THE BATTLES OF HAMEL AND MOREUIL
During June and July three tank actions were fought: the first was a
night raid on June 22-23, the second the battle of Hamel, and the third
the battle of Moreuil or Sauvillers.
The night raid is interesting in that it was the first occasion in the
history of the Tank Corps in France upon which tanks were definitely
allotted to work at night. The raid was carried out against the
enemy’s defences near Bucquoy by five platoons of infantry and five
female tanks. Its object was to capture or kill the garrisons of a
series of posts. The raid took place at 11.25 p.m. A heavy barrage
of trench-mortar and machine-gun fire was met with at a place called
Dolls’ House in “No Man’s Land”: here the infantry were held up, and
though reinforced were unable to advance further. The tanks, thereupon,
pushed on and carried out the attack in accordance with their orders.
It is worthy of note that not a single tank was damaged by the
trench-mortar barrage, which was very heavy. The tanks encountered
several parties of the enemy and undoubtedly caused a number of
casualties. One tank was attacked by a party of the enemy who were shot
down by revolver fire; later on this tank rescued a wounded platoon
commander who had been captured by the Germans.
This raid is interesting in that it showed the possibility of
manœuvring tanks in the dark through the enemy’s lines, and also the
great security afforded to the tank by the darkness.
[Illustration: PLATE V
MARK V TANK (MALE).]
The battle of Hamel, which was fought on July 4, was the first occasion
upon which the Mark V machine went into action. Much was expected of
it, and it more than justified all expectations. The object of the
attack was a twofold one--firstly, to nip off a salient between the
river Somme and the Villers-Bretonneux--Warfusée road; secondly, to
restore the confidence of the Australian Corps in tanks, a confidence
which had been badly shaken by the Bullecourt reverse in 1917.
As soon as the attack was decided on the training of the Australians
with the tanks was commenced at Vaux en Amienois, the headquarters of
the 5th Tank Brigade. Tank units for this purpose were affiliated to
Australian units and by this means a close comradeship was cultivated.
The general plan of operations was for the 5th Tank Brigade to support
the advance of the 4th Australian Division in the attack against the
Hamel spur running from the main Villers-Bretonneux plateau to the
river Somme. The frontage was about 5,500 yards, extending to 7,500
yards on the final objective, the depth of which was 2,500 yards.
The main tactical features in the area were Vaire wood, Hamel wood,
Pear-Shape trench, and Hamel village. There was no defined system of
trenches to attack except the old British line just east of Hamel,
which had been originally sited to obtain observation eastwards. The
remainder of the area was held by means of machine-gun nests.
Five companies of 60 tanks in all were employed in the attack; these
were divided into two waves--a first-line wave of 48 and a reserve wave
of 12 machines. Their distribution was as follows:
6th A.I. Brigade 2 Sections (6 tanks).
4th A.I. Brigade 1 Company (12 tanks).
11th A.I. Brigade 6 Sections (18 tanks).
Liaison between 4th and 11th Brigades 1 Company (12 tanks).
Reserves 1 Company (12 tanks).
The co-operation of the artillery was divided under the headings of
a rolling barrage and the production of smoke screens. Behind the
former the infantry were to advance followed by the tanks, which were
only to pass ahead of them when resistance was encountered. This
arrangement was not a good one and was an inheritance of the Bullecourt
distrust. The latter were to be formed on the high ground west of
Warfusée-Abancourt and north of the Somme and south of Morlancourt.
Once the final objective was gained a standing barrage was to be formed
to cover consolidation.
As the entire operation was of a very limited character an extensive
system of supply dumps was not necessary, so instead each fighting tank
carried forward ammunition and water for the infantry and four supply
tanks were detailed to carry R.E. material and other stores. Each of
these eventually delivered a load of about 12,500 lb. within 500 yards
of the final objective, and within half an hour of its capture. The
total load delivered on July 4, at 40 lb. per man, represented the
loads of a carrying party 1,250 men strong. The number of men used in
these supply tanks was twenty-four.
The tanks assembled at the villages of Hamelet and Fouilloy on the
night of July 2-3, without hostile interference. On the following night
they moved forward to a line approximately 1,000 yards west of the
infantry starting-line under cover of aeroplanes which, flying over the
enemy, drowned the noise of the tank engines.
