vessels and taken to
German ports under circumstances calling for grave investigation. Nor
did he attempt to answer the general American statistics showing that
the gain in imports to northern neutral countries exceeded the German
loss.
About the middle of his speech Sir Edward Grey said: "If a vessel was
held up by the Fleet with suspected cargo on board, the matter was
referred to the contraband committee, who decided what _part_ of the
cargo should go to the Prize Court."
Surely any other nation in the world at war would have arranged from the
outset that the capture of a vessel _with contraband_ on board _en
route for the enemy_, would have meant _confiscation_ of the ship and
her cargo. Our exceptional and extraordinary leniency was hardly
commented upon; it was certainly not satisfactorily explained.
Continuing to quote from the speech: _He would_ say to neutrals that we
could not give up the right to interfere with enemy trade and must
maintain and press that point. _He would_ ask those countries in
considering our rights to apply the principles which were applied by the
American Government in the war between the North and South as affected
by modern conditions. _If they agreed_ to it, then let them with their
Chambers of Commerce and other bodies make it easier for us to
distinguish between goods intended for the enemy and goods intended for
themselves. _If those_ neutral countries said that we were not entitled
to prevent trading through, neutral countries with the enemy, _then he_
(Sir E. Grey) _must say_ to the neutral countries who took that line
that it was a departure from neutrality. (Cheers.) But he did not think
they would take that line.
What naturally strikes the reader on perusal is this: why not the words,
"I had said" and "I have asked" instead of "he would say" and "he would
ask" which Sir Edward Grey used in his speech? Why wait eighteen months
to arrive at such a decision? Why were not these words used as soon as
war was declared? Flagrant breaches arose, as Sir Edward Grey should or
must have known, and continued to increase in magnitude from the autumn
of 1914. Why he waited until the then date, and why he had not acted
before, was not explained. In the next few grandiloquent sentences he
admitted the justification and the necessity; whilst the House cheered
the words, forgetting past neglected deeds.
Next he admitted that "Germany had, in effect, treated food, when she
found it, as absolute contraband since the first outbreak of war."
This admission gave one much to ponder over.
On the point of a stricter blockade Sir Edward Grey suggested that "if a
rigorous blockade had been established the whole world would have been
against us."
Such a contingency, put into legal parlance, is too ridiculously remote
for further consideration. Why did he not explain why our Fleet was not
allowed to limit particular imports to neutral countries to certain
fixed totals per month, or per annum? It is unthinkable to suppose that
any country would seriously threaten war in face of former well-known
precedent and because such limits were imposed by a blockading Fleet.
More particularly so if any such affected country happened to have been
one of the parties to the Treaty of the Hague, which affirmed the
integrity of poor innocent, unoffending Belgium; the country which,
without justification or excuse, was violated, and ravished, outraged by
the barbarian Hun invaders, and which so many other countries watched
aghast without attempting to help England to protect or to avenge.
Admittedly it would have been easy for us to close the Baltic and the
Mediterranean. Why did we not do so? We could then have regulated to
each country not at war its full and fair average annual complement of
necessities plus an extra and a generous margin for contingencies. The
Government of each recipient country would have seen to it that its own
respective countrymen reaped full benefits; leaks to the Central Powers
would have automatically stopped.
What countries would such a course of action have forced into war
against us?
Possibly Sweden, doubtfully Holland, remotely Denmark.
America had boasted she was "too proud to fight." She might have
favoured us with a "note," but her love of trade would have been an
absolute bar to the possibility of any cessation of supplies and
munitions.
No other country would have demurred except Greece, and the vacillating
tactics of the Greeks were but the harvest which could have been
expected from the seed of "wait-and-see" diplomatic sowing. This is
clearly shown by the utterances of King Tino, who said: "I fear the
Germans. I do not fear the English." The Greeks have similarly expressed
themselves. "We know the Germans would rob, murder, and outrage our land
and our people without any hesitation. The English are quite incapable
of anything of that kind."
It had been proved that Consulates in Greece had been nests of espionage
and arsenals of munitions, and the Islands bases for submarine
murderers; and yet their King actually sent us a protest against our
movement at Salonika to assist the persecuted Serbians whom he and his
country had pledged themselves to uphold and protect; a solemn treaty
they had long ago undertaken, but so conveniently forgotten and lamely
excused themselves out of as soon as called upon to carry it into active
force.
As a general answer to the direct charges of the Press that the Foreign
Office had not kept faith with the nation in doing all that could be
done to make an effective blockade, as an explanation to sweep on one
side the overwhelming mass of evidence relating to the extraordinary
number of German agents and dealers who swarmed throughout Scandinavia
and Holland, their amazing advertisements, their suddenly accumulated
wealth, the balance sheets showing large profits of neutral companies
dealing in Germany's requirements, the alleged wholesale dealers of
imported goods so suddenly sprung up from the ranks of hotel porters,
clerks, typists, adventurers, caretakers, and even charwomen and
servant-girls, our own inflated home prices of necessities and
commodities--Sir Edward Grey's answer to all this was: The Government
had lately sent Lord Faringdon to examine the position in Holland and
Scandinavia and he reported that on the whole things were very
satisfactory and that all was being done that could be done to prevent
the enemy obtaining supplies.
Well might the fat stomachs of the "Goulashes"[23] extend and shake in
merriment when they read these comfortable words!
Sir Edward Grey concluded his speech with this stirring peroration: The
whole of our resources were engaged in this war, and our maximum effort
was at the disposal of our Allies in carrying on this conflict. With
them we should see it through to the end and we should slacken no effort
in the common cause. We should exert all our efforts to put the maximum
possible pressure upon the enemy, and part of that pressure must be
doing the most we could to prevent supplies going to or from the enemy,
_using the Navy to its full power_ ... and in common with our Allies
sparing nothing, whether it were military, naval, or financial effort,
which this country could afford, to see the thing through with them to
the end.
In the loud cheering with which the House of Commons received the speech
no thought was given to the famous words of Napoleon: "Put no faith in
talk which is not borne out by action"; whilst future events went to
show that Napoleon truly forecasted England's present-day weakness when
he wrote: "Feebleness in its Government is the most frightful calamity
that can befall a nation."
Contrast Sir Edward Grey's eloquent words and diplomatic evasiveness
upon the treatment of neutrals with the plain, outspoken, thoroughly
English opinion of Lord Fisher, who is credited with having said:
"There are no such things as neutral powers. Powers are either with us
or against us. If they are friendly they will put up with some
inconvenience; if they are unfriendly they will squeal. Let them
squeal."
Had we acted throughout on this dictum the war would most probably have
been over well inside of eighteen months. Men of the calibre of this
grand old Sea Lord, whose farsight, foresight, and second sight have
endeared him to the nation and made him unique and incomparable, would
soon have made short work of the war. Yet they were not wanted by the
then present-day party-system Government. They were much too blunt and
honest and energetically active.
