could, with propriety, efficacy, and safety, have conferred every
reasonable privilege on the whole body of subjects in this foreign
dominion: seeing that the exertion of these privileges might have been
artfully confined to this middle state: and, as on the one hand, this
finesse would not have, in any shape, withheld the benefit of these
privileges from the natives; but, on the contrary, would have rendered
them more effectually useful to the whole body of subjects, than if they
had been committed either entirely or in common to the natives; because
the Company’s servants would, from interest, have had the same
inclination as the natives, to exert these privileges for the common
good; and they would have had infinitely greater power, from their
superior activity, intrepidity, and firmness, as also from their
superior opportunities of obtaining redress elsewhere against any
infringement made by government: so, on the other hand, the authority of
the sovereign could have incurred no risk from these privileges in the
hands of Europeans; whereas there is great danger in attempting to
confer on the natives a power to controul even the despotism of
government. With this middle state the power of juries would have been
effectual to the subject, and harmless to the sovereign: however, we
shall have occasion to be more particular on this head in the sequel.
But if the national government could, by taking this sovereign charge
upon itself, have prevented or reformed these many evils and abuses that
have arisen from the defects of the Company; and could have likewise
created other such advantages, facilitating the establishment of a
regular government in those countries; what reason can be assigned for
government’s declining this charge, and devolving it on the Company?
Government could not surely suppose that this important concern would be
managed to greater national advantage by the Company, than by itself:
seeing that common sense might have foreseen, what experience hath since
proved, that, under the management of the Company, the interest of
Britain in those countries would, in the space of a very few years, be
completely annihilated; that the countries themselves would either be
completely ruined, or otherwise lost to enemies; and that the wealth,
which was extorted from them by rapine and general havoc, being imported
into Britain in the hands of a few indiscreet individuals, would create
a torrent of profusion, extravagance, luxury, and prodigality, that
would sweep all before it into the gulf of bankruptcy, perdition, and
despair. Whereas, under the regular administration of national
government, those countries might have been still preserved in a
flourishing condition; and, in consequence, still capable of yielding to
Britain a tribute little inferior to the surplus revenue which the
Company received in the first year of the Dewanny: which tribute,
arriving immediately at the public treasury of Britain, and being there
applied to the diminution of taxes, and consequent reduction of the
price of necessaries and labour, would have proved a gentle universal
shower, reviving our decayed and drooping manufactures and commerce.
But neither could government be induced to confer this sovereignty on
the Company, by any motive of regard to the true interest of the
proprietors: seeing it was palpably evident that this charge, being so
unmeasurably superior to her powers of supporting it, must unavoidably
crush her to ruin, and, along with her, the countries subjected to her
rule; and, it is to be feared, even that community of which she forms a
part. Whereas, if the national government had taken into its own hands,
and carefully administered the government of those countries, whilst it
continued the Company in possession of her commercial privileges, she
would have continued to divide, in the first place, the six per cent.
which her commerce, (unaided by revenue) afforded; even when burdened
with the necessary expence of a small military force maintained for the
guard of that commerce in those foreign countries, and which must have
been equal to four per cent. on her capital: but this commercial
military expence being rendered in a great measure unnecessary, by the
immediate protection of national government, the saving thereof would
have added two per cent. to her dividend: and the equivalent, which
government would have paid for her fortresses, munition, &c. being added
to her capital stock, would have encreased her dividend nearly one per
cent. more; whilst her stock itself would, at this day, have been
really, and intrinsically worth 220 l. instead of ........ its present
real and intrinsic value.
It would be insulting the understanding of ministry, to suppose that it
had been restrained from assuming this sovereign charge, by any delicacy
of regard to the ideal right of the Company; derived from either
conquests, as subjects; or from the sham grant of a man, who had not
power to dispose of a single bega of land, nay, not of a cocoa-nut-tree
in that country; and consequently whose grant of the sovereignty of
Bengal could contribute nothing more to investiture or possession, than
his grant of the crown of Britain could. Though if we should (for the
sake of argument) suppose, that ministry had really admitted some such
right, we must still esteem its acquiescence in that right a most absurd
and wildly mistaken indulgence; seeing it evidently tended to the ruin
of the party whom it meant to favour.
