PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT OFFENSIVE
As soon as the position resulting from the great German attack of
March 21 began to stabilise steps were taken by the Headquarters of
the Tank Corps to reorganise and refit its battalions. This work was
most difficult on account of the reopening of the German offensive in
the Lys area, which necessitated converting the 4th Tank Brigade into
a Lewis-gun unit and dispatching it north to assist in stemming the
German advance. Besides this, towards the middle of April instructions
were received that on account of the difficulty of finding the required
number of infantry reinforcements the number of tank brigades was to
be reduced from six to four; this meant the disbanding of the 5th
Brigade in France and the breaking up of the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th
Tank Battalions in England. Yet another difficulty was the question
of re-arming, many machines had been lost during the retirement,
nevertheless, on account of insufficient transport, it was not found
possible to ship out to France the new Mark V tanks, the production of
which in England was now in full swing.
All these difficulties were eventually overcome, with the result that
during June and July four brigades of the Tank Corps were re-armed; but
before this question is dealt with it will be necessary to hark back
to the various operations which bridge the period between April 4, the
date upon which the Second Battle of the Somme ended, and August 8,
when our own great offensive was begun.
On April 9 the Germans launched their second great attack
between Festubert and Fleurbaix against the British front. It
succeeded, so it is thought, even beyond their expectations, and
by the 11th the enemy’s line roughly ran as follows: East of
Ploegsteert--Armentières--Steenwerck--Estaires--Lestren--Vieille
Capelle, through Festubert to Givenchy, with the apex of the salient
near Nieppe. This attack in all probability was meant as a feint
directed against a weak spot in our line in order to threaten the
coalfield round Bruay and so cause Marshal Foch to weaken his reserves
in Champagne and on the Somme. Succeeding as it did at first, it
appears that the German command attempted to develop it from a feint to
a decisive attack, with the result that their own reserves, of which
they had none too many, were involved as well as those of the Allies.
In order to meet the requirements of the new situation on April 11
detachments of the 7th and 11th Battalions of the 1st Tank Brigade were
dispatched to hold a line west of Merville. Two days later the 4th
Tank Brigade, now consisting of the 4th, 5th, and 13th Battalions, was
turned into a Lewis-gun Brigade. On the 13th the 5th Battalion moved to
Berthen, on the 16th the 13th Battalion to Boescheppe, and on the 17th
the 4th Battalion to the same place.
By April 17 the distribution of the Tank Corps was as follows:
_1st Tank Brigade_ 11th Battalion N.E. of Busnes.
H.Q. Bois D’Ohlain 7th „ Molinghem.
12th „ Simencourt.
_2nd Tank Brigade_ 6th Battalion Bailleulval.
H.Q. Saulty 10th „ La Cauchie.
_3rd Tank Brigade_ 3rd Battalion Toutencourt.
H.Q. Molliens-au-Bois 9th „ Merlimont.
1st „ Frechencourt.
_4th Tank Brigade_ 4th Battalion Boescheppe.
H.Q. Godewaersvelde 5th „ Berthen.
13th „ Boescheppe.
_5th Tank Brigade_ 2nd Battalion Blangy.
H.Q. Monchy Cayeux 8th „ Humières.
The fighting carried out by the Lewis-gun units was of a severe
nature, so much so that the casualties sustained caused the greatest
anxiety at the Tank Corps headquarters, as reinforcements from England
were exceedingly limited; further, as it was still hoped to save the
battalions at home to the Corps, it was especially desirable not to
call upon them for drafts.
Early on April 24 the enemy attacked south of the river Somme on a
front from Villers-Bretonneux to the Bois de Hangard. This attack
is of special interest as it was the first occasion upon which the
Germans employed tanks of their own manufacture against us.[30] By
means of these tanks the enemy penetrated our front, captured most of
the extensive village of Villers-Bretonneux and advanced as far as the
Bois de l’Abbé. Prior to this attack, at 1 a.m., a section of tanks of
the 1st Battalion, hidden in the Bois de l’Abbé, moved east of the wood
owing to the excessive gas shelling. At 8.30 a.m. this section, under
the orders of the 23rd Infantry Brigade, moved forward to secure the
Cachy switch trench against the enemy’s threatening attack; exactly
an hour later two of our machines, both females, came into view of a
hostile tank and were put out of action by its gun fire--it should be
remembered here that female tanks are armed only with machine guns.
