room, and I unfolded my plan for the post-office, and after such
an approbation of it as he usually permitted himself on the first
presentment of any idea, and desiring me to commit it to writing, he,
during that pause of conversation which follows a business closed, said,
in an affectionate tone, that he had felt much concern at an expression
which dropped from me yesterday, and which marked my intention of
retiring when he should. That as to himself, many motives obliged him to
it. He had, through the whole course of the war, and most particularly
at the close of it, uniformly declared his resolution to retire from
public affairs, and never to act in any public office; that he had
retired under that firm resolution: that the government however, which
had been formed, being found evidently too inefficacious, and it being
supposed that his aid was of some consequence towards bringing the
people to consent to one of sufficient efficacy for their own good, he
consented to come into the convention, and on the same motive, after
much pressing, to take a part in the new government, and get it under
way. That were he to continue longer, it might give room to say, that
having tasted the sweets of office, he could not do without them: that
he really felt himself growing old, his bodily health less firm, his
memory, always bad, becoming worse, and perhaps the other faculties of
his mind showing a decay to others of which he was insensible himself;
that this apprehension particularly oppressed him: that he found,
moreover, his activity lessened, business therefore more irksome,
and tranquillity and retirement become an irresistible passion. That,
however he felt himself obliged, for these reasons, to retire from the
government, yet he should consider it as unfortunate, if that should
bring on the retirement of the great officers of the government,
and that this might produce a shock on the public mind of dangerous
consequence.
I told him that no man had ever had less desire of entering into public
offices than myself; that the circumstance of a perilous war, which
brought every thing into danger, and called for all the services
which every citizen could render, had induced me to undertake the
administration of the government of Virginia; that I had both before
and after refused repeated appointments of Congress to go abroad in that
sort of office, which, if I had consulted my own gratification, would
always have been the most agreeable to me; that at the end of two
years, I resigned the government of Virginia, and retired with a firm
resolution never more to appear in public life; that a domestic loss,
however, happened, and made me fancy that absence and a change of
scene for a time might be expedient for me; that I therefore accepted
a foreign appointment, limited to two years; that at the close of that,
Doctor Franklin having left France, I was appointed to supply his place,
which I had accepted, and though I continued in it three or four years,
it was under the constant idea of remaining only a year or two longer;
that the revolution in France coming on, I had so interested myself
in the event of that, that when obliged to bring my family home, I had
still an idea of returning and awaiting the close of that, to fix the
era of my final retirement; that on my arrival here I found he had
appointed me to my present office; that he knew I had not come into
it without some reluctance; that it was, on my part, a sacrifice of
inclination to the opinion that I might be more serviceable here than
in France, and with a firm resolution in my mind, to indulge my constant
wish for retirement at no very distant day; that when, therefore, I had
received his letter, written from Mount Vernon, on his way to Carolina
and Georgia (April the 1st, 1791), and discovered, from an expression
in that, that he meant to retire from the government ere long, and as to
the precise epoch there could be no doubt, my mind was immediately made
up, to make that the epoch of my own retirement from those labors of
which I was heartily tired. That, however, I did not believe there was
any idea in either of my brethren in the administration of retiring;
that on the contrary, I had perceived at a late meeting of the trustees
of the sinking fund, that the Secretary of the Treasury had developed
the plan he intended to pursue, and that it embraced years in its view.
He said, that he considered the Treasury department as a much more
limited one, going only to the single object of revenue, while that
of the Secretary of State, embracing nearly all the objects of
administration, was much more important, and the retirement of the
officer therefore, would be more noticed: that though the government had
set out with a pretty general good will of the public, yet that symptoms
of dissatisfaction had lately shown themselves far beyond what he could
have expected, and to what height these might arise, in case of too
great a change in the administration, could not be foreseen.
