(about the first week in November) on the expediency of
suspending payments to France, under her present situation.
I had admitted that the late constitution was dissolved by
the dethronement of the King; and the management of affairs
surviving to the National Assembly only, this was not an
integral legislature, and therefore not competent to give a
legitimate discharge for our payments: that I thought
consequently, that none should be made till some legitimate
body came into place; and that I should consider the
National Convention, called, but not met as we had yet
heard, to be a legitimate body. Hamilton doubted whether it
would be a legitimate body, and whether, if the King should
be re-established, he might not disallow such payments on
good grounds. Knox, for once, dared to differ from Hamilton,
and to express, very submissively, an opinion, that a
convention named by the whole body of the nation, would be
competent to do any thing. It ended by agreeing, that I
should write to Gouverneur Morris to suspend payment
generally, till further orders.
November the 19th, 1792. Beckley brings me the pamphlet written by
Hamilton, before the war, in answer to ‘Common Sense.’ It is entitled
‘Plain Truth.’ Melancthon Smith sends it to Beckley, and in his letter
says, it was not printed in New York by Loudon, because prevented by a
mob, and was printed in Philadelphia, and that he has these facts from
Loudon.
November the 21st, 1792. Mr. Butler tells me, that he dined last winter
with Mr. Campbell from Denmark, in company with Hamilton, Lawrence, Dr.
Shippen, T. Shippen, and one other person whom he cannot recollect. That
after dinner political principles became the subject of conversation;
that Hamilton declared openly, that ‘there was no stability, no security
in any kind of government but a monarchy.’ That Lawrence took him
up, and entered the lists of argument against him; that the dispute
continued long, and grew warm, remarkably so as between them; that
Shippen, at length, joined Lawrence in it; and in fine, that it broke up
the company. Butler recommended to the company, that the dispute having
probably gone farther than was intended, it ought to be considered as
confined to the company.
Thursday, December the 27th, 1792. I waited on the President on some
current business. After this was over, he observed to me, that he
thought it was time to endeavor to effect a stricter connection with
France, and that Gouverneur Morris should be written to on this subject.
He went into the circumstances of dissatisfaction between Spain and
Great Britain, and us, and observed, there was no nation on whom we
could rely, at all times, but France; and that, if we did not prepare
in time some support, in the event of rupture with Spain and England,
we might be charged with a criminal negligence. I was much pleased with
the tone of these observations. It was the very doctrine which had been
my polar star, and I did not need the successes of the republican arms
in France, lately announced to us, to bring me to these sentiments.
For it is to be noted, that on Saturday last, (the 22nd) I received Mr.
Short’s letters of October the 9th and 12th, with the Leyden gazettes to
October the 13th, giving us the first news of the retreat of the Duke of
Brunswick, and the capture of Spires and Worms by Custine, and that
of Nice by Anselme. I therefore expressed to the President my cordial
approbation of these ideas; told him, I had meant on that day (as an
opportunity of writing by the British packet would occur immediately) to
take his orders for removing the suspension of payments to France, which
had been imposed by my last letter to Gouverneur Morris, but was meant,
as I supposed, only for the interval between the abolition of the late
constitution by the dethronement of the King, and the meeting of some
other body, invested by the will of the nation with powers to transact
their affairs; that I considered the National Convention, then
assembled, as such a body; and that, therefore, we ought to go on with
the payments to them, or to any government they should establish; that,
however, I had learned last night, that some clause in the bill for
providing reimbursement of the loan made by the bank to the United
States, had given rise to a question before the House of Representatives
yesterday, which might affect these payments; a clause in that bill
proposing, that the money formerly borrowed in Amsterdam, to pay the
French debt, and appropriated by law (1790, August 4th, c. 34. § 2.) to
that purpose, lying dead as was suggested, should be taken to pay the
bank, and the President be authorized to borrow two millions of dollars
more, out of which it should be replaced: and if this should be done,
the removal of our suspension of payments, as I had been about to
propose, would be premature. He expressed his disapprobation of the
clause above mentioned; thought it highly improper in the legislature to
change an appropriation once made, and added, that no one could tell in
what that would end. I concurred, but observed, that on a division of
the House, the ayes for striking out the clause were twenty-seven, the
noes twenty-six; whereon the Speaker gave his vote against striking out,
which divides the House: the clause for the disappropriation remained
of course. I mentioned suspicions, that the whole of this was a trick
to serve the bank under a great existing embarrassment; that the debt to
the bank was to be repaid by instalments; that the first instalment was
of two hundred thousand dollars only, or rather one hundred and sixty
thousand dollars, (because forty thousand of the two hundred thousand
dollars would be the United States’ own dividend of the instalment.) Yet
here were two millions to be paid them at once, and to be taken from a
purpose of gratitude and honor, to which it had been appropriated.
