THE FRENCH RETREAT THWARTED.
_Vionville—Mars la Tour._
That feebleness and hesitation which had been so conspicuous on the
side of the French from the outset of the campaign were not likely
to cease when dangers and difficulties increased with every passing
hour. The Emperor, while he commanded, had been incapable of taking,
not merely a bold, but any resolution, and the mental qualities of
Marshal Bazaine were not sufficiently far above the average to enable
him to remedy the mischievous effects of the long course of erroneous
conduct to the heritage of which he succeeded. Moreover, neither
Bazaine nor any other French commander, despite recent experiences,
had formed a correct estimate of German energy and enterprise. Least
of all could they believe that a single Corps and two divisions of
cavalry would venture to plant themselves across the road to Verdun.
The evil consequences were increased by the inactivity of the cavalry,
and the bad, unsoldierlike habit of making perfunctory reconnaisances
carried only a mile or so to the front and on the flanks. Marshal
Bazaine’s phrase—“les reconnaissances doivent se faire _comme
d’habitude_”—reveals the whole secret. At Wissembourg, on the 4th of
August, General Abel Douay’s horsemen returned from a short excursion
and reported that no enemy was near; and at eight in the morning of
the 16th, General Frossard was informed by the patrols which had come
in that there was no adversary in force on his front. The German horse
were near at hand, yet De Forton’s cavaliers had not felt out as far
as their bivouac. Marshal Bazaine’s original intention was that the
two corps ordered to follow the Mars la Tour road should start at four
o’clock; and Frossard had his men out in readiness to move at that hour
when a fresh order postponed the march until the afternoon. During
the night Marshal Lebœuf, alarmed at the absence of two divisions and
at the continued sojourn of De Ladmirault in the Moselle valley, had
suggested that it would be better to stand fast until the several Corps
had been once more brought within supporting distance; and Marshal
Bazaine had readily yielded to the suggestion. Still no measures were
taken to ascertain whether foes were approaching or not, and the
soldiers, horse and foot, took up their ordinary camp duties as they
would have done had they been at Chalons in time of peace. The actual
situation, if they had known it, required that every horse, man and gun
should have been in motion at dawn, yet they all lingered; and it may
be said that neither superiors nor subordinates were alive to the peril
in which they stood—not of defeat, still less rout, the odds available
against German enterprise were too great,—but of a blow which would
make them reel and, perhaps, turn them aside from the paths to the
Meuse.
_The Vionville Battlefield._
The road from Gravelotte to Verdun passes by the villages of
Rezonville, Vionville and Mars la Tour through a generally open and
undulating country. The ground slopes irregularly and gently upward
on all sides from the highway; the villages on the route are in the
hollows or shallow valleys. North and south of Rezonville a ridge
separated two ravines, the larger, on the east, formed by the Jurée
brook, had its origin north of Gravelotte, the smaller on the west,
came down also from the northern uplands, and parallel to its bed
ran the principal road from Gorze to Rezonville. At the southern
declivity of the ridge, and extending eastward as far as the Moselle,
were a series of forest—the Bois de Vionville, Bois St. Arnould, the
Bois des Ognons, the Bois des Chevaux. To the west and south-west of
Rezonville the country was generally open; but there was a clump of
trees shading a pool near Vionville, and, north of the high road, were
larger patches of woods, named after the village of Tronville. North
also of the highway, and within the French lines, woodlands covered the
hill sides towards St. Marcel, the hamlet of Villers aux Bois being
seated on the highest ground. Along this upper plateau are traces of a
Roman road, running due west, the ancient route from Verdun to Metz;
traces visible also in the fields nearer to the fortress. The French
occupied the higher stretches on the eastern and north-eastern edge of
this irregularly undulating and wooded region. General Frossard was
posted on the left of the line in front of Rezonville; Canrobert on the
heights towards St Marcel; Lebœuf had his troops about Vernéville, the
Guard stood at, and in rear of Gravelotte, and the careless cavalry
brigades under de Forton and Valabrègues had set up their camps west
of Vionville, and thence kept a listless watch towards the heights and
hollows, west and south-west, just in their immediate front.
