THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI
On October 20, the project, which had been constantly in the mind of
the General Staff of the Tank Corps for nearly three months and in
anticipation of which preparations had already been undertaken, was
approved of, and its date fixed for November 20.
The battle was to be based on tanks and led by them. There was to be no
preliminary artillery bombardment; the day the Tank Corps had prayed
for, for nearly a year, was at last fixed, and its success depended on
the following three factors:
(i) That the attack was a surprise.
(ii) That the tanks were able to cross the great trenches
of the Hindenburg system.
(iii) That the infantry possessed sufficient confidence in
the tanks to follow them.
The following difficulties had to be overcome before these requirements
could be met. The tanks, on October 20, were scattered over a
considerable area: some were at Ypres, others near Lens, and others
at Bermicourt. These would all have to be assembled not at suitable
entraining stations, as is usually the case, but at various training
areas so that co-operative training with the infantry could take
place. This was of first importance, for success depended as much on
the confidence of the infantry in the tanks as on the surprise of the
attack. At these training centres, tanks would have to be completely
overhauled and fitted with a special device to assist them in crossing
the Hindenburg trenches, which were known, in many places, to be
over 12 ft. wide, and the span of the Mark IV machine was only 10
ft. This device consisted in binding together by means of chains
some seventy-five ordinary fascines, thus making one tank fascine, a
great bundle of brushwood 4½ ft. in diameter and 10 ft. long; this
bundle was carried on the nose of the tank and, when a large trench
was encountered, was cast into it by pulling a quick release inside
the tank. As already described these tank fascines and the “fitments”
necessary to fix and release them were made by the Tank Corps Central
Workshops.
Before the infantry assembled for training a new tactics had to be
devised, not only to meet the conditions which would be encountered
but to fit the limitations imposed upon the tank by it being able to
carry only one tank fascine. Once this fascine was cast it could not be
picked up again without considerable difficulty.
Briefly, the tactics decided on were worked out to meet the following
requirements: “To effect a penetration of four systems of trenches in
a few hours without any type of artillery preparation.” They were as
follows:
Each objective was divided up into tank section attack areas, according
to the number of tactical points in the objective, and a separate
echelon, or line, of tanks was allotted to each objective. Each section
was to consist of three machines--one Advanced Guard tank and two
Infantry tanks (also called Main Body tanks); this was agreed to on
account of there not being sufficient tanks in France to bring sections
up to four machines apiece.
The duty of the Advanced Guard tank was to keep down the enemy’s fire
and to protect the Infantry tanks as they led the infantry through the
enemy’s wire and over his trenches. The allotment of the infantry to
tanks depended on the strength of the objective to be attacked, and
the nature of the approaches; their formation was that of sections in
single file with a leader to each file. They were organised in three
forces: trench clearers to operate with the tanks; trench stops to
block the trenches at various points, and trench supports to garrison
the captured trench and form an advanced guard to the next echelon of
tanks and infantry passing through.
The whole operation was divided into three phases: the Assembly, the
Approach, and the Attack. The first was carried out at night time
and was a parade drill, the infantry falling in behind the tanks on
tape lines, connected with their starting-points by taped routes. The
Approach was slow and orderly, the infantry holding themselves in
readiness to act on their own initiative. The Attack was regulated
so as to economise tank fascines; it was carried out as follows. The
Advanced Guard tank went straight forward through the enemy’s wire
and, turning to the left, without crossing the trench in front of it,
opened right sponson broadsides. The Infantry tanks then made for the
same spot: the left-hand one, crossing the wire, approached the trench
and cast its fascine, then crossed over the fascine and, turning to the
left, worked down the fire trench and round its allotted objective;
the second Infantry tank crossed over the fascine of the first and
made for the enemy’s support trench, cast its fascine, and, crossing,
did likewise. Meanwhile the Advanced Guard tank had swung round, and
crossing over the fascines of the two Infantry tanks moved forward with
its own fascine still in position. When the two Infantry tanks met they
formed up behind the Advanced Guard tank and awaited orders.
In training the infantry the following exercises were carried out:
(i) Assembly of infantry behind tanks.
(ii) Advance to attack behind tanks.
(iii) Passing through wire crushed down by tanks.
