THE FRENCH TANK CORPS
The existence of the French Tank Corps was due to the untiring energy
of one man--Colonel (now General) Estienne. On December 1, 1915, this
officer, then commanding the 6th French Divisional Artillery, addressed
a letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies in which he
expressed his firm belief that an engine of war, mechanically propelled
and protected by armour, capable of transporting infantry and guns,
was the solution to the deadlock on the Western Front. The idea of
the machine in Colonel Estienne’s mind was the result of his work
throughout the year 1915, during which period he had seen Holt tractors
in use with British artillery units.
On December 12, 1915, Colonel Estienne was given an interview at
G.Q.G., the French General Headquarters, where he set forth his theory
of mechanical warfare. On the 20th of this month he visited Paris to
discuss the details of his machine with the engineers of the Schneider
firm; but it was not until February 25, 1916, that the Department for
Artillery and Munitions decided to place with this firm an order for
400 of these armoured vehicles.
Meanwhile, Colonel Estienne returned to his command, the 3rd Corps
Artillery, before Verdun, but still kept in unofficial touch with the
manufacturers. Two months later he learned that a similar number of
cars, but of a different pattern, were to be made by the St. Chamond
works. These machines were of a heavier type with a petrol-electric
drive.
In June 1916 the French Ministry of Munitions, which had meanwhile
been created, decided on an experimental and instructional area
at Marly-le-Roi. Later on, a depot for the reception of stores
was established at Cercottes. On September 30, Colonel Estienne
was promoted to the rank of General and gazetted “Commandant
de l’Artillerie d’Assaut aux Armées” and was appointed the
Commander-in-Chief’s delegate to the Ministry of Munitions in matters
connected with tanks; he thus became the official connecting link
between the armies in the field and the constructional organisation of
the Ministry.
In October a training centre was established at Champlieu on the
southern edge of the forest of Compiègne, and it was here that the
first tank units were assembled on December 1, 1916. During the
succeeding months, Schneider (see Plate IV) and St. Chamond (see Plate
IV) machines continued to arrive, and training was carried out at this
camp until the German offensive of 1918.
On June 20 a tank establishment was sent to the Ministry of Munitions
and was approved of a month later. This establishment comprised four
Schneider battalions and four St. Chamond battalions, and the creation
of two tank training centres besides Champlieu, namely, Martigny and
Mailly Poivres.
Meanwhile, General Estienne in June visited England, and having seen
the British Mark I machine was convinced of the necessity of a lighter
tank. This tank was the result of an idea he had in mind, namely, of
producing on the battlefield waves of skirmishers in open order; each
skirmisher to be clad in armour, and to be armed with a machine gun
which could be used with uninterrupted vision in all directions. The
weight of armour necessitated an auxiliary means of motion; this, in
its turn, gave rise to the necessity for another man to drive the
machine. These views General Estienne laid before the Renault firm
in July 1916, and at the same time he urged the Ministry to accept
his proposed light tank, but without success. Complete designs were,
however, prepared and on November 27 General Estienne was able to
propose to Marshal Joffre the construction of a large number of light
tanks for future operations and to inform him of the existence of the
design of such a machine; in fact, 150 had already been ordered as
“Command” tanks for the heavy battalions (see Plate VI). Still the
Ministry was not convinced, and it was not until further trials had
taken place that, in May 1917, an order for 1,150 was authorised. This
number was increased in June to 3,500, when a new sub-department of the
Ministry of Munitions known as “Le Sous-Direction d’Artillerie” was
formed to deal with the production and design of tanks.
In spite of all General Estienne’s endeavours, he was still
experiencing from certain adherents of the old school, the thinkers in
“bayonets and sabres,” that unbending opposition which had proved so
formidable an antagonist to the progress and expansion of the British
Tank Corps, and it was not until the battle of Cambrai had been fought,
in November 1917, that the French Ministry of Munitions was finally
convinced of the value of the tank. Opposition now ceased, and in order
to accelerate the output, the firms of Renault, Schneider, and Berliet
were all engaged in the manufacture of light _chars d’assauts_.
In December 1917 it was decided to form 30 light tank battalions of 72
fighting and 3 wireless signal machines each. Of these 30 battalions
27 were in the field and the remaining 3 undergoing their preliminary
training at Cercottes on the date of the signing of the armistice.
The operations of the French Tank Corps may be divided into three
well-defined periods:
(i) First period, 1917, birth and infancy of the Schneider and St.
