CHAPTER XIII.

SEDAN.

_German Decision._

While Strasburg was enduring the agonies of a siege and bombardment,

and the “Army of the Rhine,” already oppressed by “la question des

vivres,” was chafing in its restricted camps under the cannon of Metz;

while Paris was quivering with excitement and barely restrained from

bursting into open revolt, the victorious German host was closing

steadily, yet swiftly, round the distracted and misguided Army of

Chalons. It was pressed in so closely on the Belgian frontier that,

during the afternoon of the 30th, before De Failly had been driven

over the Meuse, Count Bismarck sent a formal communication to the

German Minister at Brussels, in which he expressed a hope that, should

MacMahon lead his soldiers across the boundary, the Belgian authorities

would immediately deprive them of their arms. At night, in his quarters

at Buzancy, King William sanctioned a decisive order to his son and

the Saxon Prince. The troops were to march at dawn, attack the enemy

wherever he could be found on the left and right bank of the Meuse,

in order that he might be crushed up as much as possible between the

river and the Belgian border. The Saxon Prince was to operate beyond

the Meuse, with two Corps; the Prussian Prince on the front and left;

movements designed to bar the road to Montmédy, prevent any attempt to

recross the river, and, eventually, to interpose the German left wing

between the French and Mézières. “Should the adversary enter Belgium

and not be immediately disarmed, he is to be followed at once without

waiting for fresh orders.” These were not the final instructions which

led to the investment of an Army, but they prepared the way towards,

and foreshadowed the accomplishment of that astonishing result.

_Confusion in the French Camp._

Marshal MacMahon, perplexed, but not dismayed, by the events of the

30th, remained for some time in doubt. “I do not know what I shall do,”

said the Marshal early in the evening to Ducrot’s aide-de-camp. “In

any case, the Emperor should at once start for Sedan.” At that time

the Emperor was in the camp of Ducrot, who, instructed to protect the

retreat of the Army either by Douzy or by Carignan, that is, towards

Sedan or Montmédy, had divided his Corps between those two places.

At a later period, when darkness had set in, MacMahon, seated at a

bivouac fire, on the heights above Mouzon, sent for General Lebrun, and

directed him to retreat, at once, upon Sedan, not by the highway, which

was crowded with fugitives and wagons, but by cross roads leading upon

Douzy. “We have had a bad time,” said the Marshal, “but the situation

is not hopeless. At the most, the German Army before us cannot exceed

in numbers sixty or seventy thousand men. If they attack us, so much

the better; we shall be able, doubtless, to fling them into the Meuse.”

The Marshal, who never spared himself, and seemed to live without

sleep, rode back to Sedan, and Lebrun, stumbling along devious tracks,

in the darkness, and apparently in dubious military array, fearing

all the time that he might be attacked, entered Douzy at eight in

the morning, and did not reach Bazeilles, his destination, until ten

o’clock.

Meantime Ducrot, embarrassed by the presence of the Emperor, awaited

anxiously, at Carignan, the final orders of MacMahon. He respectfully

urged His Majesty to depart by train for Sedan, but the Emperor

refused—“he wished to be with the Corps which covered the retreat.”

He was astonished and incredulous when the rout before Mouzon was

described. “It is impossible,” he repeatedly exclaimed, “our positions

were magnificent!” In the night he vanished from Carignan; and it was

only some hours after he had gone that Ducrot was informed of his

departure by train. The General then, in concert with Margueritte,

whose cavalry were on the Chiers, resolved to retreat in the morning,

without waiting longer for orders, and to move upon Illy, because he

assumed that MacMahon would certainly direct the Army on Mézières. He

was mistaken. On reaching Villers-Cernay, about four in the afternoon

of the 31st, Ducrot learned that he was to retire upon Sedan, and

not upon Mézières, “whither I have not any intention of going,” said

the Marshal’s despatch. In fact, the two Divisions of the 1st Corps,

left at Douzy on the 30th, had been already ordered to retire on the

Givonne. Lebrun, whom we saw follow in their wake, after his painful

night march, did not destroy the bridge over the Chiers; so that,

when he was passing Francheval, Ducrot actually saw the enemy—they

were Saxon horsemen—issuing from the village, and cutting in upon the

baggage and transport trains.

On that memorable 30th, when the Emperor informed the Empress by

telegram, from Carignan, that there had been an “engagement of no

great importance,” an officer destined to be conspicuous, dropped in

upon the Army; it was De Wimpffen. He has been defined by General

Lebrun, who was with him at St. Cyr, as a man of firm will, and “an

unlimited confidence in his own capacity.” Indeed, he had come to

restore victory. When he passed through Paris, the Comte de Palikao

was good enough to tell him—so he writes, although Palikao “thinks” he

could not have so expressed himself—that MacMahon chimed in too easily

with the suggestions of the Emperor, which was not the fact; that

His Majesty was in a false position, and that he caused the greatest

embarrassment. “Send me to the Army,” said De Wimpffen, “I shall impart

the needed boldness and decision.” So he was sent to supersede De

Failly in command of the 5th Corps, carrying in his pocket a letter

which authorized him to succeed MacMahon in command of the Army, should

any accident befall the Marshal. It was this audacious personage who

supervened on the 30th, and to his horror, found the Army he might have

to guide and govern, falling to pieces under his eyes. He met troops in

flight from Mouzon; they were frightened, famished, and could hardly

be persuaded that the “Prussians” were not at their heels. As evidence

of the reigning disorder, De Wimpffen says that he collected on the

30th, three regiments belonging to the 5th, 7th, and 12th Corps, some

squadrons of De Failly’s cavalry, and several hundreds of men belonging

to the 1st Corps, who obeyed a non-combatant officer. The General led

them during the night to Sedan. A like confusion prevailed on all

sides, as the soldiers, hungry and thoroughly wearied, fell asleep as

they dropped on the ground in their dreary bivouacs.

The Emperor entered Sedan about midnight. The Marshal urged him to

embark afresh in the train, and seek security in Mézières, where

General Vinoy was expected, and where he did, indeed, arrive that night

with the advance guard of one division of the 13th Corps. The Emperor

refused to quit Sedan, but the Prince Imperial had been sent away. The

movement of Vinoy was delayed several hours, because a train running to

Avesnes, and bearing the young Prince, “his baggage, his escort, and

his suite,” barred the way to Mézières.

When morning dawned upon the discomfited Army, Marshal MacMahon had

not ceased to ponder. As he said before the Parliamentary Commission

of Inquiry in 1872, he had no intention of fighting a battle at Sedan,

but he wished to supply the Army afresh with provisions and munitions;

and he spent part of the day in considering what he should do on the

morrow, and in watching from the citadel the march of his foes. There

were, he believed, a million rations in Sedan, but eight hundred

thousand of these were stored in wagons at the station, and as shells

reached them from beyond the Meuse, the station-master sent away the

train to Mézières. With it went a company of engineers, instructed

to blow up the bridge at Donchery; but frightened by the shells, the

driver halted long enough to drop the engineers, and then hastily fled

with the powder and tools. The Marshal did not hear of the mishap until

ten o’clock at night, and when another company of engineers reached the

bridge, they found it in possession of the enemy! Early in the morning,

before that event occurred, Captain des Sesmaisons, carrying a message

from Vinoy, entered Sedan, after having been fired on by a German

battery established near Frenois. He saw the Emperor in the hotel of

the Sub-Prefect, delivered his message, and received a despatch from

His Majesty directing Vinoy to concentrate his troops in Mézières.

Anxious that the Captain should return in safety, the Emperor gave him

a horse, and traced on a map the road he should take, observing that

the Army would retire by that route the next day; that the road would

be open and safe, as it was new, had not been marked on the map, and

was unknown to the enemy. But we learn from the German Staff history,

that this recently opened road, although not laid down on the French,

was duly figured in the German map, a contrast between diligence and

negligence not easily paralleled. The Captain saw MacMahon, who then,

nearly midday, seemed resolved to march on Mézières, and believed that

he could crush any opposition.

At this moment General Douay arrived, and gave a new turn to his

thoughts. Douay had surveyed the position in front of his camp with

an anxious eye, and had noted that, unless reinforced, he could not

hold the cardinal point—the Calvaire d’Illy. He got additional troops

in the end. “But,” said the Marshal, who seemed to share Douay’s

apprehensions, “I do not want to shut myself up in lines; I wish to

be free to manœuvre.” “M. le Maréchal, to-morrow the enemy will not

leave you the time,” was the General’s answer. According to Captain

des Sesmaisons, it was Douay’s comments on the position which made

the Marshal modify his judgment, and think of fighting where he stood

rather than of retreating on Mézières. The Captain rode back to his

General, and carried with him a gloomy account of the condition and

outlook of the Army of Chalons. No troops were sent forth to watch

the Meuse below Sedan and communicate with Vinoy. Later in the day,

an old soldier who lived in the neighbourhood, sought out General

Douay and told him that the enemy was preparing to pass the Meuse at

Donchery—a fact, it might be thought, which could not escape the notice

of the watchers in Sedan—and then it was that the General occupied the

position between Floing and Illy, and began to throw up intrenchments

as cover for men and guns. He had not done so hitherto, because his

soldiers, thoroughly exhausted by incessant marches, sleepless nights,

want of food, and rear-guard combats, needed some rest. Enough has been

said to indicate the lamentable weakness of mind at head-quarters, and

the dire confusion prevailing throughout the limited area between the

Belgian frontier and the Meuse, within which the French soldiers were

now potentially inclosed. It is time to show a different example of the

practice of war.

_The Movements of the Germans._

The decision adopted by the Great Head-quarters at Buzancy were, as

usual, anticipated, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Meuse Army,

before the formal orders reached him, had directed the Guard and the

12th Corps to cross the river, by the bridge at Pouilly, constructed

on the 30th, and a new one made at Létanne soon after daybreak on the

31st. The Saxon cavalry commander, indeed, taking with him a squadron

at dawn, rode down the right bank, then shrouded in fog, as far as

Mouzon, entered the town with four lancers, and crossed the bridge to

the faubourg. Thereupon a Prussian battalion instantly passed over and

took possession of the town. This adventurous squadron had actually

captured prisoners and many wagons loaded with provisions. When the

two divisions of cavalry, preceding the infantry advance, rode towards

Douzy and Carignan, they struck the tail of Lebrun’s Corps, and fired

into the distant columns which Ducrot, on the other side of the Chiers,

was leading by the hill roads to Francheval. In fact, by noon the

Guard horsemen were masters of Carignan and such provision stores as

the French had not time to destroy; and the Saxons, passing through

Douzy, had fallen upon a convoy on the right bank. The fire of infantry

forced them back upon the town, but they held that and the unbroken

bridge until the advance guard of the 12th came up in the afternoon

and established themselves in the place. The Prussian Guard meanwhile,

after a long march, had reached, with its leading battalions, Porru

aux Bois and Francheval, the main body halting between Sachy and

Missincourt, and the cavalry remaining in the rear. Thus, the Saxon

Prince’s Army had secured all the bridges over the Chiers and the

important passage at Mouzon, where the 4th Corps stood on both banks of

the Meuse. The outposts formed a chain from the right bank of the river

in front of Douzy, through Francheval to the Belgian frontier, at that

point only nine miles from the Chiers, and sixteen from the Meuse. This

narrow belt of territory was thus barred against French enterprise;

the road to Montmédy and Metz was definitely closed. The Saxon Prince

did not push farther westward, because he knew that the Great Staff

had planned a passage of the Meuse below Sedan for the next day, and,

therefore, he did not wish to alarm the French. Enough had been done

and his troops needed rest, especially the Guard, the whole of which

had marched during the day upwards of thirty miles, and the advance

guards more. No wonder the French were astounded at the “prodigious

marches” made by Germans, whom they had considered to be incapable of

such energy and endurance. Some share of the French disasters must be

attributed to that fatal form of error—contempt for the enemy.

Not less success attended the operations of the Prussian Crown Prince,

whose business it was to secure possession of the left bank of the

Meuse, and, if practicable, bring batteries to bear upon the French

troops. We have already described the effect produced by the horse

artillery batteries established under the protection of the cavalry

at Frenois upon the railway officials who sent off the provision

trains, and upon the drivers who ran away with the powder and tools

required to destroy the bridge at Donchery. Behind the cavalry the

whole Army was soon in motion. The Würtembergers marched from Verrières

to the neighbourhood of Flize, where they became engaged with Vinoy’s

outposts, and induced them to burn the bridge over the Meuse. The 11th

Corps moved upon Donchery, and, during the afternoon, not only secured

the important bridge at that place, but constructed a second. The 5th

Corps stood close in rear of the 11th, and the Second Bavarians halted

at Raucourt. On the extreme left the 6th Corps, covering the rear,

went to Attigny, Semoy, and Amagne; the 5th Division of Cavalry was

at Tourteron, and the 6th at Poix, both scouting over the railway to

Reims, and one breaking the line at Faux.

The 1st Bavarian Corps, which led the infantry advance upon the Meuse,

moved early from Raucourt upon Remilly and Aillicourt. They had only

started at eight o’clock, yet their guns were in position opposite

Bazeilles before the last division of Lebrun’s Corps, marching from

Douzy, could gain the village. The guns opened at very long range, and

Lebrun, who was on the watch, was so impressed that he ordered the

division to turn back and enter the position by Daigny, where there was

a bridge over the Givonne. The French drew out their guns, which led

Von der Tann to reinforce his own, so that there was soon a powerful

line of batteries in action, and some houses in Bazeilles broke out

into flames. Then the Bavarian infantry brigades arrived to support the

advance guard, and the French threw out infantry to annoy the hostile

gunners. Presently a sharp-eyed artilleryman observed that barrels

of powder had been brought down to the railway bridge, apparently

with intent to blow it up. Thereupon General von Stephan directed a

Jäger battalion to frustrate this design; and just as the French were

lowering some barrels under the furthest arch, the Jägers, dashing on

to the bridge, fell upon the working party, drove it off, and poured

the powder into the Meuse. In this daring fashion was the railway

viaduct saved from destruction under the noses of the 12th Corps. Von

der Tann, having the fear of Von Moltke before his eyes, desired to

save the bridge but not engage beyond the stream. The Jägers, however,

who, in the judgment of their comrades, held a post of peril, were

promptly supported, and the forward spirit gaining the upper hand, the

little troop, driving in the French skirmishers, actually held for some

time the fringe of Bazeilles; but not being supported by the General,

who refused to disobey orders and bring on a premature engagement,

the hardy adventurers had to retire with loss, to the right bank. Yet

they secured the bridge from destruction, and to this day, apparently,

General Lebrun cannot understand how it came to pass that MacMahon’s

orders were not executed. The French say that the powder was spoilt and

that no fresh supply could be got from Sedan; but no effort is made to

explain why, when the Bavarians threw a pontoon bridge over the Meuse,

just above the railway crossing, Lebrun’s people did nothing to prevent

it. The truth is that they could not prevent one bridge from being

preserved, and the other from being built.

