THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL.
It has long been a well-authenticated fact that MacMahon’s march
eastward from Reims took the German head-quarter staff by surprise. The
reason was that they could not believe in the probability of a movement
which, from their point of view, had no defence on military grounds.
So that Marshal MacMahon with a fair, and General von Moltke with full
knowledge of the facts, really arrived at identical conclusions when
they surveyed the situation with what we may call cold scientific eyes.
The influences which governed the Marshal’s decision could not be known
at Bar le Duc on the 25th of August; but it was none the less apparent
to the cautious Von Moltke that his adversary had committed a great
error. The German was surprised, he was even somewhat embarrassed, but
he never lost his presence of mind, and he was not unprepared.
Indeed, the subject had been discussed already by himself and his
colleagues. As early as the 23rd, Prince Frederick Charles intercepted
a letter from an officer of high rank belonging to the Metz Army.
The writer expressed a confident hope that succour would soon arrive
from Chalons. Thereupon the Saxon Prince was directed to keep a sharp
look-out towards Reims, and break the railway between Thionville
and Longuyon in more places than one. The next day, at Ligny, the
Great Staff met and conferred with the Crown Prince. It was then
that Quartermaster-General von Podbielski was the first to suggest
that if a march from Reims towards Bazaine was barely admissible on
military grounds, it might be explained by political considerations,
and consequently, the General thought, the German Armies should close
to their right. The reason was not deemed sufficient, and the Armies
went on as pre-arranged. Not until eleven in the evening of the 24th
did the wary Von Moltke consider that he had accumulated information
sufficient to justify a tentative change of plans. He learned from
his own cavalry patrols that Chalons had been deserted; from a Paris
newspaper, captured on the 24th, that MacMahon was at Reims with
150,000 men; and finally he got a telegram, dated Paris, the 23rd, and
received at Bar le Duc viâ London. “The Army of MacMahon,” it said, “is
concentrated at Reims. With it are the Emperor Napoleon and the Prince.
MacMahon seeks to effect a junction with Bazaine.” Still Von Moltke
doubted. The straight line to Metz was barred, would the enemy venture
to face the risks involved in a circuitous march close to the Belgian
frontier? If he did the German Armies must plunge into the Argonne;
but at present the General decided that enough would be done were the
Army turned to the north-west, and were a keen watch kept upon its
own right by sending the cavalry, if possible, as far as Vouziers and
Buzancy. Such were the morning orders. Here it may be noted that Von
Moltke spent the afternoon in framing a plan, solely for himself, based
on the shrewd assumption that MacMahon might have quitted Reims on the
23rd, and might be over the Aisne already. If he moved on continuously
he could not be caught on the left bank of the Meuse. Therefore Von
Moltke drew out tables of marches which, had they all been performed,
as they easily might have been, would have concentrated, in full time,
150,000 men at Damvillers, east of the Meuse, and within easy reach of
the Army blockading Metz. Two corps, from that force, were also called
on to co-operate. They did move out as far as Etain and Briey, but
not being wanted they soon returned to their cantonments on the Orne
and the Yron. Thus the plan was not carried out, but it was prepared,
indeed, served as a basis, during the next two days, and was ready for
execution; and it reveals, once more, the astonishing foresight and
solid ingenuity which watched with sleepless eyes over the conduct of
the German Armies.
After he had finished the scheme by means of which he intended to
thwart MacMahon, in any case, fresh intelligence arrived—newspaper
articles and speeches in the Chamber which declared that the French
people would be covered with shame were the Army of the Rhine not
relieved; and above all a telegram from London, based on a paragraph in
“Le Temps,” of August 23rd, stating that MacMahon, although by such a
movement he would uncover the road to Paris, had suddenly determined to
help Bazaine, and that he had already quitted Reims, but that the news
from Montmédy did not mention the arrival of French troops, meaning
troops from Metz, in that region. Von Moltke was not deeply impressed
by the articles and speeches, although he begun to give some weight to
Podbielski’s shrewd remark; but the positive statement in the telegram
did move him, and he and the Quartermaster-General hastened to lay
the matter before the King. The result was that those definite orders
were issued which produced the great right wheel and sent the whole
force towards the north. Nevertheless, the strategist still insists
that, on the evening of the 25th, he had no information which gave sure
indications of the enemy’s whereabouts.
_The Cavalry Discover the Enemy._
These were soon forthcoming. The cavalry, set in motion at dawn, over
a wide space and far in advance of the new direction, were not long
in regaining touch of MacMahon’s Army. For the horsemen rode out
quickly, and speedily searched the country side from Dun on the Meuse
to the heart of the camp at Chalons, accumulating in their excursions
information almost sufficient to convince the circumspect Von Moltke.
This sudden display of activity and daring is a splendid spectacle.
The wind howled through the woods and swept the bare tracks, and heavy
storms of rain deluged the country from Bar le Duc to Rhetel, but the
swift march of these superb reiters was neither stayed by the blast,
the dripping woods, nor the saturated cross-roads. No hardships, no
obstacles slackened their speed, and large were the fruits of their
energy, endurance, and astuteness. Here we may observe, and it is a
remarkable fact, that hitherto the Saxon leader’s cavalry had been
directed only towards the west. The horsemen of the Third Army had
ridden within sight of Reims and on the south, or left flank, had
approached closely to the Aube. Those attached to the Saxon Prince’s
command had felt out to their immediate front and towards the Prussian
Crown Prince’s left, but had not examined the districts to their right
front. A cavalry regiment had made a tiring forced march towards
Stenay, but not a trooper was directed on Grand Pré, or on Varennes,
until the 25th. Yet there were French horse on Grand Pré on the 24th,
and it is evident that had only one division been despatched towards
and through Varennes immediately after the Saxon Prince’s troops had
crossed the Meuse, above and below Verdun, the presence of MacMahon’s
Army on the Aisne must have been discovered, and the report handed in
at head-quarters on the morning, or at latest the afternoon, of the
25th. That would have been done had General von Schlotheim, the chief
of the staff with the Meuse Army, been as careful to reconnoitre the
country on his right as Von Blumenthal was to send out horsemen to the
flank as well as the front of the westward moving host. It was not
done, and the error of judgment involved the loss of four-and-twenty
hours.
