had all considered, and were of one mind, first, that the House was
an inquest, and therefore might institute inquiries. Secondly, that it
might call for papers generally. Thirdly, that the executive ought to
communicate such papers as the public good would permit, and ought
to refuse those, the disclosure of which would injure the public:
consequently were to exercise a discretion. Fourthly, that neither the
committee nor House had a right to call on the Head of a department, who
and whose papers were under the President alone; but that the committee
should instruct their chairman to move the House to address the
President. We had principally consulted the proceedings of the Commons
in the case of Sir Robert Walpole, 13 Chandler’s Debates. For the first
point, seepages 161, 170, 172,183, 187,207; for the second, pages 153,
173,207; for the third, 81, 173, Appendix, page 44; for the fourth, page
246. Note: Hamilton agreed with us in all these points, except as to the
power of the House to call on Heads of departments. He observed, that
as to his department, the act constituting it had made it subject to
Congress, in some points, but he thought himself not so far subject, as
to be obliged to produce all the papers they might call for. They might
demand secrets of a very mischievous nature. [Here I thought he began
to fear they would go to examining how far their own members and other
persons in the government had been dabbling in stocks, banks, &c. and
that he probably would choose in this case to deny their power; and,
in short, he endeavored to place himself subject to the House, when
the executive should propose what he did not like, and subject to the
executive, when the House should propose any thing disagreeable.]
I observed here a difference between the British parliament and our
Congress; that the former was a legislature, an inquest, and a council
(S. C. page 91.) for the King. The latter was, by the constitution, a
legislature and an inquest, but not a council. Finally agreed, to speak
separately to the members of the committee, and bring them by persuasion
into the right channel. It was agreed in this case, that there was not
a paper which might not be properly produced; that copies only should be
sent, with an assurance, that if they should desire it, a clerk should
attend with the originals to be verified by themselves. The committee
were Fitzsimmons, Steele, Mercer, Clarke, Sedgwick, Giles, and Vining.
April the 9th, 1792. The President had wished to redeem our captives at
Algiers, and to make a peace with them on paying an annual tribute. The
Senate were willing to approve this, but unwilling to have the lower
House applied to previously to furnish the money; they wished the
President to take the money from the treasury, or open a loan for it.
They thought that to consult the Representatives on one occasion,
would give them a handle always to claim it, and would let them into a
participation of the power of making treaties, which the constitution
had given exclusively to the President and Senate. They said, too, that
if the particular sum was noted by the Representatives, it would not be
a secret. The President had no confidence in the secrecy of the Senate,
and did not choose to take money from the treasury or to borrow. But he
agreed he would enter into provisional treaties with the Algerines,
not to be binding on us till ratified here. I prepared questions for
consultation with the Senate, and added, that the Senate were to be
apprized, that on the return of the provisional treaty, and after they
should advise the ratification, he would not have the seal put to it
till the two Houses should vote the money. He asked me, if the treaty
stipulating a sum and ratified by him, with the advice of the Senate,
would not be good under the constitution, and obligatory on the
Representatives to furnish the money. I answered, it certainly would,
and that it would be the duty of the Representatives to raise the money;
but that they might decline to do what was their duty, and I thought it
might be incautious to commit himself by a ratification with a foreign
nation, where he might be left in the lurch in the execution: it was
possible too, to conceive a treaty, which it would not be their duty
to provide for. He said that he did not like throwing too much into
democratic hands, that if they would not do what the constitution called
on them to do, the government would be at an end, and must then assume
another form. He stopped here; and I kept silence to see whether
he would say any thing more in the same line, or add any qualifying
expression to soften what he had said: but he did neither. I had
observed, that wherever the agency of either, or both Houses would be
requisite subsequent to a treaty, to carry it into effect, it would be
prudent to consult them previously, if the occasion admitted. That thus
it was, we were in the habit of consulting the Senate previously, when
the occasion permitted, because their subsequent ratification would be
necessary. That there was the same reason for consulting the lower House
previously, where they were to be called on afterwards, and especially
in the case of money, as they held the purse-strings, and would be
jealous of them. However, he desired me to strike out the intimation
that the seal would not be put till both Houses should have voted the
money.
April the 6th. The President called on me before breakfast, and first
introduced some other matter, then fell on the representation bill,
which he had now in his possession for the tenth day. I had before given
him my opinion in writing, that the method of apportionment was contrary
to the constitution. He agreed that it was contrary to the common
understanding of that instrument, and to what was understood at the time
by the makers of it: that, yet it would bear the construction which the
bill put, and he observed that the vote for and against the bill was
perfectly geographical, a northern against a southern vote, and he
feared he should be thought to be taking side with a southern party. I
admitted the motive of delicacy, but that it should not induce him to
do wrong: urged the dangers to which the scramble for the fractionary
members would always lead. He here expressed his fear that there would,
ere long, be a separation of the Union; that the public mind seemed
dissatisfied and tending to this. He went home, sent for Randolph, the
Attorney General, desired him to get Mr. Madison immediately and come
to me, and if we three concurred in opinion that he should negative the
bill, he desired to hear nothing more about it, but that we would draw
the instrument for him to sign. They came. Our minds had been before
made up.