The gain on the day’s resolute operations, therefore, was the

acquisition of three permanent bridges over the Meuse, two above and

one below Sedan; the seizure of all the passages across the Chiers;

and the concentration of both Armies upon the right and left banks of

the river within striking distance of the French troops packed up in a

narrow area about Sedan. The Crown Prince brought his head-quarters to

Chémery, and the King went through that place on his way to Vendresse.

At Chémery, “a brief conference was held between the Generals Von

Moltke, Von Podbielski, and Von Blumenthal, relative to the general

state of the campaign and the next steps which should be taken.” It was

a notable meeting, and few words, indeed, were required to indicate

the finishing touches of an enterprise, so unexpectedly imposed on

them, and so resolutely carried out by these skilful, far-seeing, and

audacious captains. They had come to the conclusion that the French

had before them only one of two courses—they must either retreat

bodily into Belgium, or sacrifice the greater part of their Army in an

endeavour with the remainder to reach Paris by way of Mézières. There

was a third—to remain and be caught—but a finis so triumphant was not

foreseen by the trio of warriors who met in the village of Chémery.

_The Battlefield of Sedan._

The battlefield of Sedan may be described as the space lying within

the angle formed by the Meuse, and its little affluent, the Givonne,

which flows in a southerly direction from the hills near the Belgian

frontier. After passing Bazeilles and its bright meadows, the greater

river meanders towards the north-west, making, a little below Sedan, a

deep loop inclosing the narrow peninsula of Iges on three sides, and

then running westward by Donchery, Dom le Mesnil and Flize to Mézières.

From the northern end of the loop to the Givonne, the ground is a

rugged, undulating upland, attaining its maximum of height a little

south of the Calvaire d’Illy, at a point where the Bois de la Garenne

begins to clothe the steep slopes on the south and east. Lower still

is a deep defile, called the Fond de Givonne, through which, turning

the wood, runs the highway from Sedan to Bouillon, a town on the Semoy

in Belgium. The eastern face of the position, therefore, was the line

of the Givonne, a belt of cottages, gardens, factories and villages;

the southern and south-western was the fortress and the Meuse; the

north-western front was on the hills between Floing and Illy, and the

lowlands on the loop of the Meuse. The interval between Illy and the

Givonne was, at first, neglected because the French held that no troops

could work through the dense forest and broken ground. The issues from

this man-trap were the narrow band of territory between the head of the

Meuse loop and the wooded Belgian frontier; the high road to Bouillon;

the routes eastward to Carignan up the Chiers, and the gate of Torcy on

the south. They were all difficult, and in the nature of defiles which

can only be traversed slowly, even in time of peace, by large bodies of

men, horses, guns and wagons.

Within this remarkable inclosure the French Army sat down on the 31st

of August. The 12th and the 1st Corps, Lebrun’s and Ducrot’s, held the

line of the Givonne, looking east and south-east, because Lebrun had

to guard the Meuse at Bazeilles. The 5th Corps, now under De Wimpffen,

was partly in the “old camp,” close under the fortress, and partly

behind the 7th, which, as we have said, occupied the rolling heights

between Floing and Illy with a strong outpost in St. Menges, at the

head of the Meuse loop on the road which led to Mézières through Vrigne

aux Bois—the road supposed to be unknown to the Germans, because it

was not laid down on the French maps. The cavalry posted in rear of

the 7th were the divisions of Margueritte, Bonnemains and Amiel, while

Michel was behind Ducrot’s left at the village of Givonne. The sun

set, and the night passed, yet Marshal MacMahon expressed no decision.

Believing that the enemy’s numerical strength had been exaggerated,

or that he could break out in any direction when he pleased, or

trusting to fortune and the opportunities which might offer during the

conflict, perhaps imagining that Von Moltke would grant him another

day, the Marshal became the sport of circumstance which had escaped

his control. “The truth is,” he said to the Parliamentary Commission,

“that I did not reckon on fighting a battle on the ground we occupied.

I knew already that we had no provisions, and that the place was

barely supplied with munitions, but I did not yet know on which side I

ought, on the morrow (the 1st) to effect my retreat.” The unfaltering

adversary had no such doubts, and his firm purpose brought on not only

the Battle, but the Investment of Sedan. For the information which

reached the Great Head-quarters during the evening of the 31st, induced

Von Moltke to quicken the operations. He inferred that no attempt would

be made by the French to break out by Carignan; that they might try to

reach Mézières or pass into Belgium; and as he was eager to frustrate

their escape by any route, he instructed the Prussian Crown Prince

to set his Corps in motion during the night. The Prince immediately

issued the needful orders, and directed Von der Tann to attack with

his Bavarians at dawn, without awaiting the arrival of the 12th Corps,

so that Lebrun in Bazeilles being held fast, the attention of the

French might be attracted towards that side. The Saxon Prince, being

duly informed, entered with characteristic spirit and daring into the

plan, and not only determined to be early on the scene of action with

the 12th and the Guard, but to push the latter well forward, so as

to anticipate the French should they endeavour to gain the Belgian

border. Thus a common motive animated the German chiefs who, in taking

firm steps to gain a decisive result, were so well seconded by their

tireless and intrepid soldiers.

_The Battle of Sedan._

A thick white mist filled the valley of the Meuse on the morning of

the 1st of September, 1870, so thick that Von der Tann’s Bavarians,

marching towards the railway bridge and the pontoons above it, could

not see many steps ahead, as in two columns they moved at four o’clock

in careful silence through the dense and clammy atmosphere. At that

very time General Lebrun, whose anxieties kept him awake, started up,

and rushing forth, made the first bugler he encountered sound the call,

which roused the wearied troops sleeping on the hills between Bazeilles

and Balan. Yet it would seem that, outside the former village, no

adequate watch was kept, for when the leading Bavarians emerged from

the fog, they gained at once possession of several houses, and even

entered the principal street without firing a shot. It was only when

the enemy were within the place, that the gallant Marine Infantry,

posted in the houses and behind barricades, abruptly arrested the

intruders by opening a smart fire. Then began a sanguinary contest for

the possession of Bazeilles, which raged during many hours; a series

of street fights in which the inhabitants took an active part; combats

ebbing and flowing through and round the market-place, the church,

the larger mansions, and the pretty park of Monvillers, washed and

beautified by the stream of the Givonne. Without a detailed plan, the

incidents of this terrible episode in the battle, are unintelligible.

Vassoigne and Martin des Pallières, before the latter was wounded

on the 31st, had devised a plan of resistance worthy of the gallant

division they led, and it may be said that the defence of Bazeilles

was the most creditable feat of arms performed by the French on that

dreadful day. During the earlier hours, indeed, they kept the upper

hand, driving the Bavarians out of the village on all sides, but

being unable to eject them from two stone houses abutting on the chief

street. The Bavarian batteries beyond the Meuse could not open fire

until six o’clock, because the fog had shut out the view, which even

then was indistinct. About this time General Lebrun, who was quickly on

the scene, had called reinforcements from the 1st and 5th Corps; but

then the Saxons had come up opposite La Moncelle, where one battery,

firing at long range, astonished Lebrun, who saw that the shells from

his own guns fell short, or burst in the air. When the 12th assailed

La Moncelle fresh Bavarian columns had crossed the Meuse, and the

fierce conflict which began in Bazeilles, had extended to the park

of Monvillers, where the French fought steadily. After four hours

strenuous battle, no marked progress had been made in this quarter,

where three Bavarian brigades had fallen almost wholly into skirmishing

order, scattered amidst the houses and lanes of the villages, and some

part of the park on the left bank of the Givonne. Von der Tann bringing

over another brigade and the reserve artillery from the left bank of

the Meuse, called up a division of the 4th Corps which he held back as

a reserve. During the course of this stubborn combat, the Saxon Corps

had seized La Moncelle, and had brought ten batteries to bear on that

village and Daigny, their left flank being prolonged by two Bavarian

batteries. The accuracy of their fire still further astonished General

Lebrun, who confesses that he had never seen such artillery. He and his

staff, six or eight persons, were on an eminence above La Moncelle.

“The shells,” he writes, “cut off one branch after another, from the

tree at the foot of which I stood holding my horse;” and he goes on

to say that in quick succession, one officer was killed, two mortally

wounded, and two men who bore his fanion were hit. He was as much

impressed by the “avalanche de fer” as Marshal Canrobert himself. The

infantry in Bazeilles resisted superbly, but the French General was

none the less amazed by the terrible fire of the German guns. Between

eight and nine the wave of battle was flowing up the Givonne, for the

Guard were now approaching from Villers-Cernay.

_MacMahon’s Wound and its Consequences._

Meanwhile, inside the French lines, the drama had deepened, for the

Commander-in-Chief had been wounded. Marshal MacMahon has related how,

before daybreak, fearing lest the Germans should have moved troops

over the Meuse at Donchery, he had sent two officers to look into

matters in that quarter, and was awaiting their return when, about five

o’clock, he received a despatch from Lebrun, which made him mount his

ready-saddled horse and ride towards Bazeilles. Arrived there he saw

that the place was well defended, and went to the left intending to

examine the whole line of the Givonne, especially as Margueritte had

sent word that German troops were moving towards Francheval. Halting

above La Moncelle, not far from Lebrun, the Marshal has stated that

while he was gazing intently upon the heights in front of the Bois

Chevalier, and could not see anything, he was struck by the fragment of

a shell. At first he thought that he was only bruised, but that being

obliged to dismount from his horse, which was also wounded, he fainted

for a moment, and then found that his wound was severe. Unable to bear

up any longer he gave over the command of the Army to General Ducrot,

and was carried to Sedan. That officer did not hear of the event until

seven or later; it is impossible to fix precisely the moment when the

Marshal was hit, nor when Ducrot learned his destiny, the evidence is

so contradictory; but sometime between seven and eight Ducrot took

the reins. His first act was to order a retreat on Mézières; Lebrun

begged him to reflect and he did, but soon afterwards became positive.

“There is not a moment to lose,” he cried; and it was arranged that the

retreat should be made in echelons, beginning from the right of the

12th Corps. Neither General knew the real facts of the situation, nor

guessed even how vast were the numbers of the enemy.

The retreat began; it attracted the notice of Napoleon III., who had

ridden on to the field above Balan; and it roused De Wimpffen. He

carried in his pocket an order from Palikao authorizing him to succeed

MacMahon, if the Marshal were killed or disabled. He had kept the

fact secret; after the Marshal fell he still hesitated to use his

letter, but not long. The combat about Bazeilles was well sustained;

the cavalry had been out a little way beyond St. Menges and, as usual,

after a perfunctory search, had “seen nothing,” the attack on the

Givonne even was not fully developed. General de Wimpffen, perhaps from

mixed motives, resolved to interfere and show his old comrades how a

man who really knew war could extricate a French Army from perils in

which it had been placed by weakness and incompetence. He certainly

thought himself a great man, and he roughly stopped the retreat.

Ducrot was indignant, but he obeyed. Lebrun was not more favourably

affected by De Wimpffen’s loud voice and overbearing manner. “I will

not have a movement upon Mézières,” he exclaimed. “If the Army is to

retreat, it shall be on Carignan and not on Mézières.” It should again

be observed that the new Commander-in-Chief was quite as ignorant of

the facts as his predecessors, and even when he wrote his book many

months afterwards had not learned from sources open to all the world

how many men stood at that moment between him and Carignan, nor was he

at all acquainted with the difficult country through which he would

have to move. Ducrot’s plan, which would have placed the Army between

the Meuse below Sedan and the forest on the frontier, leaving a clear

sweep for the guns of the fortress, was far more sensible than that of

his imperious rival. Still, to have a chance of success, it should have

been begun early in the morning, when the 5th and 11th German Corps

were struggling towards the woods; even then it would have probably

failed, but there would have been no capitulation of Sedan. General de

Wimpffen, although he did not know it, was actually playing into the

hand of Von Moltke, who desired above all things that the French Corps

on the Givonne should remain there, because he knew, so great were

his means, so firm his resolution, and so admirable as marchers and

fighters were his soldiers, that the gain of a few hours would enable

him to surround the Army of Chalons.

How far the retreat from the front line was carried, when it was

stayed, and in what degree it injured the defence, cannot possibly be

gleaned from the French narratives, which are all vague and imperfect

in regard to time and place. We know that the Germans did not carry

Bazeilles until nearly eleven o’clock, and then only by dint of turning

movements executed by the Saxons and fresh Bavarian troops from the

direction of La Moncelle. General Ducrot, in his account, places his

stormy interview with De Wimpffen at a little after nine; and he says

that when it ended he spurred in haste towards his divisions—Pellé’s

and L’Hériller’s—and made them descend a part of the positions which

they had climbed a few instants before. Lebrun is equally vague. He

says in one place that when De Wimpffen came up his first brigades

had “partly” crossed the Fond de Givonne, and in another, that the

Marine Infantry had abandoned Bazeilles, which they had not done

before nine o’clock. General de Wimpffen’s recollections are still more

confused and his chronology unintelligible; so that it is impossible

to ascertain precisely what happened beyond the Givonne after Ducrot

ordered and his successor countermanded the retreat. If we take the

German accounts, and try to measure the influence of the much-debated

retreat by the resistance which the assailants encountered, we may

doubt whether it had much greater influence on the issue than that

which grew out of the impaired confidence of the troops in their

antagonistic and jealous commanders. Nevertheless, it is probable that

the swaying to and fro in the French line between Bazeilles and the

village of Givonne, after nine o’clock, did, in some degree, favour

the assailants, and render the acquisition of Bazeilles as well as

the passage of the brook less difficult and bloody. In any case, the

intervention of De Wimpffen can only be regarded as a misfortune for

the gallant French Army, which can hardly find consolation in the fact

that within four-and-twenty hours he was obliged to sign with his name

the capitulation of Sedan.

