Rationalism. It regards all things as accessible to the
researches and to the methods of human science. When Spiritualism
has recognized and proclaimed the essential and necessary facts
which constitute the intellectual and moral being by it styled
man, it halts abruptly; it hesitates also to recognize and
proclaim the mysterious facts in that sanctuary the very door of
which it has reached; it does not resign itself to adore what
lies behind the vail; it is inconsequent and timid, although
respectful and modest.
{266}
Rationalism, on the contrary, is presumptuous and audacious; its
ambition is to see clearly, to touch what is in the center of the
sanctuary, as it sees and touches what is on its outside. Its
pretension is that it may study and know, by its ordinary
processes, as well the invisible world, its Sovereign and its
laws, as the visible world in which man is now placed; and it
wars upon Christianity because Christianity admits no such
pretension. But Christianity here encounters another adversary,
Positivism. Positivism arrests its progress, saying: "I do not
know, nobody knows, if an invisible world be or be not a really
existing thing. It is a mere loss of time to think of it, for
nothing can be known about it with certainty. All religion, all
metaphysics, are chimerical and vain sciences; there is no
science but the science of the physical world, of its facts and
of its laws!"
---------------------------------------
{267}
Fourth Meditation.
Positivism.
I seek no quarrel with words, even when they provoke it.
Positivism is a word, in language a barbarism, in philosophy a
presumption. Unlike Geology, Ideology, Theology, Physics, it
qualifies a doctrine, not by its object, but by its supposed
merit. All science pretends to positiveness--that is, to be
founded upon fact and truth. But "Positivism" alone arrogates to
itself this quality. It is an arrogance, in my opinion, radically
unjustifiable.
I knew its founder, M. Auguste Comte, personally. I had some
communication with him in the period from 1824 to 1830. I then
was struck by the elevation of his sentiments and by the vigor of
his mind.
{268}
In October, 1832, at the moment when I was entering upon my
functions as Minister of Public Instruction, he came to me and
formally demanded that I should create for him in the "College of
France" a professorship of general history for the physical and
mathematical sciences. I see no cause to express myself here
otherwise than I have already done in my "Memoirs" as to the
impression produced upon me by his conversation and his personal
bearing. "He explained to me drearily and confusedly his views
upon man, society, civilization, religion, philosophy, history.
He was a man single-minded, honest, of profound convictions,
devoted to his own ideas, in appearance modest, although at heart
prodigiously vain; he sincerely believed that it was his calling
to open a new era for the mind of man and for human society.
While listening to him, I could hardly refrain from expressing my
astonishment that a mind so vigorous should at the same time be
so narrow as not even to perceive the nature and bearing of the
facts with which he was dealing, and the questions which he was
authoritatively deciding; that a character so disinterested
should not be warned by his own proper sentiments--which were
moral in spite of his system--of its falsity and its negation of
morality.
{269}
I did not even make any attempt at discussion with M. Comte: his
sincerity, his enthusiasm, and the delusion that blinded him,
inspired me with that sad esteem that takes refuge in silence.
Had I even judged it fitting to create the chair which he
demanded, I should not for a moment have dreamed of assigning it
to him." [Footnote 44]
[Footnote 44: "Mémoires pour servir a l'histoire de mon
temps," t. iii, pp. 125-7. In the sixth volume of these
Mémoires I have rectified an error inadvertently committed by
me as to the epoch of my first relations with M. Auguste
Comte.]
{270}
I should have been as silent and still more sad if I had then
known the trials through which M. Auguste Comte had already
passed. He had been, in 1823, a prey to a violent attack of
mental alienation, and in 1827, during a paroxysm of gloomy
melancholy, he had thrown himself from the Pont des Arts into the
Seine, but had been rescued by one of the king's guard. More than
once, in the course of his subsequent life, this mental trouble
seemed upon the point of recurring.
Many will be tempted to demand how a man so little master of
himself, and whose mind was under so little government, could
ever have succeeded in producing a doctrine so considerable, and
in exercising such real influence upon the philosophical world.
