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THE PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH INTEREST IN INDIA
Transcriber’s Note:
This version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.
Italics are delimited with the ‘_’ character as _italic_.
Footnotes have been moved to follow the chapters in which they are
referenced.
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH INTEREST IN INDIA:
WITH A PLAN FOR ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN THAT
COUNTRY.
LONDON:
Printed for J. ALMON, opposite Burlington House,
in Piccadilly.
MDCCLXXIII.
[Price Three Shillings.]
CONTENTS.
I. The present State of the British Interest in 5
India, &c.
II. The Nature and Effects of the Company’s 17
Government in Bengal
III. The true Causes of Evil and Abuse in the 46
Government of Bengal, and the Means to remedy them
IV. A Plan, for establishing a regular System of 106
political Government in India
V. A Plan, for establishing a regular System of 156
military Government, and of secure Defence, in
India
Chapter I
No nation nor state ever acquired an accession of dominion so truly
valuable and beneficial, as are the acquisitions lately made by Britain
in India. But the particular situation of her circumstances at the time
when these acquisitions fell into her hands, enhanced the real and
intrinsic value of them to Britain. Oppressed by a grievous debt, the
annual interest of which, exceeding four millions and a half sterling,
was levied by taxes, which raised the price of each manufacture, her
commerce labouring under such disadvantages was daily sinking into
decay; whilst a considerable part of this annual interest being paid to
foreigners, created such a drain of specie, as the balance of her trade
could not supply; so that, in proportion as her expence increased, the
means of defraying it diminished; and she was every year approaching
towards a state of national poverty and bankruptcy.
In such circumstances did Britain acquire the sovereign dominion of
Bengal, and of other rich manufacturing and trading countries in India;
which, at the time they fell to her, were capable of not only defraying
every charge of their own government and defence, but over and above
that, of yielding annually to the sovereign a sum equal to 1,300,000 l.
sterling, as can be readily demonstrated. Nor do we include in this sum
the benefit which Britain had been accustomed to receive, in her
commercial capacity, by her trade with those countries: the sum here
specified would have arisen purely in consequence of dominion: and,
whether transmitted from those countries in merchandize or in money,
would at last have arrived at the public treasury in specie: and would
thus have served to alleviate the burden of those taxes, that are
pressing every branch of her domestic commerce to ruin. And, if Britain
had bestowed the smallest attention on the political government of those
countries, she might have continued to draw from them the abovementioned
tribute sum _in perpetuum_, without any danger of draining or
impoverishing them: nay it is certain, that under a just, equitable and
well ordered government, their commerce and agriculture might have been
extended to a degree, that would have enabled them to afford a still
larger annual tribute to the sovereign. The possession of this Indian
dominion is likewise so particularly secured from domestic and foreign
danger, by the extraordinary submissive disposition of the natives, the
singularly defensible situation of the country, and the naval
superiority of Britain, that, by a very trifling expence of men, and no
pecuniary charge, she might have maintained it against all enemies. So
that Britain might have derived from this dependent dominion resources
sufficient to relieve her from all her difficulties and distresses.
This is what Britain might have done: and this was not simply possible,
it was easy of execution. But if we enquire what Britain hath done, we
shall find that, instead of applying these resources by a proper care
and attention to the purpose, for which it would seem the all-wise
dispensation of Providence had at this critical conjuncture bestowed
them upon her, she hath indolently and desperately thrown them from her,
and left them to the will of blind chance. For surely it may with
propriety be said, that the government of Britain consigned all these
resources to the guidance of blind chance, or rather to certain
destruction, when it scrupulously withheld its own care, and implicitly
confided the sovereign charge of governing and defending this foreign
dominion to a Company of Merchants, so evidently unequal to such a
charge, that, instead of being surprized that these countries should now
at last be impoverished and ruined, we have reason to be astonished,
that they have supported, for such a length of time, the complicated
evils of tyranny and anarchy.
The consequences of committing this sovereign charge to the Company have
been long foreseen, and likewise foretold, by some who were acquainted
with the nature of their government: but the power and influence of
those who were sharing amongst them the plunder of those wretched
countries, blasted the credit of their representations: until at last,
the effects being felt at home, it hath become impossible to totally
suppress the truth. Nay even now, that these men are forced to partly
acknowledge the ruinous situation of this foreign dominion, yet have
they still the assurance to mislead the public judgment, by representing
the Company as the only party concerned in the consequence: though it is
certain, that this Indian concern, which hath been leased or farmed out
by Government to the Company, is of the very highest importance to the
public interest, as having been for many years the principal support of
national opulence and credit, as well as of commerce and revenue. For,
in the article of opulence, the private fortunes acquired in those
countries by the servants of the Company, ever since the time that their
power prevailed over the native government, that is ever since 1757,
hath created an annual influx of specie to Britain of about 700,000 l.