The nation will also remember that when Lord Kitchener of Khartoum
returned from the East in the early days of the then present Government,
it had no use for his invaluable services. He was actually permitted to
accept a directorship of one of our poorest railway companies on the
south coast for want of a better occupation.[24] But the Press and the
public soon brought the Government to book, as it seemingly had to do in
every matter of real national importance.
The Government tried to keep Lord Haldane installed at the War Office,
but the Press would have none of it. It also insisted on K. of K. being
placed in his proper place and kept there. More's the pity that he was
not given a free hand to do as he liked.
The Press also clamoured for Lord Fisher as First Lord of the Admiralty.
The nation knows how he was treated. A captain in the Navy aptly
described the unwanted and slighted Admiral expert in _John Bull_,
February, 1916, as follows:
"Lord John Fisher is to-day our second Nelson--a diplomatist among
diplomats and a strategist unequalled in our history. What has Lord
John Fisher done?
"He scrapped 162 obsolete warships which were rotting in harbour at
great expense--for which the Government tried to reprimand him.
"He introduced the water-tube boilers, which, as every engineer and
seaman knows, raise a full head of steam in twenty minutes, instead
of twenty hours, as formerly.
"He introduced the steam turbine, which was adopted by every
nation.
"He introduced oil fuel into the Navy, thus making destroyers
capable of steaming further, a great benefit being the almost total
absence of smoke. He also applied it to battleships and other large
craft.
"He introduced the Dreadnought, the bulwark of Britain, and the
ship that baffled the German nation and made the Kiel Canal useless
for years. The oil-burning, water-tubed destroyer, and the _Queen
Elizabeth_--the Secret Service ship and the monitor--all emanated
from his brain.
"He introduced the battle-cruiser, against the will of a timorous
Government whose cry was ever, 'Cut down armaments,' 'Cut down the
Army and Navy.' Had Fisher listened, the Germans would to-day have
outraged our wives and crucified our children.
"He planned the Falkland Islands battle, and sent the Secret
Service ships to chase the German submarines out of the Channel. He
fought hard against the Dardanelles expedition.
"He was Sea Lord when we sank the _Blucher_, the German destroyers
in the North Sea, the German Fleet at the Falklands.
"He is a great man, who seems never to have made a mistake."
Whilst Sir Edward Grey was giving his explanations in the House of
Commons, Lord Devonport was busy in another place. He is one of our
shrewdest and most experienced business men. As Chairman of the Port of
London Authority and former Parliamentary Secretary of the Board of
Trade, he would not be likely to go into figures lightly.
He had given notice to ask the Government for its official figures of
Holland's imports of ore (metal) during 1915.
The Duke of Devonshire replied that the figures provided him were only
650,000 tons. It was admitted that Holland had virtually no smelting
plant, nor coal to feed it if it had, and the Government was virtually
bound to confess that at least this amount of contraband had mostly gone
straight through to Germany.
Lord Devonport clearly stated that in reality one and a half million
tons of metal ore had been imported; whilst he produced statistics
showing the name of every ship, the date of entry, the place from which
the cargo came, the quantity and character of the ore carried, and the
agents to whom each was consigned.
To summarise shortly the total shipments for the period named by Lord
Devonport, August, 1914, to January 15, 1916, it appears that 298 ships
carrying 1,414,311 tons of metal ore entered Rotterdam. The countries
from which the ore came included Sweden, Norway, Spain, Algeria,
Russia, and Great Britain. The totals shown monthly are as follows:
ORE CARGOES.
1914. No. of Ships. Tons.
August 38 174,162
September 11 61,679
October 10 47,900
November 8 37,300
December 14 63,900
------
Total 384,941
1915.
January 17 76,200
February 17 79,700
March 13 85,800
April 22 123,800
May 17 68,100
June 21 95,350
July 21 89,150
August 19 82,300
September 19 92,400
October 22 105,270
November 13 59,700
December 12 48,300
Total 1,006,070
1916.
To January 15 4 23,800
-------
Grand Total 1,414,311
Two hundred and fifty eight ships carried 1,321,456 tons of iron ore; 25
ships carried 41,830 tons of zinc ore, the remainder taking copper ore,
pyrites, nickel, manganese, and calamine.
Lord Devonport added:
"What has come of the much-vaunted order in Council declaring that
no goods should either enter or leave Germany? What is the ultimate
destination of these cargoes? There is no concealment about the
matter. Every captain knows exactly. There are no facilities in
Holland for converting ore into pig-iron; not a single
blast-furnace, and no coal to feed it even if there were.
"The cargoes are transhipped into barges and carried up the Rhine
to a place in easy communication with Essen, where Krupp's works
are situated. Sweden is the main source of the supply. _It is
astounding to me that the British Government should sit still while
these ores are sent to the enemy_ from mines which are virtually
the property of the Swedish Government.
"Great though _the imports of ore into Rotterdam have been, they
are insignificant compared with the importations in German ports_
in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea--Lübeck, Stettin, Swinemunde,
Emden and others. _From May 1st to December 31st, 1915, the total
of those imports were 556 cargoes and 2,089,000 tons of ore._ The
question is going to become critical for, _though the country has
been tolerant and long-enduring, things have not gone too well_.
The sheet-anchor of the situation is the British Fleet."
"The figures," says _Fairplay_, the shipping paper, "sufficiently
indicate the absurdity of supposing that the Netherlands Overseas
Trust or any similar artificial would-be barrier as at present
constituted can, in fact, prevent the enemy from receiving vital
supplies of raw or manufactured material."
Nineteen days after the delivery of Sir Edward Grey's "blockade" speech
in the House of Commons Mr. T. Gibson Bowles, speaking at a great City
demonstration in London on February 14th, 1917, under Lord Devonport as
Chairman and convened for the purpose of protesting against hampering
our Navy, said: "Since the war began Sir Edward Grey had hampered,
shackled, and strangled the Fleet in the performance of its duties."
Whilst Lord Charles Beresford wrote to the Chairman: "If the Government
had used our sea power as they were legally entitled to do at the
commencement of the war, by instituting an effective blockade and making
all goods entering Germany absolute contraband, the war would now be
over."
Lord Aberconway added: "The matter is far too serious to be trifled with
any longer; my personal knowledge intensifies my conviction."
The Government having attempted to evade any direct answer to the
startling figures and accusations of the _Daily Mail_ disclosing the
get-rich-quick method of the Scandinavian Goulashes, Lord Northcliffe
sent a Special Commissioner to Holland, and published the result of his
investigations in February, 1916. It showed a repetition of the sordid
Scandinavian fiasco, a further proof that the so-called blockade was
leaking in every seam.
To enumerate the masses of statistics would be wearisome. It is
sufficient for present purposes to quote a few extracts.