The fact is nevertheless beyond question. Whether the cause is to
be referred to the merit of M. Comte and of his doctrine, or to
the state of men's minds at the time, it is certain that not only
in France but in Europe, and particularly in England, numerous
and honorable disciples came over to his ideas, and that
Positivism became a school wanting neither in sincerity nor
credit. When such men as M. Littré, at Paris, and Mr. J. Stuart
Mill, in London, declare themselves his adherents, the doctrine
has claims to a serious examination.
{271}
M. Auguste Comte lived constantly, as far as he was individually
concerned, under the empire of a fixed idea, which occasioned him
many a painful disappointment; and he lived, as far as his system
was concerned, under the empire of a false idea, which associated
with views just in themselves and sometimes grand, one pervading
and permanent error.
His fixed personal idea consisted in his thinking himself called
to regenerate human science and human society by the single
virtue of his doctrine. Besides their share in the
presumptuousness which is the common character of mankind, minds
that are inventive and fond of systematizing are particularly
prone to extend beyond their legitimate bearings--nay, beyond all
bounds--the pretensions and the hopes which their ideas suggest.
M. Auguste Comte was one of the most striking instances, as well
as one of the most honest victims, of this intellectual
intoxication--the noblest although not the least fantastic form
of human pride.
{272}
The Christian religion has its apostles and it has its
missionaries, speaking in the name of a Master other than
themselves, and preaching a faith they did not themselves
originate. M. Auguste Comte was his own proper apostle--the
inventor and missionary of his own proper faith. Of profound
convictions, with no selfish, worldly views, he aspired to the
entire empire of the intellect, believing both the interests of
social order and the honor of the human mind involved in the
triumph of his doctrine; he ardently desired not only its
propagation, but its organization as a permanent and potent
institution, to insure and perpetuate his triumph. The real and
practical government of nations, according to him, was only, as
it ought to be only, a sort of stewardship, charged with the duty
of realizing and carrying into effect the ideas of thinking men.
"The systematic separation of the two elementary forces, the
Spiritual and the Temporal," so he wrote to Mr. J. Stuart Mill,
"constitutes certainly the principal condition for a
_denouement_ of the actual situation.
{273}
I admit that the special requirements of a situation where those
two forces are confounded may authorize, and sometimes oblige,
philosophers, in the interest of a final regeneration, to
participate, by way of exception, in actual political life,
although an inclination for such a life exposes them to the
danger of many a quicksand, and demands that their principles
should be firmly settled, to avoid the risk of a real deviation.
To embody my thought upon this subject in a palpable example
relative to a great occurrence, I blame the philosopher Condorcet
for having suffered himself to be returned as member to our
glorious Convention, in which men of action were leaders, and
properly so, whereas Condorcet could never be so placed as to
regard things from the same point of view; hence that false
position for which in the sequel he had so cruelly to suffer.
{274}
But on the contrary, I should have regarded it as very natural
for him to develop a great activity in the club of the Jacobins;
for, placed beyond the sphere of the government, properly so
called, that club constituted at that time a sort of spiritual
power, in that remarkable and so little comprehended combination
of things which characterized the revolutionary régime. ... I
have learned with much satisfaction," he added, still addressing
Mr. Mill, "that the wise energy of your resistance has succeeded
in triumphing over the blind persistence of your friends who urge
you toward a parliamentary career. I shall propose in my last
volume, and in direct terms, the institution, by individual
efforts, of an European committee, charged permanently with the
direction of a common movement of philosophical regeneration,
when once Positivism shall have planted its standard--that is,
its lighthouse, I should term it--in the midst of the disorder
and confusion that reigns; and I hope that this will be the
result of the publication of my work in its complete state."
[Footnote 45]
[Footnote 45: Letters of the 20th November, 1841, and 4th
March, 1842, published in the work of M. Littré, entitled,
"Auguste Comte and the Positive Philosophy," pp. 424, 425,
427, 429.]