This needful explanation and comment serves to illustrate the disorder,

the infirmity of purpose, and the rivalries which existed in the French

camp; and we may well agree with Marshal MacMahon when he says that the

blow which obliged him to relinquish the command was a grievous event.

Doubtless he would have taken a decided course had he not been wounded,

and would have marched, if he could, with all his forces, either on

Mézières or Carignan; and besides, he says, there was Belgium near at

hand. He would not have tried to do all three at once. It is only an

Army, well compacted and educated from the bottom to the top which can,

without serious detriment, bear three successive commanders in three

hours.

_Progress of the Battle on the Givonne._

While the French generals, almost in the presence of the helpless

Emperor, were using high words and thwarting each other’s plans, the

German onset had proceeded on all sides with unabated vigour. But,

about nine o’clock, or a little earlier, the French dashed forward so

impetuously that the foremost German troops on the Givonne as far as

Daigny, had to give ground; and the batteries were so vexed by musketry

fire that they also fell back on some points. In fact Lebrun’s left and

Ducrot’s right came on with great spirit, and shook, but did not arrest

long the hostile line. It was not until this period that the French in

Daigny pushed a brigade on to the left bank of the Givonne and occupied

ground which, by the confession of their staff officers, had never been

reconnoitred. They brought over a battery, and General Lartigue rode

with them. The brunt of the onslaught, falling upon the Saxon infantry

immediately in front, these were hard bested; but reinforcements

arriving on either hand closed in upon the enemy’s flanks, and, not

only was he routed from the field, but, being swiftly pursued, his

battery was captured, and the Saxons following the French into Daigny

wrested from them the village, the bridge, and the opposite bank of the

brook. General Lartigue’s horse was killed by a shell, and he narrowly

escaped capture, and was then, or shortly afterwards, wounded. His

chief of the staff, Colonel d’Andigné, hit twice, dropped in a field of

beet-root. Shells from his own side fell near him, and he was grateful

to them because they drove away a pig which came and sniffed at his

wounds. Saxon soldiers gave him wine and lumps of sugar, but one of

them stole his watch and cross; in the end he was tenderly carried to

an ambulance. Some of the Zouaves engaged in this combat about Daigny,

cut off from the main body of fugitives, turned northward, entered the

woods, and reached Paris after traversing the Belgian border.

The Germans owed their quick success at Daigny to the fact that

Lartigue was not supported, and to the fortunate advent, at a critical

moment, of the leading troops of the Second Saxon Division, the whole

of the 12th Corps being now on the ground, engaged or in reserve. It

need scarcely be remarked that the batteries, as usual, preceded the

bulk of the infantry, for it was the Saxon guns which extorted the

admiration of Lebrun. The attack, which had been made from his side,

upon the Saxons and Bavarians about La Moncelle, was equally brilliant

at the outset, for, as we have stated, the German batteries were driven

back by the close musketry, and the French were advancing impetuously,

when a Saxon regiment and part of a Bavarian brigade striking into the

fight, stopped the French and drove them across the rivulet. Then the

artillery returned; soon there were ninety-six guns in action; and the

infantry pressing on, restored the battle. But in Bazeilles itself the

Marines had gained ground, and fresh troops had to be poured into the

village or upon its outskirts to sustain the assailants, who were still

held at bay by the stout defenders. Yet the final stroke at the village

was delivered shortly after this check. The troops in Monvillers

and La Moncelle simultaneously swept forward from the orchards, and

osier-beds, and gardens, until they emerged on the heights beyond, and

showed a front which threatened the road from Bazeilles to Balan.

The French stronghold in the place was a large villa on the north,

which had resisted all day; but now the freshly arrived Bavarians

penetrated into the garden and turned the building on one side; while

the Saxons grouped in the park of Monvillers, cutting a path through

the hedges with their billhooks, appeared on the other. The French

then retreated; but the splendid defence of the whole position had

inflicted a heavy loss on the adversary.

In Bazeilles itself a conflict continued between the armed inhabitants

and the Bavarians, and soon after the whole village was in flames.

Whether it was set on fire purposely or not is to this day a matter

of bitter controversy; but it stands on record that only thirty-nine

lay persons met their deaths, during this long contest, from fire or

sword. It was not the interest of the Germans to create a furnace

across a line of road; and one effect of the conflagration was that the

German pioneers, unable to quench it, were compelled to open a line of

communication with the troops on the fighting line outside the burning

village.

The French retired and reformed between the Fond de Givonne and Balan,

whence their line ran northward, no longer in the valley, but along the

uplands to the Calvaire d’Illy; for the Prussian Guard, issuing from

Villers-Cernay and Francheval, had thrust the French out of the village

of Givonne, and, long before Bazeilles was finally mastered, had

established powerful lines of guns which harassed the French troops in

the Bois de la Garenne. In fact, by nine o’clock, there were six guard

batteries in action, and two hours afterwards the number was increased

to fourteen. Givonne was seized a little later, and infantry support

afforded to the right of the 12th Corps; but Prince Augustus, in

conformity with his instructions, held the main body of the Guard ready

to march towards Fleigneux, effect a junction with the Third Army, and

bar the road to Bouillon. From an eminence a little east of Givonne and

just south of La Viré farm, whereon eighteen guns stood, the Prince,

looking westward about nine o’clock, saw the smoke of that combat

near St. Menges, which he knew marked the formidable intervention of

the 5th and 11th Corps, whose operations in the forenoon must now be

succinctly described.

_The March on St. Menges._

It will be remembered that, on receiving a pressing order from Von

Moltke, the Prussian Crown Prince directed the two Corps just named and

the Würtemberg division to move out in the dark and occupy the Mézières

road in order to intercept the French should they endeavour to retire

upon that town. They promptly obeyed. The Würtembergers crossed the

Meuse on a bridge of their own making, at Dom le Mesnil; the 5th and

11th at Donchery by the permanent bridge and two improvised passages.

The object of the two Corps was to occupy the nearest villages on the

Mézières road, Vrigne aux Bois and Vivier au Court, both which were

attained about half-past seven, when the contest was fierce on the

Givonne. Here the generals commanding, Von Kirchbach and Von Gersdorf,

received that despatch from the Prussian Crown Prince which directed

them to march on St. Menges and Fleigneux, for at head-quarters

a strong hope had now arisen that the Army of Chalons could be

surrounded. The 11th moved on the right, next the Meuse, the 5th on

the left; but the roads were few between the river and the forest—one

column lost its way, and both Corps at the head of the Loop had to use

the same road. No French scouts were out along this important line of

communication. Margueritte’s horsemen had patrolled a short distance,

about six, but neither saw nor heard of the approaching columns; nor

until the German Hussars, leading the erring column ascending the Meuse

from Montimont, had got close to St. Menges, were they discovered by a

French patrol sent out at the suggestion of De Wimpffen.

_The 11th and 5th Corps engage._

The shots exchanged by the hostile cavaliers aroused the French

infantry in St. Menges; but they offered no resistance when the nearest

German battalion attacked the village, which was immediately occupied.

Two companies, prolonging the movement, effected a lodgment in Floing

and could not be expelled; while three batteries, escorted by the

Hussars, dashed upon the ridge south of St. Menges, partly protected

by a copse, and opened fire on the French. It was this initial combat

which attracted the notice of Prince Augustus of Würtemberg, who looked

with interest, from his hill above the Givonne, upon the white battle

smoke which curled up beyond the heights of Illy. Shortly afterwards

seven additional batteries issued from the defile and formed in

succession on the hill—the same which had filled General Douay with

anxiety the day before—and some infantry battalions followed; but the

body of the 11th Corps was only just clearing the pass, and the 5th

was still behind. In order to protect the batteries, infantry supports

were advanced on either flank and in front towards the Illy brook.

General Margueritte, on the Calvaire d’Illy had watched this unwelcomed

development of artillery. Seeing the infantry spread out below, he

thought that his horse might ride them down and then disable the line

of batteries, which seemed to be without adequate support. Accordingly,

by his order, General de Galliffet led forth three regiments of

Chasseurs d’Afrique and two squadrons of Lancers against the intrusive

foot and audacious gunners. But he never got near the batteries.

Swooping down the slope upon the infantry below him, his men and horses

soon fell fast, and although they swept through the skirmishers, they

were crushed by the fire of the supports and the guns on the hill and

the squads of infantry on either side. They endeavoured to ride in

upon the flanks, but their bravery was displayed in vain, for nothing

could live under the fire which smote them, and they rode back,

frustrated, to the shelter of their own lines. The cavalry outburst

had been repelled by a few companies of foot on an open hill-side. So

puissant is the breech-loader in the hands of cool infantry soldiers.

But the French foot took up the game, and the chassepot, deftly plied,

forced the forward German skirmishers to fall back on the villages and

hills.

Gradually the two Corps arrived on the scene. Before eleven o’clock

the artillery of the 5th, preceding its infantry, went into line on a

second ridge to the westward, and soon twenty-four batteries—that is,

144 guns—were pouring an “avalanche de fer” into the French position,

and crossing their fire with that of the Guard batteries, which

showered their shells into the right rear of Douay’s men from the

heights beyond the Givonne. About this time, also, as reinforcements

came up to Fleigneux, the companies there moved westward towards Olly;

captured, on their way, eight guns, many horses, much munition, and

above a hundred officers and men, who seemed intent on escaping over

the frontier, and finally entered Olly, where soon afterwards they

were gratified by the arrival of a squadron of Prussian Hussars of

the Guard. Thus was the circle completed which placed the two Armies

in communication. In front of the right wing the two companies which

at the outset obtained a lodgment in Floing, were at length supported

and relieved. As the infantry from the wooded region north of the

Meuse Loop arrived, they took the place of the battalions near the

guns, and these then went forward upon Floing, one after the other,

and by degrees got possession of the village. But the French delivered

a counterstroke so well pushed that the defenders of Floing could

not keep them back, and they were only thrust out by the timely

intervention of three fresh battalions from St. Menges. The French

retired towards the heights of Cazal, and for some time stopped the

further advance of their foes.

The battle was now practically won; for the Germans held Balan as well

as Bazeilles, supported by one-half the 2nd Bavarian Corps brought up

to aid the 1st; one division of the 4th Corps was deep in the fight,

and the other in reserve, close at hand; the line of the Givonne, from

end to end, was occupied on both banks; the Guard Cavalry, after vainly

trying to charge up the Calvaire d’Illy, were behind the 5th Corps;

south of the Meuse a Bavarian division faced the fortress; and to the

west the Würtembergers interposed between Vinoy’s troops in Mézières

and Sedan. Above all, a little after one o’clock, there were no fewer

than 426 guns hailing shells upon the unfortunate French, who were

almost piled one upon another in an area which did not measure two

miles either in depth or breadth. It stands on record that there were

in full action twenty-six batteries on the North, twenty-four on the

East, ten to the West of La Moncelle, and eleven on the South between

Wadelincourt and Villette—an array of force enough to crush out all

resistance; but the conflict still continued, for no one had authority

sufficient to stop the awful carnage.

_The Condition of the French Army._

The main interest of the drama henceforth centres in the despairing

efforts of the French to avert the catastrophe of Sedan. Early in

the morning the Emperor Napoleon mounted his horse and rode out with

his own staff to witness the battle. On his way towards Bazeilles he

met and spoke to the wounded Marshal, who was being carried to the

hospital in Sedan. Then the Emperor rode towards the hills above La

Moncelle, and for several hours he lingered on the field, well under

fire, for two officers were wounded near him; but he had no influence

whatever on the battle. Soon after taking command, De Wimpffen, riding

out of the Fond de Givonne, came plump upon Napoleon as he watched

the fight near Balan. “All goes well, Sire,” said the General; “we

are gaining ground;” and when His Majesty remarked that the left,

meaning the front towards St. Menges, was threatened, the General

replied, “We shall first pitch the Bavarians into the Meuse, and then,

with all our forces, fall upon the new foe.” They parted, the Emperor

returning to Sedan, whence he did not emerge again that day, and the

General careering towards the fight. Then followed a sharp dispute

between De Wimpffen and Ducrot, in the presence of Lebrun, ending in

the order to stop the so-called retreat which had scarcely begun. It

is impossible to reconcile the conflicting accounts of these officers;

but De Wimpffen’s own words show that, at the time, he did not attach

great importance to the attack on Douay, for to that General he wrote,

“I believe in a demonstration upon your Corps, especially designed

to hinder you from sending help to the 1st and 12th Corps,” and he

asked him to aid Lebrun. Then he went himself to the position held by

Douay, in order to expedite the despatch of reinforcements. “Come and

see for yourself,” said Douay, on reaching the heights. “I saw quite

a hostile Army extending afar,” writes De Wimpffen, “and a formidable

artillery—the big batteries of the 5th and 11th Corps—firing with

a precision which, under other circumstances,” he adds, “I should

have been the first to admire.” Prince Bibesco says that De Wimpffen

promised to send troops from the 1st Corps to occupy the Calvaire

d’Illy, and then went away. As he was riding back, in that state of

emotion which the French describe by the phrase, “le cœur navré,” he

encountered Ducrot. “The events which I predicted,” said the latter,

“have happened sooner than I expected. The enemy is attacking the

Calvaire d’Illy. Douay is greatly shaken. Moments are precious. Hurry

up reinforcements if you would keep that position.” “Well,” retorted

De Wimpffen, still believing that he had only Bavarians to deal with,

“look after that yourself. Collect what troops you can and hold the

ground while I attend to the 12th Corps.” Thereupon Ducrot ordered

up guns and infantry; while then, or shortly afterwards, De Wimpffen

called for troops from Douay, who, believing the Calvaire was or would

be occupied by Ducrot’s people, sent off three brigades, and put his

last division in front line. Apparently the cross currents of wandering

battalions met in the wood of Garenne; and it is not easy to see how

any advantages were obtained by the shifting to and fro which went on.

