power, would completely remove every obstruction arising from the
distance of situation: it would serve as an intermediate link of the
political chain: or, as a bridge of communication, joining this
dependent Indian dominion to the sovereign country. But, all obstruction
arising from the distance of situation being thus removed, what
difficulty can the national government of Britain find, in administring
the political government of that Indian dominion? Upon this plan, that
task appears to me more facil, less pregnant with difficulty, charge, or
care, than it is to govern any one, the most pretty, of our foreign
Colonies: nay it appears equally easy, as it is to govern the
neighbouring Isle of Man: seeing that the opposition of the subjects, to
the authority of government in this Indian dominion, though they be so
infinitely more numerous, is not greater than is the opposition of the
few subjects in Man. The only difficulty, that could exist to national
government, was that of duly tempering, or abating, the power of the
deputed executive government: and it appears, that this may be
completely effected by means of this intermediate controuling power;
which, in the hands of the sovereign, would act upon the government of
this Indian dominion as the pegs or keys upon the strings of a musical
instrument; of which one being gently strained, and another properly
relaxed, would create, and perpetually preserve, a perfect: harmony, or
concord, in this political system.
A PLAN, FOR ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND OF
SECURE DEFENCE, IN INDIA.
The Company’s system of military government and defence in India is, at
least, equally defective, faulty, and absurd; and, therefore, doth
equally demand reformation, as doth her political system. For the same
cause that renders the power of the Company’s several deputed governors
perfectly arbitrary and discretional, in civil matters; namely, the
Directors having preserved to themselves the charge of immediately
directing and superintending those governments; confers, upon these
deputed governors, a like arbitrary and discretional power, in military
matters. And surely it is impossible to conceive any thing more
ridiculously extravagant, than is this military system of the Company;
which affords to each governor of four different capital settlements,
the absolute, independent, and discretional power, of applying the
military force of his own government; and likewise of directing the
measures of defence: whilst each, of these four governors, holds a
particular interest of his own, which is, not only distinct from, but
opposite to that of all the others.
Can it be supposed that four men, thus opposite in their personal views
and interests, and thus independent of each other, should heartily
concur in general measures; or should cordially unite in a system of
common defence? Common sense informs us that they will not; and
experience convinces us that they do not. For it hath been known that
one, of these settlements, hath furnished arms and ammunition; and hath
otherwise befriended a power, at open war with one of the others. And,
in the case of any one of these settlements being attacked, the others
are extremely backward in supporting it; because each, of the four
governors, giving the preference to his own particular charge, in which
his own personal interest is more immediately concerned, considers all
communication of his force, to any of the other settlements, as a
diminution of his own security, and even of his importance. So that,
upon such terms, the union betwixt these four distinct, and mutually
independent, governments, can scarcely be termed federal.
Moreover, each of these four governors possesses, within the limits of
his own government, the discretionary power of making war and peace.
And, so, hath the opportunity, whenever it shall suit the purpose of his
own personal interest, to pick a quarrel, and engage his government in
war, with some one of the neighbouring native states. Nor is this an
imaginary evil; or a simple supposition of what may possibly happen; it
is a real case; an abuse that hath actually existed. For we can produce
several instances where these governors, more particularly on the coast
of Cormondel, have commenced, and industriously protracted, wars with
the neighbouring states, expressly for the purpose of plunder and
peculation.
And, from this discretionary power of peace and war lodged in the hands
of these several governors, and the consequent abuse thereof, flow the
following evils to the sovereign. First, the governor, thus warring,
exhausts and consumes the treasure of his constituent; to the end that
he and his associates, may gain occasion to pocket a part. Second, by
these offensive wars, he wastes and destroys that force, which was
intended by the sovereign for defence: and, thereby, exposes his own
charge, naked and defenceless, to the attack of other enemies. And
third, by these wanton unnecessary and unjust wars, he provokes the
hatred and jealousy of all the neighbouring states; and, thus, converts
into enemies, those native powers, who would, otherwise, be amicable and
friendly to the sovereign.
To correct these, and many other abuses of a like nature, which flow
from this absurd military system of the Company, it is evidently and
indispensably necessary, that there should be instituted, one supreme
head of military government. Which, being vested with the supreme power
of making peace and war in India, shall restrain these several
territorial governors, from engaging in unnecessary wars with their
neighbours. And which, possessing the supreme direction of the common
force, shall, in the case of particular or general danger, apply that
force to the most proper and necessary purposes.
