THE BATTLE OF AMIENS
On July 15 the renewed German offensive on the Château-Thierry--Reims
front had been launched and failed. Strategically and tactically placed
in as unenviable a position as any army well could be, the Crown
Prince’s forces received a staggering blow on the 18th, when Marshal
Foch launched his great tank counter-attack against the western flank
of the Soissons salient.
At the time of this attack the brigades of the Tank Corps were
distributed defensively along the First, Third, and Fourth Army
fronts, in order to meet by counter-attacks any renewal of the enemy’s
offensive against these Armies.
Ever since the dramatic _coup-de-main_ accomplished on July 4 by the
4th Australian Division and the 5th Tank Brigade in the battle of
Hamel, the general interest in tanks had become much more conspicuous.
The great tank attack at the battle of Cambrai, convincing in worth as
it was to all who had taken part in it, had been somewhat discredited
by the recent German offensive on the Somme front, which was seized
upon by certain soldiers of the old school to reinforce their
assertion--that the day of the tank had come and gone, and that to
fight a second battle of Cambrai was too great a gamble to be worth
risking. Now a series of projects were asked for which embraced various
areas of operation; in the Fourth Army against the Amiens salient; in
the Third Army against Bucquoy and Bapaume; in the First Army against
the Merville salient and in the Second against Kemmel hill. The only
one of these projects which offered prospects of a decisive success was
the first.
On July 13 the Fourth Army Commander was asked by G.H.Q. to submit a
scheme for an attack on his front. This was done on the 17th, when
a limited operation, with the object of capturing the Amiens outer
defence line, running from Castel through Caix to Mericourt, was
outlined. The force suggested for this attack was three corps and eight
battalions of tanks. On the 21st a conference was held at the Fourth
Army headquarters at Flixecourt when, on the suggestion of the Tank
Corps, the number of tank battalions was raised from eight to twelve;
this comprised the whole Tank Corps less the 1st Tank Brigade, which
was still armed with Mark IV machines, and which at this time was
engaged in training its personnel on the Mark V tank.
On July 27, zero day was fixed for the 10th, but on August 6 this was
changed to the 8th. All this time, in order to maintain secrecy, no
mention of the impending attack was permitted, and the only preparation
which could be undertaken was to send one officer of the Tank Corps
General Staff to the area of operations to study the ground. On July 30
a conference was held at the 5th Tank Brigade headquarters at Vaux, at
which the Fourth Army Commander explained the plan of operations. From
this day on preparations were begun, the railway moves being issued the
same evening.
As already stated, the original proposal was a limited operation, the
centre of the attack being carried out by the Canadian and Australian
Corps. The right of the Canadians was to be covered by the French
First Army attacking east and south-east of the Luce river. The left
of the Australians was to be protected by two divisions of the IIIrd
Corps operating towards Bray. On July 29 the scope of the operation was
extended as follows:
To disengage the Amiens-Paris railway by occupying the line
Hangest--Harbonnières--Mericourt.
To advance to the line Roye--Chaulnes, driving the enemy towards
Ham, and so facilitate the advance of the French on the line
Noyon-Montdidier.
The force placed at the disposal of the Fourth Army consisted of the
following Corps:
(i) The Canadian Corps--4 divisions.
(ii) The Australian Corps--4 divisions.
(iii) The IIIrd Corps--2 divisions.
(iv) General Reserve--3 divisions, to be supplemented by further
divisions as soon as possible.
(v) The Cavalry Corps--3 cavalry divisions.
Tank battalions were allotted to the 3 infantry corps as follows:
(i) Canadian Corps, 4th Tank Brigade--1st, 4th, 5th, and 14th
Battalions.
(ii) Australian Corps--5th Tank Brigade--2nd, 8th, 13th, and 15th
Battalions.
(iii) IIIrd Corps--10th Battalion.
(iv) General Reserve--9th Battalion (still refitting at Cavillon).
(v) Cavalry Corps. 3rd Tank Brigade--3rd and 6th Battalions.
The 3rd and 6th Battalions were equipped with 48 Whippet tanks each;
all the other battalions were heavy units equipped with 42 Mark V
machines each (36 fighting and 6 training tanks), except the 1st and
15th Battalions, which were each equipped with 36 Mark V One Star
machines.
As in the battle of Cambrai the initiation of the attack was to depend
on the tanks, no artillery registration or bombardment being permitted
prior to the assault. In all, some 82 brigades of field artillery,
26 brigades of heavy artillery, and 13 batteries of heavy guns and
howitzers were to be employed. The following is a summary of the
artillery instructions:
(i) No artillery bombardment.