_Cocoa Beans._--Of the 528 tons imported into Holland in 1916 Germany
received the whole.
_Cocoa Butter._--England could only obtain half what she had in 1913,
whereas Germany obtained five times as much.
_Cocoa Powder._--England obtained half 1913 supplies, whereas Germany
obtained approximately ten times as much.
_Cocoa in Blocks._--In 1913 Germany imported 4 tons from Holland,
Belgium none at all; whereas in 1915 no less than 565 tons were exported
from Holland into these two countries, all for German use.
_Copra._--In 1913 Germany obtained 26,728 tons of copra from Holland,
whereas in 1915 the amount rose to the amazing total of 106,613 tons.
It would appear from the figures that England was indirectly supplying
Germany _inter alia_ with margarine.
In 1913 Great Britain sent to Holland 1,914 tons of the raw material, as
against 6,166 tons in 1916. Germany sent no raw material to Holland
during either of the years quoted.
In 1913 Holland exported 308 tons of margarine to Belgium and to Germany
401 tons.
In 1915 Holland exported 7,616 tons to Belgium and 21,721 tons to
Germany. _Totals of 709 tons suddenly jumped to 29,237._
_Coffee._--Before the war Germany had always exported coffee to Holland
in thousands of tons. During 1915 she sent in none at all, but she
imported from Holland 129,968 tons; whilst 32,822 tons in addition were
sent to Belgium for German use as against a prior yearly average import
of about 8,000 tons.
_N.B._--England, which during 1911, 1912 and 1918 exported a yearly
average of 6,720 tons of coffee to Holland, suddenly increased her
exports to this country to 15,672 tons in 1914 and to 28,425 tons in
1915.
In March, 1916, Brazil was seizing German ships because she could not
collect a trifle of about £4,000,000 owing to her for coffee by the
Fatherland.
_Cotton._--In the three years before the war England exported an average
of 7,808 tons of unspun cotton to Holland, but in 1915 she sent no less
than 22,856 tons. Germany, which _exported_ an average of 33,975 tons
before the war, actually _imported_ from Holland direct in 1915 no less
than 38,750 tons.
The Commercial Treaty of the Rhine, cunningly made by the clever Teutons
before war was declared, prevented the Dutch from even examining any
cargoes which were thereunder arranged for direct shipment into Germany;
whilst from the very first the workings of the much-boasted arrangement
made by our Foreign Office with the Netherlands Overseas Trust _piled up
evidence, week by week and month by month, that our so-called blockade
was an absolute farce_.
In the famous "Kim" case before the Prize Court, the President, Sir
Samuel Evans, made the law quite clear. Figures were placed before the
Court to show that the average monthly quantities of lard exported from
the United States to all Scandinavia in October and November, 1913, was
427,428 lbs. Within three months of the outbreak of war one company was
shipping to Copenhagen alone _considerably over twenty times that
quantity in three weeks_.
When it might have been thought that the public had forgotten this
complete and overwhelming evidence, Lord Emmott, speaking on behalf of
the Government, told the House of Lords that "an abnormal supply to a
country is not sufficient reason to stop a cargo." Here was a Government
spokesman absolutely contradicting the Prize Court Judge--another
unwarrantable interference with the rights of Democracy.
On February 22nd and 23rd, 1916, the House of Lords debated an important
motion ably advocated by Lord Sydenham.
"That in conformity with the principle of international law and the
legitimate rights of neutrals, more effective use could be made of the
Allied Fleets in preventing supplies, directly conducing to the
prolongation of the war, from reaching the enemy."
Lord Lansdowne, Lord Emmott and the Marquis of Crewe spoke in defence of
the Government, but they brought forward no direct proof to upset the
alarming statistics which had been quoted against them. Some figures,
however, were given to show that during the last past month a greater
activity had been caused, in consequence of which there had been some
diminution of imports to Germany; whilst it was further promised that as
an attempt to concentrate the general supervision of the War Trades
Committee the work should be placed in the hands of one Minister, Lord
Robert Cecil, who would be given Cabinet rank.
That Lord Robert Cecil is a man of great ability no one doubts. The
stock he springs from is pedigree so far as politics are concerned, but
he is a lawyer. For many years past this country has suffered greatly
from a glut of lawyer politicians, particularly in the unwieldy Cabinet
of twenty-three members. The nation remembered only too well how this
noble lord had fought so strenuously and so persistently against cotton
being made contraband. His appointment therefore to this post of vital
importance, which could influence, affect and control the duration of
the war to such a great extent, was strongly objected to by the public
at large. Neither the act nor the man carried an iota of confidence.
To have seriously attacked the Government and put it out of office
would have raised a general outcry. It was considered disloyal even to
criticise. "Wait and see" was the only policy Englishmen were permitted
to contemplate. Meanwhile this farce, this weakness or this cowardly
inaction, whichever epithet is most appropriate to it, was permitted to
drift its course. Gleefully the Germans continued to annex the rich cod
and herring harvests of Norway, nor did they cavil at the super-price.
Gleefully the Norwegian fishermen continued to rake in the deluge of
gold, the like of which had never been known within the memory of man.
Gleefully the Goulashes of Scandinavia continued to increase and
multiply, whilst they prospered and waxed exceedingly rich, in spite of
a few widely-proclaimed spectacular fines and confiscations. The
advertisements in the papers of neutral countries offering to supply
necessities direct into Germany also continued and spread, like the
proverbial grain of mustard-seed, until the very mails were glutted with
contraband.
One of these multitudinous advertisements is given as an example. It is
from the _Fatherland_, March 29th, 1916, the subsidised German-American
weekly published in New York:
FOOD TO GERMANY.
DELIVERED THROUGH MY FIRM AT STUTTGART.
Can condensed milk 30 cents
Fruit marmalades, per pound 35 cents
Fifty cigars $2.00
One pound of rice 40 cents
One pound of bacon 75 cents
One pound of lard 70 cents
One pound of cheese 25 cents
100 cigarettes $1.70
Also dried fruits, beans, peas, etc. Invigorating wines for sick and
wounded.
Information and price lists on request.
E. R. TRIELER, Dept. F. 35-37, West 23rd St., New York.
No wonder Lord Grimthorpe, after quoting an influential Frenchman's
opinion that "England had muscles of iron but brains of wool," argued
that, instead of bringing more lawyers into the management, the country
would be much more satisfied if the Ministry of Blockade was put into
the hands of a fighting man like Lord Beresford or Lord Fisher.
Those in the Secret Service knew that since the outbreak of war Germans
had employed only soldiers and sailors to manage it; and that all their
lawyers and civilian politicians had been relegated to a back seat until
further notice; furthermore, that only proved ability counted.
Patronage, length of service, hereditary and social altitude carried no
weight whatsoever at Berlin; whilst the capacity for organisation and
thoroughness which Germany exhibited had astonished the world.
