concern in India than a few settlements established there for the
purpose of commerce, found it necessary, for the regular management of
these commercial concerns, to institute a sort of intermediate supreme
power, as a local check on the rest of their settlements: how much more
incumbent was it on the English Company, to constitute an immediate
directing and controuling power, over the conduct of her deputies, who
were entrusted with the charge of executing the sovereign government, of
sundry mighty states; a charge of such superior intricacy, weight,
importance, and delicacy; and so very liable to be abused.
What may have been the motive of the Directors for thus wilfully
omitting an institution so evidently useful and necessary, I shall not
pretend to determine. Possibly they might apprehend that if, upon their
acquiring this mighty sovereign dominion, they should alter that which
had been all along their commercial system, such alteration might induce
the nation to enquire into the cause of it, and so discover the nature
of their dominion, which they have ever carefully hid from the public.
Though, it is more probable, they might perceive, that the institution
of such an intermediate power would greatly interfere with their own
personal influence, power, and emoluments; seeing it must have possessed
the immediate disposal of places and posts, as well as a considerable
share in the direction of affairs: and, in order to prevent this, they
preserved to themselves the power, of immediately superintending, and
directing, the execution of government in those Indian dominions.
But whatever the motive of the Directors may have been, it is certain,
that the want of a deputed controuling power in India, hath been a
radical and grievous defect in their system: which hath produced a
number of those evils that have been falsely ascribed to the distance of
situation. And though we are far from alledging, that it was possible
for the Company to establish in those countries a government in any
degree regular, seeing that the numerous natural defects in her
constitution, unavoidably producing many destructive abuses, must have
ever proved an insuperable obstacle to that; yet do we affirm that, the
institution of a duly qualified intermediate controuling power, would
have totally prevented some, and would have greatly diminished most, of
these enormous abuses which, upon the system of the Directors, have
served to ruin those countries.
Now we have seen that the national government would, by taking upon
itself the charge of administring that Indian government, remedy or
suppress all the abuses that have sprung from the defective constitution
of the Company, (besides creating other circumstances of high utility,
that could not exist under the Company’s government.) And as the
distance of situation, preventing the sovereign from immediately
exerting his supreme influence over the deputed executive government, is
the only remaining cause of evil or abuse; it is plain that, if it is
possible to construct in India, a deputed power, upon such principles,
as that it shall effectually and completely supply the place of the
sovereign, in immediately directing, enforcing, and controuling the
measures of the deputed executive government, then must the only
obstruction to the establishment of a regular political system, be
remedied and removed. Consequently the grand _desideratum_, the only
thing that is wanting, to enable the national government of Britain to
regularly administer the government of those Indian dominions, is the
institution of a deputed controuling power in India, properly qualified
to fulfil the purposes that have been here specified.
And that it is possible, to constitute an intermediate power in India,
that shall effectually and faithfully direct, enforce, and controul the
measures of the deputed executive government in those Indian dominions,
I doubt not to evince: though, at same time, I am fully sensible of the
many real difficulties, arising from nature and circumstance, to
obstruct it; as likewise of the many artificial difficulties proceeding
from the endeavours of those who have an interest to obstruct such a
measure; and who have influence to enforce their objections, however
futile, on the understanding of others.
But before we proceed to describe the plan upon which we mean to
construct this controuling deputation, it will be necessary to explain
the extent of its charge, or number of the government’s composing that
dominion which it is meant to controul. For tho’, in our description of
the Company’s government in India, we confined our account to that of
Bengal alone, as being the most important and best known part of her
dominion; yet doth the Company possess, besides Bengal, certain other
territorial governments, of no small value and importance, in respect of
either revenue or commerce. All which governments being formed upon the
same system as that of Bengal, do not less demand reform, supervision,
and controul.
For, in the first place, the government of Madrass possesses a very
considerable and valuable territorial dominion, avowedly in the name and
right of the Company. This same government doth likewise, in every thing
beside the name, possess the absolute sovereignty of that rich
commercial province of Arcot, or the Carnatic, in which it is situated:
for, notwithstanding it tolerates a nominal Nabob, whose name it uses in
most acts of government; and who, consequently, for the Company’s
convenience, possesses the shadow of sovereignty; yet, as the government
of Madrass holds the charge of defending the country, and maintains the
military force requisite thereto, it is the actual sovereign: seeing
that, in all Indian or Asiatic governments, he who holds the sword must
be the absolute lord and master. And, notwithstanding all the Company’s
parade of appearances, this Nabob of Arcot is, in respect of sovereign
power, as much a pageant as he of Bengal: a mere screen or blind, placed
before the Company’s sovereignty.