and the dedomagement paid to Government by the Company, since the
assumption of the dewanny in 1765, is a farther influx of 400,000 l. the
drawback on teas is reckoned about 200,000 l. and the Company hath
increased her dividend since the last mentioned period 200,000 l. though
only one half of this last sum may be reckoned to remain in the country,
the other half being paid to foreign proprietors. These four sums,
making together 1,400,000 l. have been yearly drawn from India in
consequence of dominion: and, whether sent from thence in merchandize,
in bills, or in specie, have produced so much money to Britain: and
notwithstanding the private fortunes have been acquired by means that
have exhausted these sources of wealth, that might otherwise have flowed
perpetually into Britain; and the dedomagement may be considered as a
base composition, received for alienating the sovereign rights of the
British crown and nation, and for furnishing a force to support the most
detestable tyranny of a few individuals over fifteen millions of men,
who are to all intents and purposes British subjects; yet did the
opportune importation of so much wealth, serve to support the credit of
the nation under the grievous accumulation of debt contracted in the
last war; and to prevent her feeling the drain of specie made by her
foreign creditors, which otherwise would by this time have completely
exhausted her. By her commerce with those countries, Britain hath
exported yearly 5 or 600,000 l. worth of her own manufactures and
merchandize, and for these she received the commodities of India; which
commodities, being re-exported, formed the most essential article of her
traffic with Africa, on which her West India colonies do entirely
depend; they are likewise the most valuable article of her trade with
America. And the duties levied by Government, on such part of these
Indian commodities as is expended at home, create a very considerable,
and by far the most equitable and convenient branch of revenue.
But the value and importance of this Indian concern will appear in a
still stronger light, if we shall look forward to the consequences that
must naturally and unavoidably ensue to the public interest from the
loss of it. The first and most immediate of these consequences will be
national bankruptcy; or, which is the same thing, a stop to the payment
of interest on the national debt; for a deprivation of that annual
influx of specie from India will quickly produce national poverty; and
an incapacity of paying in specie the interest of the foreign creditors.
But the loss of our Indian commerce will operate this effect still more
speedily; for, on the supposition that the nation shall be deprived of
this branch of commerce, it must necessarily follow, that Government
will lose that branch of revenue which arises from the home consumption
of Indian commodities; and it is plain, that Government cannot then
continue to pay the usual expence, without making good this deficiency
of revenue by additional taxes on land, and the necessaries of life: but
as this additional load, falling on our little remaining commerce, would
by one year’s experience be found insupportable, Government would be
forced to retrench its expence, in that only article that can be
dispensed with, the payment of interest on the national debt; and when
this happens, what advantage will the public creditor hold above the
India proprietor? The only difference will be, that the latter will have
felt his loss a little earlier than the former. But national bankruptcy,
though it may be the first, is not the only, nor even the greatest,
public damage, accruing from a deprivation of this Indian concern: loss
of future credit, of trade and navigation, and consequently of naval
power and defence, will soon follow; and, in this general calamity,
everyone individual of the community will come in for his share, in
proportion to his rank or situation.
Such are the consequences that must ensue to the public interest from a
deprivation of the benefit hitherto derived from this Indian concern:
and if the nation is to suffer so grievously by the loss of this object,
can she allow herself to be persuaded, that she hath no interest in its
preservation. Now this object stands in danger of being lost to the
nation by two different causes; the first being, the neglect or
incapacity of the Company to maintain and defend it from the assault of
enemies: and the other danger arises from the oppression and misconduct
of this Company’s political government; tending to despoil those
countries of their circulating specie, their arts, manufactures,
commerce, and inhabitants, which were the only means that enabled them
to afford this benefit to Britain. The first of these dangers is
scarcely dreamt of, and yet it is perhaps immediately imminent; at
present however we are treating of the danger to be apprehended from the
political cause.