Yea, verily, it is a true saying that "Britishers are the greatest
muddlers on earth." It seems to be their grim bulldog pertinacity only
which pulls them through, and their individuality which gives them the
stamina to stay.
As the winter turned to spring and the spring to summer other terrible
disasters arose which diverted the attention of the nation from the
bogus blockade. Mr. Asquith's "one bright spot," the Mesopotamia
expedition, turned to gall and wormwood; the terrible Gallipoli fiasco
shocked the nation; the pampered Irish rebels appeared in their true
colours; the careless sacrifice of a man whom many believed to be one of
the noblest and greatest of Army Chiefs (K. of K.) this world had ever
seen, paralysed and numbed every English-speaking land; whilst German
spies were still permitted to press their deadly finger-prints upon our
national throat owing to our unbelievable weakness in neglecting to
intern all aliens of belligerent nationality.
Meanwhile the Press continued to growl and to publish statistics from
time to time to prove that the so-called blockade was still as great a
farce as ever; furthermore, it was absolutely and utterly ineffective to
stop supplies going to Germany. Whilst Ministers and Members of the
Government still had the audacity to refer to its alleged effectiveness
and to call attention to the unenviable plight of starving Germany.
All true Englishmen should gratefully thank God that we had at least one
man amongst the few real men who had the courage of his convictions,
namely, Mr. W. M. Hughes, the Australian Premier. He, during his all too
short sojourn in the Motherland, rendered noble, great and patriotic
service. He called with an unmistakable voice at the British Imperial
Council of Commerce in London, on June 8th, 1916, for a real blockade.
He said: "Do you realise the tremendous pile of treasure we are pouring
out in this contest? Do you think that any nation, no matter how
wealthy, can stand indefinitely such a strain on its wealth? It cannot.
We are living like spendthrifts, upon our capital. There must come a day
when we can no longer live upon it. I want to emphasise the point that
we cannot continue this struggle indefinitely. The blockade is one great
weapon at our disposal--one of the most effective weapons for shortening
the duration of the war--by increasing the pressure upon the enemy. _If
the blockade had been effective earlier it would have curtailed the
war._ We now have the power, as Mr. Balfour said, to make that blockade
still more effective, and whatever stands in the way of making that
blockade effective against the enemy and against neutrals must be swept
aside. _We have to choose between offending neutrals and inviting
defeat._ We have to choose between pouring out our treasure and losing
the lives of thousands of our best and bravest. Let us hedge around this
nation (Germany) a ring of triple steel through which nothing shall
pass. I have been told there are still things going out of Britain to
Germany. I am told the reason given is that we are getting German money
in exchange. That argument does not appeal to me. I would not tolerate
the practice for another hour. I would treat those who engage in it as I
would treat any other traitor to his country. Therefore insist upon the
blockade being such a blockade as will compel our enemies to recognise
the power of Britain and the Allies."
Lord Hugh Cecil, the Blockade Minister, does not appear to have been
amongst those present at this memorable gathering. More's the pity of
it! Had he been perhaps he might have had his eyes opened at last to the
folly and inefficiency of his previous policy and foolishly expressed
fallacies.
To the probable relief and secret joy of the Cabinet, and to the
irreparable loss of the nation, Mr. W. M. Hughes was in the early summer
of 1916 compelled to return to his duties in Australia. After his
regretted departure the so-called blockade continued to leak, as is
proved by the following facts and figures which found their way into the
Press in spite of all the hushing-up processes of the weaklings in
power. Can it be wondered at that many thousands of astounded Englishmen
were actually beginning to believe that some of our prominent Ministers
did not want to win the war because they were either indirectly
interested financially in Teutonic enterprise, or they were pro-German
from other mysteriously concealed causes? What other possible reasons
seemed arguable in view of their extraordinary actions, their leaving
undone those things which they ought to have done, and their doing those
things which they ought not to have done?
How German production steadily revived from the shock of the first year
of the war is shown by the following table of pig-iron output in tons
published in the _Berliner Tageblatt_:
1914. 1915. 1916.
January 1,566,505 874,133 1,077,046
February 1,445,511 803,623 1,033,683
March 1,602,714 938,438 1,114,194
April 1,534,429 938,679 1,073,706
May 1,607,211 985,968
June 1,531,826 993,496
July 1,561,944 1,047,503
August 587,661 1,050,610
September 580,087 1,033,078
October 734,841 1,076,343
November 788,956 1,019,122
December 858,881 1,029,144
Asking the Prize Court on June 5th, 1916, to condemn the Swedish vessel
_Hakan_, of Gothenburg, with her cargo of 3,238 barrels of salted
herrings, the Attorney-General, Sir F. E. Smith, alleged that the fish
were intended for Germany. Writing from Lübeck to Gottfried Friedrichs,
fishmongers, of Altona, said the Attorney-General, a member of the firm
of Witte & Co., their forwarding agents, said: "We have prohibited the
export of herrings from Norway, but our firm has obtained a licence to
export 50,000 tons. We hope to sell 75,000 tons this winter, so there is
plenty of work."
Sir Samuel Evans: How many herrings in 50,000 tons?
The Attorney-General: My assistants and confederates inform me that
there are about 450,000,000 herrings. It is a conservative estimate.
These are official figures published by the Netherlands Statistical
Department on May 20th, 1916; such great assistance rendered to Germany
is more serious owing to the fact that Germany's gain has been our loss.
FOODSTUFFS SENT FROM HOLLAND, IN TONS.
(Covering the months January to April.)
EGGS-- 1914. 1916.
To Germany 3,101 11,825
To Britain 2,733 557
FISH--
To Germany 21,337 29,378
To Belgium -- --
MEAT--
To Germany 4,156 30,621
To Britain 25,460 555
POTATO FLOUR and its products--
To Germany 13,991 43,861
To Britain 8,831 5,520
COFFEE--
To Germany 17,429 39,684
COCOA POWDER--
To Germany 598 3,302
To Britain 2,155 1,437
BUTTER--
To Germany 4,010 10,237
To Britain 1,387 33
CHEESE--
To Germany 4,120 25,437
To Britain 5,624 407
One has only to cast the eye down these figures to see what Holland
means as a depôt for Germany's food.
During the first four months of 1916 Holland had imported by consent of
Great Britain 432,702 tons of cereals. No less than 283,792 tons were
re-exported from Holland and consequently did not go into home
consumption there; 272,630 tons of this went over into Belgium. It is
important, also, to note that of the cereals imported 102,722 tons of
maize were included in the total. Most of this maize was used for
fattening pigs, which were eventually slaughtered and sent to Germany.
This abundance of pig food allowed by us to be consumed by the Dutch
pigs in fact enabled the Dutch to fatten the immense supply which they
sent over to Germany. The meat figures given above must be read in the
light of this fact.