Bombay is likewise embarked in dominion, since it seized on the rich
commercial city of Surat, with its district, &c. Though sound policy
must direct Britain to reprobate all territorial dominion on that side
of the peninsula; as causing a dangerous division and weakening of her
force and defence.
But the same policy will instruct Britain to regard dominion on the east
side of that peninsula in an opposite light; because, on that side lay
all the truly valuable dominions which she already possesses.
To fully explain what is the true interest of Britain, respecting
territorial dominion in India, would be, here, foreign and tedious; and,
to slightly touch on that subject, might afford ground for censure and
criticism: we shall only observe, in the general, that Britain ought to
value only such dominion in India as is maritime: because, in the first
place, these are ever trading and manufacturing countries; and, as such,
are highly useful to her proper commerce; they are likewise capacitated,
by their own active foreign trade, to richly reimburse her for her
expence of native strength in defending them, as well as for her trouble
in governing them: and, in the second place, being accessible to her
naval force, they are easily maintained and defended by her. Therefore,
so much of this maritime dominion as she can maintain and defend,
without creating any additional expence of native strength; and, upon a
footing so connected with that truly valuable dominion which she already
possesses, as not to cause any dangerous division of that original
strength, so much of this maritime dominion in India may be truly useful
and advantageous to her; on any other terms it may be detrimental.
Such is the present state of British dominion in India: and such is the
interest of Britain, with respect to future augmentation of dominion in
that country. And we have undertaken to plan the construction of an
intermediate power or deputation, which, under the national government
of Britain, shall effectually and faithfully superintend, enforce, and
controul the measures of these several governments that, at present are,
or in future may be, subjected to Britain: and which deputation shall of
course, in the first place, enable the national government of Britain to
establish a regular system of political government over this whole
present or future dominion: and, in the second place, shall constitute a
complete system of military government, and secure defence, for all the
several branches of this dominion. At present we are on the subject of
political government.
The properties requisite to qualify this intermediate power, or
deputation, for effectually superintending, enforcing, and controuling
the political government of dominion in India, are, first, virtue and
integrity, to faithfully and honestly discharge the duties of its
office: and, second, power or ability, to effectually fulfil the purpose
of its institution. The latter is more easily conferred; but the former
is rendered difficult, by sundry obstructions, arising from the nature
or disposition of the persons who must necessarily be employed to
compose this deputation. For it is needless to observe, that this
controuling power cannot be lodged in the subjects native of the
dependent dominion; the nature of the government, as well as the nature
of their disposition, rendering that impracticable; (as hath been
shewn): otherwise this difficulty might be more easily surmounted. But,
the Indian subjects being set aside, there remains no choice; this
controuling deputation must, _per_ force, be composed of British born
subjects: whilst the several governments, which it is meant to controul,
are at same time executed by British born subjects. And, from this
circumstance, it follows, that the personal interest of the party
controuling must naturally be the very same, with that of the party
controuled: and, of course, the views of both must likewise be the same.
This similarity or sameness of personal interest and views it is that
creates the difficulty of conferring virtue, integrity, honour, and
fidelity, on the controuling deputation. For it is morally certain, that
the similarity of interest and views will, naturally and invariably,
draw the party controuling, to concur and join, instead of controuling
or opposing, the measures of the party executing, (seeing such measures
tend to promote that which is their common interest) provided that this
party controuling shall possess the power, and opportunity of so joining
interest, with the party executing. And it is no less certain, that this
controuling deputation must, unavoidably, possess the opportunity of
thus joining interests, unless it can, by some means, be prevented and
restrained from joining and uniting the action of its own proper powers,
with the action of these powers that are proper to the executive office.
Whereas, if it shall be found possible to divide and separate the action
of these two different powers, the one from the other, in a manner so
distinct, that each shall act, in the sphere assigned to it, with
freedom and liberty; and neither shall have the opportunity of
transgressing the limits prescribed, to its own proper department, by
the sovereign; then, and in such case, it is not only possible, but
certain, that this controuling deputation may, and will be, prevented
from joining interests, with the executive deputation; and,
consequently, from promoting the very measures which it was meant to
restrain. And, from thence I conclude, that the only possible and
certain means of conferring, on this controuling deputation, virtue and
integrity to faithfully and honestly discharge the duties of its office,
is to cut it off from all opportunity of joining the powers of its
office, with those of the executive; or of assuming any share in the
executive government: in other words, it must be restrained from
interfering, either directly or indirectly, personally or by proxy, in
the immediate execution of measures, in any one of these governments
which it is meant to controul.