Chamond types.
(ii) Second period, first half of 1918, adolescence and maturity of the
Schneider and St. Chamond, and the infancy of the Renault type.
(iii) Third period, second half of 1918, adolescence and maturity of
the Renault machine.
During the first period three battles were fought:
On April 16, 1917, the French tanks fought their first engagement,
taking part in the operations of the Fifth French Army in the attempted
penetration on the Chemin des Dames. Eight Schneider companies were
employed. Three of these were to operate between the Craonne Plateau
and the Miette, and five between the Miette and the Aisne. The former
companies failed to get into action and suffered heavy losses from
the enemy’s artillery, which from the heights of the Craonne plateau
commanded their advance. The latter companies succeeded in crossing
the second and third lines of the enemy’s defences, but in spite of
their remaining for a considerable time in front of the infantry
these troops could not follow owing to the enemy’s heavy machine-gun
fire. At nightfall the tank companies were rallied, having sustained
serious losses in personnel and _matériel_. Bodies of infantry had been
specially detailed to escort the tanks and prepare paths for their
advance, but their training had been limited and their efforts were
ineffectual.
[Illustration: PLATE IV
FRENCH SCHNEIDER TANK.]
[Illustration: FRENCH ST. CHAMOND TANK.]
On May 5 one St. Chamond and two Schneider companies took part in
a hurriedly prepared operation with the Sixth Army. The Schneider
companies led the infantry in a successful attack on Laffaux hill,
and of the sixteen St. Chamond tanks detailed for the action only one
crossed the German trenches.
Between May and October preparations were made by the Sixth French
Army for an attack on the west of the Chemin des Dames, and for this
attack infantry were trained with the tanks at Champlieu and special
detachments, known as _troupes d’accompagnement_, were instructed in
the ways and means of assisting the tanks over the trenches.
The attack, which became known as the battle of Malmaison, was fought
on October 23. Five companies of tanks took part in it under the
orders of Colonel Wahl, who had recently been appointed to command the
Artillerie d’Assaut with the Sixth Army. This command was the origin
of what later became a Tank Brigade Headquarters, which corresponded
with a Group Headquarters in the final organisation of the British Tank
Corps.
In this battle the Schneider company operated with success, but the St.
Chamond machines were a failure, only one or two reaching the plateau.
On the 25th the St. Chamonds were used again.
Generally speaking, it was considered that the French heavy tanks had
justified their construction, nevertheless many still doubted their
utility when the victory of Cambrai, on the British front, dispelled
all doubts in the French mind.
The second period now opened and defensive reconnaissances were
undertaken along the French front in view of the expected German
offensive.
In March 1918 all available tanks were concentrated behind the front of
the Third French Army as counter-attack troops, and in this capacity
took part in the following minor operations, which were chiefly
undertaken to recapture features of local tactical importance: on April
5 at Sauvillers; on April 7 at Grivesnes; on April 8 at Sénécat wood,
and on May 28 at Cantigny in co-operation with American troops.
Following the great blow struck at the junction of the British and
French Armies in March the German General Staff decided to attack
the French on May 27. It would appear that this attack was at first
intended only to secure the heights south of the river Vesle, but that
by the 29th, owing to its astonishing initial success, it was decided
to push it forward with the ultimate intention of capturing Paris and
so ending the war before America could develop her full strength. In
support of this intention there is evidence that a council of war
was held in the recaptured area at which the Kaiser, Crown Prince,
Hindenburg and Ludendorff were present and at which it was decided to
exploit the success gained to its utmost, not, however, losing sight
of the original plan, which was to include the capture of Reims. This
offensive may be considered to have worn itself out by June 4, on which
date the Germans had developed a salient forty kilometres deep on a
forty kilometres front. The old capital of France, however, remained in
French hands and its occupation denied to the German forces holding the
salient a most needed line of supply.
On June 9 the attack was extended, being directed against the Third
French Army between Noyon and Montdidier. Behind this Army four heavy
tank battalions had been assembled. The first and second lines soon
fell into the enemy’s hands, and the French troops, which had been
detailed for counter-attack, were rapidly absorbed in the defence. On
the 10th reinforcements were hurried forward, and on the 11th General
Mangin launched his tank and infantry counter-attack. This battle
continued until the 13th, and in spite of the many difficulties 111 out
of the 144 tanks assembled started at zero hour. Losses in machines
were heavy and about 50 per cent. of their crews became casualties,
but in spite of this and the fact that the tanks rapidly outdistanced
the infantry, a heavy blow was inflicted on the enemy, whose offensive
definitely broke down.