The more we sent into Holland for her home supply, the more she could
release of her home-grown products to the enemy. As between Holland,
Germany and ourselves, we lost tremendously. Germany and Holland were of
immense assistance to each other, at our expense.
A weekly circular of the London Rice Brokers' Association shows the
following striking contrasts in exports from London:
EXPORTS OF RICE FROM LONDON.
January 1st to May 27th, 1915. Same period, 1916.
Cwt. Cwt.
To Holland 247,869 905,078
(say 45,000 tons)
To France 22,607 430
Thus the export to Holland had greatly increased and the supply to
France had dwindled almost out of existence. During the single week
ended May 27th, 1916, 224,252 cwt. (say 11,212 tons) were shipped to
Holland from London.
On June 2nd, 1916, the London Press wailed over the enormous supplies of
grain entering Germany through Roumania, which she was enabled to
purchase by exchanging goods made from the raw material permitted so
kindly by England to leak through the blockade.
In April one consignment of 1,500,000 eggs passed from Holland to
Germany in two days only. Indeed, so vast was the drain of Germany upon
Holland that the Dutch people complained in June that they were being
stinted of their proper food supply. Norway continued to supply nickel,
fish, copper, fish oils, and many other things, although England at last
awoke in the spring of 1916 to the advisability of purchasing part of
the Norwegian fish harvests. In this deal, however, her lawyer
Government had not the sense to consult the best export fish merchants,
who are essentially business men. She went to work in the usual
amateurish way, which spelt reckless waste and extravagance; paying £5
to £7 per package for what could have been previously arranged for at
about 10s. or less.
The English Government throughout the war had the Norwegian fish trade
absolutely in its own hands. Yet one of its own Consuls supplied Germany
wholesale in 1914; it supplied coal and salt to assist the Germans to
garner in practically the entire harvest of 1915; and it was not until
the middle of 1916 that some English sluggard in power woke up and paid
through the nose for what could have been purchased practically on our
own terms.
Sweden continued to supply almost everything and anything that Germany
required, openly when possible, smuggled in by all manner of tricks and
dodges should any difficulty of transport be likely to arise.
At the end of June, 1916, a Liverpool merchant contributed some
remarkable facts and figures to the _Liverpool Courier_, proving that
England was helping Germany to obtain what she required at the expense
of the home consumer in England. The net result of his arguments was
that our shipping and home ports were congested for several months by
Dutch imports through private arrangements between Holland and England,
whereby Holland was supplying Germany to a colossal extent and
frustrating the supreme purposes of the so-called blockade. In
conclusion, he plaintively besought the nation to adopt the
strangle-knot of Mr. Hughes by so tightening the blockade that Holland
would no longer be able to provide the Germans with food for her peoples
and materials for the manufacture of guns and explosives to slaughter
our sons.
The tables of figures quoted showed in glaring contrast the usual
enormous increases of imports upon pre-war returns which the British
reader had grown quite accustomed to see. To give but one example: the
shipments of margarine from Holland to Germany during 1915 showed
thirteen times greater, etc.
On July 20th, 1916, during the hearing of a case in the London Prize
Court relating to the S.S. _Maracus_, the Solicitor-General (Sir George
Cave) read an affidavit by Mr. John Hargreaves, provision merchant,
Liverpool, stating that in 1915 the price of lard in Germany was 100s.
per cwt., as against 50s. in Liverpool. At that price there was an
inducement to American shippers to risk shipment to Germany, and to
German buyers to open credits in New York. Should the American shipper
succeed in getting two shipments through, he might well make a large
profit which would amply compensate him for the loss of one shipment,
apart from his chance of recovering compensation from the British
Government.
An affidavit by Mr. R. M. Greenwood, Assistant Treasury Solicitor,
showed the imports of foodstuffs into Copenhagen during the first six
months of 1915 as compared with the similar period of 1913. The figures
were:
1913. 1915.
PORK 948,400 lbs. 15,062,060 lbs.
LARD 3,999,700 " 23,458,720 "
OLEO 2,509,900 " 8,775,750 "
The evidence in the case proved that the ship was bound for Germany and
her captain had been promised a bonus of £200 if the goods reached their
destination.
On June 28th, 1916, Lord Robert Cecil in reply to a question in the
House of Commons, said:
"As the result of the Paris Conference His Majesty would be advised to
issue an Order in Council withdrawing the successive Orders which had
been issued adopting with modifications the Declaration of London, and a
general statement should also be issued explaining the reason for this
step."
Amidst the loud cheering which followed a voice was heard to exclaim,
"After twenty-three months!"
How Potsdam must have hugged itself with delight in 1909, 1910, and 1911
at the absurdly childish simplicity exhibited by the English Liberal
Government in nullifying all its geographical advantages by accepting
such a one-sided code of sea-law which gave Germany the right to stop
food _en route_ to British ports, while forbidding Great Britain to stop
food _en route_ to Germany, and whilst in force rendered any effective
blockade of Germany impossible.
But what powerful mysterious motives prompted its re-adoption after it
had been rejected by the House of Lords? Again on August 20th, 1914, why
did the Cabinet illegally put it into force with modifications--though
Article 65 thereof states that the code is indivisible?
What was held in the unseen hand and to whom was it extended?
On August 2nd, 1916, M. Clemenceau published an article in _L'Homme
Enchainé_, headed, "A Fresh Assassination," in which, after commenting
upon the brutal murders of Nurse Cavell and the innocent Captain Fryatt,
he wrote:
"It is time that Great Britain made the weight of her will felt,
especially as regards the strict application of the blockade, which, has
too often been relaxed out of a desire not to arouse an unpleasant
quarrel with Washington. It is time to end these half-measures. We must
make up our minds as to what to do, and do it."
On July 6th, 1916, Lord Robert Cecil admitted in the House of Commons,
in reply, what was tantamount to a confession that the British Fleet
employed in the blockade was still muzzled, being bound down by red-tape
precedents and strict London directions.
On July 9th he was further compelled to confess that 10,708 tons of lard
had been permitted to enter Belgium, as well as about 2,000 tons of
tallow and other fats. Nominally this was fathered by the Neutral Relief
Committee, but in reality it was just so much more assistance granted to
the enemy.
FAT (FOR EXPLOSIVES) IN TONS
In the early part of 1914 Germany exported lard to Holland, but this
ceased on the eve of war. Great Britain, on the other hand, for some
extraordinary and unintelligible reason, permitted her exports to
Holland to increase. These are the figures:
From Germany. From Great Britain.
1914 861 660
1915 Nil 6,591
1916 Nil 12,273
BARLEY FOR MALT
In 1916 Great Britain exported to Holland about fifteen times more
barley than normal pre-war exports, so diminishing our home supplies
that the British working-man was deprived of his national beverage
through shortage and prohibitive prices. Whisky also was similarly
affected.
TOBACCO
The Christian spirit of "love your neighbours and your enemies better
than yourselves" had apparently no limits with the British Government.
