THE THIRD BATTLE OF GAZA
As a result of the repulse sustained by the British forces at the
Second Battle of Gaza in April 1917, the troops operating were
withdrawn from their exposed position and the Tank Detachment was
concentrated in a fig grove some 2,000 yards west of Sheikh Nebhan, at
which place it was later on reinforced by three Mark IV machines.
A new plan of operations was drawn up in which the Turkish defences
from Outpost hill to Ali El Muntar, which had resisted the combined
onslaught of several divisions, was to be turned by an extensive
flanking movement west of Gaza. This operation was to take place in
conjunction with an attack on Beersheba.
The general plan of attack was as follows:
(i) The Australian Corps and Desert Column were to operate from
Beersheba north-westwards to Hareira.
(ii) Several mounted and dismounted divisions were to operate around
Hareira and Gaza.
(iii) A composite force of French, Italians and West Indian troops was
to demonstrate by raids in the vicinity of Outpost hill.
(iv) The XXIst Corps was to attack the enemy’s defences between
Umbrella hill and the sea.
It is with the last of these four operations that this chapter is
concerned. For this attack the force detailed consisted of the 54th
Division, the Indian Cavalry Division, and the Tank Detachment--eight
machines.
The attack of the 54th Division was divided into four phases--Blue,
Red, Green, and Yellow.
The Tank Detachment left Deir El Belah on the night of October
22-23, 1917, for the beach near Sheikh Ajlin. From here a thorough
reconnaissance of the area of operations was carried out on horseback
and by drifter, after which this area was divided into tank sectors. To
these tanks were distributed as follows:
(i) _156th Infantry Brigade._--Objective--Umbrella hill north-westwards
to the eastern portion of El Arish redoubt. No. 1 tank was to support
the infantry in their attack on El Arish redoubt, deposit R.E. stores,
attack Magdhaba trench and cover the infantry consolidation.
(ii) _163rd Infantry Brigade._--Objective--El Arish redoubt northwards
to south of Zowaiid trench. No. 2 tank was to attack El Arish redoubt,
then Island wood, deposit R.E. stores, and on the arrival of the
infantry take a southerly route and capture Crested rock.
(iii) _161st and 162nd Infantry Brigades._--Objectives--Zowaiid trench
to Sea Post and the Cricket valley northwards to Sheikh Hasan and 500
yards beyond. For this operation four tanks were allotted.
No. 3 tank to attack Zowaiid trench, move north and capture Rafa
redoubt, rally, then proceed along Rafa trench, deposit R.E. material,
capture Yunus trench, attack Belah trench until the arrival of
infantry, thence proceed to Sheikh Hasan, deposit more R.E. stores, and
return to Sheikh Ajlin.
No. 4 tank to attack Rafa redoubt, co-operate with No. 3 tank against
Belah trench, make for Sheikh Hasan, deposit R.E. material, attack A.6
(an isolated Turkish trench to the north-east), and hold this until the
infantry had consolidated it.
No. 5 tank to capture Beach Post, co-operate in the assault on Cricket
redoubt, attack Sheikh Hasan in advance of the infantry, and deposit
R.E. material.
No. 6 tank to capture Sea Post, crush down the wire as far as Beach
Post, assault Gun hill, proceed to Sheikh Hasan, then deposit R.E.
stores and capture the Turkish post A.5.
(iv) _Reserve Tanks._--Nos. 7 and 8 tanks were to be held in reserve
north-east of Sheikh Ajlin; from there they were to follow up the
attack and replace any disabled machine.
In all, the above six first-line machines had twenty-nine objectives
to attack! That this could have been accomplished successfully would
have demanded a miracle; it was consequently foredoomed to failure.
The first phase of the attack was to consist in an infantry assault
protected by a creeping barrage; during this phase the tanks were to
move to their starting-points and be ready to advance at 3 o’clock on
the morning of November 2.
In order to ensure complete co-operation between the Tank Detachment
and the infantry, tank officers and other ranks were attached to
infantry brigades for ten days prior to the battle. As in France, this
system resulted in the greatest benefit to both infantry and tank
personnel alike.
