GERMAN TANK OPERATIONS
In spite of the fact that throughout the war the Germans never had at
their disposal more than some fifteen tanks of their own manufacture
and some twenty-five captured and repaired British Mark IV machines,
their employment of these machines is worth recording.
As already mentioned the Germans learnt little from the Mark I machine
they captured and held for several days during the battle of the Somme.
In fact, they appear to have treated the tanks generally, during
these operations, with scorn. The machine was indeed mechanically
indifferent, but the German, who is essentially a stupid (_dumm_) man,
could not apparently differentiate between the defects of mechanical
detail and the advantages of fundamental principles, such as mobility,
security, and offensive power, which indeed the whole “idea” of the
tank represented.
The action at Bullecourt, it is thought, opened the German eyes to the
possibilities of a tank attack, that is an attack in which tanks are
used as the resistance-breakers in advance of the infantry. If two
tanks could accomplish what the two Mark I’s did on April 11, 1917,
there was no reason why 200 should not win a great victory, and 2,000
end the war. Be this as it may, it was at about this time--the spring
of 1917--that the first German tank construction was begun at the
Daimler works near Berlin, and the result of this was the production of
fifteen machines known as “Type A.7.V.” (see Plate VI), some of which
first took the field in March 1918.
The chief characteristics of this tank were: its good speed on smooth
ground, on which it could attain some eight miles an hour; its
inability to cross almost any type of trench or shelled ground on
account of its shape. In weight it was about 40 tons, it carried very
thick armour especially in front, capable of withstanding A.P. bullets
at close range and field-gun shells, not firing A.P. ammunition, at
long; it was, however, very vulnerable to the splash of ordinary
bullets on account of the crevices and joints in its armour. The most
interesting feature of this otherwise indifferent machine was that its
tracks were provided with sprung bogies. The use of sprung tracks in so
heavy a tank was the only progressive step shown in the German effort
at tank production.
The German tank was 24 ft. long and 10 ft. 6 in. wide; its armament
was one 1·57 mm. gun and 6 machine guns; its crew, one officer,
eleven N.C.O.s, and four private soldiers--exactly twice the strength
of the crew of a British Mark IV tank. This crew comprised three
distinct classes, drivers (mechanics), gunners (artillerymen), and
machine-gunners (infantrymen). These three classes remained distinct,
little co-operation existing between them.
Both the tanks of German manufacture and the captured British tanks
were divided into sections (Abteilungen) of five machines each, the
personnel establishment of which was as follows:
_German Tanks._ _Captured Tanks._
Captain Commanding. 1 1
Lieuts. or 2nd Lieuts. 5 5
Drivers 81 81
Machine-gunners 48 20
Artillerymen 22 14
Signallers 12 12
Medical Corps 1 1
Orderlies, etc. 6 6
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Total 176 All ranks. 140 All ranks.
----- -----
This establishment was a very extravagant one when compared with
that of a Mark IV section of five tanks, namely, six officers and
thirty-five other ranks.
Besides the “A.7.V.” machines the Germans employed, during their
various offensives of 1918, a number of caterpillar ammunition carriers
known as “Munitions Schlepper,” or “Tankautos.” These could proceed
across country as well as by road.
The moral of the German Tank Corps was not high, and as regards the
personnel of the captured Mark IV Tanks it was decidedly low, the
Germans having made considerable efforts to prove to their own troops,
by means of demonstrations, that this type of tank was both vulnerable
and ineffective. The training of this Corps appears to have been
indifferent; a certain number of Assault Divisions were trained with
wagons representing tanks, and in a few cases it is believed that
actual tanks were used with infantry in combined training.
The tactics of the German tanks simply consisted in the “mopping up”
of strong points. On several occasions they did get in front of the
attacking infantry, but they do not appear in any sense to have led
the attack. The following extract from the German G.H.Q. instructions,
“The Co-operation of Infantry with Tanks” (!), indicates that no real
co-operation was ever contemplated. It reads:
“The infantry and tanks will advance independently of one another.
No special instructions regarding the co-operation with tanks will
be issued. When advancing with tanks the infantry will not come
within 160 yards of them on account of the shells which will be
fired at the tanks.”
In all, there are nine recorded occasions upon which the Germans made
use of tanks, the first of which was in their great offensive which
opened on March 21, 1918. In this attack about ten German and ten
captured British machines were used, and although they accomplished
very little they were much written up in the German press.
[Illustration: PLATE VI
FRENCH RENAULT TANK.]
[Illustration: GERMAN TANK.]
A little over a month later, on April 24, the only successful German
tank attack during the war was carried out. On this occasion,
which has been referred to in Chapter XXVI, fourteen tanks were
brought forward, and of these twelve came into action and
captured Villers-Bretonneux, a point of great tactical importance; a
counter-attack carried out by the Australian Corps and a few British
tanks, however, restored the situation.
A month later a few tanks were used by the Germans against the French
on the opening day of the great Aisne offensive, namely May 27. None
of these machines, however, succeeded in passing a large trench in the
second defensive system known as Dardanelles trench.
On June 1, fifteen operated with little success in the Reims sector,
eight being left derelict in the French lines. Similar unsuccessful
operations were carried out on June 9 and July 15.
On August 31, three German tanks approached our lines east of Bapaume;
two were knocked out by our guns and eventually captured.
On October 8, some fifteen captured British machines were used against
us in the Cambrai sector. Of this action the German account states that
these tanks were employed defensively to fill up a gap in their line;
whether this was so or not, they undoubtedly produced a demoralising
effect amongst our own men, equilibrium only being re-established when
two of them were put out of action. Three days later, on the 11th, a
few tanks were used at St. Aubert; this was the last recorded occasion
upon which the Germans made use of tanks in the Great War.
Indifferent as were the German tank tactics as compared with our own,
one fact was most striking, this being that the British infantry no
more than the German would or could withstand a tank attack. The reason
for this is a simple one, namely, inability to do so. So pronounced
was this feeling of helplessness that when, during our own retirement
in March 1918, rumours were afloat that German tanks were approaching,
our men in several sectors of the line broke and fell back. During
the German retirement a few months later on we find exactly the same
lowering of moral by self-suggested fear, fear based on the inability
to overcome the danger. This moral effect produced by the tank was
appreciated by the Germans, for in a note issued by the XVIIth German
Army we find:
“Our own tanks strengthen the moral of the infantry to a tremendous
extent, even if employed only in small numbers, and experience has
shown that they have a considerable demoralising effect on the
hostile infantry.”