THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
Towards the middle of May it was decided that all three Brigades
of Tanks, that is, the whole Heavy Branch, should take part in the
forthcoming operations of the Fifth Army east of Ypres, and that two
of these brigades should assemble in Oosthoek wood and the third at
Ouderdom. To initiate preparations an advanced headquarters was opened
at Poperinghe early in June, and on the 22nd of this month the brigade
advanced parties moved to the Ypres area.
After the battle of Messines, the 2nd Brigade (A and B Battalions)
had assembled at Ouderdom, so the present concentration only involved
moving the 1st Brigade (D and G Battalions), and the 3rd Brigade (F and
C Battalions) to Oosthoek. Seven trains were required for each of these
Brigades.
At about this time it was decided that the 1st Brigade should be
allotted to the XVIIIth Corps, the 3rd Brigade to the XIXth Corps, and
the 2nd Brigade to the IInd Corps; brigade commanders were, therefore,
instructed to place themselves in touch with these corps and commence
preparations.
The preparations required varied considerably from those for former
battles. The Ypres-Comines canal, running parallel to the front of
attack, formed a considerable obstacle to tank movement; consequently,
causeways had to be built over the canal as well as over the Kemmelbeek
and the Lombartbeek. This work was carried out by the 184th Tunnelling
Company, which was attached to the Heavy Branch for the purpose. The
work this unit carried out, normally under severe shell fire, was most
efficient and praiseworthy. Besides the building of these causeways
and the usual supply preparations, thoroughly efficient signalling
communication was arranged for, including the use of a certain number
of tanks fitted with wireless installations.
The reconnaissance work of the battalions was greatly facilitated
by that already carried out by the advanced headquarters party.
Oblique aerial photographs were provided for each tank commander,
and plasticine models of every part of the eventual battle area were
carefully prepared, the shelled zone being stencilled on them as the
bombardment proceeded. To facilitate the movement of tanks over the
battlefield a new system was made use of by which a list of compass
bearings from well-defined points to a number of features in the
enemy’s territory was prepared, thus enabling direction to be picked up
easily. The distribution of information was more rapid than it had been
on previous occasions. Constant discussions between the Brigade and
Battalion Reconnaissance officers led to a complete liaison; in fact,
everything possible was done to make the tank operations a success;
further, there was ample time to do it in.
The Fifth Army attack was to be carried out on well recognised lines;
namely, a lengthy artillery preparation followed by an infantry attack
on a large scale and infantry exploitation until resistance became
severe, when the advance would be halted and a further organised attack
prepared on the same scale. This methodical progression was to be
continued until the exhaustion of the German reserves[25] and moral
created a situation which would enable a complete break-through to be
effected.
The number of tanks allotted to the three attacking Corps was as
follows: seventy-two to each of the IInd and XIXth Corps, thirty-six
to the XVIIIth, and thirty-six to be held in Army reserve. These were
subdivided according to objectives, namely:
IInd Corps. XIXth Corps. XVIIIth Corps.
Black Line 16 tanks 24 tanks 12 tanks
Green Line 24 „ 24 „ 12 „
East of Green Line 8 „
Corps Reserve 24 „ 24 „ 12 „
The Corps objectives and the allotment of tanks to Divisions
were as follows:
In the IInd Corps the 24th and 30th Divisions supported by the 18th
Division were to attack on the right, and the 8th Division, supported
by the 25th Division, on the left. The general objective of the
operations was the capture of the Broodseinde ridge, and the protection
of the right flank of the Fifth Army. The allotment of tanks to
Divisions was: twelve to the 30th Division, eight to the 18th Division,
twenty-four to the 8th Division, and four to the 24th Division.
In the XIXth Corps the 15th Division was on the right and the 55th
Division on the left, with the 16th and 36th Divisions in reserve.
The objective of this Corps was to capture and hold a section of the
enemy’s third-line system known as the Gheluvelt-Langemarck line.
Twenty-four tanks were allotted to each of the attacking divisions.
In the XVIIIth Corps the 39th Division was on the right and the 51st
Division on the left, with the 11th and 48th Division in reserve. The
main objective was the Green Line; but should this be successfully
occupied the 51st Division was to seize the crossings of the river
Steenbeek at Mon du Rasta and the Military Road, and establish a line
beyond that river from which a further advance could be made on to the
Gheluvelt-Langemarck line; the 39th Division on the left conforming by
throwing out posts beyond the Green Line. Eight tanks were allotted to
the 51st Division and sixteen to the 39th Division.
The dead level of Northern Flanders is broken by one solitary chain
of hills, a crescent in shape, with its cusps as Cassel and Dixmude.