How far the interest of this foreign dominion hath been injured by the
Company’s political misgovernment; or how near it may be reduced to a
state of utter inability to afford any farther benefit to Britain, is
but little known by the public. For though people have heard in the
gross, that affairs in those countries are rather in a bad situation,
yet do not they either understand or believe it to be so very bad as it
really is; or rather they do not comprehend how it should be so bad; as
not being acquainted with the full power of the cause that hath produced
the evil; and every one will form his notion of effects that he neither
feels nor sees, from his knowledge or opinion of the nature and power of
the causes that produced them. In the case before us, people have been
taught to consider the oppression and extortion of its government, (of
which certain instances are quoted) as the sole cause of evil to Bengal:
of consequence it is supposed that Bengal hath suffered no farther
damage from its government, than what may have been caused by some
private acts of extortion, exercised by the few persons vested with the
powers of governing: and, besides that the authenticity of these acts is
denied or disputed, and men who are to judge only from report are apt to
make allowance for the prejudice or passion of the accuser who brings a
charge against individuals; still if all these acts of oppression that
have been narrated should be fully credited; nay, if the hearer should
suppose still more than is represented, yet cannot he conceive or allow
himself to believe that such acts of extortion, exercised by a small
number of individuals, could suffice to reduce the lately rich
commercial kingdom of Bengal to such a deplorable state of misery,
poverty, and distress: the cause assigned will appear too trivial for
the effect; and of course the effect, at least the degree of it, will be
discredited.
But he who means to acquire a just notion of the present state of those
countries, and the extent of damage they have sustained from their
present Government, must fully inform himself of the true nature and
condition of that Government, and the manner of its operation on the
general interest of the people governed; he must learn, not only that
which it hath done, but likewise that which it hath not done; for the
interest of a community may suffer far more detriment from the
nonaction, than from the oppression, of its government. To the end,
therefore, that every one may be enabled to form a proper judgment on
these matters, we mean to present a general view of the nature, and
effects, of the Company’s Government in Bengal.
THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE COMPANY’S GOVERNMENT IN BENGAL.
The English East India company is, under the title of Dewan, the real
and actual sovereign of Bengal, Behar, and Orixa: a dominion equal to
almost any one state in Europe, in respect of either extent and
fertility of country, or numbers of ingenious and industrious subjects;
and exceeding most of them in the internal materials of commerce, or
resources of wealth. The Company executes the government of this
dominion by a deputation, consisting of a Governor and Council; who
reside at Calcutta, the Company’s original presidency, or chief factory
in Bengal. And the Directors, who, as possessing the executive authority
of the Company, may be termed the supreme sovereigns of this Indian
dominion, have preserved to themselves the sole power of immediately
ordering, directing and controuling the government; for this deputed
government communicates its purposes, receives its orders, and accounts
for its conduct to none but the Directors.
But it is evident, that the distance of situation must render the
immediate controul of the Directors perfectly impotent, ineffectual, and
nugatory; for it would be absurd to suppose, that the government of
Bengal should defer the execution of any one purpose until it shall have
communicated with, and received the opinion of the Directors, which
cannot be effected in the space of a whole year; consequently the
directors cannot interfere in the direction, or ordering of this
government, farther than in some few cases of the most general or
invariable nature: but the execution of even these general orders
depends upon the will and discretion of the deputed government; seeing
the Directors cannot, at that distance, enforce it themselves: and the
same cause puts it out of their power to prevent or restrain abuse; so
that they hold neither positive nor negative authority in the immediate
execution of this government. And the condition or situation of these
directorial sovereigns at home, renders their retrospective controul
equally impotent and ineffectual; for they have no power in themselves
to inflict other punishment on their deputies, for the most audacious
disobedience, or for maladministration, than dismission from their
service; and this becomes no punishment, because the delinquents are
previously prepared for it, being ready to set out of their own accord
with a princely fortune for the mother country; where they set the
authority of the Directors at defiance; for there these sovereigns of
India are themselves subjects, and cannot call their quondam ministers
to account, except in an ordinary court of justice; and the difficulty
of obtaining evidence requisite to convict in these courts; the dread of
bringing to light, in the course of a legal process, some abstruse
mysteries of government; and the apprehension of danger arising to the
interest of the present direction from a powerful combination at the
next election, will ever deter the Directors from seriously prosecuting
a lawsuit against their deputies, even in cases of peculation from the
sovereign; but if it respects only the interest of the subject, they
will be more apt to palliate and defend the offence. We must therefore
perceive, that this deputed government acts perfectly independent of
either the immediate controul, or future awe of the sovereign: whilst
the sovereign is compelled to blindly support, with its whole power, the
authority of this government; and, without choice, to enforce all its
measures; seeing that to oppose the will of the deputy, is opposing the
authority of the sovereign.
And, as to the native subjects, the power of this deputed government
over them is perfectly absolute and complete. For the inhabitants of
those countries, being disposed by nature or climate to passive
obedience, and by long custom habituated to despotic authority, and
being farther impressed with a particular awe of Europeans, from a
notion of their natural superiority, implicitly submit to the will of
their present government, without once daring to either examine its
right, dispute its authority, or question its conduct. The subject
therefore holds not the smallest voice in the administration of
government; the jurisdiction, the police, the finances, the military
government and defence, are all incontroulably directed by the Company’s
deputation: and the entire interests of those countries, the lives and
property of the inhabitants, are subjected to its discretion, and depend
on its will.
