question is confined to citizens of a State who are temporarily in
another State without taking up their residence there. It gives them
no political rights in the State, as to voting or holding office, or
in any other respect. For a citizen of one State has no right to
participate in the government of another. But if he ranks as a citizen
in the State to which he belongs, within the meaning of the
Constitution of the United States, then, whenever he goes into another
State, the Constitution clothes him, as to the rights of person, with
all the privileges and immunities which belong to citizens of the
State. And if persons of the African race are citizens of a State, and
of the United States, they would be entitled to all of these
privileges and immunities in every State, and the State could not
restrict them; for they would hold these privileges and immunities
under the paramount authority of the Federal Government, and its
courts would be bound to maintain and enforce them, the Constitution
and laws of the State to the contrary notwithstanding. And if the
States could limit or restrict them, or place the party in an inferior
grade, this clause of the Constitution would be unmeaning, and could
have no operation; and would give no rights to the citizen when in
another State. He would have none but what the State itself chose to
allow him. This is evidently not the construction or meaning of the
clause in question. It guaranties rights to the citizen, and the State
cannot withhold them. And these rights are of a character and would
lead to consequences which make it absolutely certain that the African
race were not included under the name of citizens of a State, and were
not in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution when these
privileges and immunities were provided for the protection of the
citizen in other States.
The case of Legrand _v._ Darnall (2 Peters, 664) has been referred to
for the purpose of showing that this court has decided that the
descendant of a slave may sue as a citizen in a court of the United
States; but the case itself shows that the question did not arise and
could not have arisen in the case.
It appears from the report, that Darnall was born in Maryland, and was
the son of a white man by one of his slaves, and his father executed
certain instruments to manumit him, and devised to him some landed
property in the State. This property Darnall afterwards sold to
Legrand, the appellant, who gave his notes for the purchase-money. But
becoming afterwards apprehensive that the appellee had not been
emancipated according to the laws of Maryland, he refused to pay the
notes until he could be better satisfied as to Darnall's right to
convey. Darnall, in the mean time, had taken up his residence in
Pennsylvania, and brought suit on the notes, and recovered judgment in
the Circuit Court for the district of Maryland.
The whole proceeding, as appears by the report, was an amicable one;
Legrand being perfectly willing to pay the money, if he could obtain a
title, and Darnall not wishing him to pay unless he could make him a
good one. In point of fact, the whole proceeding was under the
direction of the counsel who argued the case for the appellee, who was
the mutual friend of the parties, and confided in by both of them, and
whose only object was to have the rights of both parties established
by judicial decision in the most speedy and least expensive manner.
Legrand, therefore, raised no objection to the jurisdiction of the
court in the suit at law, because he was himself anxious to obtain the
judgment of the court upon his title. Consequently, there was nothing
in the record before the court to show that Darnall was of African
descent, and the usual judgment and award of execution was entered.
And Legrand thereupon filed his bill on the equity side of the Circuit
Court, stating that Darnall was born a slave, and had not been legally
emancipated, and could not therefore take the land devised to him, nor
make Legrand a good title; and praying an injunction to restrain
Darnall from proceeding to execution on the judgment, which was
granted. Darnall answered, averring in his answer that he was a free
man, and capable of conveying a good title. Testimony was taken on
this point, and at the hearing the Circuit Court was of opinion that
Darnall was a free man and his title good, and dissolved the
injunction and dismissed the bill; and that decree was affirmed here,
upon the appeal of Legrand.
Now, it is difficult to imagine how any question about the citizenship
of Darnall, or his right to sue in that character, can be supposed to
have arisen or been decided in that case. The fact that he was of
African descent was first brought before the court upon the bill in
equity. The suit at law had then passed into judgment and award of
execution, and the Circuit Court, as a court of law, had no longer any
authority over it. It was a valid and legal judgment, which the court
that rendered it had not the power to reverse or set aside. And unless
it had jurisdiction as a court of equity to restrain him from using
its process as a court of law, Darnall, if he thought proper, would
have been at liberty to proceed on his judgment, and compel the
payment of the money, although the allegations in the bill were true,
and he was incapable of making a title. No other court could have
enjoined him, for certainly no State equity court could interfere in
that way with the judgment of a Circuit Court of the United States.