Their loyal and hard-suffering subjects were deprived of a full supply
of the soothing weed on the excuse of economising freight room, but no
effort seems to have been made to curtail _Dutch supplies_, which were
_thirty-five times greater than the pre-war exports_.
In 1914 Hamburg and Bremen exported 4,544 tons of tobacco to Holland,
but in 1915 and 1916 neither of these towns exported any at all.
The amounts exported by Holland from January to June in tons were as
follows:
To Great Britain. To Germany.
1914 1,611 31,891
1915 1,672 54,456
1916 923 96,931
The figures published by the German Steel and Iron Manufacturers
Association for the first six months of each respective year show the
following outputs, thanks to Sir Francis Oppenheimer's previous
Netherlands Overseas Trust, which permits iron ore in millions of tons
to proceed direct to Krupps' and other blast furnaces in Germany without
let or hindrance to be used against us.
PIG IRON
Tons
1915 5,530,000
1916 6,497,000
STEEL
1915 6,187,000
1916 7,756,000
The _Lokal Anzeiger_, July 28th, 1916, remarked: "These figures
constitute a most gratifying state of affairs in respect of the
_requirements of the German Armies_." No wonder the captured German
officer remarked: "You English will always be fools, whilst we Germans
can never be gentlemen"!
In August[25] a Mr. E. Bell, of 12, Yarborough Road, Lincoln, wrote to
the Press as follows:
"The talk of tightening the blockade of Germany is rather futile in
face of the following Board of Trade figures referring to cotton
yarn exported from the United Kingdom to the following neutral
countries:
JUNE Sweden Norway Denmark Holland Switzerland
1914 108,900 218,700 106,400 3,220,800 722,600
1915 260,800 348,300 204,700 4,493,300 1,788,800
1916 279,200 508,200 598,400 7,539,800 1,304,100
"Germany is obviously getting the surplus."
The values[26] of New York exports taken for the week July 30th to
August 5th are equally startling:
1915. 1916.
New York to £ £
Norway 1,884 137,176
Holland 713 717,601
Holland and Scandinavia 123,327 970,255
On August 26th, 1916, an agreement was signed between the Dutch Fishing
Association and the British Government regarding the release of some 120
to 150 Dutch fishing-boats laid up in Scottish ports, whereby not more
than 20 per cent. of their catch shall be permitted to go to Germany. Of
the remainder twenty per cent. was to be retained for home consumption,
and sixty per cent. sold to neutral countries. On each barrel of this
sixty per cent. the good, kind, benevolent British Government agreed to
pay a subsidy of 30s. to the Dutch boat-owners.
Now the D.F.A. owned about 850 vessels and 1,000 barrels is a good
average season's catch!
In addition to this arrangement the British Government agreed to pay
full compensation for their loss of part of the season, to be calculated
on the basis of the returns on an average season. They also agreed to
pay for any damage which might have happened to the interned boats.[27]
One wonders what British fishermen whose vessels have been commandeered
had to say when they were informed of these facts.
The _Hamburger Nachrichten_ of August 23rd, 1916, published a telegram
from its Hague correspondent declaring that the semi-official German
Central Purchase Company was seizing Dutch food in enormous quantities;
that local merchants were in a state of alarm and threatening Government
interference; and their correspondent defiantly stated: "The Netherlands
Government will hardly dream of interfering with the activity of the
Dutch Bureau of the German Central Purchase Company, the operations of
which are assuming larger and larger dimensions."
To add further proof of the utter futility and hollow sham of the
alleged blockade safeguards, namely, the Danish Association Agreement
and the Netherlands Overseas Trust, Sir Henry Dalziel informed the House
of Commons on August 22nd, 1916, that in June Denmark imported _over ten
times as much cotton yarn_ as in June, 1913, and that in the first six
months of the present year Holland exported to Germany _over twenty
times as much butter_ as in the first six months of 1914, nearly _eight
times as much cheese_, and _over seven times as much meat_.
The unfortunate Lord Robert Cecil in mid-August gave quite a eulogistic
report upon his stewardship as Blockade Minister, which was immediately
followed by the arrival from New York of the Custom House returns
showing that during the week ending August 5th the value of the exports
to Holland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark was _eight times_ as _great_ as
in the corresponding week of the preceding year. To Holland the exports
had increased in value _a thousandfold_ and to Norway
_seventy-fivefold_.
On September 1st, 1916, the Government, through the War Trade
Statistical Department, issued to the Press an official Memorandum on
the question of the efficacy of the British blockade.
It barely amounted to the proverbial half-truth, and was pitiably
feeble. It was more than unfortunate that the Government should rush
into print just before the United States export figures were due for
publication--only a week later.
These latter reliable statistics showed an extraordinary state of
affairs:
EXPORTS FROM U.S.A.
1914. 1915. 1916.
£ £ £
To Norway 1,813,400 7,815,000 10,735,600
" Sweden 2,928,800 15,654,800 10,387,800
" Denmark 3,134,000 15,964,800 11,132,400
" Holland 22,443,200 28,653,400 19,852,600
" Switzerland 204,000 547,200 1,631,200
The _Telegraaf_, Amsterdam's leading journal, on September 11th, 1916,
quoted Governmental statistics to account for the excessive rise in
price of her home products, concluding by the statement that "Holland
has sold her livelihood for greater war profits"; whilst all the Dutch
Press seemed to deplore mildly the vast and unmanageable manner in which
the smuggling of goods over the German frontier was permitted to
continue.
The figures for meat, cheese, eggs, vegetables, and butter showed an
average _increased export of seventy-five per cent._ on preceding years.
Practically every ounce went to Germany or to territory under her rule.
On September 12th, 1916, Reuter's representative at the Hague was able
to announce that: "The Dutch Overseas Trust had obtained the release of
420 tons of Kapok, Java cotton, and had also succeeded in removing the
difficulties in the way of the importation of cocoa-beans."
Such paragraphs as the above could be found repeatedly by anyone who
chose to search the Press. No wonder the smouldering wrath of the
long-suffering British public became fanned to a flame and its
confidence in its so-called representative Ministers correspondingly
decreased.
On September 9th, 1916, the Foreign Office issued a notice that no
further export licenses or further facilities would be given by H.M.G.
for the importation of certain specified commodities until further
notice. The list embraced scores of foods, but, in fact, was merely
another patch to the very ragged mantle covering the so-called blockade.
On September 12th, 1916, the War Trade Statistical Department made
another feeble attempt in public to refute the statistics quoted by the
Press. It set out specious and plausible arguments why general
conclusions should be drawn in a light more favourable to our interests.
It gave no denials nor suggested that the figures quoted were not
correct. It was a fretful official apology, a tacit admission of
weakness and inefficiency.