From Cassel to Kemmel hill had been ours since 1914; to this the
Messines-Wytschaete ridge was added, as we have seen in June 1917;
now all that remained was the extension of this ridge northwards from
about Hooge to Dixmude. The territory lying within the crescent was
practically all reclaimed swamp land, including Ypres and reaching back
as far as to St. Omer, both of which, a few hundred years ago, were
seaports. All agriculture in this area depended on careful drainage,
the water being carried away by innumerable dikes. So important was the
maintenance of this drainage system considered that in normal times a
Belgian farmer who allowed his dikes to fall into disrepair was heavily
fined.
The frontage of attack of the Fifth Army extended from the
Ypres-Comines canal to Wiltje cabaret. On the left the French were
co-operating, attacking towards Houthulst forest, and on the right
the Second Army was restricted to an all but passive artillery rôle.
This frontage was flanked by two strong positions, the Polygonveld and
Houthulst forest, which formed two bastions with a semicircular ridge
of ground as a curtain between them; in front of this low curtain ran a
broad moat--the valley of the Steenbeek and its small tributaries.
From the tank point of view the Third Battle of Ypres is a complete
study of how to move thirty tons of metal through a morass of mud and
water. The area east of the canal had, through neglect and daily shell
fire, been getting steadily worse since 1914, but as late as June 1917
it was still sufficiently well drained to be negotiable throughout, by
the end of July it had practically reverted to its primal condition of
a vast swamp; this was due to the intensity of our artillery fire.
It must be remembered at this time the only means accepted whereby to
initiate a battle was a prolonged artillery bombardment; sufficient
reliance not as yet being placed in tanks on account of their
liability to break down.[26] The present battle was preceded by the
longest bombardment ever carried out by the British Army, eight
days counter-battery work being followed by sixteen days intense
bombardment. The effect of this cannonade was to destroy the drainage
system and to produce water in the shell-holes formed even before the
rain fell. Slight showers fell on the 29th and 30th, and a heavy storm
of rain on July 31.
[Illustration: THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
July to November 1917.]
A study of the ground on the fronts of the three attacking corps
is interesting. On the IInd Corps front the ground was broken by
swamps and woods, only three approaches were possible for tanks, and
these formed dangerous defiles. On the XIXth Corps front the valley
of the Steenbeek was in a terrible condition, innumerable shell-holes
and puddles of water existed, the drainage of the Steenbeek having
been seriously affected by the shelling. On that of the XVIIIth Corps
front the ground between our front line and the Steenbeek was cut up
and sodden. The Steenbeek itself was a difficult obstacle, and could
scarcely have been negotiated without the new unditching gear which had
been produced since the battle of Messines. The only good crossing was
at St. Julien, and this formed a dangerous defile.
Zero hour was at 3.50 a.m., and it was still dark when the tanks, which
had by July 31 assembled east of the canal, moved forward behind the
attacking infantry.
Briefly, the attack on July 31, in spite of the fact that there are
fifty-one recorded occasions upon which individual tanks assisted the
infantry, may be classed as a failure. On the IInd Corps front, because
of the bad going, the tanks arrived late, and owing to the infantry
being hung up, they were caught in the defiles by hostile artillery
fire and suffered considerable casualties in the neighbourhood of
Hooge. They undoubtedly drew heavy shell fire away from the infantry,
but the enemy appeared to be ready to deal with them as soon as
they reached certain localities and knocked them out one by one. On
the XIXth Corps front they were more successful. At the assault on
the Frezenberg redoubt they rendered the greatest assistance to the
infantry, who would have suffered severely had not tanks come to their
rescue. Several enemy’s counter-attacks were broken by the tanks, and
Spree farm, Capricorn keep, and Bank farm were reduced with their
assistance. On the XVIIIth Corps front at English trees and Macdonald’s
wood several machine guns were silenced; the arrival of a tank at
Ferdinand’s farm caused the enemy to evacuate the right bank of the
Steenbeek in this neighbourhood. The attack on St. Julien and Alberta
would have cost the infantry heavy casualties had not two tanks come
up at the critical moment and rendered assistance. At Alberta strong
wire still existed, and this farm was defended by concrete machine-gun
emplacements with good dug-outs. The two tanks which arrived here went
forward through our own protective barrage, rolled flat the wire and
attacked the ruins by opening fire at very close range, with the result
that the enemy was driven into his dug-outs and was a little later on
taken prisoner by our infantry.
The main lessons learnt from this day’s fighting were--the
unsuitability of the Mark IV tank to swamp warfare; the danger of
attempting to move tanks through defiles which are swept by hostile
artillery fire; the necessity for immediate infantry co-operation
whenever the presence of a tank forced an opening, and the continued
moral effect of the tank on both the enemy and our own troops.