Ducrot was anxious to defend the Illy plateau; De Wimpffen desired to

break out towards Carignan. He fondled the idea at one o’clock, when

neither object could possibly be attained; but if there had been a

chance left, the conflict between the two Generals would have sufficed

to destroy it.

That “Army” which De Wimpffen saw from the north-western heights came

on in irresistible waves. The French infantry could not endure the

thick and ceaseless hail of shells from the terrible batteries. The

French artillery, brave and devoted, vainly went into action, for the

converging fire from the hostile hills blew up the tumbrils, sometimes

two at once, killed and wounded the gunners, and swept away the horses.

Ducrot’s reinforcements, despite his forward bearing and animated

language, melted away into the woods, and the last battalions and the

last two batteries led up by Douay were speedily forced to retire. The

Germans, already in the village of Illy, advanced to the Calvaire,

while the troops of the 11th Corps sallied out of Floing, deployed on

both sides, and soon the interval between the two villages was full of

hostile troops. General Ducrot pictures himself, and doubtless truly,

as using every effort by word and example to rally and hold fast the

foot; but they could not be held; they slipped off and vanished under

the trees. At this time the only strong body of French was Liébert’s

division above the terraced hill which leads up to Cazal, and the

cavalry of Margueritte and Bonnemains lurking in the hollows and under

the cover of trees. To these men Ducrot appealed, and his appeal was

nobly answered.

_The French Cavalry Charge._

General Margueritte commanded five regiments of horse, principally

Chasseurs d’Afrique. At the request of Ducrot he promptly moved out

from cover, and prepared to charge; but wishing to reconnoitre the

ground, he rode in advance, and was hit in the head by a bullet which

traversed his face. Mortally wounded, he gave the command to De

Galliffet, and rode off, supported by two men, and grasping the saddle

with both hands, “the star of his arm,” as Colonel Bonie poetically

calls him. Then De Galliffet performed his task, and rode straight

into the intrusive enemy. For half an hour, on the hill sides south

of Floing, and even the lowlands bordering the Meuse, the dashing

French horsemen dauntlessly struck at their foes. The German infantry

scattered in lines of skirmishers, were just attaining the crest of

the eminence, when the cavalry dashed upon them. They broke through

the skirmishers, but fell in heaps under the fire of the compact

bodies of supports. Failing to crush a front, they essayed the flanks

and even the rear, and nothing dismayed, sought again and again to

ride over the stubborn adversary, who, relying on his rifle, would not

budge. The more distant infantry and the guns, when occasion served,

smote these devoted cavaliers. Sometimes the Germans met them in line,

at others they formed groups, or squares as the French call them, and

occasionally they fought back to back. One body of horse rode into a

battery, and was only repelled by the fire of a company of infantry.

Another dashed through a village on the banks of the river, and

although they were harried by infantry, and turned aside and followed

by some Prussian hussars, several rode far down the river, and created

some disorder in the German trains. There were many charges, all driven

home as far at least as the infantry fire would permit, more than one

carrying the furious riders up to the outskirts of Floing. But, in

the end, the unequal contests everywhere had the same result—bloody

defeat for the horseman, who matched himself, his lance or sword and

steed against the breech-loader held by steady hands in front of keen

eyes. Yet it is not surprising that these daring charges excited the

ungrudging admiration and deep sympathy of friend and foe. They did not

arrest the march of the German infantry, or turn the tide of battle, or

even infuse new courage into the French soldiers, who were exposed to

trials which few, if any, troops could bear. But they showed, plainly

enough, that the “furia francese” survived in the cavalry of France,

and that, if the mounted men refused or disdained to perform more

useful work by scouting afar and covering the front of armies, they

could still charge with unabated heroism on the field of battle. They

were dispersed, and they left behind heaps of dead and dying—one-half

their strength resting on the scene of their daring. Three Generals,

Margueritte, Girard and Tilliard, were killed, and Salignac-Fenelon

was wounded. The Germans say that their own losses were small, but

that among the Jägers a comparatively large number of men were wounded

by the sword. These notable exploits were done about two o’clock or

a little later; and, with slight exceptions, they mark the end of

desperately offensive resistance on the part of the French.

During the next hour the Germans pressed their adversaries close up to

Sedan. “When the cavalry had been driven back in disorder,” says Ducrot

in his sweeping style, “the last bodies of infantry which had stood

firm broke and fled. Then on the right and left, with loud hurrahs,

which mingled with the roar of cannon and musketry, the Prussian lines

advanced.” The statement is too superlative. The cavalry in squads,

wandered, no doubt, from ravine to ravine, seeking an asylum, or tried

to enter the fortress. The remains of several brigades were piled up

in the wood of Garenne, and exposed to an incessant shell fire. But

Liébert’s division stoutly defended Cazal, and gave back, foot by foot,

until they also were under the ramparts. Towards four o’clock the

converging German columns, despite frantic onsets from bands of French

infantry, especially on the Givonne front, had thrust these over the

deep hollow way, and the victors were only halted when they came within

range of the garrison guns.

_General de Wimpffen’s Counterstroke._

Throughout the battle General de Wimpffen cherished the idea that it

would be feasible to crush “the Bavarians” and retreat on Carignan. At

one o’clock he sent a despatch to General Douay, telling the General

to cover his retreat in that direction. Douay received it an hour

afterwards, and he then replied that “with only three brigades, without

artillery, and almost without munitions,” the utmost he could do would

be to retreat in order from the field. That was near the moment when

Liébert began to fall back, fighting stiffly, from Cazal. At a quarter

past one De Wimpffen wrote a letter to the Emperor saying that “rather

than be made prisoner in Sedan,” he would force the line in his front.

“Let your Majesty,” he said, “place himself in the midst of his troops;

they will hold themselves bound in honour to fray out a passage.” His

Majesty took no notice of this appeal, and De Wimpffen waited in vain

for a reply; but he spent the time in an endeavour to dash in the

barrier in his front, direct an attack on the Givonne, which failed;

and to organize an onset on Balan, which partly succeeded. He went

into Sedan and brought out troops, and gathered up all he could from

the errant fragments of a broken Army. With these he fell fiercely and

unexpectedly upon the Bavarians in Balan; refused to suspend the fight

when ordered by the Emperor to open negotiations with the enemy; and by

degrees became master of all the village except one house. But he could

not emerge and continue his onslaught, for the hostile artillery began

to play on the village; reinforcements were brought up, arrangements

were made to frustrate the ulterior aim of the French and recover the

lost ground. Against a resolute advance the infantry led by De Wimpffen

could not stand, and possession of the village was regained just as the

white flag went up over the nearest gate of Sedan. Suddenly the firing

ceased on both sides. Although respectfully described by the Germans,

General de Wimpffen’s last charge is scoffed at by Ducrot and Lebrun,

whom he had enraged by declaring both guilty of disobedience. Lebrun,

who was an eye-witness as well as a gallant actor in the forlorn hope,

says that they had not gone a quarter of a mile before the column

broke and took refuge in the nearest houses. Looking back, De Wimpffen

is reported by his comrade to have said, “I see we are not followed

and that there is nothing more to do. Order the troops to retreat

on Sedan.” The battle had, at length, come to an end. The German

infantry, both near Cazal and Balan were within a short distance of

the fortifications; in the centre they stood south of the Warren Wood;

to the eastward long lines of guns crowned the heights on both banks

of the Givonne; on the south, the gate of Torcy was beset, and behind

all the foremost lines were ample reserves, horse as well as foot,

which had never fired a shot. The number of batteries had increased

during the afternoon, for the Würtemberg artillery was called over the

Meuse and set in array at the bend of the river above Donchery. Even

the high-tempered, if imperious, De Wimpffen was obliged to admit that

through this dread circle, neither for him nor any other, was there

an outlet. The agony had been prolonged, but enough had been done to

satisfy the “honour” of the most obstinate and punctilious of generals.

The wearied, wasted, famished, and unnerved French troops were thankful

for the impressive stillness and unwonted rest which came abruptly with

the declining sun, even though it set the seal on a horrible disaster.

_The Emperor and his Generals._

Had Napoleon III. retained that Imperial authority which he had been

supposed to possess, the slaughter might have been stayed some hours

before. For early in the afternoon he became convinced that the Army

could not be extricated, and that the time had come when it would

be well to treat. His experiences, as a superfluous attendant on the

battle-field, were dolorous. The first object which met his gaze was

the wounded Marshal. The depressing incident may have called up visions

of Italian triumphs; and, reflecting on the painful contrast, he may

have remembered what he said after returning from the sanguinary

victory of Solferino—that no more would he willingly lead great Armies

to war; for the sight of its horrors had touched the chord of sympathy

with human suffering which had always readily vibrated in his heart.

During several hours he watched the tempest lower and break in fury;

he saw and felt its effects, for two officers were shot at his side;

wherever he looked the clouds of encircling battle smoke rose in the

clear sunshine; and when he rode back into Sedan the terrible shells

were bursting in the ditches, and even on the bridge which he traversed

to gain his quarters. As the day wore on his gloomy meditations took a

more definite shape; he wished to stop the conflict, and he seems to

have thought first that an armistice might be obtained, and then that

the King of Prussia, if personally besought, would grant the Army easy

terms; for the idea of a capitulation had grown up and hardened in his

mind.

At his instigation, no officer has come forward to claim the honour,

some one hoisted a white flag. As soon as he heard of it, General

Faure, Marshal MacMahon’s Chief of the Staff, ascended the citadel

and cut down a signal so irritating to his feelings; but no one told

the Emperor that his solitary, independent, and Imperial action,

since he joined the Army of Chalons as a fugitive, had been thus

irreverently contemned. “Why does this useless struggle still go on?”

he said to General Lebrun, who entered his presence some time before

three o’clock. “Too much blood has been shed. An hour ago I directed

the white flag to be hoisted in order to demand an armistice.”

The General politely explained that other forms were necessary—the

Commander-in-Chief must sign a letter and send a proper officer, a

trumpeter, and a man bearing a white flag, to the chief of the enemy.

Lebrun drew out such a form, and started forth. Faure, who had just

pulled down the white flag, would not look at it; De Wimpffen, seeing

Lebrun ride up followed by a horseman who carried a rag on a pole,

shouted out, “I will not have a capitulation; drop that flag; I shall

go on fighting;” and then ensued their adventures about Balan, which

have been described. When Lebrun had gone, Ducrot, and subsequently

Douay, visited the Emperor. Ducrot found the interior of the fortress

in a state which he qualifies as “indescribable.” “The streets, the

squares, the gates were choked up with carts, carriages, guns, the

impedimenta and debris of a routed Army. Bands of soldiers, without

arms or knapsacks, streamed in every moment, and hurried into the

houses and churches. At the gates many were trodden to death.” Those

who preserved some remains of vigour exhaled their wrath in curses,

and shouted “We have been betrayed, sold by traitors and cowards.” The

Emperor still wondered why the action went on, and rejected Ducrot’s

suggestion of a sortie at night as futile. He wished to stop the

slaughter; but he could not prevail on Ducrot to sign any letter. Douay

at first appeared disposed to accept the burden, but De Failly or

Lebrun induced him to revoke his consent by remarking that it entailed

the duty of fixing his name to a capitulation. General de Wimpffen sent

in his resignation, which, as the Emperor could not induce one of the

other generals to take his place, was absolutely refused. The shells

were bursting in the garden of the Sub-Prefecture, in the hospitals,

the streets, and among the houses, some of which were set on fire. In

these dire straits the Emperor at length resolved that the white flag

should be again unfurled, and should, this time, remain aloft in the

sunshine. Meantime, as evident signs indicating a desire to negotiate

had appeared at various points, and as the white flag surmounted

the citadel, the King directed Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorf

and Captain von Winterfeld to summon the place to capitulate. When

Bronsart intimated to the Commandant of Torcy that he bore a summons

to the Commander-in-Chief, he was conducted to the Sub-Prefecture,

“where,” says the official narrative, “he found himself face to face

with the Emperor Napoleon, whose presence in Sedan until that moment

had been unknown at the German head-quarters.” The arrival of the

Prussian officer seems to have occurred just as the Emperor finished

writing a letter to the King destined to become famous. But he answered

Bronsart’s request that an officer fully empowered to treat should be

sent to the German head-quarters, by remarking that General de Wimpffen

commanded the Army. Thereupon, Colonel Bronsart departed, bearing a

weighty piece of intelligence indeed, but no effective reply; and soon

afterwards General Reille, intrusted with the Imperial letter, rode

out of the gate of Torcy and ascended the hill whence the King had

witnessed the battle.

_King William and his Warriors._

An eminence, selected by the Staff because it commanded an extensive

view, rises a little south of Frenois—the site has been marked on the

map with a small pyramid—and upon this, about seven o’clock, just

as the fog was lifting, King William took his stand. When the mists

vanished, the sun poured his dazzling splendour over the landscape,

and the air was so lucid that everything could be seen distinctly

through a powerful field-glass. “The sun shone out in full power,”

says Prince Bibesco. “The sun was exceedingly powerful,” writes Dr.

Russell. “The day had become so clear”—he is writing of the same period

as the Prince—“that through a good glass the movements of individual

men were plainly discernible.” And, a little earlier, he says, “on the

hills, through wood and garden,” he was looking towards the Givonne,

“and in the valleys, bayonets glistened, and arms twinkled and flashed

like a streamlet in moonlight.” And so it continued to the end. “The

hills of the battlefield,” writes Dr. Moritz Busch, “the gorge in

its midst, the villages, the houses and the towers of the fortress,

the suburb of Torcy, the ruined [railway] bridge to the left in the

distance, shone bright in the evening glow, and their details became

clearer every minute, as if one were looking through stronger and

stronger spectacles.” Through such a rich and transparent atmosphere

the King gazed from his height upon the city wherein Turenne was born,

in September, 1611, and on the battle which has made the little town

on the Meuse, which Vauban fortified, still more memorable. A glimpse

of the group on the hill is fortunately afforded by Dr. Russell, whose

keen eyes on a battlefield seem to overlook nothing. “Of the King, who

was dressed in his ordinary uniform, tightly buttoned and strapped,” it

is noted that he “spoke but little, pulled his moustache frequently,

and addressed a word to Von Moltke, Roon, or Podbielski,” who looked

frequently through a large telescope mounted on a tripod. “Moltke,” he

goes on, and the touch is characteristic, “when not looking through

the glass or at the map, stood in a curious musing attitude, with his

right hand to the side of his face, the elbow resting on the left

hand crossed towards his hip.” A picture of Von Moltke, which, taken

with what another observer calls his “refined and wrinkled face,”

deserves to live in the memory. Count Bismarck, we are told, “in his

white cuirassier flat cap with the yellow band and uniform, stood

rather apart, smoking a good deal, and chatting occasionally with a

short, thick-set, soldierly-looking man in the undress uniform of a

United States’ Lieutenant-General.” It was Sheridan. And near these

were many less famous personages, but representative of “all Germany,”

as one writer puts it. On another hill a little further west, whither

Dr. Russell transferred himself, was a second and notable group, which

he sketches. “The Crown Prince with his arms folded, and his flat

cap, uniform frock, and jack boots; Blumenthal so spruce and trim;

half-a-dozen princes and many aides-de-camp” were all sharply and

well-defined on the sky-line. Thus these two groups, “from morn to

dewy eve,” looked down, on, and into a scene which nature and man had

combined to make at once beautiful and sublime.

