And I have endeavoured to rouze and awake the nation, to some sense of,

and regard to, the interest she holds in this Indian dominion; by a

slight descriptive sketch of the nature, and degree, of benefit received

by her from it, for some years past. And, as the sensation received from

fact and experience makes ever a stronger impression on the mind, than

that which is conveyed by speculative argument, I shall here again apply

to the experience of the public, on this topic; which cannot be too much

inculcated, nor presented in too many different points of view; at this

truly critical juncture, when nothing less than the most speedy

application, of the most vigorous measures, can prevent the total loss,

of this most important object to Britain; either through the final ruin

of the countries themselves; or, otherwise, by the assault of enemies.

Britain feels a general failure of credit, not only in the East India

Company, but in individuals: and this failure of credit she can ascribe

to no other cause, than to some extraordinary defect of numerical

circulation, or a deficiency of numerical specie, sufficient to support

the wonted credit of paper. How happens this want of numerical specie to

be so severely felt, all of a sudden; or from whence should such defect

arise? Assuredly from a decrease of her wonted influx of numerical

specie; whilst her drain of that specie continues to be at least the

same as formerly. But what channel or source, of Britain’s influx, hath

been dried up so suddenly, as to create this surprizing failure of

numerical circulation? We have shown it to originate in Indian dominion;

which being, through misgovernment, reduced to a ruinous state, the

consequent wonderful decrease of revenue, hath obliged the Company, to

absorb and dry up that channel of Indian private fortunes; which, till

within these two years, used to convey into Britain, by foreign

Company’s bills, &c. at least 700,000 l. _per annum_, in numerical

specie, or what is equivalent. And as Britain hath, during the two years

that this channel was dried up, been continuing that drain, which she

could barely support, when aided by that private fortune influx, it is

plain that, within these two years, she must have diminished the

standing stock of her numerical circulation, at least, 1,400,000 l. And

one year, more of only an equally decreased degree of influx, will

diminish her circulating stock 2,100,000 l. and so on. But a total

deprivation of the influx received, for some years past, from Indian

dominion, will, annually, double the diminution of circulating stock.

And, from this view, the nation may draw the following just inferences:

first, the mighty value and importance, of this Indian dominion, to

Britain; in point of financial aid; as well as in other weighty

respects. Second, the mighty alteration of circumstances, in these

Indian countries, since the time they became subjected to the dominion

of the Company; as also, the present ruinous state of that dominion. And

from these two inferences she may deduce, that conclusion which hath

been just mentioned, that nothing less than the most speedy application

of the most vigorous and effectual measures, can possibly save those

countries from final ruin; and Britain from consequent bankruptcy,

poverty, loss of credit, of commerce, navigation, naval power, &c.

I have, in this hasty production, sketched out the nature of the

necessary measures; but the application of these measures depends

entirely upon the nation’s exerting her own attention. I am far from

meaning to work upon the passions, I apply only to the reason and

understanding of men; for had not respect to decorum, and to the dignity

of government, restrained me, I might, on this subject, have thrown out

many things, that must have excited discontent and indignation.

Nevertheless the importance and urgency of the case obliges me to add,

(and, without this, all I have said can avail nothing,) that unless the

nation shall exert herself most vigorously in this her own dearest

concern, she must not look for any such effectual measures, as will

suffice to prevent these disasters.

For the nation must consider, that her present administration consists

of the very men who transacted, and (by their truly reverberating eccho)

confirmed, to the Company, the second[2] grant of the Dewanny: knowing

that this Dewanny was nothing other than the sovereignty of a mighty

dominion, dependent upon the Crown, and Nation, of Britain: and,

consequently that, by subjecting the numerous inhabitants of those

countries to the dominion of a few merchants, incapable of administring

any sort of government, they were consigning over to tyranny and

anarchy, intolerable oppression and ruin, many millions of men, who

were, to all intents and purposes, subjects of Britain. And they are the

men who, during the four years that elapsed since that grant, have

furnished the force to support this tyranny and anarchy: and, in spite

of——enacting a farce, wherein the Directors were compelled to perform

the same part in Europe, that the native Nabobs have exhibited in India.

It cannot, therefore, be expected that they will, willingly, change

their plan of conduct: seeing that, besides their former motives, they

have the additional one of obstinacy; or shame of standing

self-condemned, for past mismanagement, should they now alter their

measures. It is rather to be supposed that they will continue the cloke

of the Company; together with the Directorial farce: and that, to

support the broken credit of the Company, (broken by collusive

management,) they will, through eccho, grant her a power, to force her

paper upon the public, for its money. As also that, under the pretext of

honouring the nation with some share in the charge of this sovereignty,

(under the Company, but no share in the profits,) they will gradually

thrust her shoulders under that whole load, which, as the Company must

manage it, will soon become intolerable. And, by the aid of these fresh

reinforcements, they will juggle it and bungle it, and bungle it and

juggle it on, for one, or possibly two, years longer: and then Nation

and Company will both tumble together, into the pit of bankruptcy,

perdition, and despair.

But shall the nation, with eyes open, suffer the pilot to crowd

stemlings on the rocks, which have already grazed the ship’s bottom? No,

we must about ship, and call another hand to the helm. Matters, it is to

be hoped, are not yet past remedy; the channel is obvious; if the nation

will but put to her hand. His Majesty can have no real interest but what

is common with that of his people: and, however the views of the Crown

may, in some cases, differ a little from these of the people; in this

particular case they must both exactly concur. He will, here, hearken to

the voice of his people: and a little popular heat will force into

administration something of that patriotic ambition, fire, spirit, and

enterprize, which alone can save this nation from dreadful impending

misfortunes.

But if the nation, sunk in the bed of slavish sloth, inebriated with the

transforming Circean cap, enervated and emasculated by the lewd embraces

of sensual pleasure, shall slight and disregard her own dearest

concerns: like the prodigal debauchee, who chides from him the faithful

friend that attempts recalling him to sober reflection; and implicitly

confides in the management of a steward, who hath already wasted the

better part of his fair patrimony: then let the nation, some two or

three years hence, recollect, that she was advised of her danger, by a

hasty production, issued about the middle of January, 1773: though not

thought of, until that most disinterested of all possible ministers had,

by way of remedying all evils, dispatched _his Secret Committee_ to the

India House: there to inspect the Company’s private œconomy: a thing,

with which neither law, justice, government, nor nation hath any thing

to do; and which, unless in cases of bankruptcy, is sacred to the

meanest individual. As if, from the Company’s books of accounts, it was

possible to discover the cause of abuse in the government of those

Indian dominions: or, as if schemes of saving to the Company, one

shilling _per_ ton, freight of her cargoes: or, three pence _per_ pound,

in warehouse room, would retrieve the, almost ruined, Interest of

Britain in India.

Footnote 2:

We must make a wide difference betwixt the first and second grants of

this Dewanny, (as it is termed.) The first grant was made for only two

years, at a time when the then ministry were in a great measure

unacquainted with the nature of the thing which they granted: having

been deceived by base art: nor did this ministry, in the course of

their administration, exert any manner of ministerial influence over

the Directors. But far different were the lights, as well as the

conduct of that ministry which, on the expiration of the first two

years, renewed that grant for the long term of five years.

FINIS.

Transcriber’s Notes:

Missing or obscured punctuation was corrected.

Typographical errors were silently corrected.

Spelling and hyphenation were made consistent when a predominant form

was found in this book; otherwise it was not changed.

The Present State of the British Interest in India With a Plan for Establishing a Regular System of Government in That Country · 第 8 / 8 段