METZ AND STRASBURG.
At the very moment when the Army of Chalons, instead of marching
on its way to Montmédy, found its Corps huddled together at Sedan,
between the river and the Belgian frontier, some information of the
movement undertaken by MacMahon, who yielded his better judgment to
the importunate entreaties (les instances) of Palikao, reached Marshal
Bazaine in Metz. He had already, on the 26th of August, collected a
large mass of troops upon the right bank, in order to break out towards
Thionville; but the rain poured down all day in torrents, and, after
a consultation at the Farm of Grimont with his Marshals and Generals,
whose opinions were adverse to the sortie projected, he issued an order
directing the Army to resume its former quarters. But, on the 29th, a
messenger who had crept through the German lines, handed to the Marshal
a despatch from the officer commanding in Thionville, Colonel Turnier,
stating that General Ducrot, with the 1st Corps, should be “to-day,
the 27th,” at Stenay on the left of the Army, General Douay on his
right being on the Meuse. Bazaine seems to have had doubts respecting
the authenticity of this missive, the handwriting of which his staff
did not recognize; but the next morning, about eleven, an agent of
his own came in from Verdun. He was the bearer of a telegram from the
Emperor—it was really the message drawn up by MacMahon on the 22nd
of August, copied, apparently, in cipher, by Napoleon, and intrusted
to Bazaine’s emissary. The despatch, which had no date, stated that
the sender would march towards Montmédy, and when on the Aisne, would
act according to circumstances, in order to succour the Metz Army.
Regarding the second document, though antecedent in point of time, as
a confirmation of the first which he had received, Marshal Bazaine, on
the 30th, issued the orders which, the following day, led to
_The Battle of Noisseville._
His plan, succinctly described, was to break through the line of
investment on the right bank of the Moselle by directing three Corps,
the 3rd, 4th, and 6th, principally upon St. Barbe, and he hoped, if
successful, to march them forward upon Kedange, while the Guard and
the 2nd Corps followed the track by the river. He estimates the force
which was available for battle at 100,000 men, but he probably had
more; at any rate, the delays which had occurred on the 14th of August,
and were in part repeated on the 31st, shows how arduous is the task
of issuing with such masses from a fortified town and position astride
of a river. The weather was not favourable, for the continuous rain
had soaked the ground, and at dawn a thick fog, which hung about for
several hours, impeded the operations. The Germans had been more than
usually on the alert since the abortive attempt on the 26th, and had
thought it expedient to include Noisseville within the line of defence.
The noise and preparations in Metz did not escape their notice, but
the dense mist concealed much from their searching gaze. Yet they saw
and heard enough, both on the eastern and western fronts of Metz, to
warrant a belief that a resolute onset was impending. As the fog bank
rolled away, the batteries and the massing of troops became visible,
and General von Manteuffel transmitted the results of his careful
observations to Von Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles, both of
whom made instant arrangements to support the 1st Corps and the other
troops on the right bank. The forenoon passed by, and, except some
slight skirmishes and a brief artillery duel, no action ensued. About
midday the French sat down to cook, and the smoke from their fires rose
in clouds, indicated their position, but hid them from view; at the
same time, although the sun was shining, the culinary haze concealed
the workmen engaged in throwing up shelter for the heavy guns drawn
from the forts; and the German leaders arrived at the conclusion that
the onslaught would be deferred until the next day; their soldiers also
fell to cooking, and some fractions recrossed the Moselle to join their
main body; but their attention to the phenomena before them was not
relaxed.
Yet the afternoon began to wear away. It was not until half-past two
that Marshal Bazaine gave that signal for attack which was nevertheless
not obeyed until another hour and a half had been consumed. The
signal was a salvo from the battery of heavy guns placed behind
the field works hastily thrown up in front of Fort St. Julien. The
battlefield of the 31st was one with which we were made acquainted
when Von Golz took upon himself to arrest the retreat of the French
over the Moselle on the 14th of August. It extended from Mercy les
Metz by Colombey, Noisseville, and Failly to Malroy on the Moselle.
The French assailants, therefore, had to cross the ravines east of
Borny and work up both banks of the Vallières brook which, rising near
St. Barbe, enters the Moselle opposite the Isle Chambière. The 6th
Corps, Canrobert’s, was to attack by the river road towards Malroy; De
Ladmirault, with the 4th, was to move by Failly and Vrémy to outflank
St. Barbe on its right, while the left of that position was to be
carried by Lebœuf’s 3rd Corps; and Frossard, with the 2nd, was to
follow and cover the right flank of Lebœuf. The Guard, the cavalry, and
reserve artillery were to stand between Fort St. Julien and the Bois
de Grimont, and all the baggage was to be ready in the Isle Chambière.