_The French are Surprised._
Suddenly, about nine o’clock, they were struck by shells fired from a
battery which seemed to have sprung out of a rounded hill a few hundred
yards to the west of Vionville. The missiles fell among the tents and
burst about a squadron filing up in watering order to the tree-shaded
pool. In quick succession three additional batteries appeared on the
crest and opening fire added to the confusion below. Murat’s dragoons
broke and fled and, accompanied by the baggage train, horses, carts,
men, galloped and ran off towards Rezonville; and De Gramont’s
troopers, further to the rear, mounted and retired in good order up the
northern slopes, halting on the right of the 6th Corps. The batteries,
six in number, then moved up to a height closer in to Vionville and
smote the infantry camps. They were promptly answered by the guns of
Frossard’s Corps, while his brigades stood to their arms, formed up and
sprang forward with alacrity. About the same time, a solitary German
battery, visible to the south, fired a few rounds into the French left
and then withdrew over the crest unable to bear the storm of Chassepot
bullets which were poured from the aroused and irritated infantry.
The collision, so unwelcome to the French, had been brought about
in this wise. Prince Frederick Charles had ordered the 3rd and 10th
Corps and the 6th Division of Cavalry to start early in the morning
and strike the Verdun road west of Rezonville. As General von
Voights-Rhetz, commanding the 10th, intended to move upon St. Hilaire,
beyond Mars la Tour, he instructed Von Rheinbaben to reconnoitre in the
direction of Rezonville, increased his horse artillery, and supported
him with an infantry detachment from Thiaucourt. About the same time
that the 10th Corps advanced its foremost brigades from Thiaucourt,
and the rest from Pont à Mousson, the 3rd Corps and the 6th Division
of Cavalry also made for the hills west and south of Vionville, the
right division proceeding by Gorze, and the left, by Buxières, towards
Tronville. Thus these two Corps were moving on two parallel curves, the
3rd being next to the enemy, and the 10th on the outer and larger arc.
The Prince and his Generals did not anticipate a battle, but they all
hoped to fall in with and punish a rear-guard, or, by striking far to
the westward, intercept and compel the French Army to halt and fight
before it reached the Meuse. It was Rheinbaben’s abrupt and thorough
home-thrust which revealed the fact that the French had not passed
Rezonville, or, at least, that a large part of the Army was near that
village. His advance-guard, three squadrons and a battery, had moved
within musket-shot of De Forton’s camp “without encountering a single
patrol;” and, taking advantage of such supineness, his artillery,
hastening forward, created the panic near Vionville, which has already
been described. Frossard’s Corps, which always behaved well, speedily
took up defensive positions. Bataille occupied Vionville and Flavigny,
and the high ground above the villages; Vergé prolonged the line
to the left, and placed one brigade facing south to front the Bois
de Vionville, and connect the array with Lapasset’s brigade on the
ridge which, from the north, overlooked the Bois St. Arnould and the
ravine leading to Gorze. The 6th Corps, encamped north of the main
road, continued the line on that side, and rapidly developed a front
facing south-west between the highway and the Roman road. The sound
of the cannonade was heard as far off as Jarny and Conflans, startled
Lebœuf at Vernéville, and aroused the Marshal, busy in his quarters at
Gravelotte.
_The Third Corps strikes in._
Rheinbaben’s bold horsemen and gunners had done their work; they had
gained for the oncoming infantry that species of moral advantage which
always accrues from a surprise. As they fell back to more sheltered
positions behind the swelling hills, the right wing of the 3rd Corps,
under Stülpnagel, entered the field from the south; the left wing,
directed by the fiery Alvensleben himself, came down into the arena
from the south-west, and several batteries, urged on by Von Bulow,
dashed up and formed the centre of the assailants. Indeed, the guns
were in action before the infantry could march over the distance
between their starting points and the outward spray of the French
line of battle; so that for an appreciable interval the groups of
batteries had to depend upon themselves. Yet not for long. Stülpnagel’s
battalions plunged into the dense woods on the right, and waged a close
combat with the skirmishers of Jolivet’s brigade, who were slow to
give ground. Beyond the thickets, the left wing of the division drove
Valazé’s skirmishers from an eminence, the highest in those parts, and
a battery was speedily in action on its bare summit. By degrees, as
they came up, the battalions of the 10th Brigade went forward on the
left, or western, flank of the height, where the contest, conducted
with vigour on both sides, eddied to and fro, until the German onset,
repeated and sustained, gained the mastery, and cleared the slopes so
effectually that five other batteries, driving up the hill as fast as
they could clear the defile, took ground on its top, and gave support
to the companies in the wood and on the open down. About an hour was
consumed in this desperate work, made all the more arduous because the
German infantry pushed eagerly into the fight, not in compact masses,
but one battalion after another as each struggled up to the front.