{275}
One can scarcely refrain from a smile when he contemplates these
dreams reduced to the form of system, ignoring every sentiment of
reality, and expounded with the confidence of fanaticism in the
name of a science called Positive. Here it is that we find the
fixed and dominant idea that pervaded and compromised the whole
life of M. Auguste Comte. Whoever did not accept his doctrine and
his system, was for him either a retrogradist full of prejudice,
or an ignoramus without scientific education, or an interested
and jealous enemy. Whoever, on the other hand, lent himself to
his views on any point, or for any time, however short, became in
the eyes of M. Comte his conquest and his property, his
philosophical serf, as it were, bound to his master by the tenure
of duty, and the render of services from which he could never
hope to enfranchise himself, without the risk of being treated
upon the instant as a deserter or a rebel, and of seeing at once
broken the closest and most approved bonds of intimacy and
friendship.
{276}
He had so entire a confidence in his own intellectual
superiority, and in the rights which it conferred, that he
expressed it sometimes with a _näiveté_ amounting almost to
idolatry. One day, believing that he had won over to his ideas M.
Armand Marrast, then the editor of the _National_, he wrote
thus to his wife: "Marrast no longer feels any repugnance in
admitting the indispensable fact of my intellectual superiority;
he is in this respect, in my opinion, especially influenced by
Mill, whom he holds, and with reason, in high account. To speak
plainly and in general terms, I believe that, at the point at
which I have now arrived, I have no occasion to do more than to
continue to exist; the kind of preponderance which I covet
cannot, henceforth, fail to devolve upon me." [Footnote 46]
[Footnote 46: Letter of the 3d December, 1842: "Auguste Comte
et la philosophic positive;" p. 324.]
{277}
Shortly after the date of this letter, M. Comte was separated
from his wife and embroiled with Mr. Mill himself, who had not,
as the former fancied, fulfilled toward him all the duties of an
accepted and loyal disciple.
I pass from the fixed idea of the man to the false idea of his
system; it appears over and over again at each step in the "Cours
de philosophie positive" of M. Auguste Comte, [Footnote 47] and
in the imposing biography consecrated to his memory by his most
accomplished disciple, M. Littré. [Footnote 48]
[Footnote 47: Six volumes 8vo., published in the interval
from 1830 to 1842 inclusive.]
[Footnote 48: Auguste Comte et la philosophic positive. 8vo.
1863.]
I extract from different parts of these volumes the passages in
which the fundamental doctrine is most clearly expressed:
"Positive philosophy is the whole body of human knowledge.
Human knowledge is the result of the study of the forces
belonging to matter, and of the conditions or laws governing
those forces." [Footnote 49]
[Footnote 49: Ibid., p. 42.]
"The fundamental character of positive philosophy is, that it
regards all phenomena as subjected to invariable natural laws,
and considers as absolutely inaccessible to us, and as having
no sense for us, every inquiry into what is termed either
primary or final causes." [Footnote 50]
[Footnote 50: Cours de philosophic positive, by M. Auguste
Comte, vol. i, p. 14.]
{278}
"The scientific path, in which I have, ever since I began to
think, continued to walk, the labors that I obstinately pursue
to elevate social theories to the rank of physical science are
evidently, radically, and absolutely opposed to everything that
has a religious or metaphysical tendency." [Footnote 51]
[Footnote 51: Auguste Comte et la philosophic positive, by M.
Littré, p. 194.]
"My positive philosophy is incompatible with every theological
or metaphysical philosophy, and consequently equally so with
every corresponding system of policy." [Footnote 52]
[Footnote 52: Ibid., p. 210.]
"M. Comte," says M. Littré, "made it a duty to speak in public
without any reticence, to deduce his positive truths, and to
confront them with the conceptions of Theology and of
Metaphysics. . . . 'Religiosity' is in his eyes not only a
weakness, but an avowal of want of power." [Footnote 53]
[Footnote 53: Auguste Comte et la phil. pos., by M. Littré,
pp. 198-255.]
