and the consequent deficiency of revenue, hath obliged the Company to
either transmit money from Europe, or otherwise to borrow money abroad,
on bill or bond, for the purchase of all her cargoes in India as well as
China: and the Company, by thus borrowing, for the purchase of cargoes,
and even the expence of her government, hath absorbed the private
fortunes, which, till then, had been transmitted to Britain, by bills on
foreign companies. We must therefore perceive, without descending to
tedious investigation, that the ruined state of those countries, having
cut off surplus revenue, hath, for these two years past, diminished the
annual influx to Britain from Indian dominion, at least one half, or
700,000 l. And this diminution of influx, whilst our drain continues the
same, we already begin to feel in our circulation: though this felt
effect is not yet traced up to its cause. Of what mighty importance then
must this Indian dominion have been, to the circulation of Britain: when
this circulation feels severely, from only two years partial deprivation
of the benefit formerly derived from that dominion? And what effect must
a total deprivation of that benefit operate, in a few years, on this
circulation; whilst, we are continuing to pay to our foreign creditors
about 1,500,000 l. _per annum_ in numerical specie; exclusive of other
less noted drains, which, it is most probable mount it up much higher?
And yet it is evident, that Britain must, unavoidably, be deprived of
this whole benefit, so soon as she shall lose her dominion in India;
whether that loss shall be caused by enemies, or by the ruin of the
countries subjected. Nay, by losing the dominion of Bengal singly, she
must not only incur a deprivation of almost the whole dominion benefit;
but she must likewise lose by far the most valuable part of that
commerce, which was carried on by the Company with those countries,
previous to dominion. For the commerce with Bengal, alone, is of much
greater value, than that with all the rest of India: and, as to the
trade with China, it is the most pernicious and losing trade to the
nation; however convenient it may be to government.
And if we shall then advert to the benefit and support which the
finances of Britain have received from this Indian dominion, for so many
years past, though under the most preposterous management; but, still
more, if we shall advert to the nature and degree of benefit that, under
proper management, might have been derived _in perpetuum_ from this
Indian dominion, in not only the article of finance, but in other
weighty respects: and, if we shall, yet farther, look forward to the
dismal consequences that must unavoidably ensue to Britain in these
several respects, from a deprivation of this Indian dominion and its
benefits; can we tamely surrender our reason to the _ipse dixit_ of men
who are hardy enough to tell us, that Indian dominion is of no value nor
utility to Britain.
Nor do these men less abuse our understanding, by holding forth the
difficulty of maintaining and defending this dominion: seeing that, of
all nations in the world, Britain is, by a variety of circumstances, the
best qualified to maintain and defend maritime or commercial dominion in
India. For, as she exceeds all the world in naval force, she is, through
that circumstance alone, the most capable of defending such dominion,
against the assault of European enemies: and had Britain availed herself
of evident advantages, had she established her naval and land defence
upon the plan that shall be explained, British dominion in India might,
at this day, have been secured from even the attempt of European rivals:
they might have admired and envied, but they would not have dared to
attack. And these European rivals are the only dangerous enemies to
British dominion in India: for as to the neighbouring native powers,
they would, from fear as well as inclination, have been amicable to
Britain; provided her government in those countries had acted with
common honesty, and common decorum, or prudence; and not as common
robbers. And, as to the unhappy native subjects themselves, their
loyalty hath been sufficiently proved, by so many years patient
submission to the most intolerable of all possible governments. Wherein
then consists the difficulty of maintaining and defending British
dominion in India?