The Germans were prepared to meet such an attack, but, as we have said,
they had come to believe that it would be deferred.
Suddenly, about four o’clock, the dead silence was broken by a salvo
from the heavy guns, followed by the fire of De Ladmirault’s batteries.
Then the action began along the whole front, the Germans at once
developing a powerful line of fifty guns about Servigny and Poix, far
in advance of the main line of defence, and bringing other pieces to
bear from different points. Nevertheless, favoured by the broken ground
and resolute to win, the French infantry persistently advanced until
about six o’clock they had driven in all the foreposts, and had gained
possession on their right of Noisseville, the garrison of which village
they curiously complain held out longer than they were entitled to do.
The capture of Noisseville facilitated the principal attacks which were
directed upon Servigny and Poix, villages which served as redoubts
guarding the avenues to St. Barbe, the culminating point in the region.
At the same time the French right had pushed well forward towards
Retonfay, the object being to protect the flank of the 3rd Corps, now
in motion upon the central posts of the German line. Here the contest
was severe, and in the end the great line of guns which had held De
Ladmirault at bay so long, unable to bear the musketry fire in front
and flank, was compelled to withdraw behind the villages. But, although
the French infantry came up boldly on both flanks, as well as in front,
they were unable to overcome the sturdy defenders, in whose possession
the villages remained at dark. The French left under Canrobert had made
repeated attacks upon Failly, which met with no success, and he halted
at Chieulles and Vany: so that the movement near the Meuse had secured
but little ground. At dark the French had not done more than occupy a
line extending from Canrobert’s right in front of Villers l’Orme to
Noisseville, and thence by Flanville to Château d’Aubigny. By this
time General von Manteuffel had been reinforced by two brigades of
Landwehr, and the 25th Division, under Prince Louis of Hesse, which had
crossed the Moselle, and considerably strengthened his right wing. Then
occurred a remarkable incident. General Aymard, about nine o’clock,
creeping silently up to Servigny, flung forward his division, and,
without firing a shot, burst in upon the surprised Germans, engaged in
preparing the defences, and carried the place. Astonished and enraged,
General von Gayl immediately gathered up a force, and breaking, in his
turn, upon the enemy, drove him out and recovered possession before ten
o’clock. Aymard’s is an example of a night attack well performed; but
the weak defence of what had been skilfully won, was not so creditable
to the French.
During the night General Manstein, with the other half of the 9th
Corps, crossed the Moselle, halted in rear of the German right wing,
and thus enabled the Hessian Division to take post behind St. Barbe.
A dense fog again filled the valley at dawn, but at an early hour
General von Manteuffel, holding his ground in the centre and on the
right, brought his batteries to bear upon Noisseville and promptly
assumed the offensive. The place was strongly occupied and stoutly
defended. Although the Germans broke in for a moment they were
speedily expelled, and several hours elapsed before the village fell
into their hands. But throughout the day, except towards Rupigny and
Failly, the French stood on the defensive. For the Germans arrayed 114
guns on the hills, crushed the adverse artillery, and prevented the
French infantry from making any combined attack. The position on their
right was soon rendered less safe by the arrival of a brigade of the
7th Corps which, coming up from Laquenexy, drove the French out of
Flanville. This demonstration on the right of Marshal Lebœuf’s line,
together with the terrible fire of the German artillery, induced him,
about eleven o’clock, to draw back the whole of his troops and allow
his adversary once more to occupy Noisseville. On the French left,
Marshal Canrobert’s soldiers had been forced back upon Chieulles, and
the attacks upon Failly had wholly failed. Prince Frederick Charles
who, at Malancourt, had heard the opening cannonade at Sedan on the
morning of the 1st, took up his post of observation on a hill towards
the Moselle before eight o’clock, and provided for the arrival of
strong reinforcements, should they be needed, from the left bank,
but only the 10th Corps passed the Moselle and was stationed between
Argancy and Antilly. The retreat of Marshal Lebœuf had been followed by
that of the other corps, and a little after noon the French Army was
marching back to the camps and bivouacs whence it had advanced on the
31st. The great sortie had signally failed in opening a road through
the investing lines. The French had 3,547 officers and men killed
and wounded, including in the latter category four Generals, one of
whom, Manèque, mortally. The German loss was 2,976 killed and wounded.
Marshal Bazaine estimates the number he put in the field at 100,000;
the German authorities say they began the fight with 40,800 men and 138
guns; and at the end of the encounter had over the Moselle 73,800 men
and 290 guns.