Major-General Doering was killed, and many officers went down in
this sanguinary strife: one battalion which dashed forward to resist
a French attack at a critical moment lost every officer. But as it
retired, broken and wasted, the French were smitten in turn by its
comrades, forced to give way, and the position was, at this heavy cost,
secured. For the troops engaged in the forest had now attained the
northern edge of the Bois de Vionville, the batteries on the lofty hill
were safe, and Stülpnagel’s Division was solidly established upon the
most commanding uplands in that part of the field.
To their left rear was the 6th Cavalry Division; but between them and
the fields west of Vionville were no infantry, only lines of guns,
protected by a few squadrons of horse. For the 6th Infantry Division,
coming on from Buxièries, had gradually wheeled to the right until they
faced to the east, the 11th Brigade crossing the high road, north of
Tronville, the 12th moving upon Vionville; so that they formed a line
of attack directed upon Bataille’s division which held Vionville and
Flavigny, having on its right, beyond the Verdun road, the division of
Lafont de Villiers belonging to Canrobert’s Corps. While Stülpnagel was
striving to obtain a grip of the woods and heights on the French left,
Buddenbrock, the other divisional commander, acting under the eyes of
his chief, threw the weight of his division upon the two villages which
covered what was then the French centre. Vionville was first carried
by the usual turning movement, and its capture was followed by the
outburst of a still more murderous conflict. The French had brought
up more and heavier pieces, and these poured a crushing fire into the
village. The Germans answered by continuing the attack on the French
infantry. Yet so confused was the engagement on the bare hill side,
so completely was it a “soldiers’ battle,” such was the swaying to and
fro of the mingled companies which, crushed and mangled, yet welded
themselves together and pressed on, that, once more, the official
German historian renounces the task of minute description. But the
effect of the hurly-burly was soon manifest—Bataille’s entire division,
unable to endure the torment, and seeing its General fall wounded,
went about and retired; Valazé’s brigade, “taken in flank,” says
Frossard, by a German battery, and losing its gallant commander, also
marched off through Rezonville; and the nearest brigade of Canrobert’s
Corps likewise receded, either under pressure or weakened in purpose
by example. The Germans paid a great price for the immense advantage
secured; but as Flavigny fell into their hands, as the left of
Stülpnagel’s Division joined in its capture, and as the front of battle
was now no longer an arc but its chord, the prize was well worth its
cost. The sole reinforcements which had arrived to aid the 3rd Corps,
were two detachments, parts of the same brigade, and pertaining to the
10th which, on their way to join that Corps then moving westward, had
turned aside, attracted by the magnetism of the cannonade. How much of
the success obtained was due to the valour, devotion, and endurance of
the artillery may be gathered from the French narratives. No troops
could have fought with greater hardihood and dash—not fleeting, but
sustained—than the infantry of the 3rd Corps, all Prussians from the
Mark of Brandenburg. But they had their equals among the dauntless
gunners, deserving to be called “_tirailleurs d’artillerie_,” who
literally used their batteries as battalions, dragging them up to the
very outward edges of the fight, often within rifle-shot, and when
pressed, retiring some scores of paces, then halting and opening at
short range upon their pursuers. The line, composed of groups of
batteries, especially in the forenoon, was the backbone of the battle.