I told him that in my opinion, there was only a single source of these
discontents. Though they had indeed appeared to spread themselves over
the War department also, yet I considered that as an overflowing only
from their real channel, which would never have taken place, if they
had not first been generated in another department, to wit, that of
the Treasury. That a system had there been contrived, for deluging the
States with paper-money instead of gold and silver, for withdrawing our
citizens from the pursuits of commerce, manufactures, buildings, and
other branches of useful industry, to occupy themselves and their
capitals in a species of gambling, destructive of morality, and which
had introduced its poison into the government itself. That it was a
fact, as certainly known as that he and I were then conversing, that
particular members of the legislature, while those laws were on the
carpet, had feathered their nests with paper, had then voted for the
laws, and constantly since lent all the energy of their talents, and
instrumentality of their offices, to the establishment and enlargement
of this system; that they had chained it about our necks for a great
length of time, and in order to keep the game in their hands, had, from
time to time, aided in making such legislative constructions of the
constitution, as made it a very different thing from what the people
thought they had submitted to; that they had now brought forward a
proposition far beyond every one ever yet advanced, and to which the
eyes of many were turned, as the decision which was to let us know,
whether we live under a limited or an unlimited government. He asked
me to what proposition I alluded; I answered, to that in the report
on manufactures, which, under color of giving bounties for the
encouragement of particular manufactures, meant to establish the
doctrine, that the power given by the constitution to collect taxes to
provide for the general welfare of the United States, permitted Congress
to take every thing under their management which they should deem for
the public welfare, and which is susceptible of the application of
money; consequently, that the subsequent enumeration of their powers
was not the description to which resort must be had, and did not at all
constitute the limits of their authority: that this was a very different
question from that of the bank, which was thought an incident to an
enumerated power: that, therefore, this decision was expected with
great anxiety; that, indeed, I hoped the proposition would be rejected,
believing there was a majority in both Houses against it, and that if it
should be, it would be considered as a proof that things were returning
into their true channel: and that, at any rate, I looked forward to the
broad representation which would shortly take place, for keeping the
general constitution on its true ground; and that this would remove a
great deal of the discontent which had shown itself. The conversation
ended with this last topic. It is here stated nearly as much at length
as it really was; the expressions preserved where I could recollect
them, and their substance always faithfully stated.
Th: Jefferson.
March 1, 1792.
On the 2nd of January, 1792, Messrs. Fitzsimmons and Gerry (among
others) dined with me. These two staid, with a Mr. Learned of
Connecticut, after the company was gone. We got on the subject of
references by the legislature to the Heads of departments, considering
their mischief in every direction. Gerry and Fitzsimmons clearly opposed
to them.
Two days afterwards (January the 4th), Mr. Bourne from Rhode Island
presented a memorial from his State, complaining of inequality in the
Assumption, and moved to refer it to the Secretary of the Treasury.
Fitzsimmons, Gerry, and others opposed it; but it was carried.
January the 19th. Fitzsimmons moved, that the President of the United
States be requested to direct the Secretary of the Treasury, to lay
before the House information to enable the legislature to judge of
the additional revenue necessary on the increase of the military
establishment. The House, on debate, struck out the words, ‘President of
the United States.’
March the 7th. The subject resumed. An animated debate took place on the
tendency of references to the Heads of departments; and it seemed that
a great majority would be against it: the House adjourned. Treasury
greatly alarmed, and much industry supposed to be used before next
morning, when it was brought on again, and debated through the day, and
on the question, the Treasury carried it by thirty-one to twenty-seven:
but deeply wounded, since it was seen that all Pennsylvania, except
Jacobs, voted against the reference; that Tucker of South Carolina voted
for it, and Sumpter absented himself, debauched for the moment only,
because of the connection of the question with a further assumption
which South Carolina favored; but showing that they never were to be
counted on among the Treasury votes.
Some others absented themselves. Gerry changed sides. On the whole, it
showed that Treasury influence was tottering. Committed to writing this
10th of March, 1792.
March the 11th, 1792. Consulted verbally by the President, on whom a
committee of the Senate (Izard, Morris, and King) are to wait to-morrow
morning, to know whether he will think it proper to redeem our Algerine
captives, and make a treaty with the Algerines, on the single vote of
the Senate, without taking that of the Representatives.
My opinions run on the following heads.
We must go to Algiers with cash in our hands. Where shall we get it? By
loan? By converting money now in the treasury?
Probably a loan might be obtained on the President’s authority: but as
this could not be repaid without a subsequent act of legislature,
the Representatives might refuse it. So if money in the treasury be
converted, they may refuse to sanction it.
The subsequent approbation of the Senate being necessary to validate a
treaty, they expect to be consulted beforehand, if the case admits.
So the subsequent act of the Representatives being necessary where money
is given, why should not they expect to be consulted in like manner,
when the case admits? A treaty is a law of the land. But prudence will
point out this difference to be attended to in making them; viz. where
a treaty contains such articles only as will go into execution of
themselves, or be carried into execution by the judges, they may be
safely made; but where there are articles which require a law to be
passed afterwards by the legislature, great caution is requisite.
For example; the consular convention with France required a very small
legislative regulation. This convention was unanimously ratified by the
Senate. Yet the same identical men threw by the law to enforce it at
the last session, and the Representatives at this session have placed it
among the laws which they may take up or not, at their own convenience,
as if that was a higher motive than the public faith.
Therefore, against hazarding this transaction without the sanction of
both Houses.
The President concurred. The Senate express the motive for this
proposition, to be a fear that the Representatives would not keep the
secret. He has no opinion of the secrecy of the Senate. In this very
case, Mr. Izard made the communication to him, sitting next to him at
table, on one hand, while a lady (Mrs. McLane) was on his other hand,
and the French minister next to her; and as Mr. Izard got on with his
communication, his voice kept rising, and his stutter bolting the words
out loudly at intervals, so that the minister might hear if he would. He
said he had a great mind at one time to have got up, in order to put a
stop to Mr. Izard.