(iv) Clearing up a trench sector under protection of tanks.
To enable them to work quickly in section single files and to form from
these into section lines, a simple platoon drill was issued, and it is
interesting to note that this drill was based on a very similar one
described by Xenophon in his “Cyropædia” and attributed to King Cyrus
(_circa_ 500 B.C.).
Whilst training was being arranged by the Tank Corps General Staff the
Administrative Staff was preparing for the railway concentration, which
was by no means an easy problem.
The difficulties of concentrating a large number of tanks in the area
of operations was accentuated by the dispersion of the Tank Corps and
the shortage of trucks; this shortage was made good by collecting a
number of old French heavy trucks; these, however, did not prove at all
satisfactory as they were too light. In spite of these difficulties
the whole of the units of the Tank Corps were concentrated in their
training areas by November 5.
In order to make the most of the available truckage and the time
attainable for infantry training, it was decided to concentrate
three-quarters of the whole number of tanks to be used, _i.e._
twenty-seven train loads, at the Plateau station by November 14 (Z-6
days); to move these to their final detraining stations on Z-4, Z-3,
and Z-2 days; and to move the remaining quarter, _i.e._ nine train
loads, from the training areas to the detraining stations on Z-5 day.
The detraining stations selected were Ruyaulcourt and Bertincourt for
the 1st Brigade, Sorel and Ytres for the 2nd Brigade, and Old and New
Heudicourt for the 3rd Brigade. At all these stations detraining ramps
and sidings were built or improved. In all, thirty-six tank trains were
run, and except for two or three minor accidents the move was carried
out to programme. This was chiefly due to the excellent work of the
Third Army Transportation Staff.
Supply arrangements were divided under two main headings: supply by
light railways and supply in the field by supply tanks. The main dumps
selected were at Havrincourt wood for the 1st Brigade, Dessart wood for
the 2nd, and Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt for the 3rd Brigade.
A few of the items dumped were 165,000 gallons of petrol, 55,000 lb.
of grease, 5,000,000 rounds of S.A.A., and 54,000 rounds of 6-pounder
ammunition. Without the assistance of the light railways this dumping
would hardly have been possible. On November 30 a S.O.S. call for
petrol was made on Ruyaulcourt. A train was loaded, despatched 3½
miles, and the petrol delivered in just under one hour. This is a fair
example of the magnificent work consistently carried out by the Third
Army light railways during the battle of Cambrai.
The Third Army plan of operations was as follows:
(i) To break the German defensive system between the canal St. Quentin
and the canal Du Nord.
(ii) To seize Cambrai, Bourlon wood, and the passages over the river
Sensée.
(iii) To cut off the Germans in the area south of the Sensée and west
of the canal Du Nord.
(iv) To exploit the success towards Valenciennes.
This operation, for its initial success, depended on the penetration of
all lines of defences, including the Masnières-Beaurevoir line, which
in its turn depended on the seizing of the bridges at Masnières and
Marcoing.
The force allotted for this attack was--two corps of three infantry
divisions each; the Tank Corps of nine battalions--378 fighting tanks
and 98 administrative machines; a cavalry corps, and 1,000 guns.
The attack was to be carried out in three phases. In the first the
infantry were to occupy the line Crèvecœur, Masnières, Marcoing,
Flesquières, canal Du Nord; the leading cavalry division was then to
push through at Masnières and Marcoing, capture Cambrai, Paillencourt,
and Pailluel (crossing over the river Sensée), and move with its right
on Valenciennes; whilst this was in progress the IIIrd Corps, which
formed the right wing of the Third Army, was to form a defensive flank
on the line Crèvecœur, La Belle Etoile, Iwuy; the cavalry were then
to cut the Valenciennes-Douai line and so facilitate the advance of
the IIIrd Corps in a north-easterly direction. The second and third
phases were to be carried out by the IVth Corps, which formed the left
wing of the Third Army, and were to consist firstly in opening the
Bapaume-Cambrai road and occupying Bourlon and Inchy, and secondly, in
opening the Arras-Cambrai road and advancing on the Sensée canal and so
to cut off the German forces west of the canal Du Nord.