_Arrival of Bazaine._
Just as Frossard’s infantry, yielding to the vehement pressure,
retreated behind Rezonville, Marshal Bazaine appeared on the scene,
and rode into the thick of the contest. At Frossard’s request he
directed a Lancer regiment, supported by the cuirassiers of the Guard,
to charge and check the pursuers. The Lancers went forth with great
spirit, but soon swerved aside, broken by the infantry fire. The
Guard horsemen, however, led by General du Preuil, rode home upon
the eager and disordered companies who were marching to the east of
the flaming village of Flavigny. But these foot soldiers, reserving
their fire until the mailed cavaliers were within two hundred and
fifty yards, plied them with shot so steadily that the squadrons
swerved to the right and left, only to fall under the bullets from
the rear ranks which had faced about. “The cuirassiers,” says General
du Preuil, “were broken by the enemy’s infantry, which received them
with a murderous fire. After the charge, the wreck of the regiment
rallied at Rezonville, having left behind on the field 22 officers,
24 _sous officiers_, about 200 men and 250 horses. When the regiment
was re-organized, instead of 115 mounted men per squadron, there were
only 62!” Colonel von Rauch had close to Flavigny two Hussar regiments;
with one he pressed on the flying cuirassiers, and with the other
charged the French infantry struggling rearward. Bazaine had just
brought up, and was posting a battery of the Imperial Guard, when the
Hussars charged down upon him, taking the battery in front and flank.
It was here that the Marshal was surrounded, separated for a moment
from his staff, and obliged, as he himself says, to “draw his sword.”
Two squadrons of his escort came to his relief, and a rifle battalion
opened upon the Prussian horse, who had to retreat, leaving behind the
battery which they had temporarily seized. General Alvensleben had
ordered up the 6th Division of Cavalry, but when they arrived, Bazaine
had brought forward the Grenadier Division of the Guard to replace
the 2nd Corps in the front line, for Jolivet’s brigade, on the French
left, had also retired to the high ground in its rear. The 6th formed
up to the south of Flavigny and advanced, but they could not make any
impression upon the re-invigorated enemy, and they drew back, having
lost many officers and men. “This demonstration, apparently without any
result,” says the official German account, “was still useful, since it
provided the artillery with an opportunity so vehemently desired of
pressing up nearer to the front.” In fact, the lines of the artillery
were now between the edge of the wood of Vionville and Flavigny, and to
the right, left, and front of Vionville itself—a distinct approximation
towards the French infantry and guns; so that there were changes on
both sides, with the difference that the French brought up fresh
troops, while the same German guns, horsemen and infantry continued the
struggle.
The crisis of the battle had now arrived; for General von Alvensleben,
in order to diminish the violent pressure on his left, which was
beyond the Verdun road, had been obliged to thrust his sole reserve
of infantry into the deadly encounter. Colonel Lehmann, commanding a
detachment of the 10th Corps, consisting of three battalions and a
half, had come up to the outskirts of the field in the forenoon, and
he was directed to take post near Tronville. When, in consequence
of the reverse inflicted on Frossard, Bazaine arrayed the Guard in
front of Rezonville and Canrobert put his reserve brigades into line
on their right, and both established their reserve artillery on the
heights to the north and east, Alvensleben sent forward Lehmann’s
battalions, which, with great difficulty, managed to keep their ground
in the copses of Tronville beyond the Verdun road. It was about two
o’clock in the afternoon and the German leader had no reserves, every
foot soldier and gun was engaged, while the greater part of the 10th
Corps was still remote from the field. Luckily for him, the reports
of the fugitive peasantry and the steady advance of the German right
through the southern woods, aroused in the mind of Bazaine a fear that
he might be turned on his left, a fear shared by at least one of his
subordinates. He, therefore, caused the Guard Voltigeurs to form front
to the south in the Bois des Ognons, so as to watch the ravines, down
one of which the Mance flowed to Ars, and in the bed of the other the
Jurée ran to Novéant. Lapasset, who barred the road from Gorze, was
reinforced by a regiment of Grenadiers, and Montaudon’s division of the
3rd Corps was taken from Lebœuf and placed near Malmaison, a little
to the north of Gravelotte. Thus the French line, instead of standing
north and south, faced generally to the south-west, between the Bois
des Ognons and the high ground north of the copses of Tronville. At
this time Lebœuf, with one division and a half—for Metman had not yet
joined him—was moving south-west from Vernéville, and De Ladmirault’s
divisions—for he had quitted the Moselle valley in the morning—were
only just showing their leading troops towards Doncourt. Nevertheless,
Canrobert, who had developed a strong line of guns as well as infantry
on the right of Picard’s Grenadiers, both on the face and flank of
the German left, determined to attempt the recapture of Vionville and
Flavigny. He was led to do so by a belief that the partial cessation of
the German fire indicated exhaustion, and, aided by the whole of his
artillery, he certainly delivered a formidable onset carried up to the
very outskirts of the two villages. It was then that Alvensleben called
upon the cavalry to charge, solely with the object of gaining time and
relieving the wearied foot, and hardly-treated gunners.