December the 30th, 1792. I took the occasion furnished by Pinckney’s
letter of September the 19th, asking instructions how to conduct himself
as to the French revolution, to lay down the catholic principle of
republicanism, to wit, that every people may establish what form of
government they please, and change it as they please; the will of the
nation being the only thing essential. I was induced to do this, in
order to extract the President’s opinion on the question which divided
Hamilton and myself in the conversation of November, 1792, and the
previous one of the first week of November, on the suspension of
payments to France: and if favorable to mine, to place the principle on
record in the letter-books of my office. I therefore wrote the letter
of December the 30th, to Pinckney, and sent it to the President, and he
returned me his approbation in writing, in his note of the same date,
which see.
February the 7th, 1793. I waited on the President with letters and
papers from Lisbon. After going through these, I told him that I had for
some time suspended speaking with him on the subject of my going out
of office, because I had understood that the bill for intercourse with
foreign nations was likely to be rejected by the Senate, in which case,
the remaining business of the department would be too inconsiderable to
make it worth while to keep it up. But that the bill being now passed, I
was freed from the considerations of propriety which had embarrassed me.
That &c. [nearly in the words of a letter to Mr. T. M. Randolph, of
a few days ago,] and that I should be willing, if he had taken no
arrangements to the contrary, to continue somewhat longer, how long I
could not say, perhaps till summer, perhaps autumn. He said, so far from
taking arrangements on the subject, he had never mentioned to any mortal
the design of retiring which I had expressed to him, till yesterday,
when having heard that I had given up my house, and that it was rented
by another, he thereupon mentioned it to Mr. E. Randolph, and asked him,
as he knew my retirement had been talked of, whether he had heard
any persons suggested in conversation to succeed me. He expressed his
satisfaction at my change of purpose and his apprehensions that my
retirement would be a new source of uneasiness to the public. He
said Governor Lee had that day informed him of the general discontent
prevailing in Virginia, of which he never had had any conception,
much less sound information. That it appeared to him very alarming. He
proceeded to express his earnest wish that Hamilton and myself could
coalesce in the measures of the government, and urged here the general
reasons for it, which he had done to me in two former conversations.
He said he had proposed the same thing to Hamilton, who expressed
his readiness, and he thought our coalition would secure the general
acquiescence of the public. I told him my concurrence was of much less
importance than he seemed to imagine; that I kept myself aloof from all
cabal and correspondence on the subject with the government, and saw and
spoke with as few as I could. That as to a coalition with Mr. Hamilton,
if by that was meant that either was to sacrifice his general system
to the other, it was impossible. We had both, no doubt, formed our
conclusions after the most mature consideration; and principles
conscientiously adopted, could not be given up on either side. My wish
was, to see both Houses of Congress cleansed of all persons interested
in the bank or public stocks: and that a pure legislature being given
us, I should always be ready to acquiesce under their determinations,
even if contrary to my own opinions; for that I subscribe to the
principle, that the will of the majority, honestly expressed, should
give law. I confirmed him in the fact of the great discontents to
the south; that they were grounded on seeing that their judgments
and interests were sacrificed to those of the eastern States on every
occasion, and their belief that it was the effect of a corrupt squadron
of voters in Congress, at the command of the Treasury; and they see that
if the votes of those members who had any interest distinct from,
and contrary to the general interest of their constituents, had been
withdrawn, as in decency and honesty they should have been, the laws
would have been the reverse of what they are on all the great questions.