So that this deputation of the Company executes the government of Bengal
with a power perfectly unlimited by any exterior controul; and if we
consider that it is at the same time foreign to the country governed,
mutable, and of very short duration, we shall find that it is equally
unrestrained by any internal check. It is therefore the most unlimited
government on earth; or rather it is the only government that can, with
propriety, be termed arbitrary and despotic.
For all other deputed governments are sufficiently restrained by the
authority of the sovereign; and we have no idea of despotism, except in
governments that are supreme or sovereign. But the idea of actual
despotism in a supreme government is merely imaginary; seeing that, in
one and all of these governments, the power of governing is conditional,
limited by rule, and subjected to controul both external and internal.
For it is evident, that, in all supreme governments, the power of
governing, and the means that support this power, must needs be derived
from the people governed; and therefore cannot exist in despight of
their consent; and though, in some of these governments, the condition,
upon which this power and these means are granted, is not specially
expressed, yet is it perfectly understood, and invariably enforced in
all of them; inasmuch as there are examples in each, of sovereigns who
have suffered the utmost punishment, for attempting to transgress the
limits of this condition; nay, there is scarce one instance where the
prince, thus transgressing, escaped the resentment of the people; and
examples of this nature are most frequent in these governments that are
falsely termed despotic. These examples must therefore convince all
sovereigns, that there is a power in the people, superior to, and
capable of controuling them; and the sense of this must ever prove an
effectual external controul on the conduct of a supreme government. But
self-interest, that _primum_ and _perpetuum mobile_ of human action,
which we may term an internal check, operates still more forcibly,
constantly, and immediately on the will of a supreme government; not
simply restraining it from doing or permitting injury, but impelling it
to promote the good of the people governed. For a government that is
sovereign, and perpetual (or _durante vita_ and hereditary) cannot
possibly separate its own private interest from that of the community
which it governs; being indeed itself a part of that community: and this
is so evident, that no prince ever attempted to advance a distinct
interest of his own, at the expence of the general weal, who was not a
fool, before he became a tyrant. But a wise sovereign considers his
people as the channel through which alone he can receive substantial
good or evil; and, acting upon this principle, he will, however absolute
and disposed by nature to tyranny, abstain from injuring the general
interest, because he is sensible that such injury will recoil upon
himself; and he will exert himself to promote the prosperity of his
people, as the only means of advancing his own power, grandeur, or
wealth. So that a sovereign prince, who understands his own real
interest, though otherwise void of virtue, will ever study to govern
well; nay, the private vices of such a prince do often operate public
good; a striking instance of which we meet with in our Henry the
Seventh; whose extreme and sordid avarice was the source of English
commerce and wealth; and his mean self-love, and jealousy of power,
established universal liberty.
But the nature of this Bengal government differs, in every circumstance,
from that of a supreme government; being deputed, foreign, mutable, and
temporary, it is no way interested in the lasting prosperity of the
community which it governs; on the contrary, this government holds an
interest which is not only distinct from, but diametrically opposite to
that of the subject. For these Governors return to Europe immediately on
the expiration of their office, which seldom dures above three years,
often less; therefore their sole aim is to amass all the wealth they
can, during the short term of their power, in order to transport it
along with their persons to their own country. But the wealth which a
government amasses, must needs be extorted from the people governed;
consequently self-interest leads this government to pillage and plunder
the subject: and we have seen that it is not restrained, by any external
controul, from advancing its own distinct interest at the expence of the
community which it governs, seeing it is perfectly exempted from all awe
of either the sovereign or the subject; and it cannot be restrained by
any internal check, because it holds no concern in the lasting welfare
of the people.
Such then is the ruling principle of this government: nor are the means
which it employs to promote its own interest less extraordinary than is
its power to enforce them. For this government, which arbitrarily
directs the jurisdiction and police, together with the imposition and
collection of taxes, doth at same time act in the capacity of a
merchant. And this commercial despotism, or despotic power lodged in the
hands of a few foreign merchants, hath, in its nature and consequences,
proved infinitely more destructive to the interest of that commercial
country, than all the operations of political tyranny have been: for
from it sprung these cruel monopolies, which struck at the very root of
manufacture, commerce, and even population.