The ground to be fought over consisted chiefly in open, rolling
downland, very lightly shelled, and consequently most suitable to
tank movement. The main tactical features were the two canals which
practically prohibited the formation of tank offensive flanks and
so strategically were a distinct disadvantage to what was meant to
be a decisive battle. Between these two canals were two important
features--the Flesquières-Havrincourt ridge and Bourlon hill. A third
very important feature, known as the Rumilly-Seranvillers ridge, ran
parallel to and north of the St. Quentin canal between Crèvecœur and
Marcoing; without the occupation of this ridge a direct attack from
the south on Bourlon hill could only take place under the greatest
disadvantage.
The German defences consisted of three main lines of resistance and
an outpost line: these lines were the Hindenburg Line, the Hindenburg
Support Line, and the Beaurevoir-Masnières-Bourlon line, the last being
very incomplete. The trenches for the most part were sited on the
reverse slopes of the main ridges, and consequently direct artillery
observation on them from the British area was impossible. They were
protected by immensely thick bands and fields of wire arranged in
salients so as to render their destruction most difficult. To have
cut these bands by artillery fire would have required several weeks
bombardment and scores of thousands of tons of ammunition.
The weather had been throughout November fine and foggy, so much so
that aeroplane observation had been next to impossible. This foggy
weather greatly assisted preparatory arrangements by securing them from
observation.
The artillery preparations were as follows:--Over 1,000 guns of various
calibres were concentrated in the Third Army area for the attack. None
of these, however, were permitted to register before zero hour. Briefly
the following was the artillery programme from zero hour on.
At zero the barrage was to open on the enemy’s outpost line; it was to
consist of shrapnel and H.E. mixed with smoke shells. It was to move
forward by jumps of approximately 250 yards at a time, standing on
certain objectives for stated periods. Simultaneously with this jumping
barrage smoke screens were to be thrown up on selected localities,
notably on the right flank of the IIIrd Corps and on the Flesquières
ridge; counter-battery work was to open and special bombardments on
prearranged localities such as bridgeheads, centres of communication,
and roads likely to be used by the German reserves were to take place.
Tank Corps reconnaissances were started as early as secrecy would
permit, but it was not until a few days before November 20 that
commanders were allowed to reconnoitre the ground from our front-trench
system. Meanwhile at the Plateau station tanks were tuned up and tank
fascines fixed. All detrainments were carried out by night, the tanks
being moved up to their position of assembly under cover of darkness.
These positions were: Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt for the 3rd
Brigade, Dessart wood for the 2nd Brigade, and Havrincourt wood for the
1st Brigade. At these places tanks were carefully camouflaged.
DISTRIBUTION OF FIGHTING TANKS
----+----+------+-----+-----+------+-----------+----------+------------
Tank|Tank|Corps.|Divn.|Bde. |No. of|Objective. | Exploit | Remarks.
Bde.| Bn.| | | |Tanks.| |towards-- |
----+----+------+-----+-----+------+-----------+----------+------------
3rd | C | IV |12th |35th | 24 | Blue |Crèvecœur |Number of
Bde.| | | | | 4[A]| | |tanks used
„ | „ | „ | „ |37th | 12 | Brown | |for
| | | | | 2[A]| | |exploitation
„ | F | „ | „ |36th | 24 | Blue |Masnières |varied
| | | | | 4[A]| | |according to
„ | „ | „ | „ |36th | 12 | Brown | |condition of
| | | | | 2[A]| | |units after
„ | I | „ |20th |61st | 18 |Vacquerie |Crèvecœur |gaining Blue
| | | | | 3[A]| | |and Brown
„ | „ | „ | „ | „ | 12 | Blue | |Lines.
| | | | | 2[A]| | |
„ | „ | „ | „ |62nd | 6 | Brown | |
| | | | | 1[A]| | |
„ | A | „ | „ |60th | 18 | Blue |Canal, |
| | | | | 3[A]| |Masnières |
| | | | | | |to |
| | | | | 3[A]| |Marcoing. |
„ | „ | „ | „ | „ | 6 | Brown | |
| | | | | 1[A]| | |
„ | „ | „ |29th | „ | 12 |Rumilly to | |
| | | | | 2[A]|Nine wood | |
2nd | B | „ | 6th |16th | 24 | Blue |Marcoing. |
Bde.| | | | | 4[A]| | |
„ | „ | „ | „ | „ | 12 | Brown | |
| | | | | 2[A]| | |
„ | H | „ | „ |71st | 24 | Blue |Nine wood |
| | | | | 4[A]| | |
„ | „ | „ | „ | „ | 12 | Brown | |
| | | | | 2[A]| | |
1st | D | III |51st |152nd| 42 | Blue |Fontaine |1st Bde.