_Bredow’s Brilliant Charge._
Bredow’s heavy brigade, the 7th Cuirassiers of Magdeburg, and the 16th
Uhlans of Altmark, eight squadrons, from which two were withdrawn
on the march to watch the Tronville Copses, was selected to assail
Canrobert’s destructive batteries and stinging infantry. Von Bredow
drew out his two regiments, led them into the shallow but protecting
hollow on the north of Vionville, and, without pausing, wheeled into
line on the move, so that the array of sabres and lances fronted nearly
eastward. Then breaking into a headlong gallop the troopers rushed
like a torrent over and through the infantry on their broad track and
into the batteries, near the Roman Road, which for the moment they
disorganized. But now the French horse swarmed forward on all sides,
and the survivors of Von Bredow’s heroic men, having cheerfully made
the heavy sacrifice demanded from them, turned about to retreat through
the French infantry, punished as they rode back by De Forton, Gramont,
Murat and Valabrègue who brought up three thousand dragoons, chasseurs
and cuirassiers against the remains of the devoted brigade. Von Bredow
sought safety behind Flavigny, whither Von Redern had ridden up with
a regiment of hussars, but he did not attack because the hostile
cavalry halted in their pursuit. The charge had cost the Magdeburgers
and Altmarkers 14 officers and 363 men, nearly one-half the strength
with which they started on their astonishing ride; but the glorious
remnant had the proud satisfaction of knowing that the two regiments
had put an end to offensive attacks from the side of Rezonville, that
their infantry comrades of the Brandenburg Corps had received effectual
succour in time of need, and that the steadfast artillery had gained
precious moments which they used to prepare for fresh exertions.
_The Fight becomes Stationary._
During the next three hours, and, indeed, to the end of the day, the
combat on the German right and centre remained stationary, varied by
desperate attempts to win ground from the Imperial Grenadiers which
cost many lives and achieved no marked success. Seven fresh batteries,
however, came successively into action, so that about four o’clock, the
German line of guns, between the wood of Vionville and Flavigny had
been increased to more than a hundred pieces and their fire effectually
stayed the French from advancing. Some portions of the 7th, 8th and
9th Corps, which had struggled up from the Moselle valley during the
sultry afternoon, entered the woods, were pushed up the ravine road
from Gorze, or were thrown forward in front of the big battery which
was the mainstay of the left wing. Prince Frederick Charles himself
arrived about four o’clock. He had ridden straight from Pont à Mousson
on learning that a serious engagement was afoot, and as he cantered up
to the front he was heartily welcomed by the men of the 3rd Corps which
he had commanded for ten years.