To attempt describing the particular methods which this government hath
practised to promote its own interest at the expence of the people, in
its double capacity, of an absolute sovereign and a despotic merchant,
would be a tedious, invidious, and even an unprofitable undertaking; for
it is almost impossible to properly delineate the conduct of a tyranny
so various and irregular in its operations; and, to those who are
unacquainted with the modes, customs, and interests of the country in
question, the recital of a few particular instances would only serve to
mislead their judgment, and darken or diminish the truth. By attending
to the general description given of the nature views and interests of
this government, we shall form a more complete and just notion of its
conduct and deportment, than can be acquired from any disjointed account
of particulars. Let us suppose a few foreigners sent into a rich
commercial country, with absolute and unlimited power over the lives and
property of the inhabitants; actuated by no other principle than that of
acquiring riches, and stimulated thereto not only by avarice but
ambition, or the desire of excelling; unrestrained by any species of
present awe or future apprehension; but on the contrary, encouraged by
precedent to expect in their own country, titles, dignity, respect, and
consequence, each in proportion to the sum he imports; and whatever
methods we can suppose would be practised by such foreigners, to
accomplish their purpose, within a short limited term, we may suppose to
have been actually employed by this Bengal government. The enormous
amount of numerous fortunes, imported by the persons employed in this
government, together with the rapidity of acquisition, are circumstances
seen and known in this country; and these will thoroughly warrant our
supposing, that the acquirers have availed themselves to the utmost of
their powers, as well as their opportunities. However, we shall err
greatly in our estimate of the damage caused to those countries, by
their government’s prosecuting its own distinct interest, if we shall
confine the reckoning to only the loss of so much specie, as hath been
extorted and exported by these foreigners: for this, though in itself a
ruinous grievance, is merely trivial, when compared with the havoc and
waste committed on the manufacture, the commerce, agriculture, and
population, by the methods employed to acquire these sums. A herd of
hogs, broke into a well dressed vineyard, will gorge their voracious
maws; but that which they eat and devour doth not destroy the vineyard;
it is their manner of eating, their rutting up, their tearing down, and
trampling under foot.
Hitherto we have regarded this government in only one point of view: we
have seen it acting for itself; but we have not seen the part it acts
for the people, in its capacity of a sovereign ruler, administring the
government of a mighty state in all its different offices or
departments; and entrusted with the care of the whole and entire
interests of a numerous commercial nation. But, in the discharge of this
sovereign trust, we shall find the government of Bengal a mere _Vis
inertiæ_, void of the two efficient principles of action, ability or
power of acting, and will or inclination. For how can we expect to find
the ability, of governing well, in the men employed by the Company to
execute the government of those countries? to attain the knowledge of
any one science or mystery, demands an effort of the mind; but it is
impossible for the brightest natural genius to arrive at even a moderate
degree of skill in the art of governing, which, as it is the most
elevated, so is it the most difficult, abstruse, various and complicated
of all human sciences, without long and intense application, study, and
reflection; and, we may add, a series of practice; and all these
gradations to skill, in governing, are wanting to our Bengal governors.
Their scholastic education extends no farther than to qualify them for
merchants clerks; and, immediately on being taken from school, they are
dispatched to India; where the manner of life is consonant to the
climate, voluptuous to a degree of dissoluteness, vain, idle,
dissipated, and an enemy to study or reflection: the juvenile part of
their life being spent in this manner, they arrive at the charge of
government with minds perfectly uninformed, and so very averse to
application, that they commit and implicitly confide the charge of their
own private concerns to servants. If such men should possess the skill
or address of governing well, it must certainly be acquired
instantaneously and supernaturally; infused into them by miracle, like
the gift of speech into the ass of Balaam.
But the want of will or inclination is an obstacle to their governing
well, still more prevalent than is the want of ability. Labour, fatigue,
and difficulty are evils, to which the human mind is so naturally
averse, that, unless it is urged by some strong impulse of passion, such
as the fear of some superior evil, or the hope and desire of some mighty
good, it will decline and evade them: what stimulum then can be
sufficiently powerful to urge the habitually indolent minds of our
Bengal governors to encounter the difficulties, the labour, and fatigue
attending a due discharge of the duties of government; which, of all
human undertakings, is the most replete with these mental evils? Yet
this government, which demands a stronger stimulum than any other
government that ever yet existed, is in effect urged by no one motive or
consideration to discharge the duties of its office; for, as it holds no
interest in the lasting welfare of the people governed, neither its
hopes nor its fears are at all interested in the good or evil
consequences that may be caused by its own vigilance or neglect: being
altogether superior to the resentment of the subject, and independent of
the sovereign’s authority, it is not impelled, by the fear of immediate
danger, nor the apprehension of future punishment: and as to the
prospect of glory, applause, or respect, which push the generous and
ambitious mind to action, our governors aim to attain them, not by
governing well, but by acquiring and bringing home a mighty fortune to
their own country.