A casual remark was made by a really able German in the Wilhelmstrasse
on English policy in regard to Germany, to Mr. D. T. Curtin, as reported
by him in the _Times_, October 21st, 1916.
"He said to me:
"'When the war began we thought it would be a fight between the
German Army and the British Navy. That was the cause of the
outbreak of German anger against England on August 4th, 1914. As
time went on we found that the English Government drew the teeth of
its Navy and enabled us to get in through the then so-called
blockade supplies of cotton, copper, lubricating oil, wool' (here
he named some twenty commodities) 'in a sufficiency that will last
us many long months yet. How different would have been our position
to-day if the British Navy had controlled the blockade as we had
every reason to fear it would! We can and will hold out for a long
time, thanks to their blunders.'
"Blockade policy, prisoner policy, enemy trade control, the
Zeppelin reprisal policy--all these are puzzles to the rulers of
Germany. All are taken as part and parcel of their belief of your
desire to curry favour with them and your fear of their
after-the-war trade struggle.
"The average German holds similar views as to America's fear of the
Kaiser's Army and Navy after the war. They frankly tell us that it
will be our turn next."
On October 25th, 1916, Mr. D. T. Curtin explained in the _Times_ how,
when he was in Germany, a neutral and pro-Ally resident of a certain
port in Germany with whom he discussed things took him for a walk and
showed him the quays. There were not hundreds, but thousands of barrels
of fats. "It almost makes me weep," he said, "to know that every one of
these barrels lengthens the war and destroys the lives of gallant
soldiers and their officers." And apart from the public evasions of the
blockade is the secret smuggling--difficult to deal with.
A day or so previously Mr. Curtin had written: "Every bar of chocolate
entering Germany prolongs the war, which I know from my own personal
necessities. The Allies and the Government should realise the great
value of the utmost pressure of the blockade."
It was not until December, 1916, that the rising tide of public feeling
threatened to burst the banks of reasonable control.
On the first day of that month a crowded meeting of City business men
was held in the Cannon Street Hotel under the presidency of Lord Leith
of Fyvie to protest against the slackness of the Government and terrible
blunders which were far too serious to openly discuss; in particular to
insist that "the British Navy be set free to exercise to the full all
its lawful sea powers." Startling disclosures were made, and the
Government, which had twice restored itself after its legal expiration,
was characterised as worn-out and stale, unable to make peace any more
than it was able to make war; sentiments which were unanimously
acclaimed.
Almost the entire British Press echoed this condemnation, and the
Haldane group, recognising that discretion was the better part, awoke at
last from its delusions of the value placed by the nation upon their
personal services, and after a few feeble remonstrances retired in
favour of a new Cabinet. "Wait and see" was compelled to give place to
"Do it now."
Mr. Asquith the Unready, Lord Grey of Falloden, the Irresolute, Lord
Haldane, the friend of the Kaiser, and the Simonite group of backers,
who for fifteen unlucky years had so grievously and disastrously led the
country astray; who had cut down armaments, hoodwinked the nation, and
when war was declared held back conscription, muzzled the Fleet and were
too late for everything, were at last fallen from doing further
mischief, and the nation breathed its prayers of thankfulness.
Of the late Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) one able editor wrote:
"Never before in all our history have such opportunities been
given. He had no opposition; the nation was solid; the Empire was
behind him. No country has ever given any leader such devotion and
none has ever seen its devotion so carelessly wasted. Declaring he
would 'stick at nothing,' he stuck at everything, and moved only
when he was pushed."[28]
What Germany thought of the change is reflected in an extract from its
Press when it first heard of the resignation of Mr. David Lloyd George
from the War Office, and it was under the belief that the Haldane group
had triumphed over him.
The Bavarian _Courier_, December 5th, 1916, said: "This is a terrible
disaster for the war party in England," whilst the Leipzig _Tageblatt_
said: "The British people have doubtless had enough of this war
agitator. His fall from power brings nearer an honourable peace for
Germany."
Within a few days of Mr. Lloyd George being created Prime Minister of
England the Kaiser was seeking peace. _Res ipsa loquitur._
* * * * *
What has been given is merely a rough and very deficient resumé of
England's sham blockade, which was permitted to muddle along its costly,
tragic, and fatal course until the Americans joined the Allies in their
fight for freedom and the rights of small nations. Washington at once
swept aside maudlin sentiment by its practical common sense,
get-right-there-quick decisions.
The nation's relief cannot be expressed in words.
Was it to be wondered at that from the soul of the Motherland prayers
had so long and so often ascended?
"Oh, for a man of the old, old Viking blood to lead and direct the
battle in place of those poor craven lawyer politicians in the Cabinet
of the never-to-be-forgotten twenty-three!"
Indeed, this was the darkest hour before the dawn.
The autumn of 1916 saw the advent of the magic of the Wizard from Wales.
To him all honour is due.
For some years prior to the war he had been perhaps the most hated man
England had ever known. He had helped to minimise the Army, the Navy,
and the House of Lords; he had led people to believe it was almost a
crime to own land; he had descended to the lowest levels of vulgar abuse
regarding our most sacred traditions; he had helped rob the Church in
his native land; he had become despised by the noblest and best of his
fellow-countrymen. His sole ambition, apparently, had been to gain the
popularity of the masses--a transient glory which might fade in an hour.
He had attained the position almost of a deity with the extreme Radical
and Socialistic Mob.
But, in this hour of Great Britain's direst peril, he valiantly came
forth. He buckled on his armour of undaunted courage and vast ability.
He put his whole heart and soul into the fight, absolutely ignoring what
effect his actions might have upon his recent followers, forgetting all
his schemes of lifelong planning, and concentrating all his vast
abilities and ceaseless, untiring energies upon one single concrete
thought, one hope, one ideal--Victory.
Like that greatest of all the heroes of ancient Rome--_Venit, vidit,
vicit_. Veritably he proved himself a man.
* * * * *
What a pity it is that since those days he has not adjusted himself to
this changed world and seized the opportunities for real statesmanship
that lie in this era of reconstruction!
FOOTNOTES:
[19] Completed on November 19th, 1915.
[20] The following illuminating advertisement also appeared in the _Neue
Freie Presse_ of January 16:
"FOR SALE.
40 tons prime beef, fresh packed in ice from Holland.
Condensed milk from ---- Amsterdam.
Raspberry jam.
China tea, 25 chests.
Soap, 20 to 40 per cent. fatty matter, 8 wagons.
Sausages from ---- Holland.
Cement, linseed oil, a wagon of each every week from ---- Denmark.
Apply, etc."
Not far away from the above advertisement in the same paper is another.
"Soup extract, 2½d. a cube. Soup vegetables, Julienne, 1s. 8d. per lb.,
China tea (Souchong), 5s. per lb., just come from a Danish export
house."
[21] "Apparently the Declaration of London was valid in the House of
Commons, but not valid in the House of Lords."--Lord Beresford, House of
Lords, February 23rd, 1916.