The error was promptly and amply repaired. While each corps in the
mighty Army, having wheeled to the right, was tramping north in the
driving rain through the muddy forest roads to gain the distant
bivouacs assigned them, the cavalry divisions had come up with,
watched, touched, astonished, and bewildered the French, making the
26th of August a memorable day in their camps.
Near the Meuse the ubiquitous patrols discovered troops at Buzancy;
upon the central road which runs beside the Aire, the foremost squadron
saw infantry and cavalry in Grand Pré; upon the Aisne, two adventurous
parties pressing up close to the flank and rear of Vouziers, were able
to observe and report the presence of large bodies of all arms encamped
to the east of the town, and to specify the positions which they held.
No attempt was made to attack, and there was no firing except a sputter
of carbine-shots discharged by a French at a German patrol which had
approached the left bank of the Aire near Grand Pré. The whole line of
horsemen, from the Meuse to the Aisne, was in constant communication,
and their scouting parties, eager to see and not be seen, found their
designs favoured by the abounding woods and the undulations of the
land. Thus, in one day, a thick fringe of lynx-eyed cavalry was thrust
in close proximity to the adversary many miles in front of the German
Corps, plodding their arduous way along the plashy tracks and by-ways
of the Argonne.
_Movements of the French._
No such bold and prudent use was made of the French cavalry by Marshal
MacMahon, whom we left with his Army still lingering near the Aisne.
The misgivings which oppressed him at Reims did not diminish during
his halt at Rhetel; and they deepened as he moved towards the Meuse.
But no doubts, based on the absence of intelligence from or concerning
Bazaine and the difficulty of supplying the Army, will account for the
misuse which he made of his cavalry. The danger he had to dread lurked
in the region to the south, yet after the 24th the duty of covering the
exposed right flank and of gleaning exact information was imposed upon
the brigade attached to the 7th Corps. For Margueritte’s division of
Chasseurs d’Afrique was, on the 25th, suddenly drawn from the right and
sent forward to Le Chesne in front of the centre pointing towards Sedan
or Stenay; while Bonnemain’s division of heavy cavalry moved slowly
close in rear of the 1st Corps, where it was useless. The incidents
of the memorable 26th, when even minutes were priceless, quickly
demonstrated the gravity of the error. On that day, at the close of a
brief march, the 12th Corps stood at Tourteron, the 5th at Le Chesne,
the 1st at Semuy, and the 7th a little east of Vouziers. Margueritte
moved on to Oches, and Bonnemain’s was at Attigny, on the left bank of
the Aisne.
Now Douay, who commanded the 7th Corps, had become anxious, for he was
on the outward flank. He sought some security by sending a brigade,
under General Bordas, to Buzancy and Grand Pré, and his strongest
regiment of Hussars to scout along the two rivers which unite at
Senuc. The Hussar patrols came in contact with the German, and it was
one of them which emptied its carbines at the hostile and inquisitive
dragoons of the 5th Cavalry Division. Retiring hastily on Grand Pré
the French Hussars handed in reports which so impressed General Bordas
that he at once contemplated a retreat on Buzancy, and forwarded the
alarming message to his Corps Commander. General Douay instantly
inferred that the dreaded German Army was not distant, and, ordering
Bordas to retreat on Vouziers, he sent the baggage and provisions to
the rear, and drew up his divisions in line of battle, at the junction
of the roads from Grand Pré and Buzancy. Just before sunset a horseman
rode up with a message that, after all, Bordas had not retired from
the village which he occupied, though he believed the road to Vouziers
was intercepted, and that the enemy might be upon him at any moment.
The remedy applied was to send forth General Dumont with a brigade
to bring him in. While Dumont marched in the darkness Douay and his
staff passed the night at a bivouac fire listening eagerly to every
sound, and starting up when the step of a wayfarer or the clink of
a horseshoe fell on their ears. About three in the morning of the
27th Dumont brought in Bordas and his brigade, together with a few
Germans who, pressing too far forward at eventide, had been captured.
Nor did the effect produced by the enterprising German cavalry end
here. General Douay had sent in to MacMahon a report of the exciting
incidents; and with the morning light came the information that the
Marshal had directed the whole Army to draw near and support the 7th
Corps. So it fell out that the mere appearance of the German cavalry
had arrested the French. But at the same time their leaders were also
told by fugitive country folk—nothing definite could be extracted from
the prisoners taken at Grand Pré—that the Prussian Crown Prince was
at Sainte-Menehould, and that another army—whence derived, in what
strength, or by whom commanded they could not imagine—was advancing
from Varennes.
_The Marshal Resolves, Hesitates, and Yields._
We now touch on the moment when the decision was adopted which impelled
the French Army on its final marches towards defeat and captivity;
a decision mainly due to the extreme pressure exerted by the Comte
de Palikao and the Regency. Marshal MacMahon had transferred his
head-quarters to Le Chesne-Populeux, a village on the canal which
connects the Aisne and the Meuse. The 12th Corps was there, with the
5th in its front at Brieulles sur Bar; the 7th, as before, at Vouziers,
and the 1st in its rear at Yoncq; Margueritte’s horse at Beaumont, and
Bonnemain’s still about Attigny. The information placed before the
Marshal by the inhabitants and his own officers seemed to justify those
apprehensions which he had so strongly expressed at Reims, and he began
to feel again that he was marching towards that “disaster which he
wished to avoid.” In the midst of a prolonged survey of the position,
he was summoned by the Emperor who, having received some authentic
information, declared that the Prussian Crown Prince had turned from
the road to Paris and was then advancing northwards. With Napoleon III.
MacMahon remained for a long time, and came back to his head-quarters
resolved to retreat upon Mézières. Indeed, he issued orders on the
spot, directing all the Corps to retire behind the canal the next day,
and take post at Chagny, Vendresse, and Poix. Then, at half-past eight
in the evening of the 27th, he dictated to Colonel Stoffel a telegram
designed for the Minister, in which he said that there was one
hostile Army on the right bank of the Meuse and another marching upon
the Ardennes. “I have no news of Bazaine,” he went on. “If I advance
to meet him I shall be attacked in front by a part of the First and
Second German Armies, which, favoured by the woods, can conceal a force
superior to mine, and at the same time attacked by the Prussian Crown
Prince cutting off my line of retreat. I approach Mézières to-morrow,
whence I shall continue my retreat, guided by events, towards the
west.” Colonel Stoffel relates that, just as he was about to carry the
telegram to Colonel d’Abzac, with orders to forward it at once, General
Faure, chief of the staff, came in; and MacMahon, seizing the telegram,
said, “Here is a despatch which I have written to the Minister.”