Men thus actuated, or rather unactuated, must, in the discharge of their
sovereign office, be perfectly torpid and listless; the machine of
political government stops in their hands, and stands stock still: their
minds being incapable of application, they withdraw themselves as much
as possible from attention, and leave the trouble of governing to
others, still less qualified than themselves; these inferior agents
being chosen, not for their abilities or virtue, but for their fitness
to serve the private purpose of the governors, otherwise by chance; but
they give themselves no trouble to inspect the conduct of these agents,
who in general are unprincipled miscreants; on the contrary, they
promiscuously approve and support every action; so that, wherever the
power of this government acts, it is only to oppress; and all beside is
left to chance. However, the power of governing, or rather of
oppressing, is not confined to the persons vested with the charge of
government: the numerous servants whom this Company disperses over the
face of the country, for the purpose of carrying on her trade, do each
of them, in his own district, assume the authority of a despot; and
communicates a like authority to all his servants and dependants, who,
it must be allowed, are far more unrelenting than their masters; and
thus tyranny is extended into every corner; oppression becomes general;
and the oppressed are excluded from the very prospect of redress; for,
on appeal to the superior, the plaintiff is ever remanded to the very
oppressor, who punishes him for having dared to complain. And thus
justice and protection are no where to be found; vice goes unpunished,
and innocence unsupported; therefore every man becomes a villain in his
own defence; and faith, confidence, truth, and honesty are banished the
land. In short, it may with strict propriety be said by these wretched
people, _Terras astræa reliquit_; and tyranny and anarchy have here set
up their throne.
And to this inaction or non-exertion of the powers of government we are
to impute the ruin of those countries, rather than to the avarice or
rapine of the persons deputed by the Company to execute that government.
For the power of governing being vested in only a few, the extortion of
these few might have been long supported by a rich commercial country,
provided they had exerted themselves to restrain and prevent all others
from plundering and oppressing. The avarice, profusion and bloody
tyranny of even Nero, and Domitian, was felt by only a few of their
subjects at Rome; every where else the empire flourished; because these
imperial monopolizers of vice would suffer none in power to be wicked
but themselves; they narrowly inspected the conduct of their governors
and officers, and severely punished their injustice or oppression. But
where the government doth not only plunder itself, but suffers every one
under it to plunder, that country must in time be completely ruined.
Now Bengal hath been subjected to a government of this nature for these
fifteen years past; for though we commonly date the commencement of the
Company’s sovereignty from the assumption of the Dewanny, (as it is
termed,) yet hath this Company (at least her deputies) possessed a
really absolute authority in those countries ever since the battle of
Plassey in 1757. That action rendered them masters of Bengal; and it was
equally within their power to assume the sovereign government at that
time, as afterwards in 1765; their own will was the only obstacle: but
notwithstanding they bestowed it on a native Nabob, yet did they retain
an absolute superiority over him, and he governed in a state of perfect
subordination to their authority; for he well knew and experienced, that
the duration of his office, and even of his existence, depended upon
their will; consequently this dependent native government could but
little restrain the conduct of the Company’s deputies, or protect the
subject from their rapacity; and when they, in 1765, set aside this
native government, they only removed a screen which they themselves had
set up, and till then preserved for their own purpose.
How far these countries may have advanced towards the period of final
ruin, under the fifteen or sixteen years domination of such a
government, we shall not pretend to determine, because the term _ruin_
is variously understood. This much is certain, that the unbounded
remittance of specie made, for some years, by the English Company, for
sundry purposes as sovereign; and for a much greater number of years,
and in much larger sums by the other European Companies, who received it
from the servants of the English Company for bills on Europe, at a very
low exchange, and employed it for every purpose in the other parts of
India and China, hath compleatly drained Bengal of its wealth, and
reduced it to a state of the most abject poverty. And the grievous
oppression and rapine exercised by the Company’s servants, and their
numerous dependants; together with the most cruel monopolies usurped by
them over every species of merchandize, and even the necessaries of
life, hath in a great measure suppressed commerce, and abolished trade.
Whilst the insatiable avarice and unrestrained extortion of those
employed in the collection of taxes and revenue having ruined the
farmer, the lands lay uncultivated and waste; insomuch that, not to
mention the immense decrease of revenue, that naturally most fertile of
all countries, Bengal, hath suffered a more severe famine than perhaps
was ever heard of; it being reckoned that a fifth part of the
inhabitants have died of want, and numbers have fled from starving and
oppression.