Bde.| E | „ | „ |153rd| 28 |Flesquières|Bourlon |used all
| | | | | | | wood, |tanks in
| | | | | | |Bapaume- |mechanical
| | | | | | |Cambrai |reserve.
| | | | | | |road |
„ | „ | „ |62nd |186th| 14 | Brown | |
„ | G | „ | „ |185th| 42 |Havrincourt|Bourlon |
| | | | | | |village, |
| | | | | | |Graincourt|
----+----+------+-----+-----+------+-----------+----------+------------
[A] In mechanical reserve, to replace breakdowns.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF CAMBRAI
November 20th 1917.]
The allotment of tanks to infantry units is given in the table on page
146. Besides these, each Brigade had eighteen supply tanks or gun
carriers and three wireless-signal tanks. Thirty-two machines were
specially fitted with towing gear and grapnels to clear the wire along
the cavalry lines of advance; two for carrying bridging material for
the cavalry and one to carry forward telephone cable for the Third Army
Signal Service. The total number of tanks employed was 476 machines.
On the night of November 17-18 the enemy raided our trenches in the
vicinity of Havrincourt wood and captured some of our men, and, from
the documents captured during the battle, it appears that these men
informed the enemy that an operation was impending; time wherein the
Germans could make use of this was, however, so limited that the
warning of a possible attack only reached the German firing line a few
minutes before it took place.
The following night, that of the 19th-20th, was broken by a sharp
burst of artillery and trench-mortar fire which died away in the early
morning, and at 6 a.m. all was still save for the occasional rattle of
a machine gun. A thick mist covered the ground when at 6.10 a.m., ten
minutes before zero hour, the tanks, which had deployed on a line some
1,000 yards from the enemy’s outpost trenches, began to move forward,
infantry in section columns advancing slowly behind them. Ten minutes
later, at 6.20 a.m., zero hour, the 1,000 British guns opened fire, the
barrage coming down with a terrific crash about 200 yards in front of
the tanks which were now proceeding slowly across “No Man’s Land,” led
by Brigadier-General H. J. Elles, the Commander of the Tank Corps, who
flew the Tank Corps colours from his tank and who on the evening before
the battle had issued the following inspiring Special Order to his men:
_Special Order No. 6_[27]
1. To-morrow the Tank Corps will have the chance for which it has
been waiting for many months--to operate on good going in the van
of the battle.
2. All that hard work and ingenuity can achieve has been done in
the way of preparation.
3. It remains for unit commanders and for tank crews to complete
the work by judgment and pluck in the battle itself.
4. In the light of past experience I leave the good name of the
Corps with great confidence in their hands.
5. I propose leading the attack of the centre division.
HUGH ELLES,
_B.G. Commanding Tank Corps_.
_November 19, 1917._
The attack was a stupendous success; as the tanks moved forward
with the infantry following close behind, the enemy completely lost
his balance and those who did not fly panic-stricken from the field
surrendered with little or no resistance. Only at the tactical points
was opposition met with. At Lateau wood on the right of the attack
heavy fighting took place, including a duel between a tank and a 5·9
in. howitzer. Turning on the tank the howitzer fired, shattering and
tearing off most of the right-hand sponson of the approaching machine,
but fortunately not injuring its vitals; before the gunners could
reload the tank was upon them and in a few seconds the great gun was
crushed in a jumbled mass amongst the brushwood surrounding it. A
little to the west of this wood the tanks of F Battalion, which had
topped the ridge, were speeding down on Masnières. One approached the
bridge, the key to the Rumilly-Seranvillers position, upon the capture
of which so much depended. On arriving at the bridge it was found that
the enemy had already blown it up, nevertheless the tank attempted to
cross it; creeping down the broken girders it entered the water but
failed to climb the opposite side. Other tanks arriving and not being
able to cross assisted the infantry in doing so by opening a heavy
covering fire. Westwards again La Vacquerie was stormed and Marcoing
was occupied. This latter village had been carefully studied beforehand
and a definite scheme worked out as to where tanks should proceed
after entering it. Difficult though this operation was, each position
was taken up and the German engineers shot just as they were connecting
up the demolition charges on the main bridge to the electric batteries.