But the Circuit Court as a court of equity certainly had equity
jurisdiction over its own judgment as a court of law, without regard
to the character of the parties; and had not only the right, but it
was its duty--no matter who were the parties in the judgment--to
prevent them from proceeding to enforce it by execution, if the court
was satisfied that the money was not justly and equitably due. The
ability of Darnall to convey did not depend upon his citizenship, but
upon his title to freedom. And if he was free, he could hold and
convey property, by the laws of Maryland, although he was not a
citizen. But if he was by law still a slave, he could not. It was
therefore the duty of the court, sitting as a court of equity in the
latter case, to prevent him from using its process, as a court of
common law, to compel the payment of the purchase-money, when it was
evident that the purchaser must lose the land. But if he was free, and
could make a title, it was equally the duty of the court not to suffer
Legrand to keep the land, and refuse the payment of the money, upon
the ground that Darnall was incapable of suing or being sued as a
citizen in a court of the United States. The character or citizenship
of the parties had no connection with the question of jurisdiction,
and the matter in dispute had no relation to the citizenship of
Darnall. Nor is such a question alluded to in the opinion of the
court.
Besides, we are by no means prepared to say that there are not many
cases, civil as well as criminal, in which a Circuit Court of the
United States may exercise jurisdiction, although one of the African
race is a party; that broad question is not before the court. The
question with which we are now dealing is, whether a person of the
African race can be a citizen of the United States, and become thereby
entitled to a special privilege, by virtue of his title to that
character, and which, under the Constitution, no one but a citizen can
claim. It is manifest that the case of Legrand and Darnall has no
bearing on that question, and can have no application to the case now
before the court.
This case, however, strikingly illustrates the consequences that would
follow the construction of the Constitution which would give the power
contended for to a State. It would in effect give it also to an
individual. For if the father of young Darnall had manumitted him in
his lifetime, and sent him to reside in a State which recognised him
as a citizen, he might have visited and sojourned in Maryland when he
pleased, and as long as he pleased, as a citizen of the United States;
and the State officers and tribunals would be compelled, by the
paramount authority of the Constitution, to receive him and treat him
as one of its citizens, exempt from the laws and police of the State
in relation to a person of that description, and allow him to enjoy
all the rights and privileges of citizenship, without respect to the
laws of Maryland, although such laws were deemed by it absolutely
essential to its own safety.
The only two provisions which point to them and include them, treat
them as property, and make it the duty of the Government to protect
it; no other power, in relation to this race, is to be found in the
Constitution; and as it is a Government of special delegated powers,
no authority beyond these two provisions can be constitutionally
exercised. The Government of the United States had no right to
interfere for any other purpose but that of protecting the rights of
the owner, leaving it altogether with the several States to deal with
this race, whether emancipated or not, as each State may think
justice, humanity, and the interests and safety of society, require.
The States evidently intended to reserve this power exclusively to
themselves.
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or
feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized
nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give
to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their
favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was framed
and adopted. Such an argument would be altogether inadmissible in any
tribunal called on to interpret it. If any of its provisions are
deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by
which it may be amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be
construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption. It is
not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the
same powers to the Government, and reserves and secures the same
rights and privileges to the citizen; and as long as it continues to
exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but
with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from
the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people
of the United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate
the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of
the popular opinion or passion of the day. This court was not created
by the Constitution for such purposes. Higher and graver trusts have
been confided to it, and it must not falter in the path of duty.
What the construction was at that time, we think can hardly admit of
doubt. We have the language of the Declaration of Independence and of
the Articles of Confederation, in addition to the plain words of the
Constitution itself; we have the legislation of the different States,
before, about the time, and since, the Constitution was adopted; we
have the legislation of Congress, from the time of its adoption to a
recent period; and we have the constant and uniform action of the
Executive Department, all concurring together, and leading to the same
result. And if anything in relation to the construction of the
Constitution can be regarded as settled, it is that which we now give
to the word "citizen" and the word "people."
And upon a full and careful consideration of the subject, the court
is of opinion, that, upon the facts stated in the plea in abatement,
Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the
Constitution of the United States, and not entitled as such to sue in
its courts; and, consequently, that the Circuit Court had no
jurisdiction of the case, and that the judgment on the plea in
abatement is erroneous.
We are aware that doubts are entertained by some of the members of the
court, whether the plea in abatement is legally before the court upon
this writ of error; but if that plea is regarded as waived, or out of
the case upon any other ground, yet the question as to the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is presented on the face of the bill
of exception itself, taken by the plaintiff at the trial; for he
admits that he and his wife were born slaves, but endeavors to make
out his title to freedom and citizenship by showing that they were
taken by their owner to certain places, hereinafter mentioned, where
slavery could not by law exist, and that they thereby became free, and
upon their return to Missouri became citizens of that State.
Now, if the removal of which he speaks did not give them their
freedom, then by his own admission he is still a slave; and whatever
opinions may be entertained in favor of the citizenship of a free
person of the African race, no one supposes that a slave is a citizen
of the State or of the United States. If, therefore, the acts done by
his owner did not make them free persons, he is still a slave, and
certainly incapable of suing in the character of a citizen.