March the 11th, 1792. Mr. Sterret tells me that sitting round a fire the
other day with four or five others, Mr. Smith (of South Carolina) was
one. Somebody mentioned that the murderers of Hogeboom, sheriff of
Columbia county, New York, were acquitted. ‘Ay,’ says Smith, ‘this is
what comes of your damned trial by jury.’
1791. Towards the latter end of November, Hamilton had drawn Ternant
into a conversation on the subject of the treaty of commerce recommended
by the National Assembly of France to be negotiated with us, and, as
he had no ready instructions on the subject, he led him into a proposal
that Ternant should take the thing up as a volunteer with me, that we
should arrange conditions, and let them go for confirmation or refusal.
Hamilton communicated this to the President, who came into it, and
proposed it to me. I disapproved of it, observing, that such a volunteer
project would be binding on us, and not them; that it would enable them
to find out how far we would go, and avail themselves of it. However,
the President thought it worth trying, and I acquiesced. I prepared a
plan of treaty for exchanging the privileges of native subjects, and
fixing all duties for ever as they now stood. Hamilton did not like this
way of fixing the duties, because, he said, many articles here would
bear to be raised, and therefore, he would prepare a tariff. He did so,
raising duties for the French, from twenty-five to fifty per cent. So
they were to give us the privileges of native subjects, and we, as a
compensation, were to make them pay higher duties. Hamilton, having made
his arrangements with Hammond to pretend that though he had no powers to
conclude a treaty of commerce, yet his general commission authorized him
to enter into the discussion of one, then proposed to the President at
one of our meetings, that the business should be taken up with Hammond
in the same informal way. I now discovered the trap which he had laid,
by first getting the President into the step with Ternant. I opposed
the thing warmly. Hamilton observed, if we did it with Ternant we should
also with Hammond. The President thought this reasonable. I desired him
to recollect, I had been against it with Ternant, and only acquiesced
under his opinion. So the matter went off as to both. His scheme
evidently was, to get us engaged first with Ternant, merely that he
might have a pretext to engage us on the same ground with Hammond,
taking care, at the same time, by an extravagant tariff, to render
it impossible we should come to any conclusion with Ternant: probably
meaning, at the same time, to propose terms so favorable to Great
Britain, as would attach us to that country by treaty. On one of those
occasions he asserted, that our commerce with Great Britain and her
colonies was put on a much more favorable footing than with France and
her colonies. I therefore prepared the tabular comparative view of the
footing-of our commerce with those nations, which see among my papers.
See also my project of a treaty and Hamilton’s tariff. Committed to
writing March the 11th, 1792.
It was observable, that whenever, at any of our consultations, any
thing was proposed as to Great Britain, Hamilton had constantly ready
something which Mr. Hammond had communicated to him, which suited the
subject and proved the intimacy of their communications; insomuch, that
I believe he communicated to Hammond all our views, and knew from
him, in return, the views of the British court. Many evidences of this
occurred; I will state some. I delivered to the President my report of
instructions for Carmichael and Short, on the subject of navigation,
boundary, and commerce, and desired him to submit it to Hamilton.
Hamilton made several just criticisms on different parts of it. But
where I asserted that the United States had no right to alienate an inch
of the territory of any State, he attacked and denied the doctrine.
See my report, his note, and my answer. A few days after came to hand
Kirkland’s letter, informing us that the British, at Niagara, expected
to run a new line between themselves and us; and the reports of Pond
and Stedman, informing us it was understood at Niagara, that Captain
Stevenson had been sent here by Simcoe to settle that plan with Hammond.
Hence Hamilton’s attack of the principle I had laid down, in order to
prepare the way for this new line. See minute of March the 9th. Another
proof. At one of our consultations, about the last of December, I
mentioned that I wished to give in my report on commerce, in which I
could not avoid recommending a commercial retaliation against Great
Britain. Hamilton opposed it violently: and among other arguments,
observed, that it was of more importance to us to have the posts than to
commence a commercial war; that this, and this alone, would free us from
the expense of the Indian wars; that it would therefore be the height
of imprudence in us, while treating for the surrender of the posts, to
engage in any thing which would irritate them; that if we did so, they
would naturally say, ‘These people mean war; let us therefore hold what
we have in our hands.’ This argument, struck me forcibly, and I
said, ‘If there is a hope of obtaining the posts, I agree it would
be imprudent to risk that hope by a commercial retaliation. I will,
therefore, wait till Mr. Hammond gives me in his assignment of breaches,
and if that gives a glimmering of hope that they mean to surrender the
posts, I will not give in my report till the next session.’ Now, Hammond
had received my assignment of breaches on the 15th of December, and
about the 22nd or 23rd had made me an apology for not having been able
to send me his counter-assignment of breaches; but in terms which showed
I might expect it in a few days. From the moment it escaped my lips
in the presence of Hamilton, that I would not give in my report till I
should see Hammond’s counter-complaint, and judge if there was a hope
of the posts, Hammond never said a word to me on any occasion, as to the
time he should be ready. At length the President got out of patience,
and insisted I should jog him. This I did on the 21st of February, at
the President’s assembly: he immediately promised I should have it in a
few days, and accordingly, on the 5th of March I received it.