There hath been, however, one weighty argument against government’s
assuming this Indian charge, which is, the danger arising to national
liberty from government’s, (or, in other words, the crown or ministry’s)
acquiring such an accession of influence, as must arise from the
possession of the many emoluments, places, posts, &c. annexed to this
Indian charge: whereas liberty is completely secured from such danger,
whilst the Company possesses it. And the certainty of this double maxim,
viz. the danger from government’s possessing this charge, and the
security whilst it is in the hands of the Company, is as generally
established as almost any one human principle: for, being violently
enforced by those whose personal views lead them to oppose
administration, and at same time not simply allowed, but even inculcated
by ministry itself, it hath been readily credited by those who, their
personal interest not being so deeply concerned, were less curious to
investigate the truth.
It may be deemed presumptuous in an individual, to question the
orthodoxy of a maxim so powerfully enforced by one party, readily
allowed by the other, and almost universally credited: tho’ the
extraordinary circumstance, of two violent rival parties concurring so
exactly on a point, where their personal interest seems to be so
materially and so oppositely engaged, would lead a bystander to suppose,
that either one of the two parties must be mistaken; or otherwise, that
one or both must misrepresent: at any rate, that uncommon instance of
candour, in ministry’s preaching up a doctrine so repugnant to that
which it pretends to be its own personal interest, would induce such
bystander to suspect its sincerity. However, as a right understanding of
this point may considerably import the public, at this critical
juncture, I shall venture disclosing my sentiments, at the risk of
censure for prolixity, as well as impertinence.
With regard to the first part of the maxim, I conceive that the danger
to liberty, from government’s holding this charge in its own hands, is
supposed to arise from the influence which the minister would acquire,
over the two subject branches of legislature, (those bulwarks of
liberty) by means of the many emoluments, places, posts, &c. annexed to
the possession of that charge. But before we admit that the ministers
holding this charge would be creative of that dangerous influence, we
ought to be satisfied that he doth not already possess it, by other
means; for, if he doth already possess such influence by other means, it
is plain that the Indian charge cannot confer it; nor will it avail to
shut one door, whilst there are others open to admit him. And that the
minister hath long been in full and plenary possession of such
influence, we have ever heard asserted by these very men who so loudly
enforce the danger of his acquiring it, by means of this Indian charge:
nay, we have much better authority than their contradictory assertions,
(even that of fact and daily experience,) for believing that the
minister hath and doth possess posts and places, and that, on any
emergency, he hath in his power other means equally effectual, towards
creating and holding such influence, in a degree as plenary and complete
as his own heart can desire. And, if the minister doth already possess
such influence by other means, it is plain, that the Indian charge
cannot confer it; nor will it avail to shut one door, whilst there are
others open to admit him. And that the minister hath been long in full
and plenary possession of such influence, we have ever heard asserted by
those very men, who so loudly enforce the danger of his acquiring it, by
means of this Indian charge: nay, we have much better authority than
their contradictory assertions, (even that of fact and daily
experience,) for believing that the minister hath and doth possess posts
and places, and that on any emergency he hath in his power other means
equally effectual, towards creating and holding such influence, in a
degree as plenary and complete as his own heart can desire. And, if the
minister doth already possess an influence so fully sufficient, it must
be allowed that, in so much as respects parliamentary influence, this
Indian charge would be a thing superfluous and useless to him; like meat
to a man that hath already filled his belly; the absence of it can
withhold nothing that he wants, and the acquisition cannot confer more
than he already possesses. I may venture to add, that we certainly hold
our liberty by some latent security, more powerful than that of
parliament itself, which neither the minister’s influence over
parliament, nor posts and places, will ever induce him to attack, or
enable him to subdue; for that, otherwise, we should have been divested
of our privileges and liberty long ago. And, upon considering these
several circumstances, I conclude, that if this Indian charge was in the
hands of government to-morrow, it would neither enable, nor induce the
minister, to attempt a jot more against our liberty, than he hath done,
can do, and will do, without it. However, by way of reinforcing my
argument, I shall add that, if the plan which I mean to propose should
be carried into execution, it would leave but few of these emoluments,
&c. to the immediate disposal of the minister; and, possibly, this
declaration may but little recommend it to his favour.
