PRESSED BACK ON METZ
Darkness had set in, and the last shot had been fired, when Marshal
Bazaine rode back to his head-quarters at Gravelotte. There he became
impressed with the scarcity—“penury”—of munitions and provisions; there
he acknowledged to the Emperor that the direct road to Verdun had been
closed, and that he might be obliged to retreat by the north; and there
he wrote the order which was to move his entire Army the next day
nearer to Metz. The troops began their retrograde march as early as
four o’clock, by which hour Prince Frederick Charles was up on the hill
above Flavigny, intently watching his antagonists. Rezonville was still
occupied by infantry, a cavalry division was drawn up between that
village and Vernéville until late in the forenoon, and the marches of
troops to and fro kept the cautious German Commanders, for some time,
in a state of uncertainty.
It has now to be shown how they had employed the 16th outside the area
of the conflict, where the several Corps stood in the evening, and by
what means the Great Staff, on the 17th, acquired the knowledge that
the “Army of the Rhine” had retired upon the line of hills immediately
to the westward of Metz.
The movement of troops comes first under notice. On the extreme left
the 4th Corps having crossed the Moselle at Marbache, had pushed
forward in a south-westerly direction, part of the Corps making a
dashing but fruitless attempt to intimidate the garrison of Toul,
so important because it barred the railway to Chalons, and at the
end of the day was still under orders to march upon the Meuse. The
Guard, preceded by its cavalry, advanced from Dieulouard to several
points half-way between the Moselle and the Meuse, the right being at
Bernecourt and the left about Beaumont. The 12th Corps, Saxons, crossed
the Moselle at Pont à Mousson, and had one division there and one about
Regnièville en Haye. The 2nd Corps, still approaching the Moselle by
forced marches, had attained villages east of the Seille. It will be
readily understood that, as the 4th and 2nd Corps were so far distant
from the centre of action west of Metz, they could hardly be moved up
in time to share in the impending struggle; and they, therefore, for
the present, may be omitted from the narrative. It was otherwise with
the remaining Corps, and it was the aim of the Great Staff to bring
them all up to the Verdun road.
From the very earliest moment, General von Moltke held the opinion
that the full consequences of the action on the 14th could only be
secured by vigorous operations on the left bank of the Moselle; and as
the reports came in from the front on the 16th, that sound judgment
was more than confirmed. The Royal head-quarters were transferred in
the forenoon to Pont à Mousson, whither King William repaired; and Von
Moltke, who had preceded the King, found information which led the
general to the conclusion that a new chapter in the campaign had been
opened. Accordingly, he desired to push up to the front the largest
possible number of troops, so that he might, if such a design were
feasible, have ample means wherewith to shoulder off the French to the
northward, and sever their communications with Chalons. At this stage,
the idea of shutting them up in Metz had not yet been conceived. The
7th, 8th and 9th were ordered to hasten forward on the road towards
Vionville, and some part of them, as we have seen, were engaged on the
16th. Extra bridges were erected on the Moselle, the roads were cleared
of all impediments, and the results rewarded the foresight, energy and
goodwill displayed by officers and men. The 12th Corps was eighteen,
and the Guard twenty-two miles from the battlefield, but so keen and
intelligent were their commanders, that, inferring from the information
they received what would be required of them, they stood prepared to
execute any order as soon as it arrived. The former body, indeed,
marched off northward in the night, and sent word of the fact to the
Guard, which led the commander to assemble the divisions on the instant
and stand ready to step forth. So that when the formal orders were
brought, the Guard started at five in the morning, when the Saxons were
already on the road. The 8th Corps, or rather its remaining division,
were on the way at dawn, preceded by the 9th, and followed by the 7th
from its cantonments on the left bank of the Seille. Thus the whole
available portions of the Second and First Armies were in motion, to
sustain the 3rd and 10th, if they were attacked on the 17th; to act, as
circumstances required, if the French abandoned the battlefield.
Prince Frederick Charles, who had slept at Gorze, took horse at dawn,
and reached his watch-tower on the hill south-west of Flavigny at
half-past four o’clock, early enough to distinguish by the increasing
light the French line of outposts between Bruville and Rezonville.
