been so unlucky in their prescriptions is, that they have proceeded upon
false principles; as having mistaken the nature of the malady. For they
have either assigned no one certain cause of evil; or else they have
traced it no farther than to the persons who have executed the
government of those countries, otherwise to the Directors: as if all the
evil had proceeded from some particular viciousness in their
disposition, as if they had been sinners above all men, or as if no men
would have done the wicked deed but they: whereas he who is the least
acquainted with human nature will allow, that few, if any men, would
have made any better use of their powers and opportunities; nay he will
add, that every other government on earth, would act the very part that
this Bengal government hath done, provided it held the same views and
interests, together with the same powers and opportunities. And, if so,
what can be more absurd, than the proposal to remedy the evils and
abuses of this government, by sending out Supervisors, with the same or
greater powers, and consequently possessing greater opportunities of
promoting their own views and interests; which are exactly the same as
these of the persons complained of; seeing that, as the same cause of
evil which existed in the Governors, would have existed in the
Supervisors, these similar causes must have operated similar effects.
Indeed we shall err widely, if we look for the original cause of evil in
these Governors: for, on inspecting the preceding description of this
Bengal government, we perceive, that their maladministration is itself
but an effect, or consequence, naturally flowing from the total want of
certain fundamental principles or powers; which, in every other
government, serve to restrain the party governing from doing or
permitting injury, and impel it to promote the good of the party
governed: and as the want of these restraining and impelling powers hath
unavoidably produced, the first tyranny, and the latter anarchy, it is
plain, that all the evils and abuses in the government of Bengal have
sprung from this deficiency. It farther appears, from the same
description, that the want of these restraining and impelling powers
arises from two different causes; the first being the particular
condition and constitution of the sovereign: and the second is there
termed the distance of situation, betwixt the sovereign residence and
the country governed; tho’ the sequel will evince this latter to be
rather a radical defect in the nature of that system, which the
Directors have adopted for the government of this distant dominion. That
these have been the two original causes of the tyranny and anarchy, and
consequently of all the evils and abuses in this Bengal government,
including these of the commercial despotism, is sufficiently evident. We
shall therefore proceed to point out the means of removing these causes,
as the only effectual method of remedying the evils. And as each of the
two causes hath contributed its proper share of the evil, and each
demands a distinct remedy, we shall consider them separately.
With regard to the condition and constitution of the Company, we have
already mentioned the several circumstances that disqualify her for the
office of a supreme sovereign; here therefore we shall only
recapitulate, or collect them into one point of view. The first defect
is, her impotence, or want of power to promote good government in her
dominion: and this proceeds from her being, with respect to her deputed
government, a meer fellow subject, totally void of supreme legislative
and judicial powers; and consequently incapable of inforcing obedience;
or of punishing disobedience: and this want of authority and power in
the sovereign, we have shown to be a principal cause of despotism in the
deputed government. A second defect in the constitution of the Company
is her want of inclination, or rather of interest, to discharge the duty
of a good sovereign; and this arises from the fluctuating and hourly
mutable state of the proprietary, the temporary and short duration of
her corporate existence, the still shorter tenor of this sovereignty,
and the annual rotation of her executive government; for, in consequence
of these several circumstances in her situation, her views are narrow,
contracted, and rapacious; the sole aim of all her measures being to
make the most of the present moment. The third defect is the mercantile
capacity of this sovereign Company; and from this defect alone flow
evils sufficient to ruin the interest of the country subjected to her
government: for, in consequence of her mercantile capacity, her deputed
government acts as a merchant; and, in consequence of her sovereign
capacity, all her mercantile servants assume the authority of
sovereigns.
These are the principal defects in the being and constitution of this
sovereign Company; and it is evident, that such defects in the
sovereign, must have contributed largely towards the existence of abuse,
in the deputed government. But these defects might have been, in a great
measure, remedied, and their consequences prevented, by a simple act of
parliament, past by the national government, at the time it thought
proper to commit the charge of this important branch of national
interest, to the care of the Company. This act might have been entitled,
“An act for better enabling the East India Company to administer the
political government, and to protect, maintain and defend certain states
and countries in India, which have become subjected to the dominion of
Britain, and which, for sundry weighty considerations, it hath been
judged proper to commit to her charge.” And it might have been conceived
in the following, or such like terms.