But it is not difficult to determine how near the interest of Britain in
those countries hath approached to ruin: for Britain is to consider them
as ruined to her purpose, so soon as they shall become incapable of
supporting a commerce beneficial to her; and at same time of yielding
her a consideration, in the nature of tribute, equivalent to the expence
of subjects which she sends out annually to maintain her dominion there.
And that they are nearly, if not totally, ruined to her, in both these
respects, we begin already to feel, in spite of all the art or influence
used to conceal the truth.
For, in the article of tribute, we find that, instead of receiving such
a surplus of revenue as sufficed, at the commencement of the Dewanny, to
not only pay for the specie part of the Company’s investment in Bengal
itself, but to purchase her cargoes, and defray all her charges in the
other parts of India, and in China, the government of Bengal was, two
years ago, reduced to the necessity of borrowing near a million sterling
on bills, which have been transmitted and accepted by the Company: in
like manner hath this government been obliged to borrow last year;
though the bills have been prevented, by an arbitrary stroke of deceit,
from appearing against them in Europe. These borrowed sums have all been
expended in Bengal itself: and if we allow that the whole hath been
employed to pay for the Company’s investment, (though by the by the
specie part of the Company’s investment cannot, at least it ought not,
if she exports the proper quantity of European commodities, exceed half
a million,) it must even then be admitted, that the revenue of Bengal
hath barely sufficed to defray the ordinary expence of government. And,
if so, from whence is the tribute of Bengal, (whether we term it
dedomagement, drawback, or encreased dividend) to arise? not from the
mighty cargoes imported; for they are purchased, not with surplus
revenue, but with borrowed money, which must be repaid either in India
or in Europe: and as to the profits on these cargoes, they will be more
than eat up by the charges of freight, and a long reckoning of India
interest at eight per cent. I am sensible, that this account is
strangely perplexed and embarrassed by intricate calculations of stock
in hand, annual importations, and future sales, &c. but when divested of
all these studied intricacies it will stand simply thus—As is the clear
surplus of revenue received in Bengal, so will be the amount of tribute
received in Britain; the former will ever exactly balance the latter.
But this surplus we find to have been, for the two past years, equal to
nothing; and the amount of tribute received in Britain must amount to
exactly as much; consequently the dedomagement, drawback, and increased
dividend for the two last years is still _in Nubibus_; where the
national part, consisting of the two first articles, is like to remain;
unless it shall be paid out of the Company’s capital stock, as the
encreased dividend hath been. But this revenue, which for the two years
past hath barely sufficed to defray the expence of government, hath not
been kept up even to that extent without the aid of violence: but
violence itself must yield to necessity, and cannot extort that which
doth not exist; moreover the Company had, in these two years, decreased
her military expence, by disbanding some thousand sipahis, and otherwise
diminishing the charge of her remaining force; and the attack made by
Shaw Allum in conjunction with the Mharrattors will, this year, compel
her to re-augment her military expence in every respect; whilst the
predatory incursions of these Mharrhattors will prevent the collection
of revenue; how then will she support the augmented charge of this year,
with a revenue decreased by a variety of causes so much below the degree
of last year? Another loan upon the strength of the capital is the only
resource; but possibly borrowing may, for several reasons, have become
impracticable by this time; and it is certain that troops will not, nay
cannot, serve without pay—Here is a blessed prospect indeed.
But, leaving this to the proof of time, we perceive that, at any rate,
we have lost the prospect of future tribute from Bengal, through the
channel of the Company; we have not so much as the promise of
dedomagement, drawback, or encreased dividend for this current year; and
if we can trust to our own reason, preferably to bankrupt promises, we
may give it up for good and all. Nay, there is mighty reason to
apprehend, that even the private fortunes will soon cease to exist; and
then Britain will cease to receive the sum of 1,400,000 l. sterling,
which for a number of years past hath been annually flowing in to her
from India, in consequence of dominion. And if she could barely support
her burden, when aided by this influx, how will she, when deprived of
it, answer the annual drain of specie made by her foreign creditors?
With respect to the present state of our commerce with those countries,
it is not enquired, and therefore not known, whether the Company exports
the stipulated sum of British commodities or not; and it is still less
known, whether the small quantity she hath exported of late is disposed
of; or whether it remains in her warehouses abroad, to swell up the
account of her stock; thus much however reason tells us, that the
inhabitants of Bengal, who cannot procure the necessaries of life,
millions having died of want, can but little afford to purchase foreign
fopperies or superfluities. Nevertheless we have seen large cargoes of
Indian manufactures imported this very year; but we are not to suppose,
that these cargoes are the produce of willing industry; they are
procured by force and compulsion; the artisan being held to work under
the discipline of task masters, who deprive him of his labour before it
is completed, at a price that will not afford him the means of living.
