AN INFANTRY APPRECIATION OF TANKS
During the many battles and engagements in which the Tank Corps took
part many appreciative special orders and letters were received from
the Higher Commanders under whose orders the Corps worked. These
kindly words, always appreciated, are apt sometimes to be regarded
as the inevitable “good chits” which courtesy demands should be
addressed to good, indifferent, and bad alike after an operation has
been successfully completed. Unsolicited testimonials, and especially
such as are not meant for the eyes of those praised, when they do, by
chance, come under these eyes, are regarded as more than mere “pats
on the back,” especially when they come from those who have fought
alongside the commended.
The following letter was written by an infantry officer who took part
in the battle of Cambrai, and addressed to a personal friend neither in
nor connected with the Tank Corps, who, months later on, showed it to
one who was. Not only did this letter come as a pleasant and gratifying
surprise to all ranks of the Corps, for it was published as a “Battle
Note,”[28] but it shows such an exceptionally clear insight into the
value and possibilities of the tanks that, even for this reason alone,
it is worth publishing. Who the writer was the Tank Corps never knew,
but his sound judgment and kindly appreciation stimulated amongst
his readers that high form of personal and collective pride which to
soldiers is known as “esprit de corps.” It is on human documents such
as these, rather than on orders and instructions, that the moral of
an individual or a unit grows strong, and by growing strong places the
entire Army one step nearer victory.
The letter reads as follows:
“I will first give you the opinion of one of my colonels. In three
years of fighting on this front, I have met no battalion commander
to equal him in power of leadership, rapidity of decision in an
emergency, and personal magnetism. I have met no man who would
judge so justly what an infantry soldier _can_ and _cannot_ do.
“He considers the tanks _invaluable_ if properly handled, either
for the attack or in defence--but he realises, as I think we all
do, that until Cambrai, the tactical knowledge shown in their
employment was of the meanest order.
“One other valuable opinion I’ve obtained. We have now with the
Battalion a subaltern, a man of about thirty--a very good soldier,
a resolute, determined kind of fellow who has seen a good deal
of fighting. He commanded a platoon in our --th Battalion in
the big tank attack at Cambrai and was in the first wave of the
attack throughout. He tells me that the tanks covering the advance
of his battalion functioning under ideal weather and ground
conditions, were handled with marked skill and enterprise in the
capture of the first two objectives covering an advance of about
3,500 yards. The moral effect of the support given by tanks on
the attacking infantry is _very great_. He says his men felt the
utmost confidence in the tanks and were prepared to follow them
anywhere. The effect of the advancing line of tanks on the enemy
infantry was extraordinary. They made no attempt whatever to hold
their trenches, and either bolted in mad panic or, abandoning their
arms, rushed forward with hands uplifted to surrender. As long as
the advance of the tanks continued, _i.e._, over the enemy trench
system to a depth of from two to three miles, the total casualties
incurred by our --th Battalion (attacking in the first wave) were
four killed and five wounded, all by shell fire.
“After the fall of the second objective, the advance ceased
for some unexplained reason--(they were told some hitch about
Flesquières)--the attack seemed to lose purpose and direction.
Tanks on the flanks began coming back. The battalion was ordered
to attack five different objectives, and before the necessary
plans could be communicated to subordinate commanders, orders were
received cancelling the previous instructions. In a word, chaos
prevailed. The afore-mentioned subaltern cannot speak too highly of
the work of the tank commanders--nothing could exceed their daring
and enterprise. He says he is absolutely convinced that infantry,
unsupported by artillery, are absolutely powerless against tanks
and that no belt of wire can be built through which they cannot
break an admirable passage for infantry.
“Lastly, he makes no secret of the fact that it would demand the
utmost exercise of his determination and resolution to stand fast
and hold his ground in the face of an attack by enemy tanks,
carried out on the same scale as ours. I may add that he is a big
upstanding fellow, a fine athlete, and afraid of nothing on two
legs.
“I give you his opinion at some length, because they are the
_ipsissima verba_ of a man qualified to speak from personal
practical experience. Personally, I believe the tanks may yet play
the biggest rôle in the war, if only the Higher Command will employ
them in situations where common-sense and past experience alike
demand their use. Two days before the Hun attacked us at Bourlon
wood we lost three officers and some seventy gallant fellows trying
to mop up a couple of enemy M.G. nests--a bit of work a couple of
tanks could have done _with certainty_ without the loss of a man.
“In the situation described after the capture of the second
objective, why should there not have been a responsible staff
officer--G.S.O.1 say--right forward in a tank to size up the
situation and seize opportunity, the very essence of which is rapid
decision? In the early days of the war, forgetful of the lessons of
South Africa, we put our senior officers in the forefront of the
battle--of late, the pendulum has swung the other way--surely the
employment of a tank for the purpose outlined would enable us now
to strike the happy mean?
“In defence, as a mobile ‘pill-box,’ the possibilities of the tank
are great--any man who has led infantry ‘over the top’ knows the
demoralising and disorganising effect of the ‘surprise packet’
machine-gun nest--what more admirable type of nest can be devised?
Continually changing position, hidden from enemy aircraft by smoke
and the dust of battle, offering no target for aimed artillery fire.
“Half the casualties we suffer in heavy fighting after the initial
attack come from the carrying parties winding slowly in and out
through barrage fire, bringing up ammunition to the infantry, the
Lewis and Vickers guns--all this could be done much more rapidly,
surely, with a minimum of loss, by tanks--for the future the tank
should relieve the artillery of all responsibility as regards
wire-cutting. You _know_ you can cross a belt of wire over which
a tank has passed, you _hope_ you can pass through a wire belt on
which the artillery has played for a couple of days. As a business
proposition a tank at £5,000 will cut more wire in one journey,
even assuming it does nothing else, than 2,000 shells at £5 each,
blazing away for a day--add the wear on the life of the gun.
“In attack, one of the most difficult problems of the infantry
is to get the Stokes guns far enough forward, with sufficient
ammunition, to come into action against machine guns or strong
points holding up the advance unexpectedly--all this could be done
by means of a tank with ease--whilst not only could the small
Stokes gun with a range of 500-600 yards be brought forward, but
also the 6 in. Stokes with a range of 1,200-1,600 yards by the same
means, and be brought into action firing from the tank.
“The tank has only one enemy to fear--the high-velocity tank gun,
firing aimed shots from forward positions. I believe this danger
can be minimised by means of escort aeroplanes attached during an
action to every tank, and provided with smoke bombs to blind the
gun position, if unable to silence the gun by machine-gun fire or
by means of ordinary bombs heavily charged.
“I have tried to outline some of the more obvious uses for which
the tank is so admirably suitable. There is a well of this
information yet untapped, not in staff offices, but in the minds
of the platoon and company commanders who have fought in the first
waves of the attack with the tank, who have seen the difficulties
it has to overcome and how it has met them or failed, and why.
Nothing has yet been produced in this war to equal the tank for
doing by _machinery_ what has hitherto been done by _men_; nothing
so well fitted to economise our man-power and reduce the appalling
wastage which has hitherto characterised our efforts in attack, and
with gain instead of loss in efficiency.
“We want thousands of tanks, both light and heavy, ranging from
two miles to eight miles per hour, armed with M.G.s, armed with
Stokes guns, unarmed and fast-travelling for transport of gun teams
to emergency tactical positions, and lastly, a staff of trained
minds to define the tactics of the tank--to refute criticism based
on ignorance, to collect, classify and investigate all available
information and suggestions, so that like an aeroplane--every ‘new
edition’ of the tank is an improvement on the last.
“I have written at some length, but the subject is big and
attractive enough to be my excuse.”