The next attack in which tanks took part was on August 19, and in
spite of the appalling condition of the ground, for it had now been
steadily raining for three weeks, a very memorable feat of arms was
accomplished. The 48th Division of the XVIIIth Corps had been ordered
to execute an attack against certain strongly defended works, and, as
it was reckoned that this attack might cost in casualties from 600 to
1,000 men, it was decided to make it a tank operation in spite of the
fact that the tanks would have to work along the remains of the roads
in place of over the open country. Four tanks were detailed to operate
against Hillock farm, Triangle farm, Mon du Hibou, and the Cockcroft;
four against Winnipeg cemetery, Springfield, and Vancouver, and four
to be kept in reserve at California trench. The operation was to be
covered by a smoke barrage, and the infantry were to follow the tanks
and make good the strong points captured.
[Illustration: PLATE II
GROUND OPERATED OVER BY TANKS DURING THE BATTLE OF MESSINES, SHOWING
PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT ON JUNE 5, 1917.]
[Illustration: GROUND OPERATED OVER BY TANKS IN AUGUST 1917, DURING THE
THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.]
Eleven tanks entered St. Julien at 4.45 a.m., three ditched, and eight
emerged on the St. Julien-Poelcappelle road, when down came the smoke
barrage, throwing a complete cloud on the far side of the objectives;
at 6 a.m. Hillock farm was occupied, at 6.15 a.m. Mon du Hibou was
reduced, and five minutes later the garrison of Triangle farm,
putting up a fight, were bayoneted. Thus one point after another was
captured, the tanks driving the garrisons underground or away, and the
infantry following and making good what the tanks had made possible. In
this action the most remarkable results were obtained at very little
cost, for instead of 600 casualties the infantry following the tanks
only sustained fifteen!
From this date on to October 9 tanks took part in eleven further
actions, the majority being fought on the XVIIIth Corps front by the
1st Tank Brigade. On August 22 a particularly plucky fight was put
up by a single tank. This machine became ditched in the vicinity of
a strong point called Gallipoli, and, for sixty-eight hours on end,
fought the enemy, breaking up several counter-attacks; eventually the
crew, running short of ammunition, withdrew to our own lines on the
night of August 24-25.
Of the attacks which were made with tanks in the latter half of
September and the beginning of October, the majority took place along
the Poelcappelle road, the most successful being fought on October 4.
Of this attack the XVIIIth Corps Commander reported that “the tanks
in Poelcappelle were a decisive factor in our success on the left
flank”; and their moral effect on the enemy was illustrated by the
statement of a captured German officer who gave as the reason of his
surrender--“There were tanks--so my company surrendered--I also.”
It is almost impossible to give any idea of the difficulty of these
latter operations or of the “grit” required to carry them out. Roads,
if they could be called by such a name at all, were few and far between
in the salient caused by the repeated attacks during the battle. This
salient had a base of some 20,000 yards and was only 8,000 deep at
the beginning of October, at which date the enemy could still obtain
extensive observation over it from the Passchendaele ridge. The ground
in between these roads being impassable swamps, all movement had to
proceed along them, consequently they formed standing targets for the
German gunners to direct their fire on. One night, at about this
period of the battle, a tank engineer officer was instructed to proceed
to Poelcappelle to superintend the demolition of some tanks which
were blocking the road near the western entrance to the village. His
description of it at night-time is worth recording.
“I left St. Julien in the dark, having been informed that our guns
were not going to fire. I waded up the road, which was swimming
in a foot or two of slush, frequently I would stumble into a
shell-hole hidden by the mud. The road was a complete shambles and
strewn with debris, broken vehicles, dead and dying horses and
men. I must have passed hundreds of them as well as bits of men
and animals littered everywhere. As I neared Poelcappelle our guns
started to fire: at once the Germans replied, pouring shells on and
around the road, the flashes of the bursting shells were all round
me. I cannot describe what it felt like, the nearest approach of
a picture I can give is that it was like standing in the centre
of the flame of a gigantic Primus stove. As I neared the derelict
tanks, the scene became truly appalling: wounded men lay drowned
in the mud, others were stumbling and falling through exhaustion,
others crawled and rested themselves up against the dead to raise
themselves a little above the slush. On reaching the tanks I found
them surrounded by the dead and dying; men had crawled to them for
what shelter they would afford. The nearest tank was a female, her
left sponson doors were open, out of these protruded four pairs of
legs, exhausted and wounded men had sought refuge in this machine,
and dead and dying lay in a jumbled heap inside.”
Whatever history may record of the Third Battle of Ypres, one fact
certainly will not be overlooked or forgotten, namely: that men who
could continue for three months to attack under the conditions which
characterised this most terrible battle of the war must indeed belong
to an invincible stock.