Of the many markets that for ages had taken off the manufactures of
Bengal, Europe is now the only one remaining; and this one market cannot
be supplied without the application of force. How long force might
supply the place of willing industry, we shall not pretend to determine;
but one year more will discover the united effects of want of artisans,
want of money, and Mharrattor incursions.
And thus have we demonstrated the nature and condition of this Bengal
government, together with the evils it hath caused to the country
governed, not from a recital of disputed facts, but from principles
universally understood and admitted. For every one, the least acquainted
with the Company’s affairs, must know and will allow that the views, the
interests, the powers and opportunities of her deputed government in
Bengal are exactly such as we have described them; and upon this one
undisputed _datum_ we have built our whole demonstration; the truth and
justness of which every man is capable of trying and proving, by the
touchstone of his own reason. For reason, without the aid of
circumstantial proof, can judge whether the line of conduct which we
have assigned to the government of Bengal, is fairly inferred and
deduced from its evident and allowed principle of action: and common
sense, unassisted by demonstration, will point out the effects that such
conduct must operate on the interest of the country governed; and, if we
farther advert to the length of time that this country hath been
subjected to such operation, we shall nearly guess at its present state
and condition.
And we doubt not, that what hath been said will enable every one, who
makes use of his own reason and reflection, to form a proper judgment
for himself on certain points of this East India business, which have
been most grossly misrepresented. For he will thereby discover, that the
object, for which the nation hath to apprehend at present, is not the
“_credit_ of the Company;” which, had she been restrained within her
natural sphere, and her conduct properly inspected by government, could
never have been injured; or, if it had, the breach could (in such case)
have little more affected the general weal, than the failure of any
large trading house; which, so long as the trade remained entire, would
have been immediately replaced by another; but he will perceive, that
the present bad state of the Company’s credit is only an effect, or
consequence, of the ruinous situation of affairs in India; and, of
course, that the object of national apprehension is the ruin or loss of
that mighty and important branch of national interest, which hath been
committed to the charge of the Company, in a manner so complete and
implicit, that the name, as well as the interest of the nation, nay the
very name of the object itself, hath been sunk and lost in that of the
Company: this Company, which is but the temporary farmer, having been,
to all intents and purposes, substituted in the stead of not only the
sovereign proprietor, but even of the farm itself. And it will farther
appear, that the danger which threatens this object is not to be averted
by blindly supporting the credit of the Company: but, on the contrary,
that the nation will, by affording this blind support, only furnish the
means of completing that ruin, which is already so far advanced. To
prevent this danger demands measures of a very different nature: and we
shall proceed to point out these measures; which, had they been applied
in time, would, we humbly conceive, have sufficed to prevent the ruin or
loss of this important concern: and which, if matters are not past
remedy, may yet serve to restore them.
THE TRUE CAUSES OF EVIL AND ABUSE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL, AND THE
MEANS TO REMEDY THEM.
It is a common saying that, the cause of an evil being known, the remedy
is readily discovered; and, upon the strength of this maxim, several,
who think they have hit upon some one cause of evil in the political
government of Bengal, have taken upon them to prescribe a remedy; which
is pronounced an universal panacea, a salve for every sore: but no
sooner have they produced their ware, than the eye hath discovered it to
be mere powder of post; or something equally unavailing.
Few of these prescriptions have at all attracted notice; the proposal
for protecting the liberty of the subject from the despotism of
government, by the institution of native juries, was indeed extremely
well calculated to please British speculation; and therefore, like the
device of hanging the bell about the cat’s neck, it was highly applauded
by those who never adverted to the difference betwixt Britain and
Bengal, in point of general constitution of government and disposition
of the natives. But, for practice, it must appear a mere chimera to such
as consider, on the one hand, that men, who are slaves to their
government and its officers in every other capacity, cannot possibly be
free in that of jurymen; and that juries, if they are not free and
impartial, avail nothing: and, on the other hand, that if the natives
should be actually endowed with the real cap of liberty in the jury
room, there is danger, nay, there is a certainty, that they would make
bold to wear it elsewhere; and then, adieu to the English dominion in
Bengal. In few words, the power of the English government, and the
freedom of native juries, are two things that cannot possibly exist
together in Bengal; the life of the one must unavoidably cause the death
of the other: and, however harsh this doctrine may sound in a freeborn
English ear, the force and truth of it will immediately strike the
politician.
Equally unavailing is that proposal for securing the liberty and
property of the subject, from the oppression and extortion of
government, by granting to the native a perpetual property in land;
without providing him the smallest security for the free possession of
its produce; which, so long as government stands on its present footing,
is liable to be wrested from him so soon as acquired.