About six o’clock the King joined the Prince, and at the same time the
9th Corps took post near the right wing of the 3rd. What the staff had
now to determine was whether the French intended to retire or attack,
and if they retired whither they went. Patrols, busy on all sides, gave
in contradictory or rather discordant reports, which for some time
left it doubtful whether the retreat was not actually being carried
out by Conflans on the Briey road; but by degrees the head-quarters
arrived at the conclusion that the French would not attack, that they
had not withdrawn far, and that the task of grappling with them must
be deferred until the next day. Soon after noon, when General Metman,
acting as rear guard, quitted Rezonville, there were on or near the
field no fewer than seven German Corps and three divisions of cavalry;
so that had the French renewed the battle for the Verdun road, even
early in the morning, they would have found it a severe task to make
their way at least along the southern or Mars la Tour high road. About
eight in the morning General von Moltke had dictated an order on the
height near Flavigny, in obedience to which the 7th Corps marched by
Borny and Ars upon Gravelotte, following the Mance brook, and occupying
the woods on the right and left; while the 8th, already in part on
the field, ascended the watercourse and ravine which gives access
to Rezonville. The object of the double movement was to accelerate
the retreat of the French from these places. It was not accomplished
without some wood-fighting, but about half-past three General Metman
withdrew his flankers, and glided out of sight beyond the ridge near
Point du Jour. But the firing had alarmed Von Moltke, who, dreading
lest the fiery Steinmetz should bring on a general or even partial
engagement, sent him positive orders to stop the combat. The veteran,
however, pressed forward himself with Von Zastrow, Von Kameke and their
staff officers. Emerging from the woods into the open, they beheld
across the deep ravine the French camps on the opposite plateau, and
even discerned the works thrown up by the careful Frossard to cover
his guns and infantry. A mitrailleuse at once opened fire on the group
of horsemen, and drove them away, but not before they had seen enough
to prove, when combined with the cavalry reports from the north-west
flank, that the French Army was encamped on the heights to the west of
Metz, and had not attempted to withdraw by any of the still open roads
towards Mézières or Chalons. Therefore, the German armies halted, and
the Generals had a little leisure to frame a plan of operations for the
18th.
_Marshal Bazaine._
Human ingenuity has imputed various motives to the French Marshal, some
of them being discreditable to his loyalty, all based on a low estimate
of his character as a man, and capacity as a soldier. His own account
is that he did not persevere in trying to effect his retreat, either by
force or skill, partly because the Army was not well supplied with food
and munitions, and partly, as is apparent from his evidence and books,
because he had formed a military theory which he proposed to work out
near Metz to the disadvantage of the enemy. He held that he had a
strong post on the flank of the German communications, and that, if he
could make his adversaries waste their troops in repeated attacks upon
“inexpugnable” positions, he might be able to resume the offensive when
the Army at Chalons should take the field. Secretly, we suspect, he had
become imbued with a belief or apprehension that what the French call
the _moral_ of the Army had been seriously impaired; that their staying
power in action was not what it should have been, and that they could
not be trusted to perform so delicate an operation as a long flank
march within reach of a foe exalted by victory, aided by a powerful
and audacious cavalry, and an infantry capable of marching twenty miles
a day, and enjoying the advantage of greatly superior numbers. As
usual, the motives of Bazaine were “mixed,” but there does not seem any
good reason to believe that he was selfishly disloyal to the Emperor,
faithless to France, or insensible to the charms of “glory.” His chief
defect was that he did not possess sufficient military competence to
command a large Army—a defect he shared with his comrades of high
rank; and his misfortune was that he succeeded to an inheritance of
accumulated error entailing severe penalties, from the infliction of
which only a rare genius, like that of the First Napoleon, could have
saved himself and his Army.
Active warfare had now continued for a fortnight, and at sundown on the
17th of August the “Army of the Rhine” found itself obliged to form
front facing, not Berlin, but Paris; while the formidable Armies of
King William, with their backs to the French capital, turned their eyes
towards the Rhine.
_The Battlefield of Gravelotte._
Whatever may have been his motives, Marshal Bazaine directed his Army
to retire upon a position of exceptional strength on the heights to the
westward of Metz, which look towards the wooded ravine of the Mance
brook throughout its course, and beyond its source over the undulating
plain in the direction of the river Orne. This ridge of upland abuts on
the Moselle near Ars, is covered at its broad southern end by the Bois
de Vaux, is intersected by the great highway from Metz to Verdun, which
is carried along a depression where the wood terminates, and over the
shoulder above Gravelotte. North of the road the high ground, with a
westerly bias, runs as far as Amanvillers, and thus trending slightly
eastward, ascends to St. Privat la Montagne and Roncourt, and back to
the Moselle bottom lands below Metz. The left of the position, opposite
the Bois de Vaux, is curved outwards, its shape being indicated by
the high road, which, after bending round and creeping up the hill
as far as Point du Jour, turns abruptly to the west, and crosses the
Mance upon a causeway east of Gravelotte. This bulwark, occupied
by Frossard’s Corps, from near Point du Jour to St. Ruffine in the
lowlands, was made more formidable by shelter-trenches, field works,
and gunpits. The two houses at Point du Jour were pierced for musketry,
and the immense quarries in the hill-side, at the elbow of the ridge
facing the Mance, were filled with troops. The only mode of reaching
the front was either up the narrow causeway by St. Hubert, or across
the deep ravine. Behind this strong front the ground sloped inwards,
so that the troops and reserves could be, and were, screened from view
as well as from fire. In the bottom stood the village of Rozérieulles;
and above, the eminences on which the engineers had planted the forts
of