And with regard to the so much talked of expence or drain of native
strength, we may surely, with good reason, say that this objection
militated much stronger against maintaining that dominion under the
Company, than under national government: tho’ the nature and extent of
even that drain under the Company, is most grossly misrepresented. For I
am well informed that the Company’s annual recruit, since the time she
completed her dominion force, hath never exceeded 1200 men; and I am
afraid it hath in general fallen short of 1000; notwithstanding she
laboured under many disadvantages, from which national government would
be exempted: such as being obliged to put up with very indifferent and
unhealthy recruits, for want of better; too little attention paid to the
manner of transporting them; and still less to their health and manner
of living in the country: whilst her governors expended numbers of them
on unnecessary predatory wars. And even this recruit we are not to
reckon a drain of real strength from Britain: seeing that, the Company’s
recruits have been mostly fellows of the most desperate circumstances,
who had no means of subsisting at home; and who therefore would, if the
Company had not taken them off, have been taken off by the gallows, or
otherwise would have emigrated to America or some other country, in
search of bread; and would thus have been equally lost to Britain. So
that, upon rationally considering this matter, we shall find that, for
the maintenance of dominion in India, the Company hath not drained this
country, of 100 men annually, that could, in any sense, be termed
useful, or a real strength to it. But, setting aside the precedent of
the Company, it is certain that, to maintain and defend the mighty
dominion of Bengal, demands an European force very little superior in
number to the garrison of that barren fortress Gibraltar: and to
maintain and defend the whole territorial possessions, together with the
commerce of Britain in India, requires a force very little exceeding the
aforesaid garrison with that of its filler fortress in Minorca. And the
annual recruit, necessary to keep up this force, after allowing largely
for climate, and every other circumstance, would, on a complete plan of
defence, not exceed 900 or at most 1000 men: and, of this recruit, at
least 200, would be wanted annually to maintain commerce, if there was
no dominion. Nay, if this is judged too great a drain for Britain, one
fourth part of that number may be reduced, by recruiting that proportion
of foreign protestants: such being easily procured; and, in such a low
proportion, they can in no respect be dangerous. And can Britain, regard
6 or 700 men annually as too great a drain, for the maintenance of that
important dominion and commerce, which is as one of the capital limbs of
her body; and at same time bestow a nearly equal share of her strength
on maintaining these two barren, and I had almost said useless,
fortresses; the pecuniary charge of which she pays out of her proper
finance, never to return; whilst Indian dominion defrays its own charge.
The only remaining objection then to Indian dominion is, the difficulty
of properly governing it. But this difficulty doth not arise, like that
in America, from the indomitably obstinate spirit of the subjects; on
the contrary, it arises from their over passive or submissive
disposition, and incapacity of resisting the power of government: and
this, instead of being an objection, is the most valuable qualification
of a dependent dominion. To remove this difficulty demands no exterior
aids, no exertion of powers or force; it depends entirely on the will of
the sovereign; and a very little art, a very little care, with a little
honesty, would serve to completely remedy it; as we doubt not to evince.
In fine, Bengal, being one of the richest commercial countries is, to
Britain as a commercial nation, the noblest and most truly valuable
acquisition that providence could possibly bestow on her: by the mild
disposition of its inhabitants it is the most facilely governed and
maintained; and, by the nature of its situation, it is the most
defensible foreign dominion on this globe; particularly to Britain which
excels in naval force. And one may almost venture to say that
providence, by throwing Bengal into the arms of Britain, seems to have
intended that this, the richest commercial state in Asia, which, through
the effeminacy of its inhabitants, is incapable of maintaining its own
independance, should be subjected to Britain, as being the fittest,
through similarity of commercial disposition, interest, and modes, to
properly govern it; and, through her superiority in naval force, the
best qualified to defend and protect it from all enemies.