Faure read, and begged the Marshal not to send it, for, said he, “You
will get an answer from Paris, which, perhaps, will prevent you from
carrying out your new plans. You can transmit it to-morrow, when we are
already on the road to Mézières.” The Marshal answered, “Send it,” and
it was sent.
The reply, so shrewdly foreseen by General Faure, was handed to the
Marshal about half-past one on the morning of the 28th. It was dated,
“Paris, August 27, 11 p.m.,” addressed to “the Emperor,” and began
with these tell-tale words, “If you abandon Bazaine,” wrote the Comte
de Palikao, “‘la revolution est dans Paris,’ or Paris will revolt, and
you will be attacked yourself by all the enemy’s forces.” He asserted
that Paris could defend herself, that the Army must reach Bazaine; that
the Prussian Crown Prince, aware of the danger to which his Army and
that which blockaded Metz, was exposed by MacMahon’s turning movement,
had changed front to the north. “You are at least six-and-thirty,
perhaps eight-and-forty, hours in advance of him,” the Minister
continued. “You have before you only a part of the forces blockading
Metz, which, seeing you retire from Chalons to Reims, stretched out
towards the Argonne. Your movement on Reims deceived them. Everybody
here feels the necessity of extricating Bazaine, and the anxiety with
which your course is followed is extreme.” The Marshal’s will broke
down under this strain. He could not bear the thought that men might
in future point to him as one who deserted a brother Marshal. Against
his better judgment he revoked the orders already issued, enjoining a
retreat upon Mézières, and put all his Corps in motion for the banks
of the Meuse. To complete the narrative of this decisive event, it
may here be said that, on the 28th, at Stonne, as the Marshal himself
has admitted, the Emperor made a last desperate appeal against the
change of plan. Another despatch from Palikao, dated half-past one in
the morning of the 28th, this time addressed to the Marshal, had come
to hand at Stonne. “In the name of the Council of Ministers and the
Privy Council,” it said, “I request you [‘je vous demande’] to succour
Bazaine—profiting by the thirty hours’ advance which you have over the
Crown Prince of Prussia. I direct Vinoy’s Corps on Reims.”
It is probable that the purport, or a copy of this telegram, was sent
to the Emperor, for he twice, through his own officers, reminded
the Marshal that the despatches of a Minister were not orders, and
that he was free to act as he thought expedient, and implored him to
reflect maturely before he gave up his intention to retreat. So much
must be said for Napoleon III.—that, at Metz, on the morrow of Woerth
and Spicheren, and at Stonne, when the toils were fast closing round
him, his military judgment was prompt and correct. But the Marshal
had decided; and the prayers of an Emperor did not avail against the
gloomy forecasts, the impassioned language, and the formal request or
demand of a Minister of War whose telegrams exhibit the depth of his
ignorance concerning the actual situation. It is not surprising that
he was ill-informed, seeing how difficult it was for officers on the
spot, German as well as French, to obtain exact knowledge; but it is
amazing that an experienced soldier and Minister of War should not be
aware of his own incompetence to direct, from his closet in Paris, an
army in the field. Palikao combined the qualities of the Dutch Deputy
with those of the Aulic Councillor; and the troops of Marshal MacMahon
tramped on to meet their approaching ruin. The positions they attained
on the 28th will be more conveniently specified later on; for it is
time to follow, once more, the footsteps of the hardy and far-marching
Germans, who were now across the direct path of MacMahon’s Army.
_Movements of the Germans._
How, by long and laborious marches, the tough foot soldiers, almost
treading on the heels of their mounted comrades, gained ground on the
adversary must now be succinctly narrated. On the 26th, the 12th Corps
reached Varennes, and the Saxon Prince established his head-quarters
at Clermont in Argonne. The Guard went on to Dombasle, and the 4th
Corps to a point beyond Fleury. Such were the marches of the Army of
the Meuse. In the Third Army, the Bavarians made a wet and weary night
march in the wake of the 4th Corps, attaining Triaucourt and Erize la
Petite; but for the moment, the 5th, the 6th, and the Würtembergers
stood fast. The reason for this apparent hesitation was that Von Moltke
was not yet quite convinced. King William remained at Bar le Duc all
the forenoon. Thither came the Crown Prince and General von Blumenthal
from Ligny, and, at a council held in the great head-quarters, both
of them declared unequivocally in favour of the northern march,
urging that it would be wiser to delay the movement on Paris than run
the risks of a battle in the north unless it could be fought by all
the forces which could be got together. These opinions prevailed,
and it was decided that the Bavarians should start at once, and that
the next day the other Corps of the Third Army should proceed to
Sainte-Menehould and Vavray. General von Blumenthal, indeed, had formed
a strong judgment on the situation. A few hours after the consultation
at head-quarters, writes Dr. William Russell in his “Diary,” “taking me
into a room in which was a table covered with a large map on a scale
of an inch to a mile, he (Blumenthal) said, ‘These French are lost,
you see. We know they are there, and there, and there—and Mahon’s
whole Army. _Where_ can they go to? Poor foolish fellows! They must go
to Belgium, or fight _there_ and be lost;’ and he put his finger on
the map between Mézières and Carignan.” It is a remarkable fact that
General Longstreet judging only from the telegrams which reached the
United States about this time, arrived at the same conclusion.
King William, during the afternoon, journeyed to Clermont; while
the Crown Prince drove to Revigny les Vaches, which he made his
head-quarters until the 28th. Before losing sight of Bar le Duc, we
may quote from Dr. Russell’s pages one other sentence, which affords
a brief glimpse of the great political leader in this war. In the
forenoon on the 26th, the graphic Diarist “saw Count Bismarck standing
in a doorway out of the rain whiffing a prodigious cigar, seemingly
intent on watching the bubbles which passed along the watercourse by
the side of the street;” but probably with his thoughts far away from
the evanescent symbols of men’s lives. He had entered the town with
the King on the 24th, and feared that the royal staff would linger
there for several days, “as in Capua;” yet, in a few hours, this
playful censor of delay was speeding North, like the Armies, to play a
conspicuous part in a sublime tragedy at Sedan.