Written March the 11th, 1792.
March the 12th, 1792. Sent for by the President, and desired to bring
the letter he had signed to the King of France. Went. He said the House
of Representatives had, on Saturday, taken up the communication he had
made of the King’s letter to him, and come to a vote in their own name;
that he did not expect this when he sent this message and the letter,
otherwise he would have sent the message without the letter, as I had
proposed. That he apprehended the legislature would be endeavoring
to invade the executive. I told him, I had understood the House had
resolved to request him to join their congratulations to his on the
completion and acceptance of the constitution; on which part of the
vote, there were only two dissentients (Barnwell and Benson); that
the vote was thirty-five to sixteen on the part which expressed an
approbation of the wisdom of the constitution; that in the letter he had
signed, I had avoided saying a word in approbation of the constitution,
not knowing whether the King, in his heart, approved it. ‘Why, indeed,’
says he,’ I begin to doubt very much of the affairs of France; there are
papers from London as late as the 10th of January, which represent them
as going into confusion. He read over the letter he had signed,
found there was not a word which could commit his judgment about the
constitution, and gave it to me back again. This is one of many proofs
I have had, of his want of confidence in the event of the French
revolution. The fact is, that Gouverneur Morris, a highflying monarchy
man, shutting his eyes and his faith to every fact against his
wishes, and believing every thing he desires to be true, has kept the
President’s mind constantly poisoned with his forebodings. That the
President wishes the revolution may be established, I believe from
several indications. I remember, when I received the news of the King’s
flight and capture, I first told him of it at his assembly. I never saw
him so much dejected by any event in my life. He expressed clearly, on
this occasion, his disapprobation of the legislature referring things to
the Heads of departments.
Written March the 12th.
Eodem die. Ten o’clock, A. M. The preceding was about nine o’clock. The
President now sends Lear to me, to ask what answer he shall give to
the committee, and particularly, whether he shall add to it, that, ‘in
making the communication, it was not his expectation that the House
should give any answer.’ I told Mr. Lear, that I thought the House had
a right, independently of legislation, to express sentiments on other
subjects. That when these subjects did not belong to any other branch
particularly, they would publish them by their own authority; that in
the present case, which respected a foreign nation, the President being
the organ of our nation with other nations, the House would satisfy
their duty, if, instead of a direct communication, they should pass
their sentiments through the President: that if expressing a sentiment
were really an invasion of the executive power, it was so faint a one,
that it would be difficult to demonstrate it to the public, and to a
public partial to the French revolution, and not disposed to considered
the approbation of it from any quarter is improper. That the Senate,
indeed, had given many indications of their wish to invade the executive
power: the Representatives had done it in one case, which was indeed
mischievous and alarming; that of giving orders to the Heads of the
executive departments, without consulting the President; but that the
late vote for directing the Secretary of the Treasury to report ways and
means, though carried, was carried by so small a majority, and with the
aid of members so notoriously under local influence on that question,
as to give a hope that the practice would be arrested, and the
constitutional course be taken up, of asking the President to have
information laid before them. But that in the present instance, it was
so far from being clearly an invasion of the executive, and would be
so little approved by the general voice, that I could not advise the
President to express any dissatisfaction at the vote of the House; and I
gave Lear, in writing, what I thought should be his answers. See it.
March the 31st. A meeting at the President’s; present, Thomas Jefferson,
Alexander Hamilton, Henry Knox, and Edmund Randolph. The subject was
the resolution of the House of Representatives, of March the 27th, to
appoint a committee to inquire into the causes of the failure of the
late expedition under Major General St. Clair, with the power to call
for such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist
their inquiries. The committee had written to Knox for the original
letters, instructions, &tc. The President had called us to consult,
merely because it was the first example, and he wished that so far as
it should become a precedent, it should be rightly conducted. He neither
acknowledged nor denied, nor even doubted the propriety of what the
House were doing, for he had not thought upon it, nor was acquainted
with subjects of this kind: he could readily conceive there might be
papers of so secret a nature, as that they ought not to be given up. We
were not prepared, and wished time to think and inquire.