“Whereas it appears, that the want of a proper legislative authority
over the ministers and servants, employed by the Company to execute the
sovereign government of these subjected dominions, must be productive of
many abuses, detrimental as well to the interest of the Company, as to
the honour and interest of the British nation. Be it enacted by &c.
that, from the time of passing this act, the Company shall possess the
power of legislation, or making laws, for the government of this foreign
dominion: and the laws thus enacted by the Company, shall be equally
binding on all her ministers, servants, and subjects, in that dominion,
as are the acts of parliament on the subjects of Britain. And being
farther sensible of the many inconveniences, that must arise from the
Company’s incapacity of punishing the offences committed by her
ministers, and servants abroad, otherwise than by applying to courts of
justice that are foreign to her government; where she cannot convict,
through the difficulty of obtaining the evidence required by the forms
of these courts; and where she is deterred from prosecuting, by the fear
of divulging the secrets of her government; insomuch that, rather than
apply to these courts, she must submit to the most audacious acts of
disobedience, and maladministration; and considering that such
incapacity in the Company must discourage all good government, and
produce tyranny and anarchy in this dominion; be it enacted, that the
Company shall have authority to erect courts of justice, and appoint
judges; with the like powers, as are vested in his majesty’s judges, and
courts of judicature, for trying and judging all suits and causes, or
offences committed within the limits of this Indian dominion; and for
punishing the same, either capitally, or by fine, imprisonment, and
banishment, though to Europe only. And whereas it is probable, that some
of the ministers or servants of the Company may, by various methods,
elude the justice of her courts abroad, and escape to Europe; in order
therefore to prevent such dangerous illusion of justice, it is enacted,
that the Company’s court of directors shall, on due information being
made to them, have power at all times to call before them such escaping
delinquents, and to try and punish them, for the offences they may have
committed within the limits of this Indian dominion, in like manner as
they could have been tried or punished by the Company’s courts abroad.
And because the liberty of appealing from the Company’s courts of
justice, to the judgment of any other courts, must be productive of the
same inconveniences to the Company, as a trial of the same cause in the
first instance would have been, and must therefore deter the Company
from ever availing herself of the judicial powers granted by this act;
it is enacted, that delinquents shall have no liberty of appealing from
the Company’s courts abroad, excepting to the Court of Directors at
home, or to a general court of Proprietors; whose judgment in all such
cases shall be final. And as the Court of Directors have, and may be,
discouraged, from prosecuting or punishing the crimes of their rich
servants, by the fear of danger to their own private interest, from a
combination of the friends and abettors of such rich delinquents at a
future annual election, be it enacted, that the 24 Directors, being such
at the time of passing this act, shall continue in office, _durante
vita_.
“And whereas it appears, that the liberty of daily selling,
transferring, and alienating the shares in the Company’s stock, of which
this sovereign dominion forms a part, tends to infuse into the
proprietors a spirit of rapacity, that may be productive of much damage
to the several interests concerned; and hath many other very pernicious
consequences; whilst it reflects disgrace on the dignity of all other
sovereigns; be it enacted, that no proprietor in this Company’s stock,
of which the sovereignty forms a part, shall have power to send his
share in the said sovereignty to market, like as it were a hog or
bullock, and to sell, transfer, and alienate the same; but that the
several proprietors of this stock and sovereignty, being such at the
time of passing this act, shall remain and continue proprietors, without
the power of alienation, except in the cases that shall be hereafter
specified.
“And whereas it hath been represented that the Company’s holding this
sovereignty by lease, and for a short term, may not only alienate her
care and prevent her from studying and promoting the lasting welfare of
the country, but may induce her to pillage, plunder and waste it; be it
enacted, that the Company shall hold the sovereignty of this dominion,
_quamdiu se bene gesserit_; to the end, that she may consider and treat
it, not as the property of another, but as her own inheritance.
“And whereas the Company exercises traffic in this dominion; and, in
consequence thereof, her ministers do likewise traffic; and whereas the
exercise of traffic is evidently repugnant to a due discharge of the
duties of government, as being unavoidably productive of destructive
monopolies and oppression; all which it is impossible to prevent, so
long as the Company herself shall continue a merchant; be it enacted,
that this Company’s commercial charter shall be dissolved; and she, and
her ministers, shall be restrained from trading or trafficking, directly
or indirectly, within the limits of this Indian dominion, under certain
penalties to be mentioned in a new charter, which shall be granted to
this Company, constituting her the United Company of English East India
Sovereigns.”