_Arrival of the Tenth Corps._
Surveying the scene from the lofty upland above the wood for a time,
he rode off to another eminence near Flavigny, because the stress
of battle was then on the left wing, where the rest of the 10th
Corps, so long absent from the field, had appeared just in time to
encounter the fresh troops which had been led forward by Marshal Lebœuf
and General de Ladmirault. When Von Bredow’s Brigade rode against
Canrobert’s Corps, Von Barby’s horse were sent to guard the extreme
left against a surprise from the masses of French troops gathering
on the Doncourt hills. They pushed far northward, and sustained a
cannonade from the enemy, who soon forced them to retreat; for Lebœuf,
with Aymard’s Division—Bazaine had now called for Nayral’s as well as
Montaudon’s—moved down towards the Tronville thickets, and Ladmirault,
whose infantry had at length reached him from the Moselle valley, sent
Grenier forward in line with Aymard. These two divisions, driving the
horsemen back towards Tronville, at once assailed the woodlands, so
often named, and combining their attack with that of Tixier, whose
division formed the right of Canrobert’s Corps, they expelled the
German infantry from the northern section of the wood. Lehmann’s
Hanoverians and the wreck of the Brandenburgers gave ground slowly,
but, after an hour’s severe bush-fighting, the left of the 3rd Corps
was obliged to yield, and nothing restrained the advancing French
infantry save the terribly effective fire of the German gunners, upon
whom the brunt of the battle fell. As the most forward German guns were
retired south of the highway, Grenier sent three batteries over the
ravine, and fortune seemed, for the first time, to favour the Imperial
soldiers. But, at this trying moment, the 20th Division of the 10th
Corps—the men had already marched that day twenty-seven miles—appeared
on the heights of Tronville. General von Kraatz, its commander,
brought with him eight battalions, four squadrons, and four batteries,
an opportune reinforcement, which had been led thither because the
summons, given by faint reverberations of a heavy cannonade, heard at
Thiaucourt, had been clenched by the arrival of a note written on the
field of battle.
The artillery, as usual, took the lead, hastening to the field across
country, and, before the infantry could advance twenty-four guns in
action north of Tronville, checked the French skirmishers, and obliged
Grenier’s batteries to recross the ravine. Then the foot went into the
wood, and soon chased the French from all the copses except a patch on
the north. At this time, General de Ladmirault, who had been joined by
heavy masses of cavalry, had on the heights, near the farm of Greyère,
abundance of artillery and De Cissey’s Division. On his right ran a
deep and steep ravine towards Mars la Tour; he was about to cross this
obstacle, and had, in fact, entered the hollow, intending to sweep
down upon the German left, when he became aware that a strong hostile
body was approaching from the west. It was General von Schwarzkoppen,
commanding a division of the 10th Corps. He brought on to the field the
38th brigade, diminished, however, by detachments to five battalions,
two companies of pioneers, twelve guns, and six squadrons of Dragoons
of the Guard. General de Ladmirault’s proceedings had been closely
watched by some German horse, and his advance-guard of Chasseurs
d’Afrique had been driven out of Mars la Tour by the Dragoons of the
Guard. Seeing the oncoming enemy, he hastily recrossed the ravine, and
placed De Cissey and his artillery in position to resist any attack.
The intelligence that an enemy had shown himself on the west had run
along the French line, and had induced Grenier and Lebœuf to suspend
their apparently prosperous onset, thus diminishing the pressure upon
Von Kraatz in the Tronville wood, and also on the artillery, which
had been so long engaged near Vionville. General Schwarzkoppen had,
during the day, marched to St. Hilaire on his way to the fords of
the Meuse; but, hearing the cannonade, he halted, sent out patrols,
and finally moved off towards the battle, guided by columns of dust,
clouds of smoke, and the deep-toned muttering of the rival guns.
When he reached Mars la Tours, Voights-Rhetz, the Corps Commander,
rode up. Both he and Prince Frederick Charles, who watched the fight
from a hill above Flavigny, were under the delusion that the French
right could be taken in flank by an attack from Mars la Tour; and
Von Wedell, who commanded the newly-arrived brigade, was ordered to
fall on. But, for once, the German Staff did not show their far-famed
skill; for they did not reconnoitre the ground, nor had they observed
the formidable array of De Cissey’s brigades. Von Wedell’s men dashed
forward with alacrity, but found in their path a deep hollow, which
covered the French front, as well as flank, on that side. Nevertheless,
the battalions, in two lines, hurried down one bank and up the other,