I instanced the new Assumption carried in the House of Representatives
by the Speaker’s vote. On this subject he made no reply. He explained
his remaining in office to have been the effect of strong solicitations
after he returned here; declaring that he had never mentioned his
purpose of going out but to the Heads of departments and Mr. Madison; he
expressed the extreme wretchedness of his existence while in office,
and went lengthily into the late attacks on him for levees, &c.
and explained to me how he had been led into them by the persons he
consulted at New York; and that if he could but know what the sense of
the public was, he would most cheerfully conform to it.
February the 16th, 1793. E. Randolph tells J. Madison and myself, a
curious fact which he had from Lear. When the President went to New
York, he resisted for three weeks the efforts to introduce levees. At
length he yielded, and left it to Humphreys and some others to settle
the forms. Accordingly, an antechamber and presence-room were provided,
and when those who were to pay their court were assembled, the President
set out, preceded by Humphreys. After passing through the antechamber,
the door of the inner room was thrown open, and Humphreys entered first,
calling out with a loud voice, ‘The President of the United States.’ The
President was so much disconcerted with it, that he did not recover it
the whole time of the levee, and when the company was gone, he said
to Humphreys, ‘Well, you have taken me in once, but, by God, you shall
never take me in a second time.’
There is reason to believe that the rejection of the late additional
Assumption by the Senate was effected by the President through Lear,
operating on Langdon. Beckley knows this.
February the 26th, 1793. Notes on the proceedings of yesterday. [See the
formal opinions given to the President in writing, and signed.]
First question. We were all of opinion that the treaty should proceed
merely to gratify the public opinion, and not from an expectation of
success. I expressed myself strongly, that the event was so unpromising,
that I thought the preparations for a campaign should go on without the
least relaxation, and that a day should be fixed with the commissioners
for the treaty, beyond which they should not permit the treaty to be
protracted, by which day, orders should be given for our forces to enter
into action. The President took up the thing instantly, after I had said
this, and declared he was so much in the opinion that the treaty would
end in nothing, that he then, in the presence of us all, gave orders to
General Knox, not to slacken the preparations for the campaign in the
least, but to exert every nerve in preparing for it. Knox said something
about the ultimate day for continuing the negotiations. I acknowledged
myself not a judge on what day the campaign should begin, but that
whatever it was, that day should terminate the treaty. Knox said he
thought a winter campaign was always the most efficacious against the
Indians. I was of opinion, since Great Britain insisted on furnishing
provisions, that we should offer to repay. Hamilton thought we should
not.
Second question. I considered our right of preemption of the
Indian lands, not as amounting to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or
paramountship whatever, but merely in the nature of a remainder after
the extinguishment of a present right, which gave us no present right
whatever, but of preventing other nations from taking possession, and so
defeating our expectancy; that the Indians had the full, undivided, and
independent sovereignty as long as they chose to keep it, and that this
might be for ever; that as fast as we extend our rights by purchase from
them, so fast we extend the limits of our society, and as soon as a new
portion became encircled within our line, it became a fixed limit of
our society: that the executive, with either or both branches of the
legislature, could not alien any part of our territory; that by the
law of nations it was settled, that the unity and indivisibility of
the society was so fundamental, that it could not be dismembered by the
constituted authorities, except, 1. where all power was delegated to
them (as in the case of despotic governments,) or, 2. where it was
expressly delegated; that neither of these delegations had been made
to our General Government, and, therefore, that it had no right
to dismember or alienate any portion of territory once ultimately
consolidated with us; and that we could no more cede to the Indians
than to the English or Spaniards, as it might, according to acknowledged
principles, remain as irrevocably and eternally with the one as the
other. But I thought, that, as we had a right to sell and settle lands
once comprehended within our lines, so we might forbear to exercise
that right, retaining the property, till circumstances should be more
favorable to the settlement, and this I agreed to do in the present
instance, if necessary for peace.