In what light then must posterity regard the policy of Britain, during
the third quarter of the eighteenth century: when it shall find her, in
the East, slighting and giving up that glorious field, which annually
yielded a golden crop, to be rutted up and trodden down by hogs and
viler beasts: whilst, in the West, she was tugging with all her might,
exerting her utmost study, care and attention, much strength, and more
money, on cultivating the sea sands; straining to subdue nature; and
forcing the horse to drink in spite of inclination? Will it not be said,
that she would have acted a far wiser part, if she had left nature and
time to slowly operate in America, the effects which they will
unavoidably produce, in spite of all her efforts; and had converted her
care and attention, to properly govern, and maintain, that noble, rich,
and grateful dependent dominion in India; which, upon such terms, would
have poured, into her publick treasury, resources, that would have
served to alleviate her burden of taxes; and, consequently, to reduce
the price of necessaries, of labour, and of manufactures; which, again,
would have preserved her commerce, not only with America, but with other
countries; and would at same time have preserved to her thousands of
industrious and useful subjects, who, through want of employment, were
forced to emigrate from her to America. And, by the same care and
attention to the government and revenue of that Indian dominion, she
would have prevented the inundation of eastern profusion and
extravagance; which chiefly contributed to convert this formerly
graniferous island, into a pasture for horses of parade and stately
pride; insomuch that, instead of supplying her neighbours as formerly,
with some hundred thousand pounds worth of grain annually, she could not
feed the greatly reduced number of her own inhabitants; nor furnish the
means of living to the industrious agricultor, and peasant; who, in
search of livelihood, fled from her to America; thereby debilitating her
own best source of strength, and prematurely accelerating the manhood of
those otherwise infant colonies.
Nevertheless there still remains a possibility of retrieving this error
in policy; or at least of preventing a farther encrease of the evils
that have arisen from it; provided that, in the first place, this Indian
dominion shall still be in our possession: and, in the second place,
that national government shall, by taking upon itself the charge of
administring the government thereof, remedy that first and radical cause
of evil and abuse which hath existed under the Company’s government: and
shall, at same time, with honest and sincere intention, spirit and
activity, apply a proper remedy to that which hath been assigned as the
second cause of evil, and the nature of which remedy shall be explained
in the sequel. For, upon such terms, there is no doubt that a regular
system of government may be established in that dependent dominion;
under which it may be restored to its pristine prosperity, nay, it may
be elevated to a state still more flourishing than it ever knew; and, in
consequence, to a capacity of yielding a still superior degree of
benefit to Britain; and in a manner widely different, and truely
salutary to her.
But I must again repeat, that it is vain to expect this reform of evils
from the management of the Company; loaded as she is with so many
natural defects, which it is out of the power of art to remedy,
otherwise than by conferring upon her the sovereign government of
Britain, along with that of this dependent dominion. For the execution
of these two sovereign governments is, by the nature of things,
inseparable: it being morally impossible, that any power can execute the
sovereign government of those Indian countries, as a dominion dependent
upon Britain, unless that power shall possess the sovereign execution of
government in Britain.
However, it would be still more vain to look for any good from that
extravagant fancy of joining the Company, with government, in this
sovereign charge. What quota of powers, proper to her and wanting to
government, can the Company contribute, to render her a necessary or
useful associate with government, in this sovereign charge? I doubt not
that the proposer’s intentions were good and honest: but his scheme
would be so far from promoting his or any one good purpose, that it
would produce the very opposite effects. For, instead of checking and
contrasting, it would serve, in the first place, to furnish, in the
Directors and their governors, a convenient cloke of excuse to ministry
and its governors, with the nation; whilst ministry and its governors
would serve the Directors and their governors a like good turn with the
proprietors: they would mutually vouch for and screen each other;
neither would be responsible, and neither would act; and thus, between
stools, &c. in the second place, commercial despotism which, by
separating the Company from the powers of government and the consequent
jealousy of privilege, must have been completely suppressed, would,
under this double-headed monster, flourish with redoubled vigour: the
national governors would, by their connection with the Company’s, become
merchants as well as tyrants; and the Company’s governors would, by
their power in the government, continue tyrants as well as merchants:
and thus the candle would burn at both ends. In the third place, the
Company which, by being excluded from the powers of government, would
have contributed so essentially in the nature of a middle state to the
establishment of a regular political system in those countries, must, by
being joined in the execution of government, entirely lose that virtue:
instead of supporting liberty, she would join in promoting tyranny; and
would still continue a ruinous pest to those countries. Indeed that
strange partnership of Nation and Co. in this sovereignty business, is a
cure infinitely worse than the disease.