These powers, grants, limitations, and restrictions, would have
qualified the Company, so far as the nature of things could admit, for
administring the political government; but, in her military capacity, as
the sovereign protector, maintainer and defender of this Indian
dominion, she hath been still less qualified, and would therefore have
required still more extraordinary powers. These however we shall not
specify, as apprehending, that what hath been already demanded will
shock. The grant of supreme legislative and judicial powers to subjects,
over their fellow subjects, must seem an absurd communication of that
which is incommunicable: the prohibition of selling and transferring the
shares of stock, would be termed a tyrannical restraint on private
property: the perpetual grant of this sovereignty to the Company, must
be deemed an unjust alienation of the Crown’s and Nation’s rights: and
the dissolution of the Company’s commercial charter, would alter her
very being and nature. In short, if we regard the proposed act simply,
it will appear a collection of absurd inconsistencies, and ridiculous
nonsense: but if we consider it conjunctly with the cause or purpose for
which it is required, then every absurdity vanishes from the act, and
centers in the cause that renders it necessary. For we appeal to common
sense, whether every circumstance, specified in this proposed act, is
not indispensably necessary, to qualify the Company for the sovereign
office of administring the political government of this Indian dominion:
and, if that necessity is admitted, then doth the act become a rational
and necessary consequence, of government’s having previously committed
that sovereign charge to the Company. Nay, we must take the liberty to
add, that government, by committing such a charge to the Company, and at
same time totally neglecting to capacitate her for supporting it, is in
a great measure accessory to all the ruinous consequences that have
ensued from her incapacity.
I am sensible it will be urged, that we proceed upon false premises; for
that government never considered these countries as subjected to the
dominion of Britain; that it never granted the sovereignty of them to
the Company; nor supposed her to be the sovereign; but that it only
acquiesced in her holding the Dewanny, on condition of her paying a part
of the revenues to the nation; and, of consequence, that government
never considered the inhabitants of those countries as subjects to the
government of Britain. But this is a most flimsy evasion, like that of
shutting our eyes to the sun, that we may deny it is day: government
granted to the Company a right or permission to hold the Dewanny; which
is explained to be, the power of collecting and appropriating the
revenues of Bengal; and, in consideration of this grant, government
demanded and received a share of these revenues; government therefore,
in its legislative capacity, admits a knowledge, that the Company did
possess the power of collecting, and also of applying the revenues of
Bengal, _ad libitum_; and, amongst other purposes, to that of defraying
the charges of the military, as well as the civil, government: and
government well knows, that the power which defrays the charges of the
military and civil government, must hold the absolute direction of both:
and what constitutes sovereign power, but the absolute direction of the
military and civil government, together with the disposal of the
revenues? But, exclusive of the Dewanny contract, the Company hath
applied, in every other characteristic of a sovereign, to government, in
its legislative capacity: she hath brought a bill into parliament, for
the grant of certain military powers and indulgences, for the better
enabling her to defend, what she there modestly, though vaguely, terms
her territorial acquisitions, (but which, by referring to the Dewanny
contract, is explained to include Bengal): and she hath applied for
certain juridical powers and grants, for the better administration of
the jurisdiction, not in her commercial factories, but over the whole
country of Bengal: therefore government hath been informed, in its
legislative capacity, by the Company herself, that she administred the
military and civil government, and appropriated the revenues of Bengal;
consequently that she was, in every sense and respect, the actual
sovereign of that country.
Now government could not be ignorant that the Company is a subject to
the national government of Britain; and that, as such, she could have
neither right, power, nor force to subject this dominion, or afterwards
to hold it in subjection, saving what she derived from the national
government; consequently government, as it understood that these
countries were subjected to the Company, must have known that they were
subjected to the dominion of Britain. And as government did permit the
Company to retain this dominion; and furnished her with a military
force, knowing it to be for the purpose of maintaining dominion, it is
plain, that the Company hath held this dominion, no otherwise than by
the grant and support of government.
But if the Company be the sovereign of Bengal, the inhabitants must,
_per_ force, be her subjects; and if the Company holds this sovereignty
as a subject to the government of Britain, by virtue of the grant or
permission of that government, and by means of a force furnished by the
same government, in what relation can this government regard the
inhabitants of Bengal? In that of subjects surely; tho’ the degree hath,
by the deed of government, been somewhat implicated; like that of a
child begot by the father upon his own daughter. And subjects they have
been to the government of Britain, in every sense and meaning; they have
yielded obedience to those subjects of this government whom it appointed
to rule over them; and they have yielded the fruits, as well as the
duties of obedience.
