TANK MECHANICAL ENGINEERING
The organisation of the “mechanical engineering” side of the Tank
Corps constituted the backbone of the whole formation, for on its
efficiency depended the efficiency of the fighting units in as high a
degree as the fighting efficiency of a cavalry regiment depends on its
horse-mastership.
In this chapter it is not intended to follow the growth of this
organisation in detail, but rather to look back on its evolution
as a whole, and then to enter upon a few particulars of the work
accomplished by it. Before doing so it must be clearly understood that
the mechanical engineering side of the Tank Corps was as much a product
of this Corps as the fighting organisation itself, as there was in the
Army no definite Mechanical Engineering Department to draw inspirations
from. The nearest was the R.A.S.C., but a very wide gap separated the
R.A.S.C. system from that adopted in the Tank Corps; both indeed dealt
with petrol engines, but the tank and its requirements are as distinct
from the lorry as the lorry is from the aeroplane--another mechanical
weapon.
Generally speaking, the experience of the engineering side of the Tank
Corps, during the two years following its inception in August 1916, has
been that the most efficient organisation depends upon the maintenance
of two simple principles, namely:
(i) No repairs to be carried out in the field--_i.e._ by fighting units.
(ii) All maintenance to be carried out by the crews of the machines
themselves.
When the Tank Corps was first formed, each Company of Tanks was
provided with its own workshops. At the end of 1916 Company Workshops
were abolished and Battalion Workshops were formed. Towards the end
of 1917, after much consideration had been given to the question,
Battalion Workshops were abolished and merged into Brigade Workshops,
while a small number of skilled workshop men were left with each
Company. In 1918 it was realised that the gradual withdrawal of special
workshop facilities from the Company organisation to the Brigade had
resulted in a considerable improvement in the skill and ability of
the tank crews themselves in the maintenance of their tanks. It was
decided, therefore, to go one step further, and not only withdraw all
Brigade Workshops into a central organisation known as the Central
Workshops, but also to withdraw the special workshop men from the
Companies, while tank crews themselves were made entirely responsible
for the maintenance of their machines.
In this way it was possible to draw a clear line between maintenance
(_i.e._ the replacing of damaged parts, which was done entirely by
the crews) and repairs (_i.e._ the mending of broken parts, which was
done entirely by the Central Workshops). At this time the argument was
frequently heard that a man who uses a machine should be able to repair
it, and that, if all repair work is done by a different organisation
from the one which actually fights the machine, there will be a serious
loss of mechanical efficiency. This idea was based upon a misconception
of the difference between the functions of repairs and maintenance. On
the contrary, it was found that the efficiency of the crews increased
several hundred per cent. after the crews themselves were made
responsible for the maintenance of their machines. To carry out this
system it is, however, necessary that stores and spare parts should be
readily available in the field; this entails an intelligent system of
Advanced Stores.
One very great advantage of this centralisation of repair work is the
considerable saving in man-power effected by employing all skilled men
exclusively on one particular job. As an example, broken unions of
petrol pipes commonly occur in all petrol engines, and if a small unit
workshop exist, the brazing out and repair of such broken unions can
be carried out there. In order to do this a coppersmith must be kept
at the unit workshop, and only part of his time will be employed in
this work of brazing petrol unions. If now, however, the unit workshops
are abolished, and all broken unions, from every unit, are sent back
to a Central Workshop for repair, there is a sufficient amount of
work of this description to keep one man, or possibly two or three,
fully employed all their time. These men become absolute experts in
brazing broken unions, and before very long can do in a few minutes a
job of this sort which would take a coppersmith with the unit workshop
considerably longer.
The complete organisation for the maintenance and repair of tanks can
be briefly described by tracing the itinerary of a tank from the day
it left the manufacturer until the day it was received at the Central
Workshops for repair.