In short, there is no alternative: if Britain means to preserve the
possession of that mighty benefit derived from dominion and commerce in
India; if she means to prevent the absolute ruin of the Company, and her
creditors; if she hath any regard to the loud cry of oppression sent
forth to her for a series of years, by her numerous wretched subjects in
those countries; and means to save them from final destruction, she must
furnish their government with a sovereign, or head, properly qualified
to administer it: for this is the foundation, as well as the crowning of
all good government; it is the center upon which the machine revolves,
from which every line issues, and in which every line terminates; it is
_sine qua non_, for without it no regular government can exist. And what
proper sovereign can Britain furnish to that dependent dominion, unless
it be her own sovereign government?
We have shown that the nation and her supreme government are perfectly
equal to the charge: to them there is not the smallest difficulty in
supporting it. Neither is there the smallest difficulty to her executive
government or ministry, provided it shall possess an ordinary share of
spirit, activity, or enterprize; and shall proceed with sincere and
upright intention. For, a regular form of government being once
established abroad, and a properly digested office or department formed
at home, the business would go on with great smoothness and facility to
ministry.
Nevertheless, as I have assumed the liberty of prescribing in this
important and almost desperate case, I am sorry, that a sincere regard
to the welfare of the patient should compel me to add, (by way of
concluding on this head,) that, unless ministry shall act upon a
principle, and with a spirit, extremely different from that which it
hath hitherto discovered in this business, it would be much more
adviseable to continue the charge in the hands of the Company: for it
can be but ruined under her. However, in strong hopes of a melioration
in these respects, which depends altogether on the will of government, I
shall proceed to disclose that plan, which, in the hands of a properly
qualified sovereign, would, I doubt not, serve to establish a regular
system of government in India.
Footnote 1:
As it is impossible to exactly ascertain the annual amount of this
private remittance made through various channels, it will no doubt be
alledged, that we have exaggerated this article; and yet we have
certain ground to affirm, that it is greatly underrated. Sure I am, if
we can suppose that the amount of such remittance made from 1757 to
1770 hath been in any degree equal to that of the two following years,
(which is ascertained,) and we have no reason to suppose that there
hath been any considerable difference, the sum assigned by us will be
greatly under mark. For no sooner did the English Company, in 1770,
open her treasury, to receive money for remittance to Britain, than
there was poured in at her three capital settlements above 1,400,000
l. for which bills were granted, presented, and accepted by the
Company, and nearly two thirds of this sum was borrowed in Bengal. And
in 1771 she hath borrowed in Bengal alone, under the promise of
remittance, a sum perhaps exceeding the whole loan of the former year;
though the bills have been postponed by her agents in Bengal, on
account of the Company’s inability to answer them. Such was the
remittance of British private fortunes for these two years, through
the channel of the English Company alone: and we have good reason to
suppose, that there may have been some made through other channels.
And these enormous sums, borrowed by the Company, as sovereign, for
the expence of Bengal, in these two years, will serve to show the
mighty alteration of affairs in that country since 1765.
A PLAN, FOR ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM OF POLITICAL GOVERNMENT IN
INDIA.