In his quarters at Clermont, General von Moltke still disposed of the
Meuse Army and the Bavarians in a manner which would enable him to
effect, if necessary, that concentration at Damvillers which we saw
him meditating and devising on the afternoon of the 25th, at Bar le
Duc. Thus, on the 27th, the Guard, which came up to Monfaucon, and the
4th Corps to Germonville, were each directed to throw bridges over the
Meuse, so that there should be four points of passage in case of need.
The Bavarians followed from the rear as far as Dombasle and Nixéville,
and the other Corps of the Third Army turned frankly northward, the
5th pushing its advance-guard to Sainte-Menehould. At the same time
the Saxon Corps had crossed the Meuse at Dun and established a brigade
firmly in Stenay. The cavalry had been as active and as useful as
ever. They had covered the march of the Saxon Corps by occupying Grand
Pré, Nouart, and Buzancy, coming into contact with the French at the
last-named village. General de Failly, who, early in the morning, had
moved to Bar, observed hostile cavaliers beyond the stream, and sent
Brahaut’s brigade to drive them off and seize prisoners. That brought
on a smart skirmish, during which De Failly received orders to retreat
on Brieulles; but Brahaut was driven from Buzancy by the fire of a
horse battery; and the unlucky French General made no prisoners. There
was no other rencontre during the day, but the German cavalry on all
sides rode up close to the enemy’s posts and kept the leaders well
informed. From the reports sent in, Von Moltke inferred that there
had been a pause in the French movements; at all events, that none of
their troops had crossed the Meuse; and, as he knew that the Saxons
were in Dun and Stenay, he thought himself, at length, justified in
believing it possible that he might strike MacMahon on the left bank.
Consequently, he abandoned the Damvillers plan, and sent back to
Metz the two Corps which had been detached from the blockading army.
Therefore, while the Saxons stood fast, for one day, the Bavarians were
directed to march, on the 28th, upon Varennes and Vienne le Chateau;
the Guard upon Banthéville; and the 4th Corps on Montfaucon—the general
direction for all the Corps being Vouziers, Buzancy, and Beaumont.
During that day these orders were fulfilled, each Corps duly attaining
its specified destination; the Guard and 4th Corps, before they
started, taking up the bridges thrown over the Meuse. Four divisions
of cavalry were out prying, through the mist, into every movement of
the 5th and 7th French Corps, whose left flank, it was ascertained,
was absolutely unguarded, so that the German horse looked on, and, in
some cases, were misled by the astonishing confusion displayed by the
enemy’s vacillating motions.
_Effects of MacMahon’s Counter-Orders._
The fatal decision adopted at Le Chesne on the night of the 27th
brought disorder and disaster upon the French Army. The wise resolve
to retreat on Mézières, strangely as the statement may sound, had
rekindled the fading spirits of the French soldiers. As soon as the
fact was communicated to them they sprung with alacrity to perform
the task of preparation. The officer who bore the order to the 7th
Corps started from Le Chesne at six o’clock, and by nine at night the
baggage, the provision transport, the engineers’ park, were actually in
motion for Chagny, through the long defile which leads to Le Chesne.
The cavalry were despatched to watch the flanks, and the infantry in
silence and darkness glided towards their first halting place, Quatre
Champs. “Everyman,” says Prince Bibesco, who was an eye-witness,
“marched with a firm step. All seemed to have forgotten the cold, the
rain, and the anxiety of the preceding days.” They drank in hope with
the refreshing air, and then their hopes were suddenly extinguished;
for as they were near Quatre Champs, at half-past five in the morning,
an aide-de-camp from MacMahon rode up to General Douay and told him the
latest decision—the Army was to move upon the Meuse.
The orders brought by the ill-omened messenger were that the 7th
Corps, that very day, should move to Nouart, which it was not destined
to reach; the 5th Beauclair, which it could not attain; that the
12th should gain La Besace, and the 1st Le Chesne, both of which
marches were duly performed. Bonnemains’ heavy brigade of horse was
sent to Les Grands Armoises, and Margueritte’s towards Mouzon, but
afterwards to Sommauthe. The 7th Corps, fearing greatly for its
baggage train, already far away, set out again and only reached
Boult-aux-Bois, the men on short rations, the horses without a feed
of oats. The same troubles beset the other corps which had despatched
their trains northward. But the largest share of ill-fortune befell
De Failly. He was ordered to march by way of Buzancy upon Nouart and
Beauclair—indeed, to get as far forward as he could on the road to
Stenay. The Marshal knew it was occupied, for he told De Failly to
expect a sharp resistance before he could carry it. But when within
sight of Harricourt and Bar his adventures began. He discerned hostile
cavalry in his path; they were vigilant Uhlans of the Guard. De Failly
halted; the cavalry increased, became enterprising, and some shots
were exchanged; but in the end the French General, finding that he
could not rely upon the support of Douay, who was resting his wearied
men at Boult-aux-Bois, and believing that the direct road to Nouart
was commanded by the enemy, he turned aside and, through narrow muddy
lanes, made his way by Sommauthe to Belval and Bois les Dames, the
last division not arriving at the camp until eight in the evening.
Nevertheless, his appearance at and south of Bois les Dames so imposed
on the German cavalry scouts that they retired from Nouart in the
afternoon. The movements and halts of both French corps had been
observed, and when night fell the Germans at Bayonville saw the French
bivouac fires beyond Buzancy and in the direction of Stenay. At this
time there were no hostile German infantry west of the Meuse nearer
than Banthéville; for the troops on the flank of the French, from
Vouziers to Dun, were wholly horsemen. No more valuable demonstration
of the priceless value of cavalry was ever made than that afforded
by the Teutons during this campaign. They were more than the “eyes
and ears of the Army;” they were an impenetrable screen concealing
from view the force and the movements of the adversary, who was still
engaged in pushing up his troops in the hope of compelling the French
to fight a decisive battle on the 30th. That hope, entertained by Von
Moltke on the 28th, was not fulfilled, because, at the last moment,
MacMahon turned his Army from Stenay upon Mouzon. On that day the King
moved on to Varennes, and the Prince, his son, to Sainte-Menehould.