Now it is naturally proper, that the same intermediate supreme power,
which superintends the political government, should likewise supremely
superintend the military government, and defence, of those Indian
dominions. And, for this latter purpose, the choice of a proper
situation, for the residence of that supreme power, becomes likewise a
point of most essential consequence. For it is evident, on the one hand,
that this military superintending power ought not to exist in any one of
these territorial governments; nay it ought not to reside in the
immediate neighbourhood of any one rich native state; because, in either
of these two situations, it is liable to be tempted, by views of avarice
or ambition, to apply the general force, to its own personal purposes;
and, if so, the cure would be worse than the disease: and, on the other
hand, it is no less evident, (from the reasons assigned on the similar
head in the political system) that this supreme military power ought to
be situated so centrically near, to all the several territorial
governments, as that it may, at all times and seasons, be capable of
keeping up a ready and speedy correspondence with each.
The distant and unconnected situation, of these four capital
governments, is likewise a mighty obstruction to a secure system of
defence. For, the wind, blowing in those seas for six months from one
quarter of the compass, and for the other six months from the opposite
quarter, doth, alternately, cut off in a great measure all naval
communication betwixt these four governments. For instance, during the
violence of the south west monsoon, that is, from the middle of April
till the middle of July, it is almost impracticable for ships to pass
from Bengal to Madrass: and, during the three more moderate months of
that monsoon, this passage is difficult and tedious. And during the
north east monsoon, the passage is much the same from Madrass to Bengal.
But the communication betwixt Bombay, and these two settlements, is
still more obstructed. For Bombay, being situated in lat. 19 deg. north,
on the west side of the peninsula of India, it is almost impossible,
from the latter end of November till the middle of February, for ships
from Bombay, bound for the Bay of Bengal, to round the island of
Ceyloan: and, for the other three months of the north east monsoon, they
are obliged, in order to weather Ceyloan, to stand over to the eastward
almost as far as Atchen head, and back again to the island; a run of
about 20 degrees. From the end of April till August, it is almost
impracticable for ships from the Bay and bound for Bombay, to round
Ceyloan; and in the other three months of the south west monsoon, that
passage is difficult and tedious. And, even in the fair passage, the run
betwixt Bengal and Bombay is seldom made in less than a month. Moreover,
during the force of the south west monsoon on the west side of the
peninsula, that is, from the middle of May till the middle of August, it
is extremely dangerous for ships to attempt running in for Bombay: the
weather being then so extremely thick, that sometimes a solar
observation cannot be obtained for several days together: and if a ship
should, in such circumstances, run in for the land, which in such
weather is not distinguishable at three leagues distance, and should
miss the opening of the harbour, which is but small, it is more than
probable that she would not be able to clear the shore, with the wind
blowing fiercely right on, and rolling before it a heavy sea. As to
Bencolen, circumstances are nearly the same with it, as betwixt Bengal
and Madrass.
Now it is evident, that this obstructed naval communication, betwixt the
four chief governments must, in many respects, greatly weaken the common
defence: and must greatly augment, to the sovereign, the charge, in both
men and money, of maintaining and defending those dominions and
possessions. Seeing it must necessitate him to keep up, in each of those
governments, a force sufficient to defend it against the whole united
strength of an offensive enemy, without trusting to any aid from the
others: because, otherwise, he runs the risk of losing them all singly,
to a force that can overpower but one of them.
But all the danger, inconveniences, and extraordinary expence, arising
from this obstructed naval communication, may be obviated and removed,
by establishing one supreme center of military defence; so situated,
with respect to the several parts of those truly valuable territorial
dominions, as that the communication betwixt it and them shall, in
either monsoon, be not only practicable but speedy and easy. For it is
evident that, in such a situation, this supreme center of defence could,
at all times, receive speedy notice of any impending danger, or actual
attack; and that, upon such notice, it could immediately transport its
own garrison, by sea; as well as collect aid from the other settlements.
So that the garrison of this supreme center of defence would act as an
army of observation; ever ready to pour in, at any quarter, on the back
of an aggressive enemy. And, of course, such a center of defence must
connect, and unite, the strength of all the several parts of British
dominion in India.
Now it appears that, the situation of residence, becomes a circumstance,
highly essential to the efficacy of each purpose, proposed from this
supreme intermediate power. And it farther appears that one, and the
same, situation is required, for all these several purposes: seeing
that, from a convenient naval port, situated at a proper distance from
the limits of all the territorial governments; and, at the same time, so
centrically near to each, that the communication with all the several
parts of dominion will be speedy and easy; this supreme power would, in
the first place, completely and effectually, faithfully and honourably
superintend, enforce, and controul the measures of political government,
as well as the conduct of military government: and, in the second place,
it would unite and connect the general strength of those dominions, and
completely secure the defence of the whole.
But, of the several settlements possessed by the Company in India,
Bengal and Madrass are evidently disqualified for this seat of
residence; not only because the communication betwixt them and the other
settlements is, at certain seasons, altogether cut off; but because they
are, themselves, territorial governments; and therein, the very object
to be controuled. Bencolen is, in every respect, out of the question.