In the Grand Ravin, which runs from Havrincourt to Marcoing, all was
panic, and from Ribecourt northwards the flight of the German soldiers
could be traced by the equipment they had cast off in order to speed
their withdrawal. Nine wood (Bois des Neuf) was stormed, and Premy
Chapel occupied. At the village of Flesquières the 51st Division,
which had devised an attack formation of its own, was held up; it
appears that the tanks out-distanced the infantry or that the tactics
adopted did not permit of the infantry keeping close enough up to the
tanks. As the tanks topped the crest they came under direct artillery
fire at short range and suffered heavy casualties. This loss would
have mattered little had the infantry been close up, but, being some
distance off, directly the tanks were knocked out the German machine
gunners, ensconced amongst the ruins of the houses, came to life
and delayed their advance until nightfall; thus Flesquières was not
actually occupied until November 21.
In the village of Havrincourt some stiff fighting took place. All
objectives were, however, rapidly captured, and the 62nd Division had
the honour of occupying Graincourt before nightfall, thus effecting
the deepest penetration attained during the attack on this day. From
Graincourt several tanks pushed on towards Bourlon wood and the Cambrai
road, but by this time the infantry were too exhausted to make good any
further ground gained.
Meanwhile No. 3 Company of A Battalion had assisted the 29th Division
on the Premy Chapel-Rumilly line, one section of tanks working towards
Masnières and another co-operating with the infantry in the attack
on Marcoing and the high ground beyond. The third section attacked
Nine wood, destroying many machine guns there and at the village of
Noyelles, which was then occupied by our infantry.
Whilst these operations were in progress the supply tanks had moved
forward to their “rendezvous,” the wireless-signal tanks had taken
up their allotted position, one sending back the information of the
capture of Marcoing within ten minutes of our infantry entering this
village; and the wire-pullers cleared three broad tracks of all wire so
that the cavalry could move forward. This they did, and they assembled
in the Grand Ravin and in the area adjoining the village of Masnières.
By 4 p.m. on November 20, one of the most astonishing battles in all
history had been won and, as far as the Tank Corps was concerned,
tactically finished, for, no reserves existing, it was not possible to
do more than rally the now very weary and exhausted crews, select the
fittest, and patch up composite companies to continue the attack on
the morrow. This was done, and on the 21st the 1st Brigade supported
the 62nd Division with twenty-five tanks in its attack on Anneux and
Bourlon wood and the 2nd Brigade sent twenty-four machines against
Cantaing and Fontaine-Notre-Dame, both of which villages were captured.
November 21 saw, generally speaking, the end of any co-operative action
between tanks and infantry; henceforth, new infantry being employed,
loss of touch and action between them and the tanks constantly
resulted. Nevertheless on the 23rd a brilliant attack was executed by
the 40th Division, assisted by thirty-four tanks of the 1st Brigade;
this resulted in the capture of Bourlon wood. The tanks then pressed
on towards the village; the infantry, however, who had suffered severe
casualties in the capture of the wood, were not strong enough to secure
a firm footing in it.
This day also saw desperate fighting in the village of
Fontaine-Notre-Dame. Twenty-three tanks entered this village in advance
of our own infantry; there they met with severe resistance, the enemy
retiring to the top stories of the houses and raining bombs and
bullets down on the roofs of our machines. Our infantry, who were very
exhausted, were unable to make good the ground gained, consequently,
all tanks which were able to do so withdrew under cover of darkness at
about 7 p.m.
On November 25 and 27 further attacks were made by tanks and infantry
on Bourlon and Fontaine-Notre-Dame with varying success, but eventually
both these villages remained in the hands of the enemy. So ends the
first phase of the battle of Cambrai.