Hamilton agreed to the doctrine of the law of nations, as laid down in
Europe, but that it was founded on the universality of settlement there;
consequently that no lopping-off of territory could be made without a
lopping-off of citizens, which required their consent; but that the law
of nations for us, must be adapted to the circumstance of our unsettled
country, which he conceived the President and Senate may cede: that
the power of treaty was given to them by the constitution, without
restraining it to particular objects; consequently that it was given in
as plenipotentiary a form as held by any sovereign in any other society.
Randolph was of opinion, there was a difference between a cession to
Indians and to any others, because it only restored the ceded part to
the condition in which it was before we bought it, and consequently,
that we might buy it again hereafter: therefore, he thought the
executive and Senate could cede it. Knox joined in the main opinion. The
President discovered no opinion, but he made some efforts to get us to
join in some terms which could unite us all, and he seemed to direct
those efforts more towards me: but the thing could not be done.
Third question. We agreed in idea as to the line to be drawn; to wit, so
as to retain all lands appropriated, or granted, or reserved.
Fourth question. We all thought, if the Senate should be consulted, and
consequently apprized of our line, it would become known to Hammond, and
we should lose all chance of saving any thing more at the treaty than
our ultimatum.
The President, at this meeting, mentioned the declaration of some
person, in a paper of Fenno, that he would commence an attack on the
character of Dr. Franklin. He said, the theme was to him excessively
disagreeable on other considerations, but most particularly so, as
the party seemed to do it as a means of defending him (the President)
against the late attacks on him: that such a mode of defence would be
peculiarly painful to him, and he wished it could be stopped. Hamilton
and Randolph undertook to speak to Fenno to suppress it, without
mentioning it as the President’s wish. Both observed, that they had
heard this declaration mentioned in many companies, and that it had
excited universal horror and detestation.
The paper in Fenno must lie between two persons, viz. Adams and Izard,
because they are the only persons who could know such facts as are there
promised to be unfolded. Adams is an enemy to both characters, and might
choose this ground as an effectual position to injure both. Izard hated
Franklin with unparalleled bitterness, but humbly adores the President,
because he is in _loco regis_. If the paper proceeds, we shall easily
discover which of these two gentlemen is the champion. In the mean time,
the first paper leads our suspicions more towards Izard than Adams, from
the circumstance of style, and because he is quite booby enough not to
see the injury he would do to the President by such a mode of defence.
February the 28th. Knox, E. Randolph, and myself met at Knox’s, where
Hamilton was also to have met, to consider the time, manner, and place
of the President’s swearing in. Hamilton had been there before, and
had left his opinion with Knox; to wit, that the President should ask
a judge to attend him in his own house to administer the oath, in the
presence of the Heads of departments; which oath should be deposited in
the Secretary of State’s office. I concurred in this opinion. Randolph
was for the President’s going to the Senate chamber to take the oath,
attended by the marshal of the United States, who should then make
proclamation, &c. Knox was for this, and for adding the House of
Representatives to the presence, as they would not yet be departed. Our
individual opinions were written, to be communicated to the President,
out of which he might form one. In the course of our conversation,
Knox, stickling for parade, got into great warmth, and swore that our
government must either be entirely new modeled, or it would be knocked
to pieces in less than ten years; and that, as it is at present, he
would not give a copper for it; that it is the President’s character,
and not the written constitution which keeps it together.