(ii) The initial attack to be opened by a barrage at zero.
(iii) The majority of the heavy guns and howitzers to concentrate
on counter-battery work.
(iv) The field-artillery brigades to be prepared to move forward
and offer the closest support to the attacking infantry.
(v) Special noise barrages to cover the approach of the tanks.
The first object of the Cavalry Corps was to secure the old Amiens
defence line and hold it until relieved by infantry units. The second,
to push forward on the line Roye--Chaulnes. For this purpose the 3rd
Cavalry Division with one battalion of Whippets was placed under the
command of the Canadian Corps, and one cavalry brigade, supported by
one company of Whippets, under that of the Australian Corps.
On July 30, the date on which preparations were begun, the Tank Corps
was distributed as follows:
_1st Tank Brigade_ 7th Battalion Merlimont.
H.Q. Estruvalle 11th „ Merlimont.
12th „ Merlimont.
_2nd Tank Brigade_ 10th „ Bouvigny.
H.Q. Bois D’Ohlain 14th „ Mont St. Eloi.
15th „ Simencourt.
_3rd Tank Brigade_ 3rd „ Toutencourt.
H.Q. Wavrans 6th „ Merlimont.
_4th Tank Brigade_ 1st „ Coullemont.
H.Q. Couturelle 4th „ La Cauchie.
5th „ Bailleulval.
_5th Tank Brigade_ 2nd „ Querrieu wood.
H.Q. Vaux 8th „ Blangy (east of Amiens).
13th „ St. Gratien (near to).
9th „ Cavillon.
In order to facilitate co-operation and staff work it was decided
to break up temporarily the 2nd Tank Brigade and to allot the 10th
Battalion to the IIIrd Corps and the 14th and 15th Battalions to the
4th and 5th Tank Brigades respectively. Besides these units five Supply
and Gun Carrier Companies were allotted for the transport of tank and
infantry supplies.
[Illustration: PLATE VII
GUN-CARRIER.]
[Illustration: MARK V STAR TANK (FEMALE).]
Briefly the general preparations were carried out as follows: the 1st,
4th, 5th, 10th, 14th, and 15th Battalions were concentrated by rail
in the Fourth Army area, detraining at Poulainville, Saleux, Prouzel,
and Vignacourt between July 31 and August 5. The 3rd and 6th Whippet
Battalions moved to Naours by the night of August 2-3, and thence to
the Boulevard Pont-Noyelles in Amiens on the night of the 6th-7th,
where they lay hid under the trees. Tanks were got ready commencing on
July 31, on which date the formation of supply dumps was begun. The 9th
Battalion, which had been withdrawn to Cavillon after the battle of
Moreuil, was allotted to the Canadian Corps for training; the training
of the Australian Corps continuing as heretofore at Vaux. Considering
the short time available for preparation the speed with which this
great battle was mounted redounds to the credit of all ranks taking
part in it. It was a triumph of good staff work.
The detailed preparations of the four groups of tanks--3rd, 4th, and
5th Brigades, and the 10th Battalion, are interesting and were as
follows:
_Fourth Tank Brigade._--This brigade established its advanced
headquarters at Dury. Its battalions were distributed as follows:
the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 15th Battalions to the 4th, 1st, 3rd, and 2nd
Canadian Divisions respectively.
No. 3 Tank Supply Company was split up amongst the divisions of
the Canadian Corps; three forward wireless stations were arranged
for as well as one back receiving station; assembly positions and
rallying-points were fixed, and the 2nd Tank Field Company was
detailed, once the battle began, to clear all obstacles off the
Berteaucourt-Thennes road and to prepare crossings over the Luce river
between Hangard and Demuin.
The plan of the Canadian Corps attack was as follows:
The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Canadian Divisions were to make good the Red Line
on zero day, except the left of the 2nd Division, which was to push on
and occupy the Blue Line. The advance of the 3rd Canadian Division was
timed to start at zero plus four hours, the time it was considered the
initial attack would leave the Green Line. The 4th Canadian Division
was to follow the 1st and 3rd to the Blue Line and then to the line
Moreuil--Demuin--Marcelcave. The 1st Tank Battalion was allotted to
this division, and arrangements were made for each of its tanks to
carry forward two Lewis and two Vickers gun-teams besides the crew,
these units being intended to assist the cavalry on the Blue Dotted
Line. Besides the above an independent force, consisting chiefly of
Canadian motor machine guns, was to operate down the Roye road.