During the attacks which had taken place since November 21, tank units
had become terribly disorganised, and by the 27th had been reduced to
such a state of exhaustion that it was determined to withdraw the 1st
and 2nd Brigades. This withdrawal was nearing completion when the great
German counter-attack was launched early on the morning of November 30.
To appreciate this attack, it must be remembered that at this time the
IIIrd and IVth Corps were occupying a very pronounced salient, and that
all fighting had, during the last few days, concentrated in the Bourlon
area and had undoubtedly drawn our attention away from our right flank
east of Gouzeaucourt. The plan of General von der Marwitz, the German
Army Commander, was a bold one, it was none other than to capture the
entire IIIrd and IVth British Corps by pinching off the salient by
a dual attack, his right wing operating from Bourlon southwards and
his left from Honnecourt westwards, the two attacks converging on
Trescault. Between these two wings a holding attack was to be made from
Masnières to La Folie wood.
The attack was launched shortly after daylight on November 30,
and failed completely on the right against Bourlon wood. Here the
enemy was caught by our artillery and machine guns and mown down by
hundreds. On the left, however, the attack succeeded: firstly, it
came as a surprise; secondly, the Germans heralded their assault by
lines of low-flying aeroplanes which caused our men to keep well
down in their trenches and so lose observation. Under the protection
of this aeroplane barrage and a very heavy mortar bombardment the
German infantry advanced and speedily captured Villers Guislain and
Gouzeaucourt.
At 9.55 a.m. a telephone message from the IIIrd Corps warned the 2nd
Brigade of the attack, but, in spite of the fact that many of the
machines were in a non-fighting condition, by 12.40 p.m. twenty-two
tanks of B Battalion moved off towards Gouzeaucourt, rapidly followed
by fourteen of A Battalion. Meanwhile the Guards Division recaptured
Gouzeaucourt, so, when the tanks arrived, they were pushed out as a
screen to cover the defence of this village. By 2 p.m. twenty tanks of
H Battalion were ready, these moved up in support.
Early on the morning of December 1, in conjunction with the Guards
Division and 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions, the 2nd Brigade delivered
a counter-attack against Villers Guislain and Gauche wood. The western
edge of the wood was cleared of the enemy; the tanks then proceeded
through the wood, where very heavy fighting took place. From the
reports received as to the large number of dead in the wood and the
numerous machine guns found in position, it is clear that the enemy had
intended to hold it at all costs. Once the wood was cleared the tanks
proceeded on to Villers Guislain, but being subjected to direct gun
fire eventually withdrew.
The counter-attack carried out by the 2nd Brigade greatly assisted
in restoring a very dangerous situation; it was a bold measure
well executed, all ranks behaving with the greatest courage and
determination under difficult and unexpected circumstances and amidst
the greatest confusion caused by the success of the German attack;
every tank crew of every movable machine had but one thought, namely,
to move eastward and attack the enemy. This they did, and it is a
remarkable fact that, though at 8 a.m. on November 30 not one machine
of the Brigade was in a fit state or fully equipped for action, by 6
a.m. on the following day no fewer than seventy-three tanks had been
launched against the enemy with decisive effect.
Thus ended the first great tank battle in the whole history of warfare,
and, whatever may be the future historian’s dictum as to its value, it
must ever rank as one of the most remarkable battles ever fought. On
November 20, from a base of some 13,000 yards in width, a penetration
of no less than 10,000 yards was effected in twelve hours; at the
Third Battle of Ypres a similar penetration took three months. Eight
thousand prisoners and 100 guns were captured, and these prisoners
alone were nearly double the casualties suffered by the IIIrd and IVth
Corps during the first day of the battle. It is an interesting point
to remember that in this battle the attacking infantry were assisted
by 690 officers and 3,500 other ranks of the Tank Corps, a little over
4,000 men, or the strength of a strong infantry brigade, and that
these men replaced artillery wire-cutting and rendered unnecessary the
old preliminary bombardment. More than this, by keeping close to the
infantry they effected a much higher co-operation than had ever before
been attainable with artillery. When on November 21 the bells of London
pealed forth in celebration of the victory of Cambrai, consciously or
unconsciously to their listeners they tolled out an old tactics and
rang in a new--Cambrai had become the Valmy of a new epoch in war, the
epoch of the mechanical engineer.