Same day. Conversation with Lear. He expressed the strongest confidence
that republicanism was the universal creed of America, except of a very
few; that a republican administration must of necessity immediately
overbear the contrary faction; said that he had seen with extreme
regret, that a number of gentlemen had for a long time been endeavoring
to instil into the President, that the noise against the administration
of the government was that of a little faction, which would soon be
silent, and which was detested by the people, who were contented and
prosperous: that this very party, however, began to see their error, and
that the sense of America was bursting forth to their conviction.
March the 2nd, 1793. See, in the papers of this date, Mr. Giles’s
resolutions. He and one or two others were sanguine enough to believe,
that the palpableness of these resolutions rendered it impossible the
House could reject them. Those who knew the composition of the House, 1.
of bank directors, 2. holders of bank stock, 3. stock-jobbers, 4. blind
devotees, 5. ignorant persons who did not comprehend them, 6. lazy and
good-humored persons, who comprehended and acknowledged them, yet were
too lazy to examine, or unwilling to pronounce censure; the persons who
knew these characters, foresaw, that the three first descriptions making
one third of the House, the three latter would make one half of the
residue; and of course, that they would be rejected by a majority of
two to one. But they thought, that even this rejection would do good, by
showing the public the desperate and abandoned dispositions with which
their affairs were conducted. The resolutions were proposed, and nothing
spared to present them in the fulness of demonstration. There were not
more than three or four who voted otherwise than had been expected.
March the 30th, 1793. At our meeting at the President’s, February the
25th, in discussing the question, whether we should furnish to France
the three millions of livres desired, Hamilton, in speaking on the
subject, used this expression; ‘When Mr. Genet arrives, whether we
shall receive him or not, will then be a question for discussion’; which
expression I did not recollect till E. Randolph reminded me of it a few
days after. Therefore, on the 20th instant, as the President was shortly
to set out for Mount Vernon, I observed to him, that as Genet might
arrive in his absence, I wished to know beforehand how I should treat
him, whether as a person who would or would not be received. He said, he
could see no ground of doubt, but that he ought to be received. On the
24th, he asked E. Randolph’s opinion on the subject, saying, he had
consulted Colonel Hamilton thereon, who went into lengthy considerations
of doubt and difficulty, and viewing it as a very unfortunate thing,
that the President should have the decision of so critical a point
forced on him; but in conclusion, said, since he was brought into that
situation, he did not see but that he must receive Mr. Genet. Randolph
told the President, he was clear he should be received, and the
President said, he had never had any doubt on the subject in his mind.
Afterwards on the same day, he spoke to me again on it, and said, Mr.
Genet should unquestionably be received; but he thought not with too
much warmth or Cordiality, so only as to be satisfactory to him. I
wondered at first at this restriction: but when Randolph afterwards
communicated to me his conversation of the 24th, I became satisfied it
was a small sacrifice to the opinion of Hamilton.
March the 31st. Mr. Beckley tells me, that the merchants’ bonds for
duties on six months’ credit became due the 1st instant, to a very great
amount; that Hamilton went to the bank on that day, and directed the
bank to discount for those merchants all their bonds at thirty days,
and that he would have the collectors credited for the money at the
treasury. Hence, the treasury lumping its receipts by the month in its
printed accounts, these sums will be considered by the public as only
received on the last day; consequently, the bank makes the month’s
interest out of it. Beckley had this from a merchant, who had a bond
discounted, and who supposes a million of dollars were discounted at the
bank here. Mr. Brown got the same information from another merchant,
who supposed only six hundred thousand dollars discounted here. But they
suppose the same orders went to all the branch banks to a great amount.
Eodem die. Mr. Brown tells me he has it from a merchant here, that
during the last winter, the directors of the bank ordered the freest
discounts. Every man could obtain it. Money being so flush, the six per
cents run up to twenty-one and twenty-two shillings. Then the directors
sold out their private stocks. When the discounted notes were becoming
due, they stopped discounts, and not a dollar was to be had. This
reduced six per cents to eighteen shillings and three pence; then the
same directors bought in again.