But it is evident that, if this controuling deputation shall exist or
reside within any one of those dominions whose government it is meant to
controul, it will be morally impossible to prevent it from joining its
powers, and, consequently, its interests, views, and measures, with the
deputed executive power of that government where it resides. For, by
virtue of its authority, which from the nature of its office must needs
be supreme over the executive deputation, it will usurp at least a part
if not the whole power of execution: or otherwise it will, by consent,
join and unite its powers with those of the executive, in order to
promote their mutual interest, by measures diametrically repugnant to
the purpose of its institution. Nor is it possible, in this case, by any
art, device or separation into parts, to prevent this usurpation or
union: let the controuling power be termed judges, supervisors, officers
of the revenue, or what else; and let the office of controuling be
divided, into as many parts as can be conceived; still, the difference
of term, will not alter the nature of the men employed; nor will the
division of parts separate their interest. All the various persons,
composing this office, will still be Europeans; the same as these who
compose the executive office; and so, all the persons in both offices
will be foreign to the country governed, acting by an authority which is
deputed mutable and temporary; consequently they will all hold the same
view; which is, to amass all the money they can during the short term of
their office, in order to transport it to their own country: and as all
of them would, by virtue of their residing within the same government,
possess the same powers, and the same opportunities of exerting them,
they would all be irresistably attracted, by the omnipotent sympathy of
self-interest, to join their several powers, in promoting that which is
the common view of one and all of them. In fine, if these controuling
and executive deputations, which thus, from the community of the _natale
solum_, hold one and the same interest, shall both reside together in
one and the same government, and thereby possess the same opportunities,
it will be equally impossible to prevent these two deputations, however
artfully separated into parts, from joining and uniting their different
powers, &c. as it is to preserve separate the guttæ of quicksilver;
which, however gently and carefully they are dropt upon the same
confined and smooth surface, will meet, join, and conglobate into one
united mass. But if the controuling deputation shall be thus permitted
to join its powers with these of the executive, and consequently forfeit
its virtue and integrity, with respect to that one territorial
government where it resides, it thereby becomes disqualified and unfit
to controul the measures of any one other government: for the judge who
is himself corrupt, is but little qualified to judge or punish
corruption in others. I therefore conclude that, in order to preserve
the virtue and integrity of this controuling deputation, it is
indispensably necessary that it should not reside within the limits of
any one of these territorial governments; these being the governments
which it is meant to controul.
On the other hand, it is equally certain, that this controuling
deputation cannot execute in person, or assume any personal share in the
execution of measures, in any one of those governments where it doth not
actually reside; it being impossible that it can act personally where it
is not personally present. It therefore follows that, by situating or
placing this controuling deputation at a sufficiently proper distance
from all these several territorial governments, it may be prevented from
assuming a personal share in the immediate execution of measures in any
one of them. And being thus, by the situation of its residence, cut off
from all opportunity of acting personally, it may likewise be precluded
from acting secondarily, or usurping by proxy any influence, in the
immediate execution of these governments, if it shall, after the manner
of the Dutch government at Batavia, be strictly prohibited from
exercising its supervising authority any where without the limits of its
own fixed residence; and from delegating or deputing its powers to any
person or persons, its own members or others, who shall reside, or may
be beyond these prescribed bounds. For though the system of the Dutch
government at Batavia is, in many respects, far too rude and unpolished;
yet is it, in this particular, most nicely circumscribed: that
government being restrained, in the most precise manner, from delegating
and transferring its authority; or from deputing any power to examine
into cases, of even the most dubious nature, within the subordinates:
but to obviate any inconvenience, that might otherwise arise from such
restraint, it hath a power to call before it, from the subordinates, all
persons or records necessary to information. For the Dutch were well
aware, that the supreme government, if it should be permitted to carry
its supervising authority on any pretext into the subordinates, would
gain an occasion of interfering in the execution of those measures which
it was intended to controul.