We drew the instrument. Randolph carried it to him, and told him we
all concurred in it. He walked with him to the door, and as if he still
wished to get off, he said, ‘And you say you approve of this yourself.’
‘Yes, Sir,’ says Randolph, ‘I do upon my honor.’ He sent it to the House
of Representatives instantly. A few of the hottest friends of the bill
expressed passion, but the majority were satisfied, and both in and
out of doors it gave pleasure to have, at length, an instance of the
negative being exercised.
Written this the 9th of April.
July the 10th, 1792. My letter of ---- to the President, directed to him
at Mount Vernon, had not found him there, but came to him here. He told
me of this, and that he would take an occasion of speaking with me on
the subject. He did so this day. He began by observing that he had put
it off from day to day, because the subject was painful; to wit, his
remaining in office, which that letter solicited. He said that the
declaration he had made when he quitted his military command, of never
again entering into public life, was sincere. That, however, when he was
called on to come forward to set the present government in motion,
it appeared to him that circumstances were so changed as to justify a
change in his resolution: he was made to believe that in two years all
would be well in motion, and he might retire. At the end of two years
he found some things still to be done. At the end of the third year, he
thought it was not worth while to disturb the course of things, as
in one year more his office would expire, and he was decided then to
retire. Now he was told there would still be danger in it. Certainly,
if he thought so, he would conquer his longing for retirement. But he
feared it would be said his former professions of retirement had been
mere affectation, and that he was like other men, when once in office
he could not quit it. He was sensible, too, of a decay of his hearing,
perhaps his other faculties might fall off and he not be sensible of it.
That with respect to the existing causes of uneasiness, he thought there
we’re suspicions against a particular party, which had been carried a
great deal too far: there might be desires, but he did not believe there
were designs to change the form of government into a monarchy: that
there might be a few who wished it in the higher walks of life,
particularly in the great cities; but that the main body of the people
in the eastern States were as steadily for republicanism as in the
southern. That the pieces lately published, and particularly in
Freneau’s paper, seemed to have in view the exciting opposition to
the government. That this had taken place in Pennsylvania as to the
excise-law, according to information he had received from General Hand.
That they tended to produce a separation of the Union, the most dreadful
of all calamities, and that whatever tended to produce anarchy, tended,
of course, to produce a resort to monarchical government. He considered
those papers as attacking him directly, for he must be a fool indeed to
swallow the little sugar-plumbs here and there thrown out to him. That
in condemning the administration of the government, they condemned
him, for if they thought there were measures pursued contrary to his
sentiments, they must conceive him too careless to attend to them, or
too stupid to understand them. That though, indeed, he had signed many
acts which he did not approve in all their parts, yet he had never put
his name to one which he did not think, on the whole, was eligible. That
as to the bank, which had been an act of so much complaint, until there
was some infallible criterion of reason, a difference of opinion must be
tolerated. He did not believe the discontents extended far from the seat
of government. He had seen and spoken with many people in Maryland and
Virginia in his late journey. He found the people contented and
happy. He wished, however, to be better informed on this head. If the
discontents were more extensive than he supposed, it might be, that the
desire that he should remain in the government was not general.
My observations to him tended principally to enforce the topics of my
letter. I will not, therefore, repeat them, except where they produced
observations from him. I said, that the two great complaints were, that
the national debt was unnecessarily increased, and that it had furnished
the means of corrupting both branches of the legislature; that he must
know, and every body knew, there was a considerable squadron in both,
whose votes were devoted to the paper and stock-jobbing interest, that
the names of a weighty number were known, and several others suspected
on good grounds. That on examining the votes of these men, they would
be found uniformly for every Treasury measure, and that as most of these
measures had been carried by small majorities, they were carried by
these very votes. That, therefore, it was a cause of just uneasiness,
when we saw a legislature legislating for their own interests, in
opposition to those of the people. He said not a word on the corruption
of the legislature, but took up the other point, defended the
Assumption, and argued that it had not increased the debt, for that all
of it was honest debt. He justified the excise-law, as one of the best
laws which could be passed, as nobody would pay the tax who did not
choose to do it. With respect to the increase of the debt by the
Assumption, I observed to him, that what was meant and objected to was,
that it increased the debt of the General Government, and carried
it beyond the possibility of payment. That if the balances had been
settled, and the debtor States directed to pay their deficiencies to
the creditor States, they would have done it easily, and by resources of
taxation in their power, and acceptable to the people; by a direct tax
in the south, and an excise in the north. Still, he said, it would
be paid by the people. Finding him decided, I avoided entering into
argument with him on those points.