In the action of June 11 the Schneider and St. Chamond tanks reached
the zenith of their career. From now onwards, though they continued to
be fought, they gradually ceased to be used as units, becoming mixed
with Renault machines until finally, in October 1918, the two remaining
mixed battalions were armed with British Mark V star tanks; these two
battalions, however, never took the field.
In order to stop the enemy’s onrush on May 27, two battalions of
Renault tanks were hurried up by road to the north-eastern fringes of
the forest of Villers-Cotterets, and on May 31 they made their debut,
two companies co-operating with colonial infantry on the plateau east
of Cravançon farm. From this date on to June 15, these two battalions
continued to act on the defensive with tired troops; nevertheless they
succeeded in preventing a further advance of the German Armies. This
closes the second period.
During the first fortnight of July the 3rd and 5th Renault Battalions
were moved to the battle area, the former being attached to the Fifth
French Army, south of Dormans, and the latter to the Tenth. These
machines came into action on the 15th, 16th, and 17th of the month.
On July 15 the Germans launched their final great attack of the war,
the blow falling between Château-Thierry and Reims. The French Armies
involved in this battle were holding the following sectors:
(i) The Tenth Army, between the Aisne and the Ourcq.
(ii) The Sixth Army, between the Ourcq and the Marne.
(iii) The Fifth Army, between the Marne and Reims.
(iv) The Fourth Army, east of Reims.
The warning order to concentrate his units was received by the G.O.C.,
French Tank Corps, on July 14. At that time the G.O.C. Tenth French
Army had at his disposal five heavy battalions and three light, and the
Fifth and Sixth French Army respectively now received one heavy and
three light battalions. The total number of tank battalions available
was, therefore, seven heavy battalions and nine light ones.
The main attack was to be made by the Tenth French Army, whilst the
Sixth and Fifth Armies were to intervene, when the time was ripe, in
order to harry the enemy in a retirement which would be inevitable if
the attack of the Tenth Army was successful. The entire operation was
to be based on tanks, which were to be engaged to the last machine. As
this was the greatest French tank battle fought during the war it is
interesting to enter, in some detail, into the operations of the tanks
allotted to the French Tenth Army.
On July 14, when orders were issued for the concentration of tanks on
the Tenth French Army front, Colonel Chedeville, commanding the 2nd
Tank Brigade, was with the Third French Army. He had at his disposal
three St. Chamond battalions, the 10th, 11th, and 12th, two Schneider
battalions, the 3rd and 4th, and one complete Light Brigade comprising
the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Renault battalions, and the 1st Schneider
battalion. Of these the first five were in the First and Third French
Army areas, and had suffered severely in the counter-attack of June 11.
Having received his orders, Colonel Chedeville at once assembled his
battalion commanders and explained to them the situation. At 6 p.m. a
further conference was held at which the proposed sectors of attack
were allotted for reconnaissance. These reconnaissances were completed
by 6 p.m. on the following day, and on them was based “Army Operation
Order No. 243,” in which tank units were allotted as follows:
_1st Corps_
3rd Heavy Tank Battalion Allotted to 153rd Division.
(27 tanks).
_XXth Corps_
12th Heavy Tank Battalion Allotted to 2nd American Division,
(30 tanks)
11th Heavy Tank Battalion „ „ 2nd American Division.
(30 tanks)
4th Heavy Tank Battalion „ „ Moroccan Division.
(48 tanks)
1st Heavy Tank Battalion „ „ 1st American Division.
(48 tanks)
_XXXth Corps_
10th Heavy Tank Battalion Allotted to 38th Division.
(24 tanks)
_In Army Reserve in the region of Villers-Cotterets--Fleury_
1st Light Tank Battalion (45 tanks)
2nd Light Tank Battalion (40 tanks)
3rd Light Tank Battalion (45 tanks)
The assembly positions from north to south of the various units were as
follows:
3rd Heavy Tank Battalion Ravine south-west of Montigny-Lengrain.
12th Heavy Tank Battalion Ravine north of Mortefontaine.
11th Heavy Tank Battalion Two Companies Ravine Longavesne and
Lepine farm, 1 Company ravine 1
kilometre north of Soucy.