_German and French Operations on the 29th._
The position of affairs on the evening of the 28th was somewhat
perplexing, because the earlier reports sent in to head-quarters
indicated, what was the fact for a brief interval, that the French were
retiring northward. But no sooner had orders been issued to fit that
state of things than certain information came to hand which showed that
the Meuse was again their immediate objective; and it was then that, by
abstaining from provocation, Von Moltke judged it possible to move up
troops sufficient to fight with advantage on the 30th, somewhere west
of Stenay. The Saxon Prince, acting within the discretionary limits
allowed him, decided to cross the Meuse with the 12th Corps, and bring
up the Guard and 4th to Buzancy and Nouart, but to evade a battle, and
content himself with the fulfilling the task of obtaining intelligence.
The orders were issued, and, while they were in execution, one body of
cavalry tracked the 7th Corps during its painful march to Oches and
St. Pierremont, and saw the divisions settling down in their bivouacs;
and another made prize of Le Capitaine Marquis de Grouchy bearing
despatches from MacMahon to De Failly. This was an important capture,
for it not only deprived the unfortunate General of vital orders, but
it placed in the hands of Von Moltke the arrangements which the Marshal
had drawn up to guide the motions of his Corps. Out of this mishap grew
a fresh misfortune for the French.
Marshal MacMahon, on the morning of the 28th, framed his plans on the
supposition that he would be able to pass the Meuse at Stenay, and kept
the heads of his columns pointing south-west; but learning at a later
period that the Saxons were posted at that place in force—his reports
said 15,000 men—he was again, at midnight, obliged to change his
scheme, and he resolved to pass the river at Mouzon and Remilly. He,
therefore, sent out orders directing the 12th Corps and Margueritte’s
cavalry to Mouzon, for, having no pontoon train, he was compelled
to seek permanent bridges; the 1st Corps and Bonnemains’ horse to
Raucourt; the 7th to La Besace, which, as we have seen, they did not
reach, but halted at Oches and St. Pierremont; and the 5th to Beaumont,
which place they entered after weary marches and a sharp action. These
were the orders for the day which, with other useful documents, were
found in the pockets of De Grouchy. No special interest pertains to
the march of the 1st Corps. The 12th found its way safely to Mouzon,
crossed the river, and occupied the heights on the right bank, while
General Margueritte despatched some of his Chasseurs on the Stenay
road. What then happened? The Chasseurs returned and reported that
they had seen no enemy, although at that moment Stenay was held by the
enemy’s horse and foot. “They committed,” writes General Lebrun, then
commanding the 12th Corps, “the fault which in former wars was made a
ground of reproach against the French cavalry.” When in sight of Stenay
they saw no Germans and turned back instead of pushing on to and beyond
the town, or trying to do so; and the corps commander justly regards
this laxity as a grave fault. So Lebrun, resting at Mouzon, could learn
nothing, either from spies or his famous Chasseurs, respecting an enemy
then within a few miles. The irony of the situation was complete when,
a little later, the Zieten Hussars from Stenay rode up to Margueritte’s
vedettes, and found him although he could not find them. In that
fashion the French made war in 1870. General de Failly and his 5th
Corps were more severely treated, for their ill-luck and misdirection
brought upon them
_The Combat at Nouart._
Acting on verbal instructions, given on the night of the 28th, at
Belval, by a staff officer from the head-quarters at Stonne, De
Failly set out the next morning towards Beaufort and Beauclair, two
villages a few miles south-west of Stenay. He did not know, as we do,
that the Marshal had changed his plans, and that the officer bearing
the countermanding order had fallen into the hands of a German patrol.
The French General did not break up his camp and quit Belval until ten
o’clock in the morning, which gave the Saxons, who had been brought
over the Meuse from Dun, plenty of time to watch his movements. Indeed,
he could see them, troops of all arms, on the heights of Nouart,
moving, as he judged, in an easterly direction, which was an error,
possibly arising from some turn in the road, for the whole 12th Corps
were over the Meuse between Dun and Nouart. General de Failly disposed
his troops in two columns, one of which marched towards Beaufort by
country roads; the other, with the General, consisting of Guyot de
Lespart’s division and two regiments of Brahaut’s cavalry, made for
Beauclair. Their road lay through the valley of the Wiseppe, a sluggish
stream meandering through a marshy bottom land and passing Beaufort
on its way to the Meuse. The route through Nouart was barred by the
Germans, and when the leading French squadrons, crossing the valley
to gain the main road, began to ascend the slopes, they suddenly came
under a smart fire from infantry and guns. The French Hussars flitted
fast back across the meadows, and De Failly at once stopped the march
of both columns, putting his infantry and guns in position, and resting
them principally upon two small villages. Then ensued, about noon, an
indecisive but vexatious combat, for the Germans did not intend to
attack in force, but simply harass and delay the 5th Corps; and De
Failly, uncertain respecting the numbers which might be hidden by the
woods, dared not retort, especially as he was remote from the French
Army and without support from any other corps. So, for several hours,
the fight went on. The object of the Saxons, who descended into the
valley, was simply to detain the French, and, although the assailants
traversed the brook and the high road, pushing forward a few companies
and supporting them by an artillery fire from the heights, they did not
come to close quarters. General de Failly was of opinion that he had
repelled an attack, and that the enemy did not renew it because the
French were so strongly posted; but the truth is that Prince George
of Saxony not only held back his superior force because he had been
enjoined to abstain from a serious engagement, but was himself misled
by erroneous reports respecting the state of affairs towards Stenay.
Soon after four o’clock De Failly also drew off; he had then just
received a duplicate of the order directing him upon Beaumont. He sadly
deplores the mischance, and pathetically relates how all his wearied
troops reached Beaumont “during the night,” except the rear-guard,
which did not enter the camp until five o’clock on the morning of the
30th.