_Fifth Tank Brigade._--The 5th Tank Brigade established its advanced
headquarters at Hospice Fouilloy with a report centre at the north-west
corner of Kate wood. Its battalions were distributed as follows: the
2nd Battalion and one company of the 13th Battalion to the 2nd and 5th
Australian Divisions; the 13th Battalion less one company to the 3rd
Australian Division; the 8th Battalion to the 4th; the 15th Battalion
was split into halves of eighteen tanks each, one half operating with
the 4th and the other with the 5th Australian Divisions.
As regards supply arrangements, No. 1 Gun Carrier Company was allotted
to the Australian Corps for transport work. Two forward wireless
stations and one back receiving station were fixed, and assembly and
rallying-points settled.
The general plan was that the tanks were to advance to the first
objective under an artillery barrage. On reaching the second objective
all tanks were to rally except those of the 15th Battalion, which were
to push on to the Blue Dotted Line carrying machine-gunners forward.
_Tenth Battalion._--The whole of the tanks of the 10th Battalion, less
one section, were to operate against the first objective and then push
on to the second, after which they were to rally west of the first
objective.
_Third Tank Brigade._--The 3rd Tank Battalion was allotted to the
3rd Cavalry Division and the 6th Tank Battalion to the 1st Cavalry
Division. The objective of these two battalions was to secure the area
between the Red Line and the old Amiens defence line. The advance of
the 3rd and 1st Cavalry Divisions was to take place at zero plus four
hours. Before the Red Line was reached the cavalry scouts were to
precede the Whippet tanks and discover crossings over the Luce river at
Ignaucourt and Demuin. If crossings were found the Whippets were to use
them; otherwise they were to advance eastwards near Caix. The formation
to be adopted by these two battalions was one company to act as a
screen in front of the cavalry with 200 yards interval between tanks,
one company in support, and one company in reserve.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF AMIENS August 8th 1918.]
The country between our front line and the line Roye--Frise was in
every respect suitable to tank movement. East of the Roye--Frise line
began the French portion of the old Somme battlefield; the ground here
in places had been heavily shelled, but was quite negotiable by heavy
tanks. The flanks of the attack were the two difficult points. Neither
permitted of the use of offensive wings and both offered good defensive
positions for the enemy’s machine-gunners.
Zero was at 4.45 a.m., when 415 fighting tanks out of 420[32] went into
action; this in itself was a notable feat of mechanical efficiency.
The attack was an overwhelming surprise and, though the enemy was
holding his line in strength, little opposition was met with except
in a few localities. At the battles of Hamel and Moreuil the German
machine-gunners had learnt to appreciate what the increased mobility of
the Mark V tank enabled it to accomplish, and not being anxious to be
crushed under its thirty tons of steel they gave less trouble during
this battle than on any previous occasion. In spite of this, many
hostile machine-gun posts were hunted out of the standing corn and run
over. Co-operation was throughout good, especially on the Canadian and
Australian fronts, where the attack swept on irresistibly. On the IIIrd
Corps front the attack started in a state of some confusion, due to the
fog and the uncertain state of the line, the Germans having attacked
the IIIrd Corps on the 6th, and the IIIrd Corps having retaken most of
their lost trenches on the 7th. This undoubtedly complicated the attack
on the 8th.
South of the river Somme all objectives were taken up to time; on the
right flank the difficult valley of the Luce was crossed by all except
two tanks; this was a high compliment to the crews working on this
flank, for the approach of the tanks was rendered most difficult on
account of fog.
Both battalions of Whippets were engaged with their respective
cavalry divisions and had a considerable amount of fighting to do in
the neighbourhood of Cayeux wood, Le Quesnel, east of Mezières, at
Guillaucourt and the railway south of Harbonnières, which was held with
great determination by the enemy as far as the Rosières-Vauvillers road.
During this day’s fighting a total of 100 machines were temporarily
put out of action chiefly by the enemy’s fire from the Chipilly ridge,
which, on account of the partial failure of the IIIrd Corps attack, was
held by the enemy for several days after August 8. On the evening of
the 8th the tanks rallied; the crews, however, were so exhausted by the
great distance covered, the maximum penetration effected being about
7½ miles, and the heat of the day, that it was necessary to resort to
the formation of composite companies for the next day’s operation, few
reserves remaining in hand, and the 9th Tank Battalion, which was now
moving eastwards from Cavillon, was not in a position to take the field
for at least forty-eight hours.