4th Heavy Tank Battalion Northern fringes of the forest of
Villers-Cotterets south-east of
Vivières.
1st Heavy Tank Battalion Maison Forestière, 200 metres north of
the railway on the road from Villers
to Soissons.
10th Heavy Tank Battalion Cross-roads south-east of the Cordeliers
cross in Villers-Cotterets forest.
1st Light Tank Battalion Northern edge of Villers-Cotterets
south-west of Vivières, ready to
attack in the wake of the Moroccan
Division.
2nd Light Tank Battalion Northern edge of forest south-west of
Vivières ready to follow 2nd American
Division.
3rd Light Tank Battalion St. George’s cross, ready to support
either the 48th Division or the XIth
Corps.
Owing to the failure of the Military Transportation Authorities great
delay was occasioned in the arrival of several units, and in some cases
tanks had to be left behind. Generally speaking, detraining stations
were not far enough forward; this resulted in the 1st and 3rd Light
Battalions arriving late at their destinations.
During the night of July 17-18, the various units proceeded to their
starting-points in rear of their respective lines of attack.
3rd Heavy Tank Battalion }
153rd Division }St. Bandry--Saconin et Breuil--Vauxbuin.
11th Heavy Tank Battalion}
12th Heavy Tank Battalion}Cutry--Missy aux Bois Ploisy.
1st American Division }
4th Heavy Tank Battalion }
Moroccan Division }St. Pierre Aigle--Chaudun--Villemontoire.
1st Heavy Tank Battalion }
2nd American Division }Chavigny--Beaurepaire Forest--Vierzy--Tigny.
10th Heavy Tank Battalion}
38th and 48th Divisions }Longpont--Villers Helon--Le Plessier Huleu.
The attack was launched at 4.35 a.m. in a slight fog which accentuated
its surprise. There was no artillery bombardment. At 7.30 a.m., owing
to the difficulties in communication and the rapidity of the advance,
the Light Tank Battalions in Army reserve were placed at the disposal
of the XXth and XXXth Corps in order to support the Divisions which had
penetrated the deepest.
In this attack the enemy’s resistance was not unusually stubborn
and the tanks and infantry advanced to a considerable depth without
difficulty. Several tanks of the 12th Heavy Battalion fell out by the
way, but those of the 10th succeeded beyond expectation in negotiating
the difficult ground in the neighbourhood of Longpont. Of the Renault
battalions only the first came into action, being launched at 7 p.m. in
an attack on Vauxcastille ravin in which it succeeded in leading the
infantry forward to a depth of three to four kilometres.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF SOISSONS
July 18th 1918.]
Of the 324 tanks which were concentrated in the Tenth French Army
Sector, 225 were engaged on July 18. Of these 102 became casualties,
62 being put out of action by artillery fire. In personnel the losses
were about 25 per cent. of the effectives engaged.
On July 19, composite units were formed and 105 machines took part in
this day’s fighting, which consisted in divisional attacks on limited
objectives launched at various hours during the day. By now the enemy’s
resistance had increased so much that several of the tank battalions
suffered heavily. The 3rd Heavy Battalion had, by the end of the
day, lost all its remaining tanks save two, but in sustaining these
casualties it had pushed the line forward to the Chaussée Brunehaut. In
the 12th Heavy Battalion only one machine reached its final objective.
In spite of this severe resistance the attack was a great success. Of
the 105 tanks operating fifty were hit by shell fire, and casualties
amongst crews totalled up to 22 per cent. of the personnel engaged.
On the following day only small local counter-attacks were carried out;
in these thirty-two tanks took part, of which seventeen were hit and no
less than 52 per cent. of their crews became casualties.
On July 21 the XXth Corps carried out a prepared attack, the
first objective being the line Buzancy--eastern edge of Concrois
wood--Hartennes wood, and the second the line of Chacrise. The attack
was launched without artillery preparation and the villages of Tigny
and Villemontoire were captured, but later on retaken by the enemy.
During this day’s fighting 100 tanks were engaged, of which thirty-six
were hit; losses in personnel amounted to 27 per cent. of effectives.
On the evening of the 21st it was decided to withdraw all tanks into
Army reserve so that they might refit for a projected attack on the
23rd. This attack was launched at 5 a.m., the XXth and XXXth Corps
taking part. The chief characteristic of this day’s fighting was that
the attack was made against an enemy occupying a defensive position
supported by a very strong force of artillery. The result of this was
that no fewer than forty-eight tanks out of eighty-two were hit. It,
however, must be remembered that during the six succeeding days of
battle the tank units, attached to the Tenth French Army, had exhausted
themselves, having practically fought to the last machine and last man.