[22] In referring to the keeping of Government pledges, Sir A. Markham
(L.) said: "The only thing the Prime Minister has stuck to has been his
salary."--House of Commons, March, 1916.
[23] _Goulashe_ is the name given to illicit traders with Germany.
[24] Books on the life of Lord Kitchener of Khartoum do not dwell upon
this unpardonable fact. Some discreetly omit to mention it.
[25] _Daily Mail_, August 16th, 1916.
[26] _Evening News_, August 24th, 1916.
[27] _Daily Mail_, August 28th, 1916.
[28] _Daily Mail_ leading article, December 6th, 1916.
L'ENVOI
Before parting with my reader I feel an apology is due from me, not for
anything I have written, but for what I have left unsaid.
I admit this book is an amalgam, and far from being what it might have
been, had circumstances not required the exercise of considerable
restraint on the part of the writer.
Staunch loyalty to his native land is the least return every true-born
British subject can make for his birthright; and just as in carrying out
the investigations entrusted to me, I ever kept in mind that the one and
only object of my existence for the time being was to help my country,
so in compiling the preceding chapters I have been compelled, by what in
a higher sphere would be called reasons of State, to suppress many facts
and incidents which would, I make no doubt, have constituted interesting
reading matter.
I have striven to give nothing away that could be construed directly or
indirectly against my country. I have touched, lightly, yet I trust
sufficiently, upon the canker spots that I so fervently hope and pray
may in time be eradicated from our system of home and foreign affairs.
I may have added to my roll of enemies, yet I rejoice in the consolation
that by my actions I know I have brought to me many true and great
friends.
My readers may complain that the narrative portion of the book dealing
with detailed adventures could well have been extended, and that the
discursive semi-political portion could well have been curtailed.
I sympathise exceedingly with them to that extent, but if they knew all
they would, I am sure, sympathise even more deeply with me in the
difficulties which have arisen regarding the publication of these
remnants of my knowledge which are now placed before them. The book, as
it is, consists of but the fragments of a tale untold.
Had I been dealing with a foreign country as a foreigner, what a
different word-film I could have unrolled!--whilst it must not be
forgotten that I hope to re-visit in the future the countries mentioned.
Were I permitted to record all the happenings of the past I might find
such a return too eagerly awaited and the welcome accorded might be open
to various interpretations by the Powers-that-be.
It is extraordinary but nevertheless true that there are people who
entertain doubtful feelings regarding anyone who has undertaken Secret
Service work. Some even suggest that such a person, male or female,
could only be classified as a spy, a person to be shunned and avoided.
What ignorance! What little-mindedness!
When the country had declared war and we knew that the long-anticipated
war with Germany had become an established fact, what Englishman, worthy
of the name, could rest without dreams of active service? Who hesitated
to question the service? When I failed again and again for enlistment by
reason of age and was told to apply to Lord Grey direct, I had a tinge
of suspicion that if I did have the luck to be found acceptable it would
probably be for foreign intelligence work.
A bald statement of fact that such work was or is contemptible could
only spring from a craven-souled individual who would probably shrink
from his country's call in any event; from some narrow-minded,
over-indulgent stay-at-home; or from some pompous, self-exalted
incompetent, whose ideas of men and things are beneath contempt indeed.
Secret Service is essentially a service of isolated individuality. A
member is not supposed to know, nor permitted if possible to know, other
members, beyond those whom he must of necessity meet; yet I knew many
more active members than my C.O. had any knowledge or any intention that
I should know.
All those whom I had the honour of meeting I found to be men of honour,
men whom I am proud to have met. I do not care to express any opinion
concerning the ladies, because it is very certain that the more a man
studies women the less he really knows of their true nature.
The men in responsible positions (I do not attempt to include the
underlings employed in casual cases) I found in every instance to be
unflinchingly loyal and true to their country over every other
consideration. I will give an instance of this extremeness. An officer
in the Army, whom I would unhesitatingly have trusted with my honour and
my life, was working with me in a dangerous undertaking. To safeguard us
both, so far as I could, I suggested that we should form an absolute
alliance, for life or death. He solemnly agreed, but he made one
stipulation. It was that, if he received a peremptory order from home to
put an effective stop to my further services, he should, very
reluctantly indeed, but without the smallest hesitation, shoot me
without warning. He hastened to add: "You know, old chap, I need not
express my known feelings to you, but I am a soldier of the King. I have
to obey my orders, and when my country is at war I would shoot my whole
family without question, if so ordered from H.Q." I knew he meant it.
I read an account of the capture of this friend by the Germans in
Finland--I knew what that meant. I mourned his loss for two whole years.
Poor devil! How I pitied him and his fate! But the Secret Service is
ever one of surprise and surprises. On April 7th, 1920, I received a
letter from the much-lamented departed, "chipping" me in great glee,
adding that he had left this branch of service only a few months after I
myself had retired hurt, because, to use his own words, "the War Office
refused to give me any honours of any kind."
As would be expected, he went straight out to France, where his valour
in the field immediately earned some half-dozen mentions in despatches,
the D.S.O. and other decorations. Knowing his bravery, skill, and
marvellous work whilst abroad in the Secret Service, it seems
unbelievable that Home Authorities (who apparently decorated every
inmate of the Whitehall Offices, and even telephone girls who retained
their stools whilst Zepps were about!) could wilfully ignore such
services as his.
That this was not an exceptional case, I may add that I do not know, nor
have I ever heard of, even one solitary honour or recognition being
bestowed by our own Government upon a soul who _actively served abroad
in the Foreign Secret Service_; although I do know of highly-coveted
decorations being offered and given from abroad, which would-be
recipients declined, or dare not accept, because of those above and
around them.
Personally I doubt whether any responsible member of the British Foreign
Secret Service ever really troubled himself one iota about such trivial
matters as decorations--as such. An ambition to climb to the highest
rung of acknowledged service to one's country was another matter.
The sporting element of discomfiting and checkmating the Huns seemed to
be the one thought uppermost in their minds, whilst, if any time for
reflection was ever found, it was generally passed in cursing
politicians at home for curtailing activities by shortage of funds, and
Ministers abroad for not following Nelson's patriotic ophthalmic action
at the battle of Copenhagen.
Speaking for myself, I can only say that my greatest joys in life have
been consummated in successful big-game shooting. My employment in the
Foreign Secret Service gave me opportunities at far Bigger Game than my
wildest dreams had ever led me to hope for.
I enjoyed to the full every minute of those activities. I would not have
missed them for a king's ransom; whilst now I rest in the consolation
that if my past life thitherto had been useless and of little worth to
the world at large or to anyone in it, I was, during the period of my
then employment, striving to accomplish a better thing than I had ever
done, to help to victory the noblest cause this world has ever known.
"JIM."
THE END
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