The principle of law is too well settled to be disputed, that a court
can give no judgment for either party, where it has no jurisdiction;
and if, upon the showing of Scott himself, it appeared that he was
still a slave, the case ought to have been dismissed, and the judgment
against him and in favor of the defendant for costs, is, like that on
the plea in abatement, erroneous, and the suit ought to have been
dismissed by the Circuit Court for want of jurisdiction in that court.
But, before we proceed to examine this part of the case, it may be
proper to notice an objection taken to the judicial authority of this
court to decide it; and it has been said, that as this court has
decided against the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court on the plea in
abatement, it has no right to examine any question presented by the
exception; and that anything it may say upon that part of the case
will be extra-judicial, and mere obiter dicta.
This is a manifest mistake; there can be no doubt as to the
jurisdiction of this court to revise the judgment of a Circuit Court,
and to reverse it for any error apparent on the record, whether it be
the error of giving judgment in a case over which it had no
jurisdiction, or any other material error; and this, too, whether
there is a plea in abatement or not.
The objection appears to have arisen from confounding writs of error
to a State court, with writs of error to a Circuit Court of the United
States. Undoubtedly, upon a writ of error to a State court, unless the
record shows a case that gives jurisdiction, the case must be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction in _this court_. And if it is
dismissed on that ground, we have no right to examine and decide upon
any question presented by the bill of exceptions, or any other part of
the record. But writs of error to a State court, and to a Circuit
Court of the United States, are regulated by different laws, and stand
upon entirely different principles. And in a writ of error to a
Circuit Court of the United States, the whole record is before this
court for examination and decision; and if the sum in controversy is
large enough to give jurisdiction, it is not only the right, but it is
the judicial duty of the court, to examine the whole case as presented
by the record; and if it appears upon its face that any material error
or errors have been committed by the court below, it is the duty of
this court to reverse the judgment, and remand the case. And certainly
an error in passing a judgment upon the merits in favor of either
party, in a case which it was not authorized to try, and over which it
had no jurisdiction, is as grave an error as a court can commit.
The plea in abatement is not a plea to the jurisdiction of this court,
but to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. And it appears by the
record before us, that the Circuit Court committed an error, in
deciding that it had jurisdiction, upon the facts in the case,
admitted by the pleadings. It is the duty of the appellate tribunal to
correct this error; but that could not be done by dismissing the case
for want of jurisdiction here--for that would leave the erroneous
judgment in full force, and the injured party without remedy. And the
appellate court therefore exercises the power for which alone
appellate courts are constituted, by reversing the judgment of the
court below for this error. It exercises its proper and appropriate
jurisdiction over the judgment and proceedings of the Circuit Court,
as they appear upon the record brought up by the writ of error.
The correction of one error in the court below does not deprive the
appellate court of the power of examining further into the record, and
correcting any other material errors which may have been committed by
the inferior court. There is certainly no rule of law--nor any
practice--nor any decision of a court--which even questions this
power in the appellate tribunal. On the contrary, it is the daily
practice of this court, and of all appellate courts where they reverse
the judgment of an inferior court for error, to correct by its
opinions whatever errors may appear on the record material to the
case; and they have always held it to be their duty to do so where the
silence of the court might lead to misconstruction or future
controversy, and the point has been relied on by either side, and
argued before the court.
In the case before us, we have already decided that the Circuit Court
erred in deciding that it had jurisdiction upon the facts admitted by
the pleadings. And it appears that, in the further progress of the
case, it acted upon the erroneous principle it had decided on the
pleadings, and gave judgment for the defendant, where, upon the facts
admitted in the exception, it had no jurisdiction.
We are at a loss to understand upon what principle of law, applicable
to appellate jurisdiction, it can be supposed that this court has not
judicial authority to correct the last-mentioned error, because they
had before corrected the former; or by what process of reasoning it
can be made out, that the error of an inferior court in actually
pronouncing judgment for one of the parties, in a case in which it had
no jurisdiction, cannot be looked into or corrected by this court,
because we have decided a similar question presented in the pleadings.
The last point is distinctly presented by the facts contained in the
plaintiff's own bill of exceptions, which he himself brings here by
this writ of error. It was the point which chiefly occupied the
attention of the counsel on both sides in the argument--and the
judgment which this court must render upon both errors is precisely
the same. It must, in each of them, exercise jurisdiction over the
judgment, and reverse it for the errors committed by the court below;
and issue a mandate to the Circuit Court to conform its judgment to
the opinion pronounced by this court, by dismissing the case for want
of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court. This is the constant and
invariable practice of this court, where it reverses a judgment for
want of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court.