On the evening of the 23rd they were withdrawn in Army reserve, and
three days later were placed in G.H.Q., reserve.
Meanwhile the Sixth French Army had conformed to the requirements of
the main attack. The tank units of this Army were, on the evening of
July 14, placed under the orders of Commandant Michel; they comprised
the following battalions:
503rd Renault Regiment: 7th, 8th, and 9th Battalions.
13th St. Chamond Battalion.
On July 15, company commanders reconnoitred the front of attack,
the tanks meanwhile being got ready for entrainment. On July 18 all
units were in position with the infantry units to which they had been
allotted, as follows:
7th Light Battalion. 2 Companies to the 2nd Division.
8th „ „ 3 „ „ 47th „
9th „ „ 1 „ „ 164th „
2 „ „ 63rd „
13th Heavy Battalion 1 „ „ 47th „
2 Companies in Army reserve.
The 2nd and 47th Divisions were in the IInd Corps, whilst the 63rd and
164th Divisions were in the VIIth Corps.
At zero hour plus thirty minutes the tanks left their starting-points.
The 7th and 8th Light Battalions operated effectively in the capture
of the heights west of Neuilly St. Front and hill 167. The attack of
No. 325 Company of the 9th Light Battalion, operating with the 47th
Division, was brilliantly executed north of Courchamps.
In the evening the tanks rallied, the attack being continued with all
available machines on the following morning.
As a general rule a section of five tanks was affiliated to each
attacking battalion. This policy continued to the end of the operations
on July 26, when the regiment was withdrawn to rest, worn out more
by “trekking” than by fighting. The casualties in this sector were
extremely light.
When the front of the attack, launched by the Germans, on July 15,
became known to the French Higher Command, a Light Regiment of tanks,
consisting of the 4th and 6th Battalions, was hurriedly dispatched from
the Sixth French Army area to the Fourth Army east of Reims. The 5th
Battalion engaged one company with the 73rd Infantry Division of the
Sixth French Army in the recapture of Janvier wood, south of Dormans,
on July 15, and two companies on July 16 and 17, in “mopping up” in the
direction of Bois de Conde, east of Château-Thierry.
When it was realised that the German attack east of Reims had failed,
the 4th and 6th Battalions were hurriedly transported by road, between
July 16 and 19, south of the Marne, south-west of Reims, to take part
in local counter-attacks. These attacks were entrusted to the Ninth
French Army, which had taken over command of all French troops south
of the Marne, and had at its disposal the 4th, 5th, and 6th Light Tank
Battalions, and two companies of heavy tanks, which had been rapidly
sent up by train from St. Germaine between Epernay and Reims.
Two sections of the 4th Light Battalion were engaged on July 18
with two battalions of the 7th Infantry Regiment; two on July 20,
with the 97th and 159th Regiments; and one on the 19th, with the
131st Division--all in the neighbourhood of the Bois de Leuvrigny
south of the Marne. Later, on July 23, sections of the 4th Battalion
were employed with British troops--the 186th Infantry Brigade in
the attack on Marfaux and with the 56th and 60th Battalions of the
chasseurs-à-pied at Connetreuil, whilst, on the same date, two sections
of the 6th Battalion attacked with units of the 15th British Division
between Espilly and Marfaux, and two more were employed unsuccessfully
with the 37th Infantry Regiment against Fauants farm.
So ends the account of the tank actions in the battle of Soissons.
This great victory, from a tank point of view, had a stupendous
influence on succeeding operations, owing to:
(i) The eagerness with which Infantry Commanders now clamoured for
tanks.
(ii) The speeding up of the formation and training of new tank
battalions.
From this date on, battalions of Renault tanks became available at the
rate of one a week; this resulted in tired battalions being speedily
replaced by fresh ones, consequently they were never so completely worn
out as was the case in the British Tank Corps, which only received two
fresh battalions between August and November 1918, one of which arrived
too untrained ever to go into action.
The operations from now on will be very briefly described, as space
does not permit of elaboration. It is, however, of interest that these
tank actions should be enumerated, for they show that, without the
assistance of the tank, a deadlock would have re-occurred.