Bladensburg, October the 1st, 1792. This morning, at Mount Vernon, I
had the following conversation with the President. He opened it by
expressing his regret at the resolution in which I appeared so fixed, in
the letter I had written him, of retiring from public affairs. He said,
that he should be extremely sorry that I should do it, as long as he
was in office, and that he could not see where he should find another
character to fill my office. That as yet, he was quite undecided whether
to retire in March or not. His inclinations led him strongly to do it.
Nobody disliked more the ceremonies of his office, and he had not the
least taste or gratification in the execution of its functions. That he
was happy at home alone, and that his presence there was now peculiarly
called for by the situation of Major Washington, whom he thought
irrecoverable, and should he get well, he would remove into another
part of the country, which might better agree with him. That he did not
believe his presence necessary; that there were other characters who
would do the business as well or better. Still, however, if his aid was
thought necessary to save the cause to which he had devoted his life
principally, he would make the sacrifice of a longer continuance. That
he therefore reserved himself for future decision, as his declaration
would be in time if made a month before the day of election. He had
desired Mr. Lear to find out from conversation, without appearing to
make the inquiry, whether any other person would be desired by any
body. He had informed him, he judged from conversations that it was
the universal desire he should continue, and he believed that those
who expressed a doubt of his continuance, did it in the language of
apprehension, and not of desire. But this, says he, is only from the
north; it may be very different in the south. I thought this meant as
an opening to me to say what was the sentiment in the south, from which
quarter I came. I told him, that as far as I knew, there was but one
voice there, which was for his continuance. That as to myself, I had
ever preferred the pursuits of private life to those of public,
which had nothing in them agreeable to me. I explained to him the
circumstances of the war which had first called me into public life, and
those following the war, which had called me from a retirement on which
I had determined. That I had constantly kept my eye on my own home,
and could no longer refrain from returning to it. As to himself, his
presence was important; that he was the only man in the United States
who possessed the confidence of the whole; that government was founded
in opinion and confidence, and that the longer he remained, the stronger
would become the habits of the people in submitting to the government,
and in thinking it a thing to be maintained; that there was no other
person, who would be thought any thing more than the head of a party. He
then expressed his concern at the difference which he found to subsist
between the Secretary of the Treasury and myself, of which he said he
had not been aware. He knew, indeed, that there was a marked difference
in our political sentiments, but he had never suspected it had gone so
far in producing a personal difference, and he wished he could be the
mediator to put an end to it. That he thought it important to preserve
the check of my opinions in the administration, in order to keep things
in their proper channel, and prevent them from going too far. That as
to the idea of transforming this government into a monarchy, he did
not believe there were ten men in the United States whose opinions were
worth attention, who entertained such a thought. I told him there were
many more than he imagined. I recalled to his memory a dispute at
his own table, a little before we left Philadelphia, between General
Schuyler on one side and Pinckney and myself on the other, wherein the
former maintained the position, that hereditary descent was as likely to
produce good magistrates as election. I told him, that though the
people were sound, there were a numerous sect who had monarchy in
contemplation; that the Secretary of the Treasury was one of these. That
I had heard him say that this constitution was a shilly-shally thing, of
mere milk and water, which could not last, and was only good as a step
to something better. That when we reflected, that he had endeavored in
the convention, to make an English constitution of it, and when failing
in that, we saw all his measures tending to bring it to the same thing,
it was natural for us to be jealous; and particularly, when we saw that
these measures had established corruption in the legislature, where
there was a squadron devoted to the nod of the Treasury, doing whatever
he had directed, and ready to do what he should direct. That if the
equilibrium of the three great bodies, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, could be preserved, if the legislature could be kept
independent, I should never fear the result of such a government;
but that I could not but be uneasy, when I saw that the executive had
swallowed up the legislative branch. He said, that as to that interested
spirit in the legislature, it was what could not be avoided in any
government, unless we were to exclude particular descriptions of men,
such as the holders of the funds, from all office. I told him, there was
great difference between the little accidental schemes of self-interest,
which would take place in every body of men, and influence their votes,
and a regular system for forming a corps of interested persons, who
should be steadily at the orders of the Treasury. He touched on the
merits of the funding system, observed there was a difference of opinion
about it, some thinking it very bad, others very good; that experience
was the only criterion of right which he knew, and this alone would
decide which opinion was right. That for himself, he had seen our
affairs desperate and our credit lost, and that this was in a sudden and
extraordinary degree raised to the highest pitch. I told him, all that
was ever necessary to establish our credit, was an efficient government
and an honest one, declaring it would sacredly pay our debts, laying
taxes for this purpose, and applying them to it. I avoided going further
into the subject. He finished by another exhortation to me not to decide
too positively on retirement, and here we were called to breakfast.