_The State of Affairs at Sundown._
Thus, for the French, terminated another day of error and loss, which
left three Corps still on the left bank of the Meuse. When the sun went
down, the German horse were close to every one of them except the 12th,
which, it will be remembered, was on the right bank near Mouzon. The
active cavalry moved in the rear of the 1st Corps, seizing prisoners at
Voncq, riding up to Le Chesne, and keeping watch through the night upon
the wearied 7th Corps, as it sought repose in the camps of Oches and
St. Pierremont. The German Infantry Corps, meantime, had been closing
up for the final onslaught. The 12th Corps was in and about Nouart,
covered by outposts and patrols, which stretched away to Stenay. The
Guard was at Buzancy, the 4th Corps at Remonville; the 5th Corps was at
Grand Pré, with the Würtembergers near at hand; the Bavarians had come
up to Sommerance and its neighbourhood on both banks of the Aisne; the
11th Corps stood at Monthois on the left, while the 6th Corps was in
the rear at Vienne le Chateau. The head-quarters of King William were
set up in Grand Pré, under the old gloomy castle, the Prussian Prince
was near by at the little village of Senuc, and the Saxon Prince at
Bayonville. Thus, in three days, the whole Army had drawn together,
facing north, and was ready, at a signal, to spring forward and grapple
with the enemy who had committed himself so rashly to a flank march in
the face of the most redoubtable generals, and the best instructed,
disciplined and rapidly-marching troops in Europe.
Examining attentively the reports which reached him from all points of
the extensive curve upon which the cavalry were so active, and poring
over the map, General von Moltke at length formed a definite judgment
on the position as it appeared to him through this medium. He inferred
that the Army of Chalons was marching in a north-west direction towards
the Meuse; that its principal forces were then probably between Le
Chesne and Beaumont, with strong rear guards to the south; and the
practical result of his cogitations was that the German Armies should
move upon the line Le Chesne-Beaumont in such a way as might enable
them to attack the enemy before he reached the Meuse. Therefore, the
Saxon Prince’s Army, except the Guard, which was to become the reserve,
was to march early on Beaumont, two Corps of the Third Army were to
support the Saxon onset, but the left of that Army was to march on Le
Chesne. As a matter of fact, the French, in part at least, were nearer
the Meuse than Von Moltke supposed, for the 12th Corps was on the right
bank, and the 1st at Raucourt; while the 7th was at Oches, the 5th at
Beaumont, and there were no troops at Le Chesne except stragglers.
MacMahon took in the situation; he was resolved to pass the river
“coûte que coûte”: and his chance of doing so, even then, depended
on the rapidity with which his troops could march. The 5th Corps was
struck and routed the next day, but the French Army did succeed in
effecting a passage over the stream.
_The Battle of Beaumont._
The German Armies had now fairly entered the Ardennes, formerly the
northern district of the old province of Champagne. It is a land of
vast woods which crowd one upon another between the Bar and the Meuse.
Looking from some smooth hill-top, the landscape, in summer, wears
the aspect of a boundless forest, the dark furrowed lines of shadow
alone indicating the hollows, gullies, ravines, and defiles. Here and
there may be seen a church or château, or a glimpse may be caught of
a road bordered by tall trees. The woods are so dense that infantry,
still less guns and horsemen, cannot work through them, or move at all,
except upon the high roads, lanes and tracks, worn by the villagers and
farm people. Marshy brooks lurk under the green covert, and rivulets
burrow their way through steep banks. Yet there are open spaces in the
maze of verdure, farmsteads and fields, and rounded heights whence the
tourist may contemplate the extensive panorama. It is not a country
which lends itself easily to military operations, but one more suitable
to the sportsman than the soldier. The boar of the Ardennes is still
famous and it is on record that a certain Herr von Bismarck, once upon
a time, hunted the wolf through the snow in the very region where he
was hunting the French in August, 1870.
It was amidst these thickets, dingles, and almost pathless wilds that
the French had to retreat and the Germans to pursue. We have seen that
General de Failly’s Corps was struggling all night to reach what they
hoped would be a comparative haven of rest at Beaumont, a bourgade
upon the high road from Le Chesne to Stenay, planted down in a hollow,
surrounded by gardens, and having in its centre a fine church visible
from afar. Here he pitched his tents, so that his tired soldiers might
recover from the fatigues they had endured in useless marches; and he
thought, in his simple way, that he might safely defer his march until
the afternoon. Yet Marshal MacMahon had visited the camp early in the
morning, and if he used language to De Failly, as he probably did,
similar to that which he employed at Oches, it should have quickened
the General’s movements and saved him from defeat. For, after visiting
Beaumont, MacMahon, much concerned for the 7th as well as the 5th
Corps, rode into the camp at Oches. The trains had entered the defile
leading to Stonne, some hours earlier, preceded and escorted by the
brigades of Conseil Dumesnil’s Division, and the 2nd Division was just
about to start, leaving the 3rd as a rear-guard. “You will have 60,000
men upon your hands, this evening,” he said, “if you do not succeed in
getting beyond the Meuse.” Urging Douay to get rid of his heavy convoy,
and “coûte que coûte,” cross the river, he indicated Villers below
Mouzon as the point of passage, and rode away. The misfortunes of the
7th Corps, also much tried, will be related later; but it may be said
that they did not reach Mouzon, for their outlet from the toils proved
to be the southern gate of Sedan!
_The Surprise of the 5th Corps._
Inspired by the hope of closing with the enemy, the German Armies were
astir at dawn, and soon long columns of men and guns were tramping
steadily northward; but, for the present the narrative is concerned
only with the Saxon 12th, the Prussian 4th, and Von der Tann’s
Bavarians. These troops advanced through the forests, the Saxons
near the Meuse, the 4th in the centre by Nouart and Belval, and the
Bavarians, from their distant bivouac at Sommerance, upon and beyond
Sommauthe. Now it was originally designed that the two Corps, on the
right and centre, should attack simultaneously, and to insure this,
each column, on arriving at the skirts of the forest, was directed
to halt under cover until it had ascertained that the others on each
flank had also gained the edge of the woods. But it turned out that the
Saxons, from the start, were delayed by various obstacles which impeded
not only the artillery, but the infantry. The leading division of the
4th Corps met with fewer obstructions on its route through Belval, and
thus arrived first on the scene of action. On the line of march in the
forest, intelligence was picked up which quickened its motions, and a
squadron sent forward confirmed the statement that the French about
Beaumont reposed in thoughtless security. The Corps Commander, Von
Alvensleben I.,—for there were two who bore the name in this Army,—an
officer ever ready to go forward, was present with the advance-guard
of the division, and not likely to hold it back. So the soldiers
advanced in silence. On approaching the open country, the Hussars in
the front glided out of sight, and a company of Jägers crept towards
the selvage of the wood, and, from a hillock near a farm, they saw,
only six hundred paces distant, a French camp, and beyond other camps.