and then met an entire French Division. A brief and bloody fight at
close quarters—the opposing lines were separated in some places by
only fifty yards—ensued; but so continuous and deadly was the French
fire that the sturdy Westphalians had to yield. Their dead and dying
covered the summit, and filled the hollow way; two-thirds of the 16th
Regiment were left on the field, and the whole brigade, shattered into
a shapeless crowd of fugitives, hurried to the rear. Then forward to
their succour came bounding the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard, Colonel von
Auerswald at their head, spurring headlong to the front through the
disordered crowd, taking the hedges and ditches in their stride, and
galloping furiously into the midst of the pursuing French, who had
leaped forward from the right of Grenier’s Division. It was a hopeless
charge—a ride to certain death—but the readiness of the Dragoons saved
the right of the brigade; yet at great cost, for they left dead on the
field their brave Colonel, a Major, and three Captains. Nine officers
in all, and seventeen men were killed; four officers and sixty men were
wounded; while one officer and five men were captured. Two of Count
Bismarck’s sons, privates in this regiment, rode in the charge; the
eldest, Herbert, was shot in the thigh, the youngest, Wilhelm, a stout
trooper, lifted a wounded comrade on to his horse, and carried him off
the field. The charge of the Dragoons enabled the broken battalions to
draw off towards Tronville, but the guns in position still held on near
Mars le Tour, west of which, towards Ville sur Yron, a horse battery
and a squadron of the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard were engaged in a
smart skirmish with a body of Chasseurs d’Afrique. This encounter was
followed shortly afterwards by
_The great Cavalry Combat._
Ladmirault had sent six regiments of horse over the gully on his
right—Legrand’s Hussars and Dragoons, Du Barail’s solitary regiment of
Chasseurs d’Afrique, and the superb brigade of Lancers and Dragoons
of the Guards commanded by General de France. On the other side Von
Barby’s brigade had approached Mars la Tour during the fatal attack
upon De Ladmirault’s infantry, and soon after it was joined by two
squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers, the 10th Hussars, and the 16th
Dragoons. Sweeping round to the north of the village, Barby formed
up his troopers in the narrow space between the Yron and the Greyère
ravine, while Legrand and his comrades showed their compact masses
to the north. The French regiments were placed in echelon, Legrand’s
Hussars, led by General Montaigu, on the left, Gondrecourt’s Dragoons
on his right rear, and next the Guard Lancers and Dragoons. The
Chasseurs d’Afrique were behind all. The first shock fell upon the 13th
Dragoons which, having taken ground to the right, had only time to
wheel partially into line before Montaigu’s Hussars rode through the
squadron’s intervals, and it would have fared ill with the Prussians
had not Colonel von Weise plunged in with the 10th Hussars and overset
the French. Von Barby on the left, at the head of the 16th Uhlans
and 19th Dragoons, met the French Guard Cavalry in full shock, and
then ensued a furious confused fight upon the whole line. Each side
endeavoured to fall upon a flank, and the squadrons swayed to and fro
amid a huge cloud of dust. Suddenly, a squadron of Prussian Guard
Dragoons, returning from a patrol, came riding across country from the
west and struck the flank of the French Guards. Du Barail’s Chasseurs
d’Afrique and Gondrecourt’s Dragoons dashed into the _melée_, but the
Westphalian Cuirassiers drove like a wedge into the opposing ranks,
and the 16th Dragoons fell upon and smote them in flank and rear.
Legrand was killed, Montaigu wounded and a prisoner, and the French
cavalry, wheeling about, rode out of the fight, throwing into disorder
a brigade of Chasseurs, which had been sent by General de Clérambault
to cover the retreat. The Gallic horse had brilliantly sustained
their reputation, yet they were overmatched by the Teutons, who also
lost three commanding officers. But Von Barby was able to reform his
victorious squadrons on the plateau and withdraw them at leisure,
watched, but not pursued, by a squadron of Dragoons belonging to De
Clérambault’s division. General Ladmirault surveyed the field from the
heights of Bruville, and came to the conclusion that no more could be
accomplished by the French right wing. He had only two divisions, his
cavalry had been defeated, and he “discovered” between Tronville and
Vionville “an entire Corps d’Armée.” So he rested and bivouacked on
the hills about the Greyère farm. The forces of his next neighbour on
the left, Lebœuf, had been reduced to Aymard’s division, for Marshal
Bazaine had called away Nayral to support Montaudon near Rezonville;
indeed, at one moment he had abstracted one of Aymard’s brigades, but,
yielding to Lebœuf’s remonstrances, he sent it back.