It was towards the King’s hill that General Reille turned when he rode

out of the Torcy gate. Walking his horse up the steep, he dismounted,

and taking off his cap, presented a letter to his Majesty. King

William, breaking the Imperial seal, read these phrases, which, if

somewhat dramatic, are striking in their brevity:—[1]

Monsieur mon Frère,

N’ayant pu mourir au milieu de mes troupes, il ne me reste qu’ à

remettre mon epée entre les mains de Votre Majesté.

Je suis de Votre Majesté,

le bon Frère,

NAPOLÉON. Sédan, le 1^{er} Septembre, 1870.

Only one half hour earlier had Colonel Bronsart brought the startling

information that the Emperor was in Sedan! The King conferred with

his son, who had been hastily summoned, and with others of his trusty

servants, all deeply moved by complex emotions at the grandeur of their

victory. What should be done? The Emperor spoke for himself only, and

his surrender would not settle the great issue. It was necessary to

obtain something definite, and the result of a short conference was

that Count Hatzfeldt, instructed by the Chancellor, retired to draft a

reply. “After some minutes he brought it,” writes Dr. Busch, “and the

King wrote it out, sitting on one chair, while the seat of a second was

held up by Major von Alten, who knelt on one knee and supported the

chair on the other.” The King’s letter, brief and business-like, began

and ended with the customary royal forms, and ran as follows:

“Regretting the circumstances in which we meet, I accept your Majesty’s

sword, and beg that you will be good enough to name an officer

furnished with full powers to treat for the capitulation of the Army

which has fought so bravely under your orders. On my side I have

designated General von Moltke for that purpose.”

General Reille returned to his master, and as he rode down the hill

the astounding purport of his visit flew from lip to lip through the

exulting Army which now hoped that, after this colossal success, the

days of ceaseless marching and fighting would soon end. As a contrast

to this natural outburst of joy and hope we may note the provident

Moltke, who was always resolved to “mak siker.” His general order,

issued at once, suspending hostilities during the night, declared that

they would begin again in the morning should the negotiations produce

no result. In that case, he said, the signal for battle would be the

reopening of fire by the batteries on the heights east of Frénois. The

return of peace, so fervently desired by the Army, was still far off in

the distance when the tired victors bivouacked in quiet, and dreamed of

home through the short summer night.

[Footnote 1: “Not having been able to die in the midst of my troops,

nothing remains for me but to place my sword in the hands of your

Majesty.”]

_How the Generals Rated each other._

While General Reille, who performed his part with so much modesty and

dignity, rode back over the Meuse, the Emperor still awaited, in the

Sub-Prefecture, the advent of General de Wimpffen, who was fretting

and fuming at the Golden Cross within the walls. According to his own

confession he had become convinced that the refusal of his sovereign to

head a sally from Balan had delivered over the Army to the mercy of the

Germans, and violent despair had taken possession of his soul. For had

not the Comte de Palikao sent him to overbear Napoleon III. and the set

who surrounded him, and had he not failed to bend the monarch to his

will? Twice, he repeats, with pride, “I obstinately refused to obey”

the Emperor’s invitation to treat with the enemy; and because Napoleon

III. had authoritatively interfered with his command he sent in that

letter of resignation which the Emperor refused to accept. At first he

seemed inclined to resist as well as resent the conduct of his master,

who had presumed to consult others and, by hoisting the white flag, to

take, as the General haughtily says, “a decision contrary to my will.”

Let the Emperor sign the capitulation. Such were the first thoughts

of a man whose temper was imperious, but whose better nature was not

insensible to reason. He quelled his wrath and threw off his despair,

moved, as he says, by the feeling that in defending the interests of

the Army he would be rendering a last service to his brave companions

in arms, and to his country. So he went from the Golden Cross to the

Sub-Prefecture. Still angry, he loudly asserted as soon as he entered

the room that he had been vanquished in battle because, addressing the

Emperor, “your Generals refused to obey me.” Thereupon Ducrot started

up, exclaiming, “Do you mean me? Your orders were only too well obeyed,

and your mad presumption has brought on this frightful disaster.” “If I

am incapable,” retorted De Wimpffen, “all the more reason why I should

not retain the command.” “You took it this morning,” shouted Ducrot,

also a violent man, “when you thought it would bring honour and profit.

You cannot lay it down now. You alone must bear (endosser) the shame of

the capitulation.” “Le General Ducrot était très exalté,” he says in

his narrative, and he calls on his brother officers who were present

to testify that he used these brave words, which, in substance, appear

in De Wimpffen’s account; but the latter adds that he threw back the

accusation, saying, “I took the command to evade a defeat which your

movement would have precipitated;” and that he requested General Ducrot

to leave the room, as he had not come to confer with him! What the

quiet and well-mannered Emperor thought of his two fiery and blustering

Generals is nowhere stated. The calm language in the pamphlet

attributed to Napoleon III., which shows, nevertheless, how deeply he

was vexed by De Wimpffen’s selfish wish to shirk his responsibilities

at such a moment, takes no note of the quarrel, and simply tells us how

“the General understood that, having commanded during the battle, his

duty obliged him not to desert his post in circumstances so critical.”

Thus, when General Reille returned with King William’s letter, he found

De Wimpffen in a reasonable frame of mind and ready to perform, with

courage and address, the hard task of obtaining the best terms he could

for the French Army from the placidly stern Von Moltke, in whose heart

there were no soft places when business had to be done.

_The Generals Meet at Donchery._

Late on the evening of September 1st a momentous session was held

in Donchery, the little town which commands a bridge over the Meuse

below Sedan. On one side of a square table covered with red baize sat

General von Moltke, having on his right hand the Quartermaster-General

von Podbielski, according to one account, and Von Blumenthal according

to another, and behind them several officers, while Count von

Nostitz stood near the hearth to take notes. Opposite to Von Moltke

sat De Wimpffen alone; while in rear, “almost in the shade,” were

General Faure, Count Castelnau, and other Frenchmen, among whom was

a Cuirassier Captain d’Orcet, who had observant eyes and a retentive

memory. Then there ensued a brief silence, for Von Moltke looked

straight before him and said nothing, while De Wimpffen, oppressed by

the number present, hesitated to engage in a debate “with the two men

admitted to be the most capable of our age, each in his kind.” But he

soon plucked up courage, and frankly accepted the conditions of the

combat. What terms, he asked, would the King of Prussia grant to a

valiant Army which, could he have had his will, would have continued

to fight? “They are very simple,” answered Von Moltke. “The entire

Army, with arms and baggage, must surrender as prisoners of war.” “Very

hard,” replied the Frenchman. “We merit better treatment. Could you not

be satisfied with the fortress and the artillery, and allow the Army to

retire with arms, flags and baggage, on condition of serving no more

against Germany during the war?” No. “Moltke,” said Bismarck recounting

the interview, “coldly persisted in his demand,” or as the attentive

D’Orcet puts it, “Von Moltke was pitiless.” Then De Wimpffen tried to

soften his grim adversary by painting his own position. He had just

come from the depths of the African desert; he had an irreproachable

military reputation; he had taken command in the midst of a battle, and

found himself obliged to set his name to a disastrous capitulation.

“Can you not,” he said, “sympathize with an officer in such a plight,

and soften, for me, the bitterness of my situation by granting more

honourable conditions?” He painted in moving terms his own sad case,

and described what he might have done; but seeing that his personal

pleadings were unheeded, he took a tone of defiance, less likely to

prevail. “If you will not give better terms,” he went on, “I shall

appeal to the honour of the Army, and break out, or, at least, defend

Sedan.” Then the German General struck in with emphasis, “I regret that

I cannot do what you ask,” he said; “but as to making a sortie, that

is just as impossible as the defence of Sedan. You have some excellent

troops, but the greater part of your infantry is demoralized. To-day,

during the battle, we captured more than twenty thousand unwounded

prisoners. You have only eighty thousand men left. My troops and guns

around the town would smash yours before they could make a movement;

and as to defending Sedan, you have not provisions for eight-and-forty

hours, nor ammunition which would suffice for that period.” Then, says

De Wimpffen, he entered into details respecting our situation, which,

“unfortunately, were too true,” and he offered to permit an officer to

verify his statements, an offer which the Frenchman did not then accept.

Beaten off the military ground, De Wimpffen sought refuge in politics.

“It is your interest, from a political standpoint, to grant us

honourable conditions,” he said. “France is generous and chivalric,

responsive to generosity, and grateful for consideration. A peace,

based on conditions which would flatter the amour-propre of the Army,

and diminish the bitterness of defeat, would be durable; whereas

rigorous measures would awaken bad passions, and, perhaps, bring on an

endless war between France and Prussia.” The new ground broken called

up Bismarck, “because the matter seemed to belong to my province,”

he observed when telling the story; and he was very outspoken as

usual. “I said to him that we might build on the gratitude of a

prince, but certainly not on the gratitude of a people—least of all

on the gratitude of the French. That in France neither institutions

nor circumstances were enduring; that governments and dynasties were

constantly changing, and the one need not carry out what the other had

bound itself to do. That if the Emperor had been firm on his throne,

his gratitude for our granting good conditions might have been counted

upon; but that as things stood it would be folly if we did not make

full use of our success. That the French were a nation full of envy

and jealousy, that they had been much mortified by our success at

Königgratz, and could not forgive it, though it in nowise damaged them.

How, then, should any magnanimity on our side move them not to bear

us a grudge for Sedan.” This Wimpffen would not admit. “France,” he

said, “had much changed latterly; it had learned under the Empire to

think more of the interests of peace than of the glory of war. France

was ready to proclaim the fraternity of nations; and more of the same

kind.” Captain d’Orcet reports that, in addition, Bismarck denied that

France had changed, and that to curb her mania for glory, to punish

her pride, her aggressive and ambitious character, it was imperative

that there should be a glacis between France and Germany. “We must have

territory, fortresses and frontiers which will shelter us for ever

from an attack on her part.” Further remonstrances from De Wimpffen

only drew down fresh showers of rough speech very trying to bear, and

when Bismarck said “We cannot change our conditions,” De Wimpffen

exclaimed, “Very well; it is equally impossible for me to sign such a

capitulation, and we shall renew the battle.”

Here Count Castelnau interposed meekly to say, on behalf of the

Emperor, that he had surrendered, personally, in the hope that his

self-sacrifice would induce the King to grant the Army honourable

terms. “Is that all?” Bismarck inquired. “Yes,” said the Frenchman.

“But what is the sword surrendered,” asked the Chancellor; “is it

his own sword, or the sword of France?” “It is only the sword of

the Emperor,” was Castelnau’s reply. “Well, there is no use talking

about other conditions,” said Von Moltke, sharply, while a look of

contentment and gratification passed over his face, according to

Bismarck; one “almost joyful,” writes the keen Captain d’Orcet. “After

the last words of Von Moltke,” he continues, “De Wimpffen exclaimed,

‘We shall renew the battle.’ ‘The truce,’ retorted the German General,

‘expires to-morrow morning at four o’clock. At four, precisely, I shall

open fire.’ We were all standing. After Von Moltke’s words no one spoke

a syllable. The silence was icy.” But then Bismarck intervened to sooth

excited feelings, and called on his soldier comrade to show, once

more, how impossible resistance had become. The group sat down again

at the red baize-covered table, and Von Moltke began his demonstration

afresh. “Ah,” said De Wimpffen, “your positions are not so strong as

you would have us believe them to be.” “You do not know the topography

of the country about Sedan,” was Von Moltke’s true and crushing answer.

“Here is a bizarre detail which illustrates the presumptuous and

inconsequent character of your people,” he went on, now thoroughly

aroused. “When the war began you supplied your officers with maps of

Germany at a time when they could not study the geography of their own

country for want of French maps. I tell you that our positions are not

only very strong, they are inexpugnable.” It was then that De Wimpffen,

unable to reply, wished to accept the offer made, but not accepted at

an earlier period, and to send an officer to verify these assertions.

“You will send nobody,” exclaimed the iron General. “It is useless,

and you can believe my word. Besides, you have not long to reflect.

It is now midnight; the truce ends at four o’clock, and I will grant

no delay.” Driven to his last ditch, De Wimpffen pleaded that he must

consult his fellow-Generals, and he could not obtain their opinions

by four o’clock. Once more the diplomatic peacemaker intervened, and

Von Moltke agreed to fix the final limit at nine. “He gave way at

last,” says Bismarck, “when I showed him that it could do no harm.”

The conference so dramatic broke up, and each one went his way; but,

says the German official narrative, “as it was not doubtful that the

hostile Army, completely beaten and nearly surrounded, would be obliged

to submit to the clauses already indicated, the Great Head-quarter

Staff was occupied, that very night, in drawing up the text of the

capitulation” a significant and practical comment, showing what stuff

there was behind the severe language which, at the midnight meeting,

fell from the Chief of that able and sleepless body of chosen men.

_Napoleon III. Surrenders._

General de Wimpffen went straight from the military conference to the

wearied Emperor who had gone to bed. But he received his visitor,

who told him that the proposed conditions were hard, and that

the sole chance of mitigation lay in the efforts of His Majesty.