But still, if we were to admit a real danger to liberty from the
minister’s possessing these emoluments, &c. it remains to be proved that
liberty hath been, is, and will be secured from such danger, by the
Company’s holding that Indian charge. And, when the nature of this
security comes to be examined, I apprehend it will be found more
difficult to prove this latter part of the maxim, than the former. For
it is notorious that, ever until the late distraction in the Company’s
affairs, the arbitrary application of these emoluments, posts, &c. was
vested in the Directors; and indeed the entire powers and interests of
the Company; insomuch that the Directors might, with propriety, be
termed the Company. So that the whole security of national liberty, and,
of course, the sole obstruction to the minister’s dangerous views,
depended on the integrity and independent spirit of 24 Directors; of
whom, again, one or two generally leads all the rest. Consequently, to
come at the fingering of these dangerous emoluments, &c. the minister
had only to subvert the integrity, or subdue the independance, of these
Directors. And, to effect this, a minister possessed more than one
infallible recipe. By artfully joining the mighty influence which he
held in the Company’s stock thro’ his numerous dependants, to one or
other of two parties contending violently for the direction, he could
reduce both to a perfect dependance on himself: by the same means he
could hold them in subjection: but still more, by the awe of wresting
from them the sweet management of this Indian sovereignty, which they
were sensible he could do by a word. And thus he could work upon their
fears. But inclination would naturally and powerfully lead the Directors
to throw themselves into the arms of a minister; not so much for his
immediate assistance; tho’ even that might be of great use, for
rendering matters easy with the proprietors, as well as parliament and
the nation; but because, on these terms, they secured, in him, an
omnipotent supporter and all powerful advocate, against the day of
distress, which they well knew must come, and that soon: whereas,
otherwise, they must lay their account with finding him a severe judge,
and bitter prosecutor.
By these several operations on the hopes and fears of the Directors, it
was extremely easy for a minister to render them as pliant as a glove;
as obedient as a spaniel, to fetch and carry at bidding. And the
Directors being once reduced to this state of dependance, it is evident,
that the minister must possess a full and arbitrary power over all the
emoluments, posts, places, &c. appertaining to this Indian charge. But
the disposal of the present emoluments, &c. was a trivial matter,
compared with other advantages, which this Indian business, whilst in
the hands of the Company, presented to an artful and enterprising
minister. For, under the plausible and indeed undeniable pretext of
qualifying the Company for administring this sovereign charge, he might
have drawn from the legislature certain military as well as political
powers; which, being gradually augmented as occasion offered, might have
at last established a sort of power, in this government, distinct from
and independent of the legislature: the exertion of which power, being
confided to the Directors, would in fact have rested with the minister.
Here indeed was a real danger to liberty; provided it had been possible
to hold up this Indian business, in the hands of the Company, for any
length of time; for, notwithstanding I consider national liberty as
inexpugnable to the open assaults of a minister, yet, from such a secret
convenient and commanding post as this mentioned, he might have made
frequent sly and successful incursions on the confines of liberty; which
would have greatly straitened her quarters, and wasted her strength.
On the other hand, if that Indian charge had been vested in the national
government, liberty must have been perfectly secured from this last
mentioned danger; for, in such case, there could have been no pretext
for demanding these extraordinary distinct powers; and, consequently, no
opportunity of establishing that truly dangerous _imperium in imperio_.
And even in the application of the ordinary powers, emoluments, &c. a
minister must have been subjected to many troublesome checks, and
restraints. His Majesty, who can have no views distinct from the general
interest of his people, must have held a principal voice in every
measure; as likewise must some others his counsellors. Parliament too
must have proved an inconvenient restraint on a minister; particularly
in the article of estimates and accounts of revenue, which must have
been submitted to its inspection; and notwithstanding the certainty of
carrying points by a majority of voices, yet, as there will ever be some
refractory members, these might have carried tales to the public; which,
provided this charge had been in the hands of national government, would
have judged itself interested in the affair; and would therefore have
taken the liberty to criticise his measures, or censure his misconduct.
Whereas, this business being secured, as private property, in the hands
of the Company, king, parliament, and nation were all excluded from
participation: the proprietors alone had a right to examine measures or
accounts; and, the majority of them upon all questions being mercenary
retainers to ministry and the direction, they must have ever been a mere
_servile pecus_. So that the business might have been snugly confined to
three or four ministerial associates, with their faithful dependants in
Leadenhall Street; whilst the minister needed never appear in the
affair; free from care, charge, or trouble; and irresponsible for either
measures, or consequences; he might enjoy all the sweets, without the
least alloy of bitter.