October the 31st, 1792. I had sent to the President, Viar and Jaudenes’s
letter of the 29th instant, whereupon he desired a consultation of
Hamilton, Knox, E. Randolph, and myself, on these points. 1. What notice
was to be taken hereof to Spain. 2. Whether it should make part of the
communication to the legislature. I delivered my opinion, that it ought
to be communicated to both Houses, because the communications intended
to be made, being to bring on the question, whether they would declare
war against any, and which of the nations or parts of the nations of
Indians to the south, it would be proper this information should be
before them, that they might know how far such a declaration would lead
them. There might be some who would be for war against the Indians, if
it were to stop there, but who would not be for it, if it were to lead
to a war against Spain. I thought it should be laid before both Houses,
because it concerned the question of declaring war, which was the
function equally of both Houses. I thought a simple acknowledgment of
the receipt of the letter should be made by me to the Spanish Charges,
expressing that it contained some things very unexpected to us, but that
we should refer the whole, as they had proposed, to the negotiators
at Madrid. This would secure to us a continuation of the suspension
of Indian hostilities, which the Governor of New Orleans said he had
brought about till the result of the negotiation at Madrid should be
known; would not commit us as to running or not running the line, or
imply any admission of doubt about our tentorial right; and would avoid
a rupture with Spain, which was much to be desired, while we had similar
points to discuss with Great Britain. Hamilton declared himself the
advocate for peace. War would derange our affairs greatly; throw us
back many years in the march towards prosperity; be difficult for us to
pursue, our countrymen not being disposed to become soldiers; a part
of the Union feeling no interest in the war, would with difficulty be
brought to exert itself; and we had no navy. He was for every thing
which would procrastinate the event. A year, even, was a great gain to a
nation strengthening as we were. It laid open to us, too, the chapter
of accidents, which in the present state of Europe, was a very pregnant
one. That while, however, he was for delaying the event of war, he had
no doubt it was to take place between us for the object in question:
that jealousy and perseverance were remarkable features in the character
of the Spanish government, with respect to their American possessions;
that so far from receding as to their claims against us, they had
been strengthening themselves in them. He had no doubt the present
communication was by authority from the court. Under this impression
he thought we should be looking forward to the day of rupture, and
preparing for it. That if we were unequal to the contest ourselves, it
behoved us to provide allies for our aid. That in this view, but two
nations could be named, France and England. France was too intimately
connected with Spain in other points, and of too great mutual value,
ever to separate for us. Her affairs too, were such, that whatever
issue they had, she could not be in a situation to make a respectable
mediation for us. England alone, then, remained. It would not be easy to
effect it with her; however, he was for trying it, and for sounding them
on the proposition of a defensive treaty of alliance. The inducements to
such a treaty, on their part, might be, 1. The desire of breaking up our
former connections, which we knew they had long wished. 2. A continuance
of the statu quo in commerce for ten years, which he believed would
be desirable to them. 3. An admission to some navigable part of the
Mississippi, by some line drawn from the Lake of the Woods to such
navigable part. He had not, he said, examined the map to see how such
a line might be run, so as not to make too great a sacrifice. The
navigation of the Mississippi being a joint possession, we might
then take measures in concert for the joint security of it. He was,
therefore, for immediately sounding them on this subject through our
minister at London; yet so as to keep ourselves unengaged as long as
possible, in hopes a favorable issue with Spain might be otherwise
effected. But he was for sounding immediately, and for not letting slip
an opportunity of securing our object.
E. Randolph concurred, in general, with me. He objected that such a
reliance could not be effected without pecuniary consideration probably,
which he could not give. And what was to be their aid? If men, our
citizens would see their armies get foothold in the United States, with
great jealousy; it would be difficult to protect them. Even the French,
during the distresses of the late war, excited some jealous sentiments,
Hamilton said, money was often but not always demanded, and the aid he
should propose to stipulate would be in ships. Knox _non dissentiente_.
The President said the remedy would be worse than the disease, and
stated some of the disagreeable circumstances which would attend our
making such overtures.
November, 1792. Hamilton called on me to speak about our furnishing
supplies to the French colony of St. Domingo. He expressed his opinion,
that we ought to be cautious, and not go too far in our application
of money to their use, lest it should not be recognised by the mother
country. He did not even think that some kinds of government they
might establish could give a sufficient sanction.* I observed, that the
National Convention was now met, and would certainly establish a form
of government; that as we had recognised the former government because
established by authority of the nation, so we must recognise any other
which should be established by the authority of the nation. He said we
had recognised the former, because it contained an important member of
the ancient, to wit, the King, and wore the appearance of his consent;
but if, in any future form, they should omit the King, he did not know
that we could with safety recognise it, or pay money to its order.