But the government of Britain, which hath thus by force subjected the
inhabitants of Bengal to its dominion; which hath, for a series of
years, held them in subjection; and hath, all along, exacted from them
the tribute of subjection; hath withheld from them the protection due to
subjects. For it hath scrupulously withdrawn itself from all regard or
attention to their government; and hath left it implicitly to the
guidance of a few merchants; whom it knew to be perfectly unqualified
for administring any sort of government: in consequence of which these
wretched people have, for many years, been ruled, without law, justice,
or government. Unhappy subjects, who are forced to obey a sovereign that
refuses them protection, and leaves them exposed to all the horrors of
tyranny and anarchy.
It will nevertheless be still insisted that government could not,
without committing a number of irregularities and absurdities, endow the
Company in the manner specified; as also that the Company, when thus
endowed, would still have been altogether unequal to the charge of
regularly administring a sovereign government. But surely government, if
it would not or could not capacitate the Company to regularly govern
those countries, ought not to have furnished her the means of
oppressing, ravaging, pillaging, and ruining them; to the disgrace of
humanity, and the indelible reproach of the British name. Government
would have acted a part far more consistent with the rules of honour and
humanity, if, instead of furnishing to the Company this military power,
it had restrained her from availing herself of the advantage, gained by
force and chance, over that mild, unwarlike, but industrious people; and
obliged her to leave them to their own government.
But then the situation of affairs in those countries, where the nation
and Company held such a valuable commercial interest, rendered it highly
improper and dangerous to leave the native government to itself:
moreover the nation and Company could not, in such case, have acquired
the mighty wealth and other benefits that have been derived from the
conquest, or assumed dominion, of those countries. Oh wealth, basely
acquired, and foolishly applied! Was there then no medium, no middle
channel, thro’ which government might have steered the Nation and
Company to this same wealth and benefits, clear of all these
irregularities, incongruities, inhumanities, and reproaches? Yes surely;
and one so obvious and conspicuous, that it is impossible to conceive
how government could be so industrious as to shun or miss it. Had the
national government taken upon itself the charge of superintending the
government of those countries, as reason and the nature of things
directed, then would it have furnished them a sovereign, naturally free
from all the defects of the Company, and completely endued with all the
qualifications of power, ability, and inclination from interest, to
protect and regularly govern them.
For it is plain, that the national government, possessing supreme
legislative, and judicial power, must have been capable of enforcing
obedience to the laws which it might have enacted for the good
government of those countries; and of punishing disobedience, not only
in the natives, but in the ministers whom it would have employed to
execute that government; as these must have been its own subjects. And,
on the other hand, the nation being an immutable body, and holding this
sovereignty in her own right, and by perpetual tenor; her government
must have been actuated, by the strong motive of self interest, to exert
itself in promoting the real and lasting welfare of those countries. And
as to the commercial despotism, it could never have existed under the
national government.
It therefore follows, that the national government, being perfectly free
from all the defects of the Company, would, by the simple, natural, and
rational act of assuming the administration of government in those
countries, have prevented or reformed all the several abuses or evils
that have sprung from the defective constitution of the Company, as
sovereign. But besides the mighty reform of abuses, that must have been
immediately caused by thus changing the person of the sovereign; there
is another advantage, which, though it cannot be said to spring directly
from that change, yet would it have ensued as a natural consequence of
the national government’s taking upon itself this sovereign charge; and
that is, the creation or institution of a new interest in that country;
a sort of middle state, betwixt the native subjects and their foreign
government.
The middle state here meant is the East India Company, (or which is the
same, her servants in Bengal;) which, being now reduced to the condition
of a subject, tho’ still retaining all her commercial privileges and
interests in that country, would have formed an intermediate link in the
political chain, serving to connect the natives with their government,
and government with the natives. For, in every one circumstance that
respected the liberty of the subject, this middle state must have held
precisely the same interest as the natives; and, in consequence, the
same inclination to oppose all oppression of government: and, in every
thing that respected the real interest, the power, or honour of the
sovereign, the community of _Natale Solum_ must have led it to support
the measures of government. Therefore, this middle state, holding a
great weight in that dependent dominion, (not indeed from its numbers,
but from the powerful support and influence of the Company, which would
have been still very respectable in the sovereign country,) must have
carried a mighty poise into the scale of liberty, in opposition to the
despotism of government; whilst, at same time, it would have created no
danger to the power of the sovereign. And a middle state of this nature
must have been of inexpressible utility; facilitating, in many respects,
the establishment of a regular political œconomy