And, there then remains only Bombay; which is so far possessed of the
properties requisite to this residence, in that it is, at present, not
greatly embarked in territorial dominion; and is, likewise, a sea port.
But in respect of communication, with the truly valuable possessions of
Britain in India, Bombay is altogether unfit to be either the residence
of the supreme controuling power, or yet the center of defence; as must
appear from the preceding description; which was more particularly
enlarged, for the express purpose of evincing this. Far from being a
proper center of defence, all the force that is lodged at Bombay becomes
detached, and completely lost to the defence of Britain’s truly valuable
possessions; at least on any sudden emergency. Indeed Bombay is, in
every thing, respecting either dominion or commerce, a dead load, and
useless settlement; saving it be for the sole purpose of a naval port,
or a place for refitting our squadrons.
But the choice of Bombay for a naval port, is the most dangerous and
fatal error, in the whole absurd system of the Company’s defence: seeing
that, by this absurd choice, Britain loses the use of her naval force;
which is her capital strength of defence, against the attack of France,
her only dangerous enemy in India—As will appear—It is impossible that
ships, the best fitted from Europe, can subsist, in those seas, for two
years, without a thorough repair: and more particularly in time of war;
when action hath happened, and is again expected. And this thorough
repair they cannot obtain but in a naval port, properly filled with
docks, or careening platforms. Bombay is the only naval port, thus
fitted by Britain, in India; consequently the squadron of Britain must
retire, at least every second year, to Bombay, for repair. But the
British squadron being once retired to Bombay, (as is common, in
October,) which is situated in lat. 19 degrees north, on the west side
of the peninsula; it is as effectually excluded, for five months, from
the bay of Bengal, and more particularly from Bengal itself, as if it
was still in Europe. And, during these five months, the enemy may either
scour that Bay with single cruizers, or she may transport, and, without
opposition, land a force in Bengal; and these said five months are the
very fittest in the whole year for land operations. This must be
thoroughly understood by all those who are acquainted with the
navigation of those seas: and could be here readily demonstrated; was it
not that, by publickly pointing out our own weakness, we should point
out to the enemy her strength. It is most certain that, if France
understands her own advantage, (and it is to be apprehended she is but
too well acquainted with it): she may either waste and consume the
British squadron, through preventing its repair; or otherwise she may
effect every purpose, against Bengal, nay against Madrass, with as great
security, as if there was no British squadron in India: ever so long as
Britain shall continue her only naval port at Bombay. Nor is there any
alternative. For as to that ridiculous notion, of carrying a squadron of
large ships up the river of Bengal to repair, no commander in his senses
would, in the time of war, when he expected to be equally matched by the
enemy, so soon as the season arrived, incur the risk of losing some of
his ships, in the passage up and down that incredibly dangerous river;
and still less would he subject himself to the certainty of losing half
his hands, by that putrid unhealthy air at Culpee, or Ingelee. Neither
would he be mad enough, in the while of a hot war, to use that dangerous
expedient, of half repairing at Trincamalay; where he is liable to be
surprized by an enemy, in the act of repairing. In fine, so long as
Bombay continues to be our only naval port, our commanders must, of
necessity, either waste and lose their squadron; or else they must
retire to Bombay, at the least, once in two years; and, thereby leave
the seas, with all our valuable possessions in the Bay of Bengal, freely
exposed to the attack of an enemy, for five months.
It therefore follows that, if Britain means to avail herself of her
naval force, which is the principal defence of her dominion and commerce
in India, she must establish a proper naval port, on the east side of
the peninsula; because, on that side lay all her truly valuable
possessions, and commerce. And that port, which I mean to propose, is in
every respect completely qualified for this purpose: though I cannot, in
this publication, specify the place; lest the enemy should anticipate,
and take the advantage of our shameful neglect.
I am sensible it will be immediately exclaimed that we have already too
many possessions in India; and that this is no time to increase our
settlements there; and thereby to increase the drain of our native
strength, as well as the expence of treasure.
But, to this, I answer, that this new establishment would not encrease
the number of our capital settlements in India: on the contrary, it
would diminish it, from four to three: for it would suppress, in the
first place, Bombay; which is in every respect a truly useless
settlement; and would therefore be exchanged for this new settlement;
which would serve to connect the whole strength of this dominion; as
well as to promote a variety of other very important purposes. In the
second place, Bencolen would be reduced to the degree of a subordinate,
immediately under the direction of the resident at this new settlement;
and completely secure under its protection.