“General,” said the Emperor, “I shall start at five o’clock for the

German head-quarters, and I shall see whether the King will be more

favourable;” for he seems to have become possessed of an idea that

King William would personally treat with him. The Emperor kept his

word. Believing that he would be permitted to return to Sedan, he

drove forth without bidding farewell to any of his troops; but, as

the drawbridge of Torcy was lowered and he passed over, the Zouaves

on duty shouted “Vive l’Empereur!” This cry was “the last adieu which

fell on his ears” as we read in the narrative given to the world

on his behalf. He drove in a droshki towards Donchery, preceded by

General Reille who, before six o’clock, awoke Count Bismarck from his

slumbers, and warned him that the Emperor desired to speak with him. “I

went with him directly,” said Bismarck, in a conversation reported by

Busch; “and got on my horse, all dusty and dirty as I was, in an old

cap and my great waterproof boots, to ride to Sedan where I supposed

him to be.” But he met him on the high road near Frénois, “sitting

in a two-horse carriage.” Beside him was the Prince de la Moskowa,

and on horseback Castlenau and Reille. “I gave the military salute,”

says Bismarck. “He took his cap off and the officers did the same;

whereupon I took off mine, although it was contrary to rule. He said,

‘Couvrez-vous, donc.’ I behaved to him just as if in St. Cloud, and

asked his commands.” Naturally, he wanted to see the King, but that

could not be allowed. Then Bismarck placed his quarters in Donchery at

the Emperor’s disposal, but he, thinking, as we know, that he would

return to the Sub-Prefecture, declined the courtesy, and preferred

to rest in a house by the wayside. The cottage of a Belgian weaver

unexpectedly became famous; a one-storied house, painted yellow, with

white shutters and venetian blinds. He and the Chancellor entered the

house, and went up to the first floor where there was “a little room

with one window. It was the best in the house, but had only one deal

table and two rush-bottomed chairs,” In that lowly abode they talked

together of many things for three-quarters of an hour, among others

about the origin of the war which, it seems, neither desired, the

Emperor asserting, Bismarck reports that “he had been driven into it

by the pressure of public opinion,” a very inadequate representation

of the curious incidents which preceded the fatal decision. But when

the Emperor began to ask for more favourable terms, he was told that,

on a military question, Von Moltke alone could speak. On the other

hand Bismarck’s request to know who now had authority to make peace

was met by a reference to “the Government in Paris;” so that no

progress was made. Then “we must stand to our demands with regard to

the Army of Sedan,” said Bismarck. General von Moltke was summoned,

and “Napoleon III. demanded that nothing should be decided before he

had seen the King, for he hoped to obtained from His Majesty some

favourable concessions for the Army.” The German official narrative of

the war states that the Emperor expressed a wish that the Army might be

permitted to enter Belgium, but that, of course, the Chief of the Staff

could not accept the proposal. General von Moltke forthwith set out for

Vendresse where the King was, to report progress. He met His Majesty on

the road, and there “the King fully approved the proposed conditions

of capitulation, and declared that he would not see the Emperor until

the terms prescribed had been accepted;” a decision which gratified the

Chancellor as well as the Chief of the Staff. “I did not wish them to

come together,” observed the Count, “until we had settled the matter

of the capitulation;” sparing the feelings of both and leaving the

business to the hard military men.

The Emperor lingered about in the garden of the weaver’s cottage; he

seems to have desired fresh air after his unpleasant talk with the

Chancellor. Dr. Moritz Busch, who had hurried to the spot, has left

a characteristic description of the Emperor. He saw there “a little

thick-set man,” wearing jauntily a red cap with a gold border, a

black paletôt lined with red, red trousers, and white kid gloves,

“The look in his light grey eyes was somewhat soft and dreamy, like

that of people who have lived hard. His whole appearance,” says the

irreverent Busch, “was a little unsoldierlike. The man looked too

soft, I might say too shabby, for the uniform he wore,” phrases which

suggest a lack of sympathy with adversity, and severe physical as

well as mental suffering. But imagination can realize a picture of

the fallen potentate, whose dynasty, crashing down, drew so much with

it, as he was seen by the cynical German, talking to his officers, or

to the burly Chancellor, or walking alone up and down a potato field

in flower, with his white-gloved hands behind his back, smoking a

cigarette; “betrayed by fortune” or fate, as he believed, but pursued,

as others might say, by the natural consequences of his marvellous

adventures, and of a strange neglect of the one source of strength

on which he relied, the Army. He had failed in the business upon the

conduct of which he prided himself; he was a bankrupt Emperor.

_The French Generals Submit._

While one scene in the stupendous drama was performed at the weaver’s

cottage, another was acted or endured in Sedan, where De Wimpffen had

summoned the generals to consider the dreadful terms of capitulation.

He has given his own account of the incident; but the fullest report

is supplied by Lebrun. There were present at this council of war more

than thirty generals. With tearful eyes and a voice broken by sobs, the

unhappy and most ill-starred De Wimpffen described his interview and

conflict with Von Moltke and Bismarck, and its dire result—the Army

to surrender as prisoners of war, the officers alone to retain their

arms, and by way of mitigating the rigour of these conditions, full

permission to return home would be given to any officer, provided he

would engage in writing and on honour not to serve again during the

war. The generals, save one or two, and these finally acquiesced, felt

that the conditions could not be refused; but they were indignant at

the clause suggesting that the officers might escape the captivity

which would befall their soldiers, provided they would engage to

become mere spectators of the invasion of their country. In the midst

of these mournful deliberations Captain von Zingler, a messenger from

Von Moltke, entered, and the scene became still more exciting. “I am

instructed,” he said, “to remind you how urgent it is that you should

come to a decision. At ten o’clock, precisely, if you have not come to

a resolution, the German batteries will fire on Sedan. It is now nine,

and I shall have barely time to carry your answer to head-quarters.” To

this sharp summons De Wimpffen answered that he could not decide until

he knew the result of the interview between the Emperor and the King.

“That interview,” said the stern Captain, “will not in any way affect

the military operations, which can only be determined by the generals

who have full power to resume or stop the strife.” It was, indeed, as

Lebrun remarked, useless to argue with a Captain, charged to state a

fact; and at the General’s suggestion De Wimpffen agreed to accompany

Captain von Zingler to the German head-quarters.

These were, for the occasion, the Château de Bellevue, where the

Emperor himself had been induced to take up his abode, and about eleven

o’clock, in a room under the Imperial chamber, De Wimpffen put his name

at the foot of the document drawn up, during the night, by the German

Staff. Then he sought out the Emperor, and, greatly moved, told him

that “all was finished.” His Majesty, he writes, “with tears in his

eyes, approached me, pressed my hand, and embraced me;” and “my sad and

painful duty having been accomplished, I remounted my horse and rode

back to Sedan, ‘la mort dans l’âme.’”

So soon as the convention was signed, the King arrived, accompanied

by the Crown Prince. Three years before, as the Emperor reminds us in

the writing attributed to him, the King had been his guest in Paris,

where all the sovereigns of Europe had come to behold the marvels of

the famous Exhibition. “Now,” so runs the lamentation, “betrayed by

fortune, Napoleon III. had lost all, and had placed in the hands of

his conqueror the sole thing left him—his liberty.” And he goes on

to say, in general terms, that the King deeply sympathized with his

misfortunes, but nevertheless could not grant better conditions to

the Army. “He told the Emperor that the castle of Wilhelmshöhe had

been selected as his residence; the Crown Prince then entered and

cordially shook hands with Napoleon; and at the end of a quarter of an

hour the King withdrew. The Emperor was permitted to send a telegram

in cipher to the Empress, to tell her what had happened, and urge her

to negotiate a peace.” Such is the bald record of this impressive

event. The telegram, which reached the Empress at four o’clock on the

afternoon of the 3rd, was in these words: “The Army is defeated and

captive; I myself am a prisoner.”

For one day more the fallen sovereign rested at Bellevue to meditate

on the caprices of fortune or the decrees of fate. But that day, at

the head of a splendid company of princes and generals, King William,

crossing the bridge of Donchery, rode throughout the whole vast extent

of the German lines, to greet his hardy warriors and be greeted by them

on the very scene of their victories. And well they deserved regal

gratitude, for together with their comrades who surrounded Metz, by

dint of long swift marches and steadfast valour, they had overcome two

great Armies in thirty days.

During the battle of Sedan, the Germans lost in killed and wounded

8,924 officers and men. On the other hand, the French lost 3,000

killed, 14,000 wounded, and 21,000 captured in the battle. The number

of prisoners by capitulation was 83,000, while 3,000 were disarmed in

Belgium, and a few hundreds, more or less, made their way by devious

routes near and over the frontier, to Mézières, Rocroi, and other

places in France. In addition, were taken one eagle and two flags, 419

field guns and mitrailleuses, 139 garrison guns, many wagons, muskets,

and horses. On the day after the surrender, the French soldiers, having

stacked their arms in Sedan, marched into the peninsula formed by the

deep loop of the Meuse—“le Camp de Misère” as they called it—and were

sent thence in successive batches, numbered by thousands, to Germany.

Such was the astonishing end of the Army of Chalons, which had been

impelled to its woful doom by the Comte de Palikao and the Paris

politicians. Directed by General Vinoy, who was an able soldier, the

troops brought to Mézières, escaped by rapid and clever marches from

the German cavalry and the 6th Corps, and formed the nucleus of the

improvised Army which afterwards defended the capital.

_The End._

On the 3rd of September the Emperor Napoleon III. departed from

Bellevue on his journey to the Castle of Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel. The

morning was wet and gloomy, and a thunderstorm was gathering among the

hills of the Ardennes. The Imperial baggage-train had been permitted

to leave Sedan, and was drawn up on the road ready to start. Columns

of prisoners also were moving out of the fortress and marching towards

the peninsula formed by the Meuse. It was a lugubrious scene, and

the superstitious might remark that as the sun shone resplendently

on the German victory, so his light was obscured when the captive

Emperor drove through the muddy streets of Donchery and thence to the

northward, wrapped in the sombre mist and thickly falling rain. And

as he journeyed, disconsolately, in the forenoon, upon the road to

Bouillon, orders went forth from the German head-quarters, where time

was never lost, directing the conquering generals to leave the 11th and

one Bavarian Corps on guard over Sedan and the thousands of unhappy

prisoners, and resume, with all the rest, that march on the capital of

France which had been so abruptly interrupted only eight days before.

So the victors and the vanquished went their different ways.

The Emperor travelled without haste, and on the evening of the 4th he

slept at Verviers. The next morning he learned, in common with all

Europe, indeed all the civilized world, that the fires which seethe

under the bright surface of society in Paris had once more burst

through the thin crust of use and wont, and that the dynasty of the

Bonapartes had been utterly overthrown at a blow to make way for the

Republic. Like intelligence reached the King of Prussia, also, at his

head-quarters, which, on the 5th, were already in Reims. The contrast

is painful. The King saw his hopes of an early peace destroyed; but

his was a solidly planted throne and he was the leader of irresistible

armies. The Emperor knew that his fond dream of founding an Imperial

House had been dispelled in an hour by a blast of national wrath;

and, being a kindly man, his agony was the keener because, as he

pathetically says, “he was separated from his son, and knew not what

fate had befallen the Empress.” Racked by such sad reflections, at

the very time when his wife was escaping to England, Louis Napoleon

Bonaparte went, by railway, from Verviers to Wilhelmshöhe. There,

during a luxurious captivity of six months, he had ample leisure to

meditate on the causes which led to the catastrophe of Sedan and the

surrender of Metz; and to ascertain, if he could, why, after a second

trial, ending in the third entry of hostile troops into Paris, the

French nation had lost its belief in the saving qualities of a family

bearing a name which, if associated with undying “glory,” has also

become indissolubly linked with bitter memories of lost provinces and

gigantic military disasters.

APPENDICES.

I.

THE GERMAN FIELD ARMIES.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, KING WILLIAM OF PRUSSIA; Chief of the Staff,

General Baron von Moltke; Quartermaster, General Podbielski;

Inspector-General of Artillery, General von Hindersin.

Present with the Great Head Quarters were the Minister of War, General

von Roon; and the Federal Chancellor and Minister President, General

Count von Bismarck-Schönhausen.

FIRST ARMY.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Steinmetz; Chief of the Staff, Gen. von

Sperling; Chief Quartermaster, Col. Count von Wartensleben.

_First Corps._[2]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General Baron von Manteuffel; Chief of the

Staff, Lieut.-Col. von der Burg. 1st Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Bentheim;

1st Brig., Major-Gen. von Gayl; 2nd Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von

Falkenstein. 2nd Div., Major-Gen. von Pritzelwitz; 3rd Brig.,

Major-Gen. von Memerty; 4th Brig., Major-Gen. von Zglintski; Commander

of Artillery, Major-Gen. von Bergemann.

Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200

horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers.

[Footnote 2: This Corps did not arrive until August 5.]

_Seventh Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Zastrow; Chief of the Staff, Col. von

Unger. 13th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Glümer; 25th Brig., Major-Gen. Baron

von Osten-Sacken; 26th Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von Golz. 14th Div.,

Lieut.-General von Kameke; 27th Brig., Major-Gen. von François; 28th

Brig., Major-Gen. von Woyna; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. von

Zimmermann.

Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200

horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; and 3 companies of Pioneers.

_Eighth Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Goeben; Chief of the Staff, Col.

von Witzendorff. 15th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Weltzien; 29th Brig.,

Major-Gen. von Wedell; 30th Brig., Major-Gen. von Strubberg. 16th Div.,

Lieut.-Gen. Barnekow; 31st, Major-Gen. Count Neidhard von Gneisenau;

32nd, Col von Rex; Commander of Artillery, Colonel von Kameke.

Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200

horses; 15 batteries, 90 guns; and 3 companies of Pioneers.

_First Cavalry Division._

COMMANDER, Lieut.-General von Hartmann. Brigadiers: 1st Brig.,

Major-Gen. von Lüderitz; 2nd Brig., Major-Gen. von Baumgarth (each was

composed of one Cuirassier and two Uhlan regiments, and accompanied by

a Horse Artillery Battery).

Strength: 24 squadrons, 3,600 horses, and 6 guns.