Marshal Bazaine and his troops re-entered their prison on the
afternoon of the day when the white flag was hoisted on the Citadel of
Sedan; and with his and their subsequent misfortunes we have nothing
more to do in this work. Neither is it our business to consider whether
by marching up instead of down the right bank he could have escaped
with some portion of his Army safe and sound to the South of France.
That he did his uttermost to push through on the 31st is the contention
of the German staff, but it is doubtful whether on the second day
the same spirit prevailed. All the knotty questions suggested by the
military situation about Metz and elsewhere at the end of August could
only be adequately discussed by entering upon a history of transactions
with which we have no present concern. The essential fact is that the
French Marshals tried to break the barrier and failed at a moment
when even their success could not have prevented the capitulation at
Sedan. The attempt demonstrated the immense advantages of a carefully
prepared defensive position combined with a readiness to use artillery
in the front line from the first, and an equal readiness to become
the assailant whenever a useful opportunity occurred. But to the mind
of this writer the moral of the Metz episode in the great war is the
danger attending these large intrenched camps, which will certainly
exert in the future, as they have in the past, an irresistible
attraction upon inferior commanders, and will task the intellect,
and the ingenuity and the firmness of the greatest to put them to a
proper use. Neither Bazaine nor any colleague in superior command
could be described as a man of genius, and to such soldiers, while war
is conducted on a vast scale and armies in the field are numbered by
the hundred thousand, places like Metz will not cease to become traps
in which frustrated or beaten armies will be caught and captured,
sometimes, it may be, by force or stratagem; usually by stress of
famine. Meantime the issue of the war will be decided, as it always
has been, by the belligerent who is able to keep the field.
Although huge Armies had penetrated so swiftly into France on the
morrow of the frontier victories, there were still, besides the
fortress of Metz, which was in an exceptional case, several other
strongholds which stood out defiant upon the main lines of the German
communications. They were Verdun, Toul, Bitsche, Phalsburg, Strasburg,
and, at a later stage, Belfort. Each of these, except the last-named,
required to be, and were, watched or invested by troops drawn from
the active Armies or the reserves in Germany; but they had little or
no influence upon the colossal events which decided the issue of what
we have called the Campaign of Sedan. Strasburg alone was a cause of
any anxiety, because the Germans were eager to obtain possession of
a fortress the fall of which would give them undisputed command of
the Rhine, and become of great value in the event of unlooked-for and
improbable reverses. General von Werder, with the Baden Division,
after the battle of Woerth, had been sent to invest the town, and he
arrived before it on the 11th. It is not intended to relate in these
pages the siege of Strasburg, which properly belongs to the story
of the Franco-German war as a whole. The point to note is that the
regular siege was preceded by a useless bombardment. The engineer
desired to proceed in the orthodox way; the chief of the staff wished
to try the more violent method. He insisted that a bombardment would
terrify the inhabitants, and make them exert such a pressure on the
Governor, General Uhrich, a gallant veteran, as would compel him
to surrender. The dispute was determined by an appeal to the Great
Head-quarters, then at Pont à Mousson, and General von Moltke, who
desired that the place should be taken in the shortest possible time,
and that the 40,000 men before it might be available for other
operations, decided in favour of the bombardment. The consequence
was that dreadful sufferings were inflicted upon the inhabitants of
Strasburg, and terrible devastation brought upon the town, but that the
cruelty did not attain the end in view; and that the wise engineer was
permitted to apply his method at a moment when, had his advice been
adopted, the besieging Army would have been near the success which
was ultimately attained. The bombardment of Strasburg was not only an
error regarded from a military point of view, it was a great political
blunder; for who can doubt that the agonies endured in the last days
of August, 1870, and the resentment created by the awful destruction
of life and property, have materially helped to render inveterate that
hostility to German rule which even now reigns in Strasburg as strong
as ever. Strasburg would have been captured, probably at an earlier
date, had there been no bombardment, humanity would have been spared
a heartrending spectacle, and Germany would have profited by showing
some deference towards the feelings and some regard for the lives of
the people whose town it was intended to restore to the Reich, and over
whom she had determined to rule. It was only on the 26th, when the
King had just turned northward from the Ornain to hunt after MacMahon,
that Von Werder, finding Uhrich resolute, decided to proceed by way
of a regular siege. After the end of the month the fortress ceased to
be, in any sense, a danger to the German Armies, which, whether closed
around Metz or marching westward through France, could afford to await,
with calmness, the certain surrender of Strasburg, an end which might
have been attained just as quickly had the wisdom of King William’s
statesmen been called in to sustain the sound judgment of General
Schulz, the accomplished Engineer.