On the night of August 8-9, the front line of our attack from north
to south ran approximately as follows: along the outer Amiens defence
line to Proyart--west of Rainecourt--east of Vauvillers--east of
Rosières--east of Meharicourt--east of Rouvroy--east of Bouchoir. South
of the Amiens-Roye road the line was continued by the French, who had
captured Hangest, Arvillers, and Pierrepont.
Up to 6 o’clock on the morning of August 9, some 16,000 prisoners had
passed through the British and French cages, and over 200 guns had been
counted. Many prisoners testified to the rapid advance of the tanks
which, appearing suddenly out of the mist, rendered all resistance
useless. It is interesting to record that those prisoners who had seen
tanks before all noticed that they were up against a new type which
moved faster and manœuvred better than the old ones.
On the evening of the 8th orders were issued that the attack should be
resumed on the following morning with a view to advancing it to the
line Roye--Chaulnes--Bray-sur-Somme--Dernancourt, particular attention
being paid to the left flank. A strong position was to be established
north of the Somme in order to form a defensive flank to the Fourth
Army.
On August 9, north of the Somme, the 10th Battalion put sixteen tanks
into action with the 12th and 58th Divisions. The attack was, however,
at first held up by machine-gun fire from the woods round Chipilly, and
the work entailed in engaging these weapons by means of tanks was found
most difficult on account of the steep valleys in this sector and the
close nature of the woods. Later on in the day, objectives were gained,
but only after five tanks had been put out of action.
South of the Somme the 5th and 4th Tank Brigades attacked the front
Framerville-Rosières-Bouchoir with 89 tanks. Near Lihons five machines
received direct hits, but in the action round Framerville out of the
13 tanks engaged only 1 was hit. The fewness of tank casualties here
was undoubtedly due to the excellent infantry co-operation, riflemen
working hand-in-hand with the tanks and picking off the enemy’s gunners
directly the machines came under hostile artillery observation.
The 3rd Tank Brigade’s action with the Cavalry Corps was disappointing,
the tanks being kept too long at their Brigade Headquarters. At
Beaufort and Warvillers the Whippets rendered great assistance to
the infantry by chasing hostile machine-gunners out of the crops and
shooting them down as they fled.
On this day in all 145 tanks went into action, of which 39 were hit by
hostile gun fire.
On the night of August 9-10, the attack had reached the line
Bouchoir--Warvillers--Rosières--Framerville--Mericourt. On the 10th
the Fourth Army orders were to continue the advance with the object of
gaining the general line Roye--Chaulnes--Bray-sur-Somme--Dernancourt.
New French forces were also going to attack on the front south of
Montdidier.
On the morning of August 10 the 10th Battalion co-operated in two small
attacks carried out by the 12th Division. Seven tanks took part and
attacked the enemy north of Morlancourt and along the Bray-Corbie road.
This was the last action fought on this front by this battalion.
South of this, the 5th Tank Brigade carried out a minor night operation
against Proyart, and the 4th Tank Brigade with 43 tanks supported the
32nd Division, fresh from the general reserve, and the 4th Canadian
Division in an attack on the line Roye--Hattencourt--Hallu; owing
to the late issue of orders, the hour of attack was altered, and
eventually the advance took place in daylight without smoke. A stubborn
resistance was met with, and out of the 43 tanks operating no fewer
than 23 received direct hits.
The Whippets with the cavalry fared equally badly on this day. They
were ordered to capture Parvillers, but neither the cavalry nor
Whippets reached this spot owing to the old trench systems and the
broken nature of the ground. The edge of the old Somme battlefield had
now been reached, and the time was rapidly approaching when the shelled
area would offer as great an obstacle to the attack as it would an
assistance to the retiring enemy.
During the 10th some 67 tanks in all were engaged, and of these 30
received direct hits.
On August 11 no appreciable change took place on the British front.
Lihons was, however, captured by the 1st Australian Division, assisted
by ten tanks of the 2nd Battalion, otherwise most of the tank
operations consisted in mopping up strong points. On the evening of
this day the 4th and 5th Tank Brigades were withdrawn from action to
refit.