_End of the Battle._
It was now past seven o’clock, and both sides were exhausted by
the tremendous strain which they had borne so long; yet the battle
continued until darkness had settled over the woods and villages and
fields. For Barnekow’s division and a Hessian brigade had entered the
woodlands and pressed forward on the Gorze road, creating new alarm
in the mind of Bazaine, who throughout the day was governed by his
belief that the Germans intended to turn his left and cut him off from
Metz. So that when Colonel von Rex pushed boldly up the ravine against
Lapasset and his flankers opened fire from the edge of the Bois des
Ognons, the French Commander drew still more troops to that flank.
Between Rezonville and the ridges near Gravelotte he had, by eventide,
placed the whole of the Guard, Frossard’s Corps, Lapasset’s brigade,
and one-half of Lebœuf’s Corps. Fearing the storming columns which ever
and anon surged outward from the woods towards the commanding heights
south of Rezonville, Bourbaki brought up fifty-four guns and arrayed
them in one long battery. The closing hours of the day witnessed a
stupendous artillery contest, which was carried on even when the
flashes of flame alone revealed the positions of the opposing pieces.
The thick smoke increased the obscurity, and yet within the gloom
bodies of German infantry, and even of horse, sallied from the woods or
vales and vainly strove to reach the coveted crests or storm in upon
Rezonville itself. At the very last moment a violent cannonade burst
forth on both sides, yet to this day neither knows why it arose, where
it began, or what it was to effect. At length the tired hosts were
quiet; the strife of twelve hours ended. The German line of outposts
that night ran from the Bois des Ognons along the Bois St. Arnould,
then to the east of Flavigny and Vionville through the Tronville
Copses; and after the moon rose upon the ghastly field the cavalry rode
forth and placed strong guards as far westward as Mars la Tour and
the Yron. The French slept on the ground they held, the heights south
of Rezonville, that village itself, and the ridges which overlook the
highway to Verdun as far as Bruville and Greyère. It had been a day of
awful carnage, for the French had lost, in killed and wounded, nearly
17,000, and the Germans 16,000 men.
It is impossible to state exactly the numbers present on the
field—probably, 125,000 French to 77,000 Germans. The latter brought
up two complete Corps, the 3rd and 10th, two divisions of cavalry,
the 5th and 6th—these sustained the shock and bore the chief loss—a
brigade of the 8th Corps, the 11th Regiment from the 9th, and four
Hessian regiments of that corps under Prince Louis, the husband of the
British Princess Alice. They also had, in action or reserve, 246 guns.
The French mustered the Imperial Guard, the 2nd Corps, three divisions
and one regiment of the 6th Corps, three divisions of the 3rd, and two
of the 4th Corps, five divisions of cavalry, and 390 guns; so that
on the 16th, they were, at all times, numerically superior in every
arm. When Alvensleben came into action a little after ten o’clock with
the 3rd Corps and two divisions of cavalry—perhaps 33,000 men—they
had in their front the 2nd and 6th Corps, the Guard, and the Reserve
Cavalry—not less than 72,000, the guns on the French side being always
superior in number. The 3rd Corps, less one division, was at ten
o’clock only three miles from the field; these and half the 4th Corps
arrived in the afternoon, adding more than 50,000 men to the total,
while the Germans could only bring up the 10th, and parts of the 8th
and 9th, fewer than 40,000, some of them marching into line late in the
evening. The French Marshal, who fought a defensive battle, did not use
his great strength during the forenoon, or in the afternoon when his
right wing had wheeled up to the front. The result was an “indecisive
action”—the phrase is used by the official German historian—and that
it was indecisive must be attributed, at least in part, to the fact
that Marshal Bazaine, nor he alone, stood in constant dread of an
overwhelming inroad of “Prussians” on his left, with intent to cut him
off from Metz and thrust him, unprovided with munitions of all kinds,
on to the Briey–Longuyon road. But it may be inferred from the mode in
which the battle was fought by the French commanders, from the first
shot to the last, that the Germans had obtained a moral ascendency
over the leaders and the led, and that such an ascendency had a great
influence upon the tactics, as well as the strategy, of Marshal Bazaine
and his subordinates in command. Nothing supports the correctness of
this inference more strongly than the fact that an Army of 120,000 men
considered a great success had been achieved when it had resisted the
onsets of less than two-thirds of its numbers, and had been driven from
its line of retreat!