ORIGINS OF THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI
The battles of 1914 were primarily infantry battles based on the power
of the rifle, and it was not until 1915 that the quick-firing gun
and the heavy howitzer began to replace the rifle as the reducers of
resistance to the infantry attack.
In 1915, as far as the British Army is concerned, it may be said that
artillery was generally looked upon as an adjunct to the infantry. This
idea died hard, and it was not until the battle of the Somme was half
way through that it became apparent that it was no longer a question
of guns co-operating in the infantry advance, but of the infantry
itself co-operating with the artillery bombardments. In other words
the limit of the infantry advance was the limit of the range of the
guns, particularly the 18-pounders. This meant that no penetration of a
greater depth than about 4,000 yards could be effected unless a second
echelon of guns and infantry was launched and brought into action
simultaneously with or just before the first assault had reached the
range limit of the guns which were supporting it.
Two factors prohibited this from being done; the first was the heavily
shelled area which usually extends over the whole 4,000 yards of the
initial advance; the second, the great difficulty of keeping the second
echelon of guns supplied with sufficient ammunition to maintain the
second barrage. The shelled area not only prohibited the movement of
guns for days, but produced such exhaustion on the second echelon of
infantry crossing it, that by the time it caught up with the first
echelon its men were too fatigued to continue the attack.
By some it was hoped that the tank would partially overcome this
difficulty if it were brought into action on the area over which the
18-pounder barrage was beginning to fail, and by producing a local
barrage of its own, by means of its machine guns, that it would cover
any advance from 4,000 yards onwards.
This idea, though perfectly sound in itself, was doomed to failure as
long as the conditions of ground produced by artillery fire rendered it
impossible to support these tanks by infantry in fighting condition.
The first solution to this problem was to cease using heavy artillery
on ground to be traversed by the infantry attackers. This, however, is
at best but a half measure, for though, in the present phase of the
war, co-operation between infantry and tanks was of vital importance,
this co-operation could not be maintained for long if one arm has to
rely on its muscular power, whilst the other relies on petrol as its
motive force. At best, the advance of 4,000 to 6,000 yards will be
extended to 8,000 or 12,000 yards, when the endurance of the infantry
will reach its limit and the advance automatically cease. This is not
sufficient, for in a war such as was being waged in 1917 (a trench
war), in order to beat an enemy, the first necessity was to prevent him
using his spade. This can only be done by maintaining a continuous, if
comparatively slow advance, that is, by replacing muscle by petrol as
the motive force. This means the creation of a mechanical army.
In August 1917 the Tank Corps fully realised that the creation of
such an army, even on a very small scale, would take at least a year;
further, that its creation depended on the value of the tank being
fully recognised by those who could create such an army, and upon this
army being used in a suitable area of operations. Consequently the
first thing to do was to discover a suitable tank area; the second, to
hold a tactical demonstration on it with tanks so as to convince the
General Staff of their power and value. These steps it was felt would
have to be taken before the petrol engine would be accepted as the
motive force of the modern battle.
The selection of a theatre of operations depends on the objective to
be gained; the gaining of the objective on the breaking down of the
enemy’s resistance. Consequently the weapon which will most speedily
overcome this resistance must be considered first, and the area of
attack in the theatre of operations chosen must be selected as far as
possible with reference to its powers.
In the present instance we find that the chief resistance to our
infantry advance comes from the enemy’s machine guns. We dare not
concentrate all our artillery on these, for if we do, we shall release
his guns, which, free, can put up a stronger resistance than his
machine guns on account of their superior range. Further, whilst by
sound and flash ranging and aeroplane observation we can discover his
main gun positions, no means have yet been discovered whereby his
machine guns can be located other than by advancing on them and risking
casualties. Tanks must, therefore, be employed to do this in order to
clear the way for the infantry advance. Consequently, if sufficient
tanks are forthcoming, in order to guarantee a decisive success, it is
no longer a question of the tank as a spare wheel to the car, in case
of an unforeseen puncture in our operations, but as the motive force of
the car itself, the infantry being merely its armed occupants; without
which the car is valueless.