The cavalry horses were picketed, the artillery teams had not returned
from seeking water, the soldiers were either resting or employed on the
routine work of a camp. What should be done? Here was an absolutely
unguarded Army Corps, ignorant that an enemy was within short musket
range. The divisional commander had orders to await the arrival of
lateral columns, but he felt that the Frenchmen might discover his
unwelcome presence at any moment. He had only a brigade on the ground,
yet the temptation to seize an opportunity so unexpected, was almost
irresistible. He, therefore, decided to attack as soon as his brigade
could deploy, and his batteries plant themselves in a favourable
place. Suddenly the men in the French camp were all in motion. General
von Alvensleben inferred that the proximity of his troops had been
perceived, whereas the activity displayed, as we learn from De Failly,
was caused by an order to fall in before starting for Mouzon. Without
waiting, however, until the battalions in rear could reach the ground,
Alvensleben opened fire, and the shells bursting in their camp, gave
the first warning to the French that their redoubtable adversaries were
upon them. General de Failly says that the grand-guards had not had
time to signal the enemy’s presence, and that his own information led
him to believe that the Germans had marched upon Stenay. The verdict of
Marshal MacMahon upon his subordinate is that “General de Failly was
surprised in his bivouac by the troops of the Saxon Crown Prince.”
The French soon recovered from their disorder, swarms of skirmishers
rushed out towards the assailants, some batteries went rapidly into
action; and the combined fire of shells and bullets wrought havoc
among the Prussian gunners and the infantry, hitting even those on
the line of march. They did not yield to the pressure; and when the
French delivered a determined attack it was repelled by volleys and
independent firing. Then the French got several batteries into position
on the hill side north of Beaumont; the Germans were reinforced by the
arrival of guns and foot, for the other division of the Corps came up
and at once deployed on the right of its comrades. At this time, a
little after one o’clock, the Saxons on the right, next the Meuse, and
the Bavarians on the left, who had been marching since five o’clock in
the morning, had also begun to take part in the fight. King William
and his vast Staff, posted on a hill off the road from Buzancy, and
his son, on a similar elevation near Oches, were closely watching the
battle, discernible thence in its general smoky features, at least by
the King.
General de Failly had no desire to fight a regular engagement. His aim
was to put his troops in order and offer as much resistance as might be
required to cover his retreat upon Mouzon, distant only six miles. He,
therefore, relied on his line of guns above the village, and they were
effective, for some time; but he showed great apprehension lest his
left, or Meuse flank, should be turned. Seeing the German lines develop
and grow stronger, in men and guns, feeling the new power brought
to bear by the Saxons, who, cramped for want of room, were pressed
close to the river, and, hearing the Bavarian guns on his right, he
made one more vigorous effort to arrest the 4th Corps. Thick lines of
skirmishers, followed by supports in close order, dashed forward with
such valour and impetuosity that they drove in the covering infantry
and charged to within fifty paces of the guns. The danger was great,
but the Germans rapidly flung everything near into the contest,
gained the mastery, compelled the gallant Frenchmen to wheel about,
followed them promptly, captured the southern camp, and then poured
into Beaumont itself upon all sides. But the chassepot had told, and
the Germans paid heavily, as they always did and were ready to do, for
their persistent courage and well-tempered audacity. With the town fell
the other camps; and then, for a time, the infantry combat ceased. But
the artillery advanced, as usual, and engaged in a long duel with the
powerful line of batteries established by the French to facilitate the
retreat of their infantry and arrest pursuit. Although not able to
stand up against 150 guns, they did not retire until their infantry
had got into another position between the Yoncq brook and the Meuse.
Then the batteries cleverly withdrew in succession, and before the 4th
Corps could advance, De Failly’s troops disappeared in the woods, and
were seen no more until they were reached beyond the hills and thrust
headlong into Mouzon.
While the 4th Corps was pulling itself together after the onset, De
Failly had been compelled by the impenetrable wood of Givodeau to
divide his forces, the left and the reserve artillery following the
main route to Mouzon took post above Villemontrey, close to the Meuse,
and derived support from guns and infantry which Lebrun had put into
position on the high land in an elbow of the river on the right bank.
The right wing hurried round the western side of the Givodeau thickets,
and found a post upon a plateau beyond. In the meantime, General Lebrun
had ordered two brigades of infantry, commanded by Cambriels and
Villeneuve, and a cavalry division, to cross the river at Mouzon, but
Marshal MacMahon, riding up, ordered back Cambriels, and all the horse
except two regiments of cuirassiers. Those we shall presently meet
again. The German right wing vainly endeavoured to drive De Failly from
Villemontrey, and, after repeated attempts and much loss, desisted from
the enterprise; but kept a strong force at hand and a large number of
guns in action.
Meantime a singular incident had occurred to the west of Beaumont.
Just as the Bavarians were about to join in the attack on the camps
by throwing themselves on the French flank, they were fired on from
a farm called La Thibaudine and a hamlet named Warniforêt. They
were astonished because the presence of an enemy there was not even
suspected. The enemy was also astonished and still more frightened.