It can scarcely be necessary to pursue such a question further. The
want of jurisdiction in the court below may appear on the record
without any plea in abatement. This is familiarly the case where a
court of chancery has exercised jurisdiction in a case where the
plaintiff had a plain and adequate remedy at law, and it so appears by
the transcript when brought here by appeal. So also where it appears
that a court of admiralty has exercised jurisdiction in a case
belonging exclusively to a court of common law. In these cases there
is no plea in abatement. And for the same reason, and upon the same
principles, where the defect of jurisdiction is patent on the record,
this court is bound to reverse the judgment, although the defendant
has not pleaded in abatement to the jurisdiction of the inferior
court.
The cases of Jackson _v._ Ashton and of Capron _v._ Van Noorden, to
which we have referred in a previous part of this opinion, are
directly in point. In the last-mentioned case, Capron brought an
action against Van Noorden in a Circuit Court of the United States,
without showing, by the usual averments of citizenship, that the court
had jurisdiction. There was no plea in abatement put in, and the
parties went to trial upon the merits. The court gave judgment in
favor of the defendant with costs. The plaintiff thereupon brought his
writ of error, and this court reversed the judgment given in favor of
the defendant, and remanded the case with directions to dismiss it,
because it did not appear by the transcript that the Circuit Court had
jurisdiction.
The case before us still more strongly imposes upon this court the
duty of examining whether the court below has not committed an error,
in taking jurisdiction and giving a judgment for costs in favor of the
defendant; for in Capron _v._ Van Noorden the judgment was reversed,
because it did _not appear_ that the parties were citizens of
different States. They might or might not be. But in this case it
_does appear_ that the plaintiff was born a slave; and if the facts
upon which he relies have not made him free, then it appears
affirmatively on the record that he is not a citizen, and consequently
his suit against Sandford was not a suit between citizens of different
States, and the court had no authority to pass any judgment between
the parties. The suit ought, in this view of it, to have been
dismissed by the Circuit Court, and its judgment in favor of Sandford
is erroneous, and must be reversed.
It is true that the result either way, by dismissal or by a judgment
for the defendant, makes very little, if any, difference in a
pecuniary or personal point of view to either party. But the fact that
the result would be very nearly the same to the parties in either form
of judgment would not justify this court in sanctioning an error in
the judgment which is patent on the record, and which, if sanctioned,
might be drawn into precedent, and lead to serious mischief and
injustice in some future suit.
We proceed, therefore, to inquire whether the facts relied on by the
plaintiff entitled him to his freedom.
The case, as he himself states it, on the record brought here by his
writ of error, is this:
The plaintiff was a negro slave, belonging to Dr. Emerson, who was a
surgeon in the army of the United States. In the year 1834, he took
the plaintiff from the State of Missouri to the military post at Rock
Island, in the State of Illinois, and held him there as a slave until
the month of April or May, 1836. At the time last mentioned, said Dr.
Emerson removed the plaintiff from said military post at Rock Island
to the military post at Fort Snelling, situate on the west bank of the
Mississippi river, in the Territory known as Upper Louisiana, acquired
by the United States of France, and situate north of the latitude of
thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north, and north of the State of
Missouri. Said Dr. Emerson held the plaintiff in slavery at said Fort
Snelling, from said last-mentioned date until the year 1838.
In the year 1835, Harriet, who is named in the second count of the
plaintiff's declaration, was the negro slave of Major Taliaferro, who
belonged to the army of the United States. In that year, 1835, said
Major Taliaferro took said Harriet to said Fort Snelling, a military
post, situated as hereinbefore stated, and kept her there as a slave
until the year 1836, and then sold and delivered her as a slave, at
said Fort Snelling, unto the said Dr. Emerson hereinbefore named. Said
Dr. Emerson held said Harriet in slavery at said Fort Snelling until
the year 1838.
In the year 1836, the plaintiff and Harriet intermarried, at Fort
Snelling, with the consent of Dr. Emerson, who then claimed to be
their master and owner. Eliza and Lizzie, named in the third count of
the plaintiff's declaration, are the fruit of that marriage. Eliza is
about fourteen years old, and was born on board the steamboat Gipsey,
north of the north line of the State of Missouri, and upon the river
Mississippi. Lizzie is about seven years old, and was born in the
State of Missouri, at the military post called Jefferson Barracks.
In the year 1838, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff and said
Harriet, and their said daughter Eliza, from said Fort Snelling to the
State of Missouri, where they have ever since resided.
Before the commencement of this suit, said Dr. Emerson sold and
conveyed the plaintiff, and Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, to the
defendant, as slaves, and the defendant has ever since claimed to hold
them, and each of them, as slaves.
In considering this part of the controversy, two questions arise: 1.
Was he, together with his family, free in Missouri by reason of the
stay in the territory of the United States hereinbefore mentioned?
And 2. If they were not, is Scott himself free by reason of his
removal to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, as stated in the
above admissions?
We proceed to examine the first question.