The area of operations selected must firstly be suitable to the rapid
movement of tanks, and secondly, unsuitable to hostile anti-tank
defences. Further, it should be chosen with reference to the tactical
characteristics of this arm. Once chosen, all other weapons should be
deployed and employed to facilitate the advance of the tank, because
it is to be used as the chief maintainer of infantry endurance, and it
is the infantry man with his machine gun and bayonet who is going, for
some time to come, to decide the battle.
Such were the views held in the Tank Corps at the opening of the Third
Battle of Ypres, and the following extract taken from a paper written
on June 11, 1917, is not only of interest but prophetic of future
events:
“If we look at a layered map of France we can at once put our
finger on the area to select. It lies between the Scarpe and the
Oise, the Flanders swamps in the north and the Ardennes in the
south-east. It was down this funnel of undulating country that
the Germans advanced in 1914, and it is up it that they will most
likely be driven if strategy is governed by ground and tactics by
weapons.”
The main area suitable for tank operations having been fixed upon
by the Tank Corps, the next requirement was to select a definite
objective, the attack against which would draw the enemy’s reserves
towards it and so relieve the pressure which was being exerted against
the Fifth Army at Ypres. Two localities were considered, St. Quentin
and Cambrai. The first was opposite the French area, the second
opposite the British.
The suggestion put forward as regards the St. Quentin operation was
abandoned on account of difficulties arising out of a British force
operating in the French area; it must be remembered that at this time
no real unity of command existed in France.
The Cambrai project consisted in a surprise raid, the duration of which
would be about twenty-four hours. The whole operation may be summed up
in three words, “Advance, Hit, Retire.” Its object was to destroy the
enemy’s personnel and guns, to demoralise and disorganise his fighting
troops and reserves, and not to capture ground or to hold trenches.
It was further considered that such an operation would interrupt his
_roulement_ of reserves and make the enemy think twice as to replacing
fresh divisions by exhausted and demoralised units in those parts of
his line which were not included in his battle front. Further, it would
confuse him as to the decisive point of attack; for any day one of
these raids might be followed by a strong offensive.
The actual area of operations selected was the re-entrant formed by
the L’Escaut or St. Quentin Canal between the villages of Ribecourt,
Crèvecœur, and Banteux. The going in this area was excellent; further,
the area to be raided contained several fair-sized villages and
important ground, and was well limited by the canal, which not only
made a rapid reinforcing of the area in the bend difficult, but
completely limited the tank objectives.
The plan of attack was a threefold one:
(i) To scour the country between Marcoing, Masnières, Crèvecœur, Le
Bosquet, Banteux.
(ii) To form an offensive flank between Le Bosquet and Ribecourt.
(iii) To form an offensive flank against Banteux.
The attack was to be launched at dawn, the first line of tanks
making straight for the enemy’s guns, which before, and as the tanks
approached them, were to be bombed by our aeroplanes. The second and
third lines of tanks were to follow, whilst our heavy guns commenced
counter-battery work and the shelling of the villages and bridges along
the canal. The essence of the entire operation was to be surprise
coupled with rapidity of movement. The spirit of such an enterprise is
audacity, which was to take the place of undisguised preparation.
It must be realised that both the St. Quentin and Cambrai projects
were the home product of the Tank Corps, and they did not emanate
from higher authority, which, when approached, was unable to sanction
either. In spite of this, steps were taken to reconnoitre the Cambrai
area, and for this purpose both the Brigadier-General commanding the
Tank Corps and the 3rd Tank Brigade Commander visited Sir Julian Byng,
the Third Army Commander, at his Headquarters in Albert. Though it is
not known whether the Third Army Commander had already considered the
possibilities of an offensive on the front of his Army, in September it
would appear that he approached G.H.Q. on the subject, with the result
that still no action outside the Ypres area could be considered, anyhow
for the present.