_Third Cavalry Division._

COMMANDER, Lieut.-Gen. Count von der Gröben. Brigadiers: 6th Brig.,

Major-Gen. von Mirus (one Cuirassier and one Uhlan regiment); 7th

Brig., Major-Gen. Count von Dohna (two Uhlan regiments).

Strength: 16 squadrons, 2,400 horses, 1 Horse Artillery battery, 6 guns.

_Strength of First Army._

Battalions. Squadrons. Batteries. Guns.

1st Corps 25 8 14 84

7th Corps 25 8 15 90

8th Corps 25 8 14 84

1st Cav. Div. 24 1 6

3rd Cav. Div. 16 1 6

-- -- -- ---

Total 75 64 45 270

THE SECOND ARMY.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, H.R.H. Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia; Chief

of Staff, Major-Gen. von Stiehle; Chief Quartermaster, Colonel von

Hertzberg; Commander of Artillery, Lieut.-Gen. von Colomier.

_The Guard Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Prince Augustus of Würtemberg; Chief of the Staff,

Major-Gen. von Dannenberg. 1st Div., Major-Gen. von Pape; 1st Brig.,

Major-Gen. von Kessel; 2nd Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von Medem. 2nd Div.,

Lieut.-Gen. von Budritzki; 3rd Brig., Colonel Knappe von Knappstädt;

4th Brig., Major-Gen. von Berger; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen.

Kraft, Prince of Hohenlohe Ingelfingen.

CAVALRY DIVISION:—Commander, Major-Gen. Count von der Golz; 1st Brig.,

Major-Gen. Count von Brandenburg I. (Life Guards and Cuirassiers); 2nd

Brig., Lieut.-Gen. Prince Albert of Prussia (two Uhlan regiments); 3rd

Brig., Lieut.-Gen. Count von Brandenburg II. (two Dragoon regiments).

Strength of Corps: 29 battalions, 29,000 men; 32 squadrons, 4,800

horses; 15 batteries, 90 guns; and 3 companies of Pioneers.

_Second Corps._[3]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Fransecky; Chief of the Staff, Colonel

von Wichmann; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. von Kleist. 3rd Div.,

Major-Gen. von Hartmann; 5th Brig., Major-Gen. von Koblinski; 6th

Brig., Colonel von der Decken. 4th Div., Lieut.-Gen. Hann von Weihern;

7th Brig., Major-Gen. du Trossel; 8th Brig., Major-Gen. von Kettler.

Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200

horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; and 3 companies of Artillery.

[Footnote 3: Came up to the front at the battle of Gravelotte.]

_Third Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Lieut.-Gen. von Alvensleben II.; Chief of the

Staff, Colonel von Voigts-Rhetz; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen.

von Bülow. 5th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Stülpnagel; 9th Brig., Major-Gen.

von Döring; 10th Brig., Major-Gen. von Schwerin. 6th Div., Lieut.-Gen.

Baron von Buddenbrock; 11th Brig., Major-Gen. von Rothmaler; 12th

Brig., Colonel von Bismarck.

Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200

horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; and 3 companies of Pioneers.

_Fourth Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Alvensleben I.; Chief of the Staff,

Colonel von Thile; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. von Scherbening.

7th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Schwarzhoff; 13th Brig., Major-Gen. von

Worries; 14th Brig., Major-Gen. von Zychlinski. 8th Div., Lieut.-Gen.

von Schöler; 15th Brig., Major-Gen. von Kessler; 16th Brig., Colonel

von Scheffler.

Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200

horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; and 3 companies of Pioneers.

_Ninth Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Manstein; Chief of the Staff, Major

Bronsart von Schellendorf; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. von

Puttkammer. 18th Div., Lieut.-Gen. Baron von Wrangel; 35th Brig.,

Major-Gen. von Blumenthal; 36th Brig., Major-Gen. von Below. The

Hessian Division (25th): Commander, Lieut.-Gen. H.R.H. Prince Louis

of Hesse; 49th Brig., Major-Gen. von Wittich; 50th Brig., Colonel von

Lyncker.

Strength of Corps: 23 battalions, 23,000 men; 12 squadrons, 1,800

horses; 15 batteries, 90 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers.

_Tenth Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Voigts-Rhetz; Chief of the Staff,

Lieut.-Col. von Caprivi; Commander of Artillery, Colonel Baron von der

Becke. 19th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Schwarzkoppen; 37th Brig., Colonel

von Lehmann; 38th Brig., Major-Gen. von Wedell. 20th Div., Major-Gen.

Kraatz Koschlau; 39th Brig., Major-Gen. von Woyna; 40th Brig.,

Major-Gen. von Diringshofen.

Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200

horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers.

_Twelfth (Royal Saxon) Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General H.R.H. the Crown Prince of Saxony; Chief of

the Staff, Colonel von Zezschwitz; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen.

Köhler. 1st Div., Prince George of Saxony; 1st Brig., Major-Gen. von

Craushaar; 2nd Brig., Colonel von Montbé. 2nd Div., Major-Gen. Nehrhoff

von Holderberg; 3rd Brig., Major-Gen. von Leonhardi; 4th Brig., Colonel

von Schulz. [N.B. The Infantry Divisions were also numbered 23 and

24, and the brigades 45, 46, 47, and 48, to fit them into the general

system.]

Strength of Corps: 29 battalions, 29,000 men; 24 squadrons, 3,600

horses; 16 batteries, 96 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers. [The Cavalry

formed the 12th Division, commanded by the Count of Lippe; Brigadiers,

Major-Gen. Krug von Nidda and Major-Gen. Seufft von Pilsach.]

_The Fifth Cavalry Division._

COMMANDER, Lieut.-Gen. Baron von Rheinbaben; 11th Brig., Major-Gen. von

Barby (a Cuirassier, a Uhlan, and a Dragoon regiment); 12th Brig.,

Major-Gen. von Bredow (similarly formed); 13th Brig., Major-Gen. von

Redern (three Hussar regiments).

Strength of Division: 36 squadrons, 5,400 horses; 2 batteries, 12 guns,

Horse Artillery.

_The Sixth Cavalry Division._

COMMANDER, Duke William of Mecklenburg-Schwerin; 14th Brig., Major-Gen.

Baron von Diepenbroick-Grüter (a Cuirassier and two Uhlan regiments);

15th Brig., Major-Gen. von Rauch (two Hussar regiments).

Strength of Division: 20 squadrons, 3,000 horses; and 1 Horse Artillery

battery, 6 guns.

_Strength of Second Army._

Battalions. Squadrons. Batteries. Guns.

Guard 29 32 15 90

2nd Corps 25 8 14 84

3rd Corps 25 8 14 84

4th Corps 25 8 14 84

9th Corps 23 12 15 90

10th Corps 25 8 14 84

12th Corps 29 24 16 96

5th Cav. Div 36 2 12

6th Cav. Div 20 1 6

--- --- --- ---

Total. 181 156 105 630

THE THIRD ARMY.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, H.R.H. the Crown Prince of Prussia; Chief of the

Staff, Lieut.-Gen. von Blumenthal; Chief Quartermaster, Colonel von

Gottberg; Commander of Artillery, Lieut.-Gen. Herkt.

_Fifth Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Lieut.-Gen. von Kirchbach; Chief of the Staff,

Colonel von der Esch; Commander of the Artillery, Colonel Gaede. 9th

Div., Major-Gen. von Sandrart; 17th Brig., Colonel von Bothmer; 18th

Brig., Major-Gen. von Voigts-Rhetz. 10th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Schmidt;

19th Brig., Colonel von Henning auf Schönhoff; 20th Brig., Major-Gen.

Walther von Montbary.

Strength of Corps; 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200

horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers.

_Sixth Corps._[4]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von Tümpling; Chief of the Staff, Colonel

von Salviati; Commander of Artillery, Colonel von Ramm. 11th Div.,

Lieut.-Gen. von Gordon; 21st Brig., Major-Gen. von Malachowski; 22nd

Brig., Major-Gen. von Eckartsberg. 12th Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Hoffmann;

23rd Brig., Major-Gen. Gündel; 24th Brig., Major-Gen. von Fabeck.

Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200

horses, 14 batteries, 84 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers.

[Footnote 4: This Corps did not cross the frontier until the 6th of

August.]

_Eleventh Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Lieut.-Gen. von Bose; Chief of the Staff,

Major-Gen. Stein von Kaminski; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen.

Hausmann. 21st Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Schachtmeyer; 41st Brig., Colonel

von Koblinski; 42nd Brig., Major-Gen. von Thile. 22nd Div., Lieut.-Gen.

von Gersdorff; 43rd Brig., Colonel von Konski; 44th Brig., Major-Gen.

von Schkopp.

Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8 squadrons, 1,200

horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; 3 companies of Pioneers.

_First Bavarian Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General von der Tann-Rathsamhausen; Chief of the

Staff, Lieut.-Col. von Heinleth; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. von

Malaisé. 1st Div., Lieut.-Gen von Stephan; 1st Brig., Major-Gen. Dietl;

2nd Brig., Major-Gen. von Orff. 2nd Div., Major-Gen. Schumaker; 3rd

Brig., Colonel Heyle; 4th Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von der Tann.

Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 20 squadrons, 3,000

horses (Cuirassiers and Light Horse); 16 batteries, 96 guns; 3

companies of Pioneers.

_Second Bavarian Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General Ritter von Hartmann; Chief of the Staff,

Colonel Baron von Horn; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. Lutz. 3rd

Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Walther; 5th Brig., Major-Gen. von Schleich; 6th

Brig., Colonel Borries von Wissel. 4th Div., Lieut.-Gen. Count von

Bothmer; 7th Brig., Major-Gen. von Thiereck; 8th Brig., Major-Gen.

Maillinger.

Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 20 squadrons, 3,000

horses (Cuirassier, Uhlan, Light Horse); 16 batteries, 96 guns; 3

companies of Pioneers.

_The Würtemberg Division._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Lieut.-Gen. von Obernitz; Chief of the Staff,

Colonel von Bock; Commander of Artillery, Colonel von Sick; 1st Brig.,

Major-Gen. von Reitstenstein; 2nd Brig., Major-Gen. von Starkloff; 3rd

Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von Hügel.

Strength of Division: 15 battalions, 15,000 men; 10 squadrons, 1,500

horses; 9 batteries, 54 guns; 2 companies of Pioneers.

_Baden Division._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Lieut.-Gen. von Beyer; Chief of the Staff,

Lieut.-Col. von Leszczynski; Commander of Artillery, Colonel von

Freydorf; 1st Brig., Lieut.-Gen. du Jarrhs, Baron von la Roche; 2nd

Brig., Major-Gen. Keller.

Strength of Division: 13 battalions, 13,000 men; 12 squadrons, 1,800

horses; 9 batteries, 54 guns; 1 Pioneer company.

_Second Cavalry Division._[5]

COMMANDER, Lieut.-Gen. Count Stolberg-Wernigerode; 3rd Brig.,

Major-Gen. von Colomb (two regiments, Cuirassier and Uhlan); 4th Brig.,

Major-Gen. Baron von Barnekow (two regiments of Hussars); 5th Brig.,

Major-Gen. von Baumbach (two regiments of Hussars).

Strength: 24 squadrons, 3,600 horses; 2 Horse Artillery batteries, 12

guns.

[Footnote 5: This Division came up after the 4th of August.]

_Fourth Cavalry Division._

COMMANDER, General H.R.H. Prince Albrecht of Prussia, senior; 8th

Brig., Major-Gen. von Hontheim (two regiments, Cuirassier and Uhlan);

9th Brig., Major-Gen. von Bernhardi (two Uhlan regiments); 10th Brig.,

Major-Gen. von Krosigk (two regiments, Hussar and Dragoon).

Strength: 24 squadrons, 3,600 horses; 2 Horse Artillery batteries, 12

guns.

STRENGTH OF THIRD ARMY.

Battalions. Squadrons. Batteries. Guns.

5th Corps 25 8 14 84

6th Corps 25 8 14 84

11th Corps 25 8 14 84

1st Bavarian 25 20 16 96

2nd Bavarian 25 20 16 96

Würtemberg Div. 15 10 9 54

Baden Div 13 12 9 54

2nd Cav. Div. 24 2 12

4th Cav. Div. 24 2 12

--- --- -- ---

Total 153 134 96 576

TOTAL OF THE THREE ARMIES.

Battalions. Squadrons. Batteries. Guns.

First Army 75 64 45 270

Second Army 181 156 105 630

Third Army 153 134 96 576

--- --- --- -----

Grand Total 409 354 246 1,476

By the end of August the 17th Division of Infantry and the 2nd Division

of Landwehr, under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, in addition

to the 3rd Reserve Division already on the spot under General Kunsmor,

were brought up to take part in the investment of Metz. The troops

sent forward to reinforce the Baden Division before Strasburg were the

Landwehr Division of the Guard, the 1st Reserve Division, and the 1st

brigade of reserve cavalry. During August, counting all ranks, sick or

well, and including every species of non-combatant, the mean strength

of the Armies in the field was 780,723 men, and 213,159 horses.

II

THE FRENCH ARMY.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON III.; “Major-General” or Chief

of the Staff, Marshal Lebœuf, assisted by General Lebrun and General

Jarras; Commander of Artillery, General Soleille; of Engineers, General

Coffinières de Nordeck.

IMPERIAL GUARD.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General Bourbaki; Chief of the Staff, General

d’Auvergne; Commander of Artillery, General Pé d’Arros; Divisional

Commanders: 1st Div. (Voltigeurs), General Deligny; Brigadiers:

1st Brig., General Brincourt; 2nd Brig., General Garnier. 2nd

Div. (Grenadiers), General Picard; Brigadiers: 1st Brig., General

Jeanningros; 2nd Brig., General le Poitevin de Lacroix.

Strength of Corps: 24 battalions; 24 squadrons—(Desvaux’s Div. of three

brigades, commanded by Halna du Fretay, De France, and Du Preuil,

consisting of Guides, Chasseurs, Lancers, Dragoons, Cuirassiers, and

Carbineers)—60 guns, and 12 mitrailleuses; 2 companies of Engineers.