We must then perceive, that this controuling deputation being seated at
a properly sufficient distance from all these territorial governments,
and the exercise of its powers being expressly confined to that
particular seat of residence, it will, by such means, be effectually
restrained from interfering, in any shape, either directly or
indirectly, in the execution of any one of those governments which it is
intended to controul. And we must farther perceive that, by virtue of
such effectual restraint, that clear separation of office, which alone
can prevent the junction or union of the powers, interests, and views of
this controuling deputation with those of the executive, will be
completely accomplished. Seeing that, the action of the controuling
power being strictly confined within the limits of its own proper
sphere, the executive power must remain at full liberty to act
distinctly and freely in the office assigned to it by the sovereign.
The principal source of corruption, and grand stumbling block of virtue,
being thus removed, the integrity of this controuling deputation may be
established on a firm and solid basis, by skilfully dividing the parts
which go to compose it: and, in particular, by clearly separating the
political and judicial powers: which, if they shall be judiciously
divided into two distinct departments, mutually independent and
uninfluenced, will, each of them, act as an effectual check, and
powerful impulse, on the other: so as to prevent either from abusing its
authority, or neglecting its duty. Whereas, if the political power
should, at same time, possess the power of judging, trying and
determining, or should even possess any influence over the judicature,
there is danger that it might, on some occasions, sacrifice its duty to
its interest. And this is the very capital error of the Dutch system at
Batavia, inasmuch as that government, possessing the judicial power,
hath thereby the opportunity of perverting justice, sometimes to the
prejudice of its constituent, and often to the detriment of its
subordinates.
Nor would we be here understood to signify, by judicial power, a simple
court of judicature, established for the purpose of deciding litigated
cases of property; the judicial power here meant, must extend to every
thing that respects a due execution of the jurisdiction and police, in
the subordinate governments. Therefore its authority must not be
passive, and confined to such matter as shall come before it by
complaint; but it must be active, assuming cognizance of all public
nuisance, trespass, or delinquency, that may be brought before it by
information. For, here, juries may exist with great propriety and
efficacy, seeing that the Company will, on account of her commerce, keep
a number of servants at this supreme settlement; there will likewise be,
no doubt, many free merchants (as they are termed): and, consequently,
there will never be wanting a choice of persons unconnected with, and
uninfluenced by the political government; and therefore fit to form a
grand inquest; as well as petit or special juries, to decide in either
criminal cases, or disputes of property. And this judicial power must
farther be endued with all proper and necessary officers; particularly
an attorney general: it must likewise be divided into distinct courts;
resembling, as nearly as circumstances will admit, or occasion requires,
the courts of justice in the sovereign country.
Nevertheless, we do not presume to dictate or prescribe the exact or
complete form of this judicial power: we would only hint at the main
purposes of its institution; a due consideration of which will readily
suggest the particular form, to those whose province it may be to
construct it. We shall only observe that, in order to confer a due
weight on the judicial power, it is not sufficient that it should be
independent, in its corporate capacity; the judges and officers
composing it must, in their personal capacity, be placed as far as
possible beyond the influence of the political power. The salaries
annexed to their offices must be such as will afford dignity, as well as
independance: whilst, on the other hand, they shall be debarred, under
the severest penalties, from holding, either directly or indirectly, any
place, post, emolument, or employment, of any nature, distinct from that
of its own proper department. Moreover, the political power should hold
no voice in conferring the degrees of this department: that should be
vested in the judicial power itself, with reference to the confirmation
of the sovereign.
This judicial power may be termed the supreme Court of Judicature, for
the whole British dominion in India: to which all the subjects, under
the several governments, whether natives or Europeans, may readily
appeal, against the oppression of their governors, or the perversion of
justice: and, on which they may securely depend for redress; provided it
shall be placed above the influence of the political power. This supreme
court of judicature would likewise be of inexpressible utility, as a
check on the power, and an impulse on the will, of the political branch.
We may add, that a judicious subdivision of the political power, into
different departments, might contribute considerably to its virtue.
These are the outlines of that measure, by which we propose to preserve
this controuling deputation free from corruption: and we doubt not but,
upon this plan, when meliorated and improved by the superior
understanding of others, a controuling power may be constructed, which
shall be completely qualified, in point of virtue and integrity, to
faithfully and honourably superintend, enforce, and controul the
execution of political government in those Indian dominions. And this
is, by far, the most difficult, delicate, and important part of the
undertaking.
For, as to the power and ability, requisite to qualify this deputation
for effectually fulfilling the purpose of its institution, that is
readily bestowed. The degree of power is altogether in the disposal of
the sovereign. And, its efficacy or ability depends, principally, upon
the choice of such a situation for the seat of its residence, as shall
enable it to keep up, at all seasons, a ready and speedy correspondence
with the several subordinate governments,