The first phase of the battle opened at 11 o’clock on the night of
November 1-2, the 156th Infantry Brigade assaulting Umbrella hill. To
this attack the enemy did not respond immediately, but when he did he
opened a heavy artillery fire all down his front which endangered the
forward movement of the tanks to their starting-points, which, in spite
of this, they reached half an hour before the second zero hour.
It had been hoped to make every use of the full moon which rose in
the early evening, but the smoke, resulting from the battle, and a
dense haze restricted vision so completely that the tanks had to move
forward on compass bearings. At 3 a.m. a heavy barrage was opened on
the enemy’s front-line system, behind which the tanks, followed by
the infantry, moved forward. No difficulty was experienced in dealing
with the first objective, as the Turks were evidently taken quite by
surprise. Under cover of the barrage our troops pushed on till they
approached their second objective, when the enemy’s fire began to make
itself felt. Along the coastline the attack proceeded according to
programme, all objectives, including Sheikh Hasan, being taken. The
161st and 163rd Brigades encountered considerable opposition at Rafa
trench, Island wood, Crested rock, Gibraltar, and north of El Arish
redoubt. Briefly the operations carried out by the eight tanks of the
detachment were as follows:
No. 1 tank successfully attacked El Arish redoubt and was penetrating
the maze of trenches beyond, when owing to the darkness it was ditched;
its crew then joined the infantry.
No. 2 tank assaulted El Arish redoubt and met a similar fate;
eventually it received a direct hit which broke its right track; its
crew also joined the infantry.
No. 3 tank attacked Rafa redoubt, and later on, losing direction in the
mist, rallied.
No. 4 tank assaulted Rafa Junior, Yunus and Belah trenches, and after
depositing its R.E. material rallied.
No. 6 tank captured Sea Post, moved along the enemy’s trench, crushing
down the wire as far as Beach Post, attacked Cricket redoubt, Gun hill,
and Tortoise hill, and reaching Sheikh Hasan deposited its R.E. stores.
Shortly after this it moved forward to attack A.5, but breaking a track
it had to be abandoned.
Nos. 7 and 8 tanks received instructions at 4 a.m. to support the
infantry attack on El Arish redoubt, and to proceed in this direction
with R.E. material. These machines were loaded up with empty sandbags
on the roof, these caught fire, probably through the heat of the
exhaust pipe, both tanks went out of action.
On the whole the tank operations during the Third Battle of Gaza were
of assistance to the infantry. All tanks, except one, reached their
first objectives; four reached their second, third, and fourth, and one
reached its fifth objective. Of the eight machines operating five were
temporarily disabled. Casualties in personnel were very light--only one
man being killed and two wounded.
The Third Battle of Gaza closed the tank operations with the Army
of Palestine, and though the damaged machines were repaired and put
into fighting trim they were not used again. In order to overcome the
great difficulty in rounding up, by means of cavalry, the rearguard
detachments of the retiring Turkish Army, a mission was sent to France
to obtain, if possible, a number of Whippet machines. This mission
reached Tank Corps Headquarters in France on March 21, the day the
German offensive was launched. All hope of procuring these machines
consequently vanished. The Tank Detachment, therefore, handed over
their machines to the Ordnance Department at Alexandria and returned to
England.
The tank operations in Sinai and Palestine conclusively proved that
tanks could be employed almost anywhere in desert regions, and all that
they required were certain improvements in mechanism and changes in
design.
What success the Tank Detachment won during its two years in the East
was due to the determination and fine fighting spirit displayed by its
officers and men, who laboured under the greatest difficulties, not the
least being the entire lack of knowledge displayed by the other arms
in the limitations of tanks and their tactical employment. When all is
said and done and every criticism rounded off, success with tanks in
battle is as much a matter of co-operation, that is, unity of action
of all arms combined, as it is of mechanical fitness. This can only be
attained by constant practice in combined exercises on the training
area long prior to the battle even being thought of.