During the next few days it was decided that, whilst pressure should be
kept up south of the Somme, a new battle should open to the north of
this river on the Third Army front, and that three Tank Brigades should
co-operate in this attack; this necessitated the transfer of the 4th
Tank Brigade to the IIIrd Corps north of the Somme and the withdrawal
of the 10th, 14th, and 15th Battalions from the Fourth Army area; this
left the 4th Tank Brigade with the 1st, 4th, and 5th Battalions, and
the 5th Tank Brigade with the 2nd, 8th, and 13th Battalions.
On August 17 the general situation was as follows: A total of 688
tanks had been in action on August 8, 9, 10, and 11; 480 machines
had been handed over to Salvage; very few of the remaining machines
were actually fit for a lengthy action, and all required a thorough
overhaul; four days, as we shall see, were only possible for this, for
the next battle was scheduled to open on August 21.
The great battle of Amiens was now at an end. A tremendous physical,
and above all, moral blow had been dealt the enemy; not only had he
lost 22,000 prisoners and 400 guns, but also all hope of winning the
war by force of arms. On August 16 the Fourth Army Commander, General
Sir Henry Rawlinson, issued the following Special Order, which sums up
the reason for this great victory:
“The success of the operations of August 8 and succeeding days was
largely due to the conspicuous part played by the 3rd, 4th, and
5th Brigades of the Tank Corps, and I desire to place on record my
sincere appreciation of the invaluable services rendered both by
the Mark V and the Mark V Star and the Whippets.
“The task of secretly assembling so large a number of tanks
entailed very hard and continuous work by all concerned for four or
five nights previous to the battle.
“The tactical handling of the tanks in action made calls on the
skill and physical endurance of the detachments which were met with
by a gallantry and devotion beyond all praise.
“I desire to place on record my appreciation of the splendid
success that they achieved, and heartily to congratulate the Tank
Corps as a whole on the completeness of their arrangements and the
admirable prowess exhibited by all ranks actually engaged on this
occasion.
“There are many vitally important lessons to be learned from
their experiences. These will, I trust, be taken to heart by all
concerned and made full use of when next the Tank Corps is called
upon to go into battle.
“The part played by the tanks and Whippets in the battle of August
8 was in all respects a very fine performance.”
The success of the operations may be attributed to--surprise, the
moral effect of the tanks, the high moral of our own infantry, the
rapid advance of our guns, and the good roads for supplies.
The main deductions to be drawn from this battle are:
(i) That once preparations are well in progress it is almost impossible
to modify them to meet any change in objective.
(ii) That the staying power of an attack lies in the general reserve.
In this attack the tank general reserve was very weak, consequently
after August 8 tank attacks began to “peter out.”
(iii) That the heavy tank is an assault weapon. Its role is in trench
warfare. Once open warfare is entered on infantry must protect tanks
from artillery fire.
(iv) That the endurance in action of heavy tanks may, at present, be
put down as being three days, after which they require overhaul.
(v) That the supply tank is too slow and heavy; a light machine such as
a cross-country tractor should replace it.
(vi) That at present wireless and aeroplane communications cannot be
relied upon; the safest means of communication and the simplest is by
galloper.
(vii) That the attachment of tanks to cavalry is not a success; for,
in this battle, each of these arms in many ways impeded rather than
helped the other. During the approach marches the Whippets frequently
were reported to have been unable to keep up with the rapid movement of
the cavalry; during actual fighting the reverse took place. By noon on
August 8, great confusion was developing behind the enemy’s lines, by
this time the Whippets should have been operating five to ten miles in
advance of the infantry, accentuating this demoralisation. As it was,
being tied down to support the cavalry, they were a long way behind
the infantry advance, the reason being that as cavalry cannot make
themselves invisible on the battlefield by throwing themselves flat
on the ground as infantry can, they had to retire either to a flank
or to the rear to avoid being exterminated by machine-gun fire. Close
co-operation between cavalry and tanks being, therefore, practically
impossible, both suffered by attempting to accomplish it.
The outstanding lesson of the battle of Amiens as far as tanks are
concerned is that neither the Mark V nor the Whippet machine has
sufficient speed for open warfare. Had we possessed a machine which
could have moved at an average rate of ten miles an hour, which had
a radius of action of 100 or more miles, in this battle we should
have not only occupied the bridges across the Somme between Peronne
and Ham by noon on August 8, but, by wheeling south-east towards
Noyon, we should have cut off the entire German forces south of
the Amiens--Roye--Noyon road and inflicted such a blow that in all
probability the war would have ended before the month was out. Both
from the positive and negative standpoint, this battle may be summed up
as “a triumph of machine-power over man-power,” or, if preferred, “of
petrol over muscle.”