From the manufacturer the tank was first sent to the tank testing
ground at Newbury, which was manned and administered by No. 20
Squadron, R.N.A.S. From here it was sent to Richborough and shipped
across the channel by channel ferry and received by another detachment
of No. 20 Squadron at Havre. From Havre it was sent to the Bermicourt
area, and after being put through further tests was handed over to the
Central Stores. The Central Stores were situated at the village of
Erin on the Hesdin-St.-Pol railway, and consisted of some seven acres
of railway sidings and some six acres of buildings. These stores were
built in 1917, and at first included the Central Workshops; in 1918,
however, these workshops were installed at Teneur, about a mile and a
half away, and covered some twenty acres of ground.
From the Central Stores tanks were issued to battalions, and after
repair at the Central Workshops were received again at these stores for
reissue as they were required.
As the battalions carried out all their own mechanical maintenance,
Advanced Stores were instituted, these being sent out from the Central
Stores into the forward area immediately behind the front to be
attacked by the tanks. These stores were organised on a very mobile
footing and proved invaluable in all battles since October 1917.
Besides the moving forward of these Advanced Stores, Tank Field
Companies, originally known as Salvage Companies, were despatched from
the Central Workshops to the battle areas. The duty of these companies
was to take over from the fighting units all damaged tanks, such as
those knocked out by the enemy’s artillery fire; they were, in fact,
the clearers of the battlefield so far as tanks were concerned. Apart
from salving complete tanks an immense quantity of other material was
reclaimed, such as 6-pounder guns, machine guns, ammunition, tools,
track plates, gears, transmissions, and engine parts, etc., which in
the two years of the existence of these companies totalled in value
several millions of pounds.
The work carried out by the Tank Field Companies was particularly
dangerous, and many casualties amongst their personnel occurred. In
the actual reclaiming of machines or parts they were constantly under
shell fire, and the actual carrying to and fro of the material made use
of required great physical strength, since the ground to be traversed
was frequently a mass of shell-holes; incidentally a great deal of work
had to be done at night since many of the machines to be salved were
frequently situated in full view of the enemy.
From the Tank Field Companies the salved machines were sent to the
Central Workshops at Teneur. Here they were repaired, and this work
entailed considerably more skill and labour than the initial assembly
of the machines in the home factories on account of the shattered and
burnt-out condition many of these machines were reduced to. Much of
this repair work was carried out by Chinese labour and at these shops
over 1,000 Chinese were quartered for work, schools being instituted
for them so that mechanics, fitters, etc., could be trained.
Besides testing and repairing machines much other work was carried
out at the Central Workshops--“gagget” making, experiments, making
good minor deficiencies of manufacture and generally improving the
machines. This work frequently consisted in “panic” orders, such as the
sledge and fascine making for the battle of Cambrai. One hundred and
ten tank sledges and 400 tank fascines, bundles of wood which will be
mentioned later, when dealing with the battle of Cambrai, were ordered
on October 24, 1917. The former required some 3,000 cubic feet of wood,
weighing 70 tons, and the latter 21,500 ordinary fascines, representing
some 400 tons of brushwood and over 2,000 fathoms of chain to hold them
together. This order came on the top of a particularly strenuous period
following the tank operations round Ypres. At the same time another
order for the overhaul and repair of 127 machines was made.
Owing to the limited amount of time allowed for the transport of
material from the base ports to the Central Workshops and from the
Central Workshops to the forward area, extensive use was made of
lorries. From November 10 to the 25th, twenty-eight lorries engaged
on this work covered a total of 19,334 miles, averaging 690 miles per
lorry, while three box cars averaged 1,242 miles each.
The part played by the 51st Chinese Labour Company, attached to the
Workshops, materially contributed to the work being duly completed in
time for the battle. Owing to the necessity for secrecy the personnel
of the Workshops were without knowledge of the immediate urgency of
the work they were engaged on. In spite of this all ranks worked with
the utmost enthusiasm, accomplishing the task in the required time.
During these three weeks the Central Workshops were working 22½ hours
out of every 24 without a break, and had it not been for the “grit”
displayed by all ranks the battle of Cambrai could not have been
fought, and without this battle the whole course of the war might have
been changed; for it was the battle of Cambrai, as we shall shortly
see, which demonstrated the full power of the tank and which placed it
henceforth in the van of every battle.