{279}
"The 'positive state' is that state of the mind in which it
conceives that phenomena are governed by constant laws, from
which prayer and adoration can demand nothing, but to which
intelligence and science may address their demands; so that, by
familiarizing himself with those laws more and more, and by
conforming to them more and more, man acquires an ever-growing
empire over nature and over himself, which empire is the sum of
all civilization. The 'theological state,' on the contrary, is
that state of the mind which conceives that phenomena are the
results of volition, or, if the social development has arrived
at Monotheism, that they are the results of a single, all-wise,
and all-powerful will. This providence, essentially collective
where Polytheism is supposed, essentially single in the case of
Monotheism, governs the world, dispenses its good and its evil,
lays its finger upon human events, and regards the destiny of
each individual man.
{280}
Such is the contrast between the two doctrines. ... Profiting
by the instruction of the illustrious De Maistre, our French
priests at last comprehended that ultramontanism was the only
logical consequence deducible from their essential principles.
The more the positive school defines the real character of its
progress, the more must we see this retrograde concentration
also develop itself; which will involve at some later epoch
Deists themselves, as Positivism proceeds to gain complete
ascendancy; an ascendancy, in other respects, far more likely
to be furthered than retarded by such coordination of its
adversaries, for this will tend to give at last to the
struggles of philosophy a decisive character; but the
Positivists will alone succeed in prevailing (at least as far
as speculative doctrines are concerned) over the coalition of
all the philosophical forces of the ancient school, whether
metaphysical or theological." [Footnote 54]
[Footnote 54: Auguste Comte et la phil. pos., by M. Littré,
pp. 370, 434. ]
{281}
M. Comte had even more aversion for Metaphysics than for
Theology. He took particular offense at the contemporary
spiritualistic school, and the scientific psychology of MM.
Royer, Collard, Maine de Biran, Cousin, and Jouffroy.
"In no view," said he, "is there any room for this illusory
psychology; this final transformation of a theology, which men
strive, nowadays, so idly to reanimate; for--without troubling
itself either with the physiological study of our intellectual
organs, or with the observation of those rational processes,
which in effect direct our different scientific
researches--Psychology pretends to arrive at the discovery of
the fundamental laws of the human mind by contemplating that
very mind--that is to say, by making complete abstraction both
of causes and of effects." [Footnote 55]
[Footnote 55: Cours de philosophic positive, by M. Auguste
Comte, vol. i, p. 34.]
{282}
Even while absolutely rejecting Theology, M. Comte treated it
with more esteem than Metaphysics.
"We are," he said, "too disposed, nowadays, to ignore the
immense benefits due to religious influence. The positive
philosophy, however paradoxical it may be to claim for it such
a peculiarity, is virtually the only philosophy capable of
worthily appreciating all the participation of the spirit of
religion in the whole grand development of humanity. Is it not
directly evident that, as by an invincible organic necessity,
moral efforts have almost always to combat to some degree or
other the most energetic impulses of our nature; the
theological spirit was imperatively called upon to furnish to
social discipline that general basis which was quite
indispensable at a time when human foresight, whether of men in
masses or of men as individuals, was certainly far too limited
to offer any sufficient _point d'appui_ to influences
purely rational?"
{283}
... "When the positive philosophy shall have acquired that
character of universality which it is still without, it will be
capable of replacing entirely, with all its native superiority,
that theological philosophy and that metaphysical philosophy of
which this universality is in these days the sole real
peculiarity, and which, deprived of this motive for preference,
will have for our successors nothing but an historical
existence." [Footnote 56]
[Footnote 56: Cours de philosophic positive, by M. Comte,
vol. v, p. 73; vol. i, p. 23.]
I do not pause to notice in how many respects this language is
superficial, confused, and incoherent. I only draw attention to
the fundamental idea which it manifests--matter, the forces of
matter, and its laws; these are the sole objects of human
knowledge, the sole domain of the human mind. Aware of, and
embarrassed by the objections which the idea has from the
beginning of time excited, M. Littré has striven to rid himself
of them by an admission, sincere no doubt, like everything that
he thinks, and everything that he says, but full in its turn of
confusion and incoherence.