The combat was caused by a French brigade, which had wandered from its
line of march. It seems that the advance brigade of Conseil Dumesnil’s
division preceding the transport of the 7th Corps, a series of wagons,
nine miles in length, had been ordered by MacMahon, who met them, to
move by Yoncq instead of La Besace, and that, when the rear brigade
came up to the point of divergence, the marker left to give information
having disappeared, these unfortunate troops went forward on the great
road to Beaumont. A staff officer arrived just as the action began,
and he was leading the errant troops back, when the Bavarians emerged
in view. The conflict which ensued was sharp, but it delayed the 7th
Corps and ended in the rout of the French, who fled as best they could
through Yoncq towards Mouzon. About this time Douay was at Stonne;
the Uhlans of the Guard had followed him step by step, and bringing a
horse battery to bear on his rear guard, had induced General Dumont to
halt, deploy the brigade, and in his turn open fire; but General Douay
promptly appeared and stopped the action, having made up his mind that
the pressing duty of the hour was to get over the Meuse in accordance
with the Marshal’s desire. So the 7th, after some hesitation, retired
upon Raucourt, hoping thence to gain Villers below Mouzon; yet, being
pursued by the Bavarians, they were overtaken and attacked outside
Raucourt, and, hearing that the bridge was broken, they turned, some
upon Remilly, and others through Torcy into Sedan itself.
_The Flight to Mouzon._
When the left wing of the 4th Corps, pressing towards the defile of
the Yoncq and the slopes above it, sought to discover the French on
that side, they were at first sharply punished; but, following on, they
came up and closed with their adversaries. One brigade of Bavarians had
been sent to the 4th Corps and moved on the left flank of the toilsome
advance. For the ground was difficult, the obstacles numerous, and the
French, though shattered and dispirited, still displayed a fighting
front. But at length, late in the afternoon, the Germans mastered a
hill-top whence adverse artillery had fired upon the assailants; and
then these fairly entered the plain before Mouzon. Here, however, the
French occupied an isolated hill, called Le Mont de Brune, close to
and almost overhanging the Faubourg of Mouzon, from which its summit
is less than a mile distant. Unluckily for them they formed front
facing eastward, apparently anticipating an attack on that side; but
the Germans promptly turned the flank from the south and south-west,
and drove the defenders down the steep slopes towards Mouzon, capturing
ten guns. The victorious forward movement brought the leading companies
in front of Villeneuve’s brigade and the Cuirassiers in the plain. The
Germans halted, and opened a steady fire, when suddenly they beheld
the 5th Cuirassiers coming down on their left flank and rear. Captain
Helmuth, who commanded the three companies exposed to this ordeal,
made the left company face about in time, and then forbidding his men
to form rallying squares or groups, ordered them to stand fast as they
were, and only open fire when he gave the signal. The gallant French
horsemen, as was their wont, rode straight upon the infantry; but
the independent firing opened on them at point blank range, broke the
impetus and crushed in the head of the charging squadrons. Colonel
Contenson fell mortally wounded within fifteen paces of the infantry
line; and, although some fiery spirits dashed into their ranks, and one
engaged in single combat with Captain Helmuth until he fell pierced by
ball and bayonet, yet the whole mass of cavalry was routed with immense
loss, and driven into the Meuse.
For, by this time, the wreck of De Failly’s Corps was in full retreat
on all sides, and troops, artillery, transport trains, and stragglers,
were crowding on towards the bridge. When his right was turned by
the movement upon the Brune hill, and still further by the march of
the Bavarian brigade upon Pourron, De Failly quitted his post at
Villemontrey, which enabled the right division of the 4th Corps, the
Saxon regiments fighting by its side, and the artillery to push on
by the main road to Mouzon. After the first surprise of the Beaumont
camp, the French had mainly stood, here and there, to facilitate
their retreat, and the contest, which went on all the afternoon
among the woods and hills and ravines, was really a running fight.
The Germans had pursued with relentless pertinacity. Their soldiers
had been marching all day, but they seemed to be tireless, for they
never halted until the fugitives were over the Meuse, or the darkness
forbade further motion. De Failly had been surprised and thrust in
disorder over the river, and when the evening closed the Germans were
in possession of the faubourg of Mouzon, and of the bridge at its
western end. The 7th Corps, cut off from Villers, had moved, in a state
bordering on panic, upon Remilly; but there they found Bonnemains’
cuirassiers, the tail of a division belonging to the 1st Corps, and
a baggage column. The Meuse had been dammed to fill the ditches of
Sedan, and not only were the fords rendered useless, but the swelling
stream was unusually high. Douay, halted at seven o’clock, became
impatient after dark, and at ten rode down to the bridge. He found
the cuirassiers engaged in passing over the feeble construction. “The
horses,” writes Prince Bibesco, “affrighted, because they could not see
the shaking planks hidden by the water, and shifting under their steps,
moved with hesitation, their necks extended, their ears erect. Sitting
upright, shrouded in their large white cloaks, the cuirassiers marched
on silently, and appeared to be borne on the stream. Two fires, one at
each end of the bridge, flung a ghastly light on men and horses, and,
flickering on the helmets, imparted a fantastic aspect to this weird
spectacle.” At length the white horsemen passed over; but when the turn
of the artillery came the horses were still more recalcitrant, and the
passage was so slow that, at two in the morning of the 31st, only three
batteries and two regiments of foot had passed the Meuse. Douay then
learned that the Marshal had ordered all the Army to assemble at Sedan,
and he moved the rest of his Corps over the bridge at Torcy. These few
details will give some idea of the terrible disorder which prevailed
throughout the French Army.
On the evening of the 30th the Germans were upon the Meuse. The 4th
Corps was before Mouzon; one Bavarian Corps at Raucourt, the other at
Sommauthe; the 5th and 11th Corps about La Besace and Stonne; the 12th
was near the Meuse in front of Beaumont, and the Guard just behind
them; the Würtembergers were at Verrières, and the 6th Corps well
out to the west at Vouziers. On this flank also were the 5th and 6th
Cavalry Divisions threatening and watching the French communications;
while the 12th Cavalry Division was astride the Meuse at Pouilly,
and one of its squadrons, evading and passing through Margueritte’s
vedettes, had discovered and reported the presence of French troops on
the Chiers near Carignan, and the movement of trains on the railway
towards Sedan.
So ended this ominous day. The Army of the Meuse had lost 3,500 men in
killed and wounded, but they had routed one French Corps, and fractions
of two others, and they had captured forty-two guns. The French loss
is set down at 1,800 killed and wounded, but the Germans aver that,
included among the 3,000 acknowledged to be missing, there were 2,000
who bore no wounds.