Zero hour was fixed for 3.10 a.m. and tanks were timed to leave their
starting-line at 3.2 a.m. under cover of artillery harassing fire,
which had been carried out on previous mornings in order to accustom
the enemy to it. This fire lasted seven minutes, then a pause of one
minute occurred, to be followed by barrage fire on the enemy’s front
line for four minutes. This allowed twelve minutes for the tanks to
advance an average distance of 1,200 yards before reaching the infantry
line at zero plus four minutes, when the barrage was to lift. All tanks
were on the starting-line up to time, which is a compliment to the
increased reliability of the Mark V machine over all previous types.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF HAMEL
4th July 1918.]
As the barrage lifted the infantry and tanks moved forward. The
position of the tanks in relation to the infantry varied, but,
generally speaking, the tanks were in front of the infantry and
immediately behind the bursting shells. The enemy’s machine-gunners
fought tenaciously, and in several cases either held up the infantry,
or would have inflicted severe casualties on them, if tanks had not
been there to destroy them. The manœuvring power of the Mark V tank
was clearly demonstrated in all cases where the infantry were held
up by machine guns, it enabled the tanks to drive over the gunners
before they could get away. There were a great number of cases in which
the German machine guns were run over and their detachments crushed.
Driving over machine-gun emplacements was the feature of this attack;
it eliminated all chance of the enemy “coming to life” again after the
attack had passed by.
Tanks detailed for the right flank had severe fighting and did great
execution, their action being of the greatest service. The tanks
detailed to support the infantry battalions passing round Vaire and
Hamel woods and Hamel village guarded their flanks whilst this manœuvre
was in operation.
The tank attack came as a great surprise to the Germans and all
objectives were taken up to scheduled time. The enemy suffered heavy
loss, and, besides those killed, 1,500 prisoners were captured. The
4th Australian Division had 672 officers and other ranks killed and
wounded, and the 5th Brigade had only 16 men wounded and 5 machines
hit. These tanks were all salved by the night of July 6-7.
The co-operation between the infantry and tanks was as near perfect
as it could be; all ranks of the tank crews operating were impressed
by the superb moral of the Australian troops, who never considered
that the presence of the tanks exonerated them from fighting, and who
took instant advantage of any opportunity created by the tanks. From
this day on the fastest comradeship has existed between the Tank and
Australian Corps. Bullecourt was forgotten, and from the psychological
point of view this was an important objective to have gained prior to
the great attack in August.
The second battle in which the Tank Corps took part in July was the
battle of Moreuil or Sauvillers; it is of particular interest, for
it was the only occasion during the war in which our tanks, in any
numbers, operated with the French Army. Another interesting point
connected with this attack was the rapidity with which it was mounted.
At 2.30 p.m. on July 17 the 5th Tank Brigade Commander was informed
that he was to prepare forthwith to co-operate in an attack to be made
by the IXth Corps of the First French Army, and, for this purpose,
the 9th Battalion of the 3rd Tank Brigade was to be placed under his
command and that he and this battalion would come under the orders of
the 3rd French Infantry Division.
The object of the operation was a threefold one:
(i) To seize the St. Ribert wood with the object of outflanking
Mailly-Raineval from the south.
(ii) To capture the German batteries in the neighbourhood of St. Ribert
or to force them to withdraw.
(iii) To advance the French field batteries eastwards in order to bring
fire to bear on the ridge which dominates the right bank of the river
Avre.
The three French Divisions attacking were the 152nd Division on
the right, the 3rd in the centre, and the 15th on the left. Their
respective frontages were 950, 2,000, and 800 metres. The greatest
depth of the attack was 3,000 metres.
The operation was to be launched as a surprise, after a short and
intense artillery preparation; the main objectives were to be captured
by encircling them and then “mopping” them up.
There were three objectives: The first included Bois des
Arrachis, Sauvillers, Mongival village, Adelpare farm and
Ouvrage-des-Trois-Bouqueteaux; twelve tanks and four battalions of
infantry were detailed for this. The second included the clearing of
the plateau to the north of the Bois-de-Sauvillers and the capture
of the south-west corner of the Bois-de-Harpon; the number of tanks
allotted to this objective was twenty-four, with four fresh infantry
battalions. The third, known as the Blue Line, an outpost line covering
the second objective, was to be occupied by eight strong infantry
patrols and all available machines.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF MOREUIL OR SAUVILLERS
July 23rd 1918.]