Shortly afterwards a British male Mark IV machine hove into sight, and
speeding into action there then took place the first tank _versus_
tank duel to be recorded in history. This male soon scored a direct
hit on its antagonist, whereupon the enemy evacuated their tank and
fled. By this time three more enemy tanks had appeared; these the Mark
IV machine engaged, and was in the process of driving off the field of
battle when it received a direct hit from a field-gun shell and was put
out of action.
South-west of Villers-Bretonneux, seven Whippet machines were sent
out at 10.30 a.m. to clear up the situation east of the village of
Cachy. Whilst proceeding round the north-east side of this village
they suddenly came upon two battalions of Germans massing in a hollow
preparatory to making an attack. Without a moment’s hesitation the
seven Whippets formed line and charged down the slope right on to
the closely formed infantry. Indescribable confusion resulted as the
Whippets tore through the German ranks, the enemy scattered in all
directions, some threw themselves on their knees before the machines,
shrieking for mercy, but only to be run over and crushed to death.
In a few minutes no fewer than 400 Germans were killed and wounded.
The Whippets, having now completed their task, viz. “clearing up the
situation,” returned, one machine being put out of action by artillery
fire on the journey home; in all only five casualties amongst the crews
were suffered during this action.
The two most remarkable features of this little engagement are:
firstly, the helplessness of some 1,200 infantry against seven tanks
manned by seven officers and fourteen other ranks; and, secondly, that
the tanks left their starting-point, which was 3½ miles from the scene
of action, at 10.30 a.m., covered ten miles of ground, fought a battle,
and were back home again at 2.30 p.m.
On April 25 further minor tank operations took place in the
Villers-Bretonneux area, chiefly east of the Bois d’Aquenne and the
Monument, and, on the next day, British tanks for the first time in
their history co-operated with the French Army, four tanks of the 1st
Battalion being ordered to assist the Moroccan Division in an attack
on the Bois de Hangard. This attack was not a success, due to two
quite exceptional reasons; two trees were cut down during the night,
which were to have acted as landmarks for the tanks, and the smoke
barrage was in error put down to the east instead of the west of the
German line; consequently the tanks not only lost their direction but
were subjected to an intense machine-gun fire when nearing the German
position; this prevented the French infantry co-operating with them.
The month of May was chiefly spent in re-sorting the tank battalions
and resting the men. The embargo on the importation of tanks from
England had now been removed, and Mark V tanks were arriving in France
at the rate of sixty a week. This machine, very similar in shape to
the Mark IV or Mark I, was a great improvement on all former types,
it being a much more mobile and handy weapon. A new system of tactics
was at once got out to cover its increase in power, and training was
started so as to accustom all ranks to its use.
At about this time a considerable number of French troops were
billeted in and around the Tank Corps area and it is a pleasure to
record their extreme keenness to learn all they could about tanks
and their tactics. General Maistre, commanding the Tenth French
Army, with its headquarters then at Beauval, particularly asked that
tank demonstrations should be held for the units of his command.
This was done, and right through May and June two or three of these
demonstrations were given weekly. Besides French troops, units from the
Ist, XIth, XIIIth, XVIIth, and XVIIIth English Corps and the Canadian
and Australian Corps also attended, the greatest benefit resulting to
all taking part.
From the beginning of June onwards preparations were set on foot
to have all tank units ready by August 1 for any eventuality. This
necessitated intensive training, re-arming and re-equipping. Sledges
for supply haulage were prepared, bridges for the passage of light
tanks over wide trenches were made, cribs were constructed for the
heavy tanks--these were large hexagonal crates which served the same
purpose as the tank fascines did at the battle of Cambrai; wire-pulling
apparatus was got ready, smoke apparatus ordered, and portable railway
ramps made. It was altogether an excessively busy time on the training
ground and in the workshops, and, as matters eventually turned out, it
was extremely fortunate that this work was taken up at this early date,
for, as a future chapter will show, when the Tank Corps was next called
upon to make ready for an extensive operation only eight days were
obtainable to prepare in.