As to the drain of native strength, this establishment would, instead of
adding, considerably decrease it: for the garrison, together with the
artillery, &c. of Bombay, would be transported thither; as likewise
would the better part of the garrison at Bencolen: and these two
garrisons, being placed there, would form an army of observation, for
all our valuable possessions, as hath been described; consequently the
territorial governments would not demand that degree of force, which is
requisite at present, when each stands on its own bottom.
And with regard to the expence of treasure, I shall only observe that,
it is most unaccountably absurd in Britain to send out to India, a
squadron of 17 ships of the line, besides frigates, (as she did in last
war,) for the protection of her dominion and commerce in that country;
which squadrons become evidently unprofitable to that purpose, through
the circumstance of wanting a properly situated naval port; when less
than a single year’s charge, of such squadron, would suffice to
completely fit up a naval port, so situated as that, from thence, her
naval force would completely effect its intended purpose. For I affirm,
that the port which I propose would be completely fitted up, in every
respect, as a naval port, for less expence than one year’s charge of
such squadron; seeing that I do not propose docks, but platforms for
careening, as at Batavia; and these are prepared, in infinitely less
time, and at much less charge than docks; whilst they are far more
convenient and expeditious for repairing large ships, than these docks
at Bombay. And, as to the fortification immediately requisite, it would
be but little expensive, and would demand but little time to rear it:
because it would be perfectly accessible to the ships; and so, whilst it
protected them, would be protected by them.
Moreover no part of the treasure, expended on originally fitting this
naval port, would come immediately out of Britain’s proper treasury; for
the whole would be defrayed by the dependent dominion in India. And this
new establishment would, in a very little time, not only support its own
charge, but would richly reimburse Britain for her original cost. Seeing
it would, in the first place, as a colony or settlement, yield her
immediate treasure, together with sundry commodities peculiar to itself;
and, in a little time, it would, under proper conduct, produce rich
manufactures. In the second place, it would, as an Emporium, (for which
purpose it is perfectly adapted by its situation,) greatly improve the
commerce of Britain in India: and as a centrical magazine or warehouse,
for the commodities of China as well as India, it would reduce the term
of the Company’s voyages to one year; and, thereby, reducing the expence
of her carriage nearly one third, it would enable her to sell cheaper;
and consequently advance her commerce in Europe. Likewise the Company’s
ships rendezvousing and departing from this port for Europe, under
proper convoy, this would secure her trade from that imminent danger to
which it is exposed, from her ships rendezvousing singly, at that button
of an island, St. Helena: a circumstance that may, in the very first
year of a French war, completely ruin this Company; as that enemy is now
perfectly acquainted with her route. Now Bombay is perfectly useless to
all these, and indeed to every other purpose; as can be readily
demonstrated: and the whole benefit derived from it, as a colony or
settlement, in the year, doth not suffice to defray one month’s expence.
But this new establishment, being once fitted up as a naval port, from
whence the squadrons of Britain can, in either monsoon, command all her
valuable possessions; this same establishment would, at same time,
completely suit for the residence of that supreme intermediately
superintending power. For this port is situated, at such a distance from
all the territorial governments, as would suffice to effectually prevent
the controuling power, from interfering in the immediate execution of
government. And, having said that it is perfectly well situated for a
naval port, it follows that the communication, betwixt it and all the
parts of the British dominion in India, must be speedy and easy, in
either monsoon: and consequently that, from this residence, this supreme
power can effectually superintend, enforce, and controul the measures of
political, as well as of military, government, in this whole dominion.
And, being the center of naval defence, it must be the only proper
center of land defence: seeing the squadron will be ever at hand, to
transport its land force, to any part of this dominion, that may be in
danger.
And thus have I accomplished that which I proposed: having planned the
design of an intermediate power which, in such a situation as hath been
described, would establish a completely regular system of government,
civil as well as military, in the whole present or future dominion of
Britain in India: nay which would, in the hands of national government,
render the task of governing this Indian dominion, as facil and easy, as
it is to govern the small Isle of Man. And, the seat of its residence
being at same time the center of naval and land defence, it would
completely connect the, otherwise, divided strength of the several
governments: and would establish the general defence, upon a footing so
secure, that no enemy, either European or native, would dare to attack
British dominion in India. It likewise appears that the drain of native
strength, requisite to maintain this whole dominion, would but little
exceed that which Britain expends on maintaining the two barren
fortresses, of Gibraltar and St. Philips’s. Whilst no part of the
pecuniary charge, of either establishing or afterwards supporting this
system of government, nor yet of the land and even naval defence, would
come out of the treasury of Britain; but would all be defrayed by the
dependent dominion.
I have farther demonstrated the moral impossibility of governing and
maintaining this Indian dominion, by means of the Company; upon any
other terms, than these, of constituting her sovereign at home as well
as abroad; and of conferring, upon her Directors, the sovereign
execution of government in Britain, as well as in that dependent
dominion.