We have before observed, that the second cause why these restraining and
impelling powers, which alone can prevent tyranny and anarchy, have been
altogether wanting in the Company’s system of government, appears to be
the distance of situation, betwixt the sovereign residence and the
country governed. And we shall here add that, if national government
should adopt the same system, this distance would operate, under it,
effects the same in nature as these under the Company; and nothing but
the difference in other circumstances, betwixt the national government
and Company, could prevent these effects from being likewise equal in
degree. For it is evident that, if the executive government of the
nation should, as the Directors have done, preserve to itself the charge
and power of immediately superintending and controuling the execution of
government in that Indian dominion, the distance of situation would
create to that government an equal impossibility of advising and
directing measures, of enforcing the execution or observance of orders,
and of preventing or restraining abuse: consequently, in the immediate
execution of all measures, the national governors would possess the same
unlimited power, as the Company’s governors have done. And the only
advantage to that Indian government, from national governments assuming
from the Company the charge of administering it, would arise from the
following circumstances. First, the superior retrospective or _ex post
facto_ authority of national government, enabling it to judge and punish
the maladministration, or disobedience of its ministers. Second, The
superior inclination or disposition of national government (arising from
its perpetual interest in the property) to exert itself in promoting
proper measures. Third, The suppression of commercial despotism. And
fourth, The existence of the Company as a middle state betwixt the
natives and their foreign government. All which innovations, arising
from national government’s taking upon itself the administration of this
Indian government, though they are indispensably necessary and highly
conducive to the establishment of a regular political system, yet do we
perceive that they, singly and unsupported, cannot suffice to create
that due proportion of restraint on the power, or of impulse on the will
of the deputed executive government, which is absolutely necessary to
the perfect suppression of tyranny, anarchy, and abuse. Nor is it
possible to complete this restraint and impulse, to that sufficing
degree, unless by a proper exertion of the sovereign’s own supreme
influence.
But we find that, upon the Company’s system, the distance of situation
renders the influence of the sovereign altogether impotent to this
effect: and if we should take it for granted that her system hath been
just or complete, then must we conclude, that this sovereign impotence
is a consequence naturally and unavoidably arising from the distance;
and, therefore, above the remedy of art. But, if we consult our own
reason, we shall perceive that the Company’s impotence, in that
particular respect, proceeded from a radical defect or error in her
system; which might have been remedied by art. For, it is evident, that
the distance of situation was in every circumstance similarly and
equally obstructive to the Company’s immediately or personally executing
the government of that Indian dominion, as it was to her immediately
restraining or enforcing the manner of execution: and yet we find that
the Directors could discover a remedy for the first of these
obstructions, by the succedaneum of appointing a deputed executive
government. And, as the second sprung from the same cause, and was
exactly similar in its nature, common sense must surely have instructed
her, that it was to be removed by a similar remedy; it being certain
that, if the Directors had thought proper to institute in India a
deputation properly qualified to controul their executive deputation,
the measures of those Indian governments might have been enforced or
retrained by the sovereign rending in Europe, as effectually as they
have been executed by the same sovereign: that is to say, as
effectually, as the defective constitution of the Company, (which
equally disqualified her for controuling as for executing,) could admit.
But it could not be ignorance, or want of common sense, that prevented
the Directors from instituting a controuling deputation of this nature:
seeing they had before them the precedent of these other European
nations, who hold any possessions in India: all of whom have provided
something of this kind: for instance, the Dutch government at Batavia.
Sound policy quickly pointed out to the Dutch, the absurdity of
committing the charge of their dispersed concerns in India, to a
multiplicity of distinct heads, all acting under no other constraint, or
restraint, than that of the Company’s Directors residing in Europe.
Therefore, so soon as the Dutch Company began to extend her possessions
in India, she instituted one supreme government at Batavia, with full
powers, and authority, to direct and controul the executive government
of all her other settlements. And this government acts in India as an
intermediate power, betwixt the Company residing in Europe, and her
various possessions in that distant country; and as the perpetual
residentiary supervisor of all her interests there. The Directors
communicate all their purposes immediately to it; and it disperses
orders and instructions to all the subordinate governments; which again
transmit to it a regular account of their situation, wants, or
transactions. All governors, chiefs, &c. are immediately responsible to
it: all appointments to, and removals from, office in the subordinates,
are made immediately by it: and all complaints or appeals, against the
misconduct or injustice of these governors, are immediately addressed to
it. In fine, it may be termed the center of the Dutch government in
India. And though this government can in no shape be termed the complete
model of a deputation, fit to controul or enforce the execution of
sovereign government, in various territorial dominions; yet, to this
institution, defective as it is, the Dutch owe it, that the government
of their numerous subordinate possessions in India hath been conducted,
for about two hundred years, clear of any enormous abuse.