{284}
"The positive philosophy," says he, "is at once a system which
comprehends all that is known of the world of man and of
society, and also a general method, containing in itself all
the ways by which men have come to learn all these things. What
is beyond, whether, materially speaking, that space without
limit, or intellectually that concatenation of never-ending
causes, all this is absolutely inaccessible to the human mind.
By inaccessible is not meant null or non-existent. Immensity in
matter, as in intellect, is connected by a close band with what
we know, and it is only by such an alliance that it becomes an
idea positive in itself, and of the same order; what I mean is,
that by so touching and bordering what we know, immensity
appears under the double character of reality and of
inaccessibility. It is an ocean which dashes upon our shores,
and for which we have nor bark nor sail, but the clear vision
of which is as salutary as it is formidable." [Footnote 57]
[Footnote 57: Auguste Comte et la phil. pos., by M. Littré,
p. 519.]
{285}
The vision so admitted by M. Littré is not clear, and neither is
it salutary; but vague, and without result. The imagery does not
destroy the system which it seeks to vail from us. Every
religious belief, every spiritual doctrine, God and the human
soul, are discarded by Positivism, and treated as arbitrary and
transitory hypotheses, which, however they may have conduced to
the development of humanity, ought now to be rejected by human
reason, just as the foot may throw down the ladder which has
enabled it to mount to the summit. To call things by their proper
names, Positivism is Materialism and Atheism, with more or less
explicitness, confidently or hesitatingly, accepted as the last
term of human science, and when hard pressed, taking refuge in
the darkness of skepticism.
What are the foundations upon which Positivism rests? What facts,
what proofs, does M. Auguste Comte adduce in support of his
principles, that matter, its forces, and its laws, constitute the
sole object of human knowledge, the sole domain of the human
mind?
{286}
He appeals to two arguments--the one metaphysical, the other
historical; the one derived from the mind of man itself, the
other from the history of humanity.
I cannot here follow M. Comte in his long and complex explanation
of the two orders of proofs to which he appeals in support of his
system; what I shall say will, I think, suffice to demonstrate
that neither can stand any serious examination.
As a metaphysician--for metaphysician he must permit himself to
be called, since he makes use of metaphysics, whatever his
antipathy for philosophers who bear that name;--as
metaphysician, I repeat, M. Auguste Comte belongs to the
sensualistic school, He thinks with Locke and Condillac, that man
deduces all his ideas and all his knowledge from impressions
received by him from the outer world, and from the reflections
which he makes upon those impressions.
{287}
He takes, therefore, as his starting point, the maxim of that
school which proclaims that "there is nothing in the intelligence
which has not first been in the sense." Nevertheless, whether by
an act of proper and remarkable sagacity, or struck by the reply
of Leibnitz, "unless the intelligence itself," he admits that
sensation does not account for all that passes and develops
itself in the mind of the observer of the external world. "If,"
he says, "on the one side every positive theory must necessarily
be founded upon observation, it is, on the other side, equally
plain that to apply itself to the task of observation, our mind
has need of some 'theory.' If, in contemplating the phenomena, we
do not immediately attach them to certain principles, not only
would it be impossible for us to combine these isolated
observations, so as to draw any fruit therefrom; but we should be
entirely incapable of retaining them, and in most cases the facts
would remain before our eyes unnoticed.
{288}
The need at all times of some 'theory' whereby to associate
facts, combined with the evident impossibility of the human mind
at its origin forming 'theories' out of observations, is a fact
which it is impossible to ignore." [Footnote 58]
[Footnote 58: Cours de philosophic positive, par M. Auguste
Comte, vol. i. p. 8.]
This fact, thus proved by M. Comte himself; this necessary part
of the human mind, indispensable to enable it to acquire
knowledge of the external world; this "theory," anterior to all
observation, which man requires for the purpose himself of
observing, what are they else than those universal and necessary
principles proclaimed by the spiritualistic school, and to which
I recently referred?--principles inherent in the human mind,
which it applies as from its own stores in taking cognizance of
the external world, and by virtue of which, just as one mounts a
river up to its source, man mounts and mounts up to God, and up
to the relations of man with God.
{289}