On August 1, 45 French tanks took part in an engagement at Grand
Rozoy. Then came the great British tank attack of August 8, in which
the First and Tenth French Armies co-operated, 110 French tanks taking
part on this day and the following, 80 advancing with the infantry a
distance of 18 kilometres on the south of the Roye-Amiens road, whilst
30 made a 5-kilometre advance near Montdidier. Between August 16 and
18 the attack developed west of Roye; here 60 Renault and 32 Schneider
machines were engaged; co-operation with the infantry was, however,
difficult on account of the broken nature of the old battlefield across
which the attack was now being pushed.
The next operation was a continuation of the Tenth Army’s offensive; it
took place between the Oise and the Aisne, beginning on August 20, and
being continued intermittently up to and including September 3. On the
20th and 22nd, 12 Schneider, 28 St. Chamond, and 30 Renault tanks were
engaged north of Soissons.
During the week commencing August 28, three Light Battalions advanced
five kilometres between the Aisne and the Aillette, 305 machines being
employed at different times during these operations.
The next operation in which tanks were engaged was the cutting off of
the St. Mihiel salient, French tanks being used with the Second French
and American Armies. During the two days’ fighting, September 12 and
13, some 140 tanks took part in the battle.
On September 14, the Tenth French Army resumed its offensive east of
Soissons, eighty-five Renault tanks co-operating between the 14th and
the 16th. Ten days later an extensive joint attack was made by the
Fifth and Second French Armies in conjunction with the American Army
commencing on the 26th; this attack continued until October 9.
The Fourth Army attacked on a 15-kilometre front in the Champagne, and
in all 630 Renault and 24 Schneider actions were fought. Meanwhile the
Second French Army and the American Armies attacked on a 12-kilometre
front between the Argonne and the Meuse, and advanced during the seven
battle days some 15 kilometres; 350 Renault, 34 Schneider, and 27 St.
Chamond actions were fought in connection with this advance.
At the urgent request of the Sixth French Army Commander, whose
command had joined the “Grand Army of Flanders” after its work in the
Soissons area had been concluded in July, a Renault battalion, less one
company, and some heavy tank units were entrained for Dunkerque, the
third company of this battalion having already been sent on detachment
to Salonika at the urgent request of General Franchet d’Esperey. On
September 30 and October 3 and 4, 55 tanks were employed north-west
of Roulers, and from the 14th to the 19th, 178 tank engagements were
fought, in which the enemy was driven back some 15 kilometres. This
advance was continued on the 31st of this month in the direction of
Thielt, and on this and the two following days 75 tank engagements took
place.
From the end of September onwards, operations generally had consisted
in following up the enemy all along the line and pressing back his
rearguards. On September 30, a minor tank action was fought between
the Aisne and the Vesle; on October 16 another on the eastern bank of
the Meuse, and between October 17 and 19 yet another north-east of
St. Quentin, in co-operation with the British attack further north.
In this last attack the French Army advanced ten kilometres on a
three-kilometre front. The last actions fought by French tanks took
place between October 25 and 31, the first south of the Oise and in the
direction of Guise, when, on a front of five kilometres, an advance of
no fewer than fifteen was made, the second north-west of Rethel, and
the third north of Cruyshantem in Flanders.
In conclusion, it is interesting to summarise the statistics available
and compare them with those of the British Tank Corps given at the end
of Chapter XXXVII.
In August the strength of the French Tank Corps was 14,649 all ranks,
approximately the strength of an infantry division. During 1918,
3,988 individual tank engagements were fought: 3,140 by Renault, 473
by Schneider, and 375 by St. Chamond tanks. Tanks were employed on
45 of the 120 days which elapsed between July 15 and November 11. In
personnel the casualties between these dates were approximately 300
officers and 2,300 other ranks.
Finally it may be stated that as there can be no doubt that July 18
was the second greatest turning-point in the war on the Western Front,
the first being the battle of the Marne in 1914, so can there be no
doubt that the battle of Soissons would never have been won had not the
French possessed a powerful force of tanks whereby to initiate success.
The German General Staff, which should be the best judge of this
question, candidly admit that the French victory was due to the use of
“masses of tanks.” Neither was the General Commanding-in-Chief of the
French Armies reticent, for on July 30 he issued the following special
order of the day to the French Tank Corps: “Vous avez bien mérité la
patrie,” whilst General Estienne, to whom so much was due, received the
Cravat of the Légion d’Honneur and was promoted to the rank of General
of Division for the great services he had rendered to his country.