_First Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Marshal MacMahon, Duke of Magenta; Chief of the

Staff, Gen. Colson; Commander of Artillery, Gen. Forgeot. Divisional

Commanders: 1st Div., Gen. Ducrot; 1st Brig., Gen. Wolff; 2nd Brig.,

Gen. de Postis du Houlbec. 2nd Div., Gen. Abel Douay; 1st Brig., Gen.

Pelletier de Montmarie; 2nd Brig., Gen. Pellé. 3rd Div., Gen. Raoult;

1st Brig., Gen. l’Hériller; 2nd Brig., Gen. Lefebvre. 4th Div., Gen.

Lartigue; 1st Brig., Lieut.-Gen. Fraboulet de Kerléadec; 2nd Brig.,

Gen. Lacretelle.

Strength of Corps: 52 battalions—45 deducting the regiments left in

Strasburg; 28 squadrons—Duhesme’s brigade of Cuirassiers, Hussars,

Chasseurs, Lancers, and Dragoons—96 guns and 24 mitrailleuses; 5½

companies of Engineers.

_Second Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General Frossard; Chief of the Staff, Gen. Saget;

Commander of Artillery, Gen. Gagneur, 1st Div., Gen. Vergé; 1st

Brig., Gen. Letellier Valazé; 2nd Brig., Gen. Jolivet. 2nd Div., Gen.

Bataille; 1st Brig., Gen. Pouget; 2nd Brig., Gen. Fauvart-Bastoul. 3rd

Div., Gen. de Laveaucoupet; 1st Brig., Gen. Doëns; 2nd Brig., Gen.

Micheler.

Strength of Corps: 39 battalions; 16 squadrons—(Valabrègue’s Division,

4 regiments of Chasseurs and Dragoons)—72 guns, 18 mitrailleuses; 5

companies of Engineers.

_Third Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Marshal Bazaine; Chief of the Staff, Gen. Manèque;

Commander of Artillery, Gen. de Rochebouët. 1st Div., Gen. Montaudon;

1st Brig., Gen. Baron Aymard; 2nd Brig., Gen. Clinchant. 2nd Div.,

Gen. de Castagny; 1st Brig., Gen. Nayral; 2nd Brig., Gen. Duplessis.

3rd Div., Gen. Metman; 1st Brig., Gen. de Potier; 2nd Brig., Gen.

Arnaudeau. 4th Div., Gen. Decaen; 1st Brig., Gen. de Brauer; 2nd Brig.,

Gen. Sanglé-Ferrière.

Strength of Corps: 52 battalions; 28 squadrons—(De Clérambault’s Div.,

3 regiments of Chasseurs, 4 of Dragoons, organized in 3 brigades)—96

guns, 24 mitrailleuses and 5½ companies of Engineers.

_Fourth Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General de Ladmirault; Chief of the Staff, Gen.

Osmont: Commander of Artillery, Gen. Lafaille. 1st Div., Gen. Courtot

de Cissey; 1st Brig., Gen. Count Brayer; 2nd Brig., Gen. de Golberg.

2nd Div., Gen. Grenier; 1st Brig., Gen. Bellecourt; 2nd Brig., Gen.

Pradier; 3rd Div., Gen. Count de Lorencez; 1st Brig., Gen. Count Pajol;

2nd Brig., Gen. Berger.

Strength of Corps: 39 battalions; 16 squadrons—(Legrand’s Div., 1

brigade of Hussars and 1 of Dragoons)—72 guns, 18 mitrailleuses; 4

companies of Engineers.

_Fifth Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General de Failly; Chief of the Staff, Gen.

Besson; Commander of Artillery, Gen. Liédot. 1st Div., Gen. Goze; 1st

Brig., Gen. Sauron; 2nd Brig., Gen. Nicolas-Nicolas. 2nd Div., Gen.

de l’Abadie d’Aydrein; 1st Brig., Gen. Lapasset; 2nd Brig., Gen. de

Maussion. 3rd Div., Gen. Guyot de Lespart; 1st Brig., Gen. Abbatucci;

2nd Brig., Gen. de Fontanges.

Strength of Corps: 39 battalions; 16 squadrons—(Brahaut’s Div.,

brigade of Hussars and Chasseurs, and one of Lancers)—72 guns, 18

mitrailleuses; 4 companies of Engineers.

_Sixth Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, Marshal Canrobert; Chief of the Staff, Gen.

Henri; Commander of Artillery, Gen. Labastie. 1st Div., Gen. Tixier;

1st Brig., Gen. Péchot; 2nd Brig., Gen. Le Roy de Dais. 2nd Div.,

Gen. Bisson; 1st Brig., Gen. Archinard; 2nd Brig., Gen. Maurice. 3rd

Div., Gen. Lafont de Villers; 1st Brig., Gen. Becquet de Sonnay; 2nd

Brig., Gen. Colin. 4th Div., Gen. Levassor-Sorval; 1st Brig., Gen. de

Marguenat; 2nd Brig., Gen. Comte de Chanaleilles.

Strength of Corps: 49 battalions; 24 squadrons—(Div. of

Salignac-Fénelon, three brigades Lancers, Hussars, Chasseurs, and

Cuirassiers)—114 guns, 6 mitrailleuses, and 5 companies of Engineers.

[Only 40 battalions and 36 guns were able to reach Metz.]

_Seventh Corps._

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, General Félix Douay; Chief of the Staff, Gen.

Renson; Commander of Artillery, Gen. de Liégeard. 1st Div., Gen.

Conseil Dumesnil; 1st Brig., Gen. Nicolaï; 2nd Brig., Gen. Maire. 2nd

Div., Gen. Liébert; 1st Brig., Gen. Guiomar; 2nd Brig., Gen. de la

Bastide. 3rd Div., Gen. Dumont; 1st Brig., Gen. Bordas; 2nd Brig., Gen.

Bittard des Portes.

Strength of Corps: 38 battalions; 20 squadrons—(Amiel’s Div., five

regiments, in two brigades, Lancers, Hussars, and Dragoons)—72 guns, 18

mitrailleuses, and 4 companies of Engineers. [One cavalry brigade of

two regiments never joined the 7th Corps.]

_Reserve Cavalry._

1st Div., Gen. du Barail; 1st Brig., Gen. Margueritte; 2nd Brig., Gen.

de Lajaille; 16 squadrons, Chasseurs d’Afrique, and 12 guns. [Three

regiments reached Metz on the 10th of August, and the 4th at Mouzon on

the Meuse.]

2nd Div., Gen. Viscomte de Bonnemains; 1st Brig., Gen. Girard; 2nd

Brig., Gen. de Brauer; 16 squadrons, all Cuirassiers.

3rd Div., Gen. de Forton; 1st Brig., Gen. Prince Murat; 2nd Brig.,

Gen. de Gramont; 16 squadrons—(one brigade of Dragoons, the other

Cuirassiers)—and 12 guns.

Artillery Reserve: Gen. Canu, 126 guns, 6 mitrailleuses, and 3

companies of Engineers.

STRENGTH OF ARMY.

Battalions. Squadrons. Batteries. Guns. Mitrailleuses.

Guard 24 24 12 60 12

1st Corps 52 28 20 96 24

2nd Corps 39 16 15 72 18

3rd Corps 52 28 20 96 24

4th Corps 39 16 15 72 18

5th Corps 39 16 15 72 18

6th Corps 49 24 20 114 6

7th Corps 38 20 15 72 18

Reserve Cav. 48 6 30 6

Reserve Art. 16 96

--- --- --- --- ---

332 220 154 780 144

It is not possible to do more than guess at the numerical strength of

the French Corps, and consequently of the French Army; so great is the

variation in the strength of battalions and squadrons. The infantry of

the several Corps was continually augmented by the arrival of reserves,

so that, the losses at Spicheren notwithstanding, the 2nd Corps was

stronger by more than 2,000 men, five days after the battle, than it

was on the morning of the 6th; Marshal Lebœuf told the Parliamentary

Commission that, on the 1st of August, according to the “states” sent

in to the head-quarters, the effective of the Army of the Rhine,

including all the Corps in the field, was 243,171 men. But “the real

effective,” he adds, “was greatly superior.” For by the 1st of August,

no fewer than “278,882 men had been sent to the Army of the Rhine,” and

subsequently, until the 14th, “numerous detachments.” It is plain that

no precise information can be obtained, but it seems probable that the

strength was always greater than that reported at the time. Similar

uncertainty prevails respecting the effective strength of the “Army of

Chalons.” The only authentic figures extant are those supplied by the

German account of the capitulation, from which the original strength,

increased by additions on the line of march, may be inferred.

III.

THE PROTOCOL OF CAPITULATION.

Between the undersigned, the Chief of the Staff of His Majesty the

King of Prussia, commanding in chief the German Army, and the General,

commanding in chief the French Army, each having received full powers

from their Majesties, King William and the Emperor Napoleon, the

following Convention has been concluded:

_Article 1._—The French Army, placed under the orders of General de

Wimpffen, finding itself actually surrounded in Sedan by superior

forces, is prisoner of war.

_Article 2._—Having regard to the brave defence of this Army, an

exception is made for all the generals and officers, as well as for the

functionaries, having the rank of officer, who shall give their word of

honour, in writing, not to bear arms against Germany, and not to act

in any other manner against her interests until the end of the present

war. The officers and functionaries who may accept these conditions,

shall preserve their arms and personal property.

_Article 3._—All other arms, as well as the _matériel_ of the Army,

consisting of flags (eagles and standards), cannons, horses, military

chests, army equipages, munitions, etc., shall be surrendered at Sedan

to a Military Commission, appointed by the French Commander-in-Chief,

to be given over immediately to the German Commissioner.

_Article 4._—The fortress of Sedan shall be immediately placed in its

actual state, and, at the latest, by the evening of September 2, at the

disposal of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

_Article 5._—The officers who shall not have subscribed the engagement

mentioned in Article 2, and the men, after having been disarmed,

shall be ranked in regiments and conducted in good order into the

peninsula formed by the Meuse near Iges. The groups thus constituted

shall be handed over to the German Commissioners by the officers, who

will immediately give over the command to the sous-officers. This

arrangement will begin on the 2nd of September and should be finished

on the 3rd.

_Article 6._—The military medical men, without exception, will remain

behind to take care of the wounded.

Done at Frénois, September 2, 1870.

(Signed) VON MOLTKE.

DE WIMPFFEN.

IV.

A LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL WORKS CONSULTED FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.

Der Deutsch-Französische Krieg, 1870–71. Redigirt von der

Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abtheilung des Grossen Generalstabes.

The German Artillery. Captain Hoffbauer.

Operations of the First Army. Major A. von Schell.

Operations of the Bavarian Army. Captain H. Helvig.

Tactical Deductions from the War 1870-71. Captain A. von Boguslawski.

Our Chancellor; Sketches for a Historical Picture. By Moritz Busch.

Bismarck and the Franco-German War, 1870-71. By Dr. Moritz Busch.

My Diary during the last Great War. By W. H. Russell.

L’Armée du Rhin. Par le Maréchal Bazaine.

Episodes de la Guerre de 1870 et le Blocus de Metz. Par l’Ex-Maréchal

Bazaine.

Affaire de la Capitulation de Metz. Procès Bazaine.

Metz, Campagne et Négociations. Par un Officier supérieur de l’Armée du

Rhin.

Journal d’un Officier de l’Armée du Rhin. Par Ch. Fay.

Œuvres Posthumes autographes inédits de Napoleon III. Collected and

published by the Comte de la Chapelle.

Sedan. Par le Général de Wimpffen.

La Journée de Sedan. Par le Général Ducrot.

Guerre de 1870. Bazeilles-Sedan. Par le Général Lebrun.

Campagne de 1870. Belfort, Reims, Sedan, Le 7^{e} Corps de l’Armée du

Rhin. Par le Prince Georges Bibesco.

Journal d’un Officier d’Ordonnance, Juillet 1870—Février 1871. Par le

Comte d’Hérisson.

Campagne de 1870. La Cavalerie Française. Par le Lieut.-Col. Bonie.

Campagne de 1870–71. Siége de Paris. Operations du 13^{e} Corps et de

la Troisième Armée. Par le Général Vinoy.

Documents Relatifs au Siége de Strasbourg. Publiés par le Général

Uhrich.

Un Ministère de la Guerre de vingt quatre jours. Par le Général Cousin

de Montauban Comte de Palikao.

Enquête Parlementaire sur les Acts du Gouvernement de la Défense

Nationale.

Papiers et Correspondances de la Famille Impériale.

Ma Mission en Prusse. Par le Comte Benedetti.

France et la Prusse avant la Guerre. Par le Duc de Gramont.

_The Times_, October 25, 1871. Translation of Prince Bismarck’s Reply

to Count Benedetti’s “Mission en Prusse.”

La Politique Française en 1866. Par G. Rothan.

L’Affaire du Luxembourg: le prélude de la Guerre de 1870. Par G. Rothan.

Les Coulisses de la Diplomatie. Quinze Ans à l’Etranger. 1864–1879. Par

Jules Hansen.

Revue des Deux Mondes. Avril, 1878; and 1886–7.

Papers presented to Parliament Respecting the War between France and

Germany, 1870.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF WOERTH, ABOUT NOON. Plan I.

_Weller & Graham L^{td}. Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons_]

[Illustration: BATTLE OF SPICHEREN, 3.30. P.M. Plan II.

_Weller & Graham L^{td}. Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons_]

[Illustration: COLOMBEY-NOUILLY, 5. P.M. Plan III.

_Weller & Graham L^{td}. Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons_]

[Illustration: VIONVILLE-MARS LA TOUR, ABOUT 4 P.M. Plan IV.

_Weller & Graham L^{td}. Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons._]

[Illustration: GRAVELOTTE, 2.45 P.M. Plan V

_Weller & Graham L^{td}. Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons._]

[Illustration: SEDAN, ABOUT 10 A.M. Plan VI.

_Weller & Graham L^{td}. Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons_]

[Illustration: GENERAL MAP OF WAR-FIELD. _Weller & Graham L^{td}.

Lithos._ _London, Bell & Sons_]

INDEX

Abbatucci’s brigade at Woerth, 115.

Abzac, Colonel d’, 252.

Aillicourt, 293.

Aire, river, 248.

Aisne, river, 232, 242, 248, 249, 264, 277;

the Guard on the, at Triaucourt, 232;

canal, Meuse and, 251.