Sure I am if I had been minister, and minded to make a job of this
Indian business, I would certainly have exerted myself most sedulously
to preserve it in the hands of the Company. And, to divert the nation
from ever turning her eye towards it, I would have strenuously
inculcated the rights of the Company, national faith, the impossibility
of conducting this business otherwise than through the Company; and,
above all things, I would, by my emissaries, have alarmed the public,
with fears of danger to their liberty, should this business ever come
into the hands of government; whilst, by the same canal, I would have
trumpeted forth my own candour, disinterestedness as a minister,
indifference to power, and delicate regard to national liberty and
private property, in thus disclaiming an object so replete with
ministerial advantages, which was within my power. And thus would I have
continued the game, until it was up: and then I would have directed the
enquiries, which decency and regard to appearances extorted from me, in
such a manner as to suppress, instead of investigating: though, at same
time, I would have boldly expressed my indignation at the Company’s
misconduct; and loudly denounced vengeance against the individuals that
had shared in the plunder; not a soul that was guilty should escape.
And, to wind up the whole affair dextrously, I would have tasked my own
powers, and those of my myrmidons, to represent all these Indian
acquisitions as a transitory, casual, and accidental piece of business;
which was altogether out of our tract; and which, if the nation had ever
engaged in maintaining them, would have ruined and exhausted her: and so
the nation was to thank me, for withholding her from ruin.
In this manner, I say, would I, who am a reptile, have acted, had I been
minister, and minded to make a job of this business: but I am far from
intimating or insinuating that our ministers, who are men of high birth
and strict honour, could be capable of admitting even a thought of
taking such base advantages. All that I have said is only meant to show,
that a minister, if he had the inclination, possessed an infinitely
fairer opportunity, of converting this business to sinister purposes,
whilst it was in the hands of the Company; than he possibly could have
had, from the same business, under the conduct of national government.
And, from thence, I would infer that, had this business been in the
hands of government, our liberty, nay and our property too, would have
been secured from many dangers, to which they have been exposed, whilst
this business hath been in the hands of the Company.
I cannot then conceive what other objections could be started against
government’s taking upon itself the charge of this Indian dominion:
unless it be the old trite arguments of timid sluggish indolence, want
of enterprize, &c. That, the distance of situation rendering it
impossible for Britain to properly maintain and govern this dominion, it
would become an object of no true value or importance, but rather a
heavy load exhausting her strength. But it is now more than time for the
nation to recal her faith from men whom she hath sufficient ground to
suspect of deceit; and, rousing her senses, to take the liberty of
trying these matters by the standard of her own reason; which we shall
endeavour to aid by the following hints.
To properly demonstrate the true value and importance of this Indian
dominion to Britain, would demand a volume; we have, in the first part,
presented a slight sketch of it; here therefore we shall offer only one
or two remarks respecting its importance to our finances; and though we
do not offer these remarks as the result of exact calculation, yet will
they serve to throw a light on this subject. Ever since the last war
Britain hath paid annually to foreign creditors, in interest, about
1,500,000 l. and this is paid, not in paper, but all in hard money; or,
otherwise, in what is equivalent, the stoppage of so much hard money as
is reckoned to come into Britain by the balance of her trade. On the
other hand, the net specie balance of trade with all the world,
(exclusive of that part which strictly and properly may be termed the
produce of Indian dominion,) after deducting the imperceptible and
enormous drain of specie made by smuggling, doth not at this day perhaps
amount to 800,000 l. The difference then betwixt her numerical specie
disbursement and receipt in balance of trade, must needs have been made
good from some other fund than the circulating stock of specie,
otherwise circulation must in that number of years have totally ceased.
And this fund we need not mention to have been the dominion in India.
Ever since 1757, the private fortunes acquired there in consequence of
dominion or conquest, having been remitted either in bills on foreign
Indian companies, or in diamonds, have created an annual influx of
specie, (or what is equivalent,) to the amount of at least 700,000 l.[1]
The Company too received since that period, and previous to the Dewanny,
though by virtue of dominion or conquest, sundry large sums of money;
which she invested in merchandize; and, thereby, saved to Britain so
much specie as she would, otherwise, have transmitted for the purchase
of such merchandize; and it doth not require demonstration to prove,
that all such saving is, in every respect, the same as the influx of an
equal sum. And ever from 1765, till some time in 1770, the Company paid
for all her cargoes, not only in India but in China, with the surplus
revenue of Bengal: and of course this surplus revenue hath, for that
space, saved, (which is the same as gained) annually to Britain, the
whole sums which the Company used to transmit for the purchase of her
cargoes in India and China; and which, on an average, may be reckoned
500,000 l. _per annum_: but these cargoes were, from 1765, encreased to
an enormous degree; and if we add only 200,000 l. for such encrease, we
shall find that the surplus revenue of Bengal hath, by the return of
trade, created an annual influx to Britain of at least 700,000 l. in
specie: and this, added to the private fortunes, makes 1,400,000 l.
received yearly by Britain, from Indian dominion.