The attack was to be preceded by one hour’s intensive bombardment,
including heavy counter-battery fire. The creeping barrage was to
consist of H.E. and smoke shells and was to move at the rate of 200
metres in six minutes up to the first objective, after this at the rate
of 200 metres in eight minutes.
Tanks were to attack in sections of three, two in front and one in
immediate support, the infantry advancing in small assaulting groups
close behind the tanks.
Directly the orders were issued preparations were set on foot. On July
18, Lieutenant-Colonel H. K. Woods, commanding the 9th Battalion,
and his reconnaissance officers visited General de Bourgon,[31] the
Commander of the 3rd French Division, who explained to them the
scheme; on the next day these officers reconnoitred the ground over
which the battalion would have to operate, and tactical training was
carried out with the French at the 5th Tank Brigade Driving School at
Vaux-en-Amienois. On the 20th and 21st training continued, and further
examination of the ground was made, and on the 22nd details of the
attack were finally settled. In spite of the continuous exertion of
the last few days all ranks were in the greatest heart to show the 3rd
French Division what the British Tank Corps could do.
Meanwhile headquarters were selected, communications arranged for,
supplies dumped, and reorganisation and rallying-points worked out and
fixed.
The move of the 9th Battalion is particularly interesting on account
of its rapidity. On July 17 it was in the Bus-les-Artois area; on the
18th it moved 16,000 yards across country and entrained under sealed
orders at Rosel, detraining at Conty. On the night of the 19th-20th it
moved 4,000 yards from Conty to Bois-de-Quemetot; on 20th-21st, 9,000
yards to Bois-de-Rampont; on 21st-22nd, 7,000 yards to Bois-de-Hure and
Bois-du-Fay; and on 22nd-23rd 4,500 yards from these woods into action
with thirty-five machines out of the original forty-two fit to fight.
The country over which the action was to be fought was undulating,
and with the exception of large woods there were few tank obstacles.
Prior to the operations the weather had been fine, but on the day of
the attack heavy rain fell and visibility was poor, a south wind of
moderate strength was blowing.
The preliminary bombardment began at 4.30 a.m., and, an hour later,
the tanks having been moved up to their starting-points without
incident, the attack was launched. The tanks advanced ahead of the
infantry, Arrachis wood was cleared and Sauvillers village attacked,
the tanks occupying this village some fifteen minutes before the
infantry arrived. At Adelpare farm and Les-Trois-Bouqueteaux the
enemy’s resistance, as far as the tanks were concerned, was light, and
the German machine-gun posts were speedily overrun. From Sauvillers
village, at zero plus two hours, the tanks advanced on to Sauvillers
wood, which, being too thick to enter, had to be skirted, broadsides
being fired into the foliage. Whilst this was proceeding other tanks
moved forward towards the Bois-de-St.-Ribert, but as the infantry
patrols did not appear they turned back to regain touch with the French
infantry. About 9.30 a.m., whilst cruising round, six tanks were put
out of action in rapid succession by direct hits fired from a battery
situated to the south of St. Ribert wood. At 9.15 a.m. an attack on
Harpon wood was hastily improvised between the O.C. B Company, 9th
Battalion, and the commander of one of the battalions of the 51st
Regiment. This attack was eminently successful; the French infantry,
following the tanks with great élan, established posts in Harpon wood.
After this action the tanks rallied.
In this attack the tank casualties were heavy in personnel: 11 officers
and men were killed and 43 wounded, and 15 tanks were put out of action
by direct hits. The losses in the French Divisions were: 3rd--26
officers and 680 men; 15th--15 officers and 500 men; 152nd--20 officers
and 650 men. It should be noted that though the 3rd, with which
tanks co-operated, had to attack the largest system of defences, its
casualties approximately equalled those of each of the other divisions.
The number of prisoners captured was 1,858, also 5 guns, 45 trench
mortars, and 275 machine guns.
After the attack, when the tanks had returned to their positions of
assembly, General Debeney, commanding the First French Army, paid the
9th Battalion the great honour of personally inspecting it on July 25,
and of expressing his extreme satisfaction at the way in which the
Battalion had fought. As a token of the fast comradeship which had now
been established between the French troops of the 3rd Division and the
9th Tank Battalion, this battalion was presented with the badge of the
3rd French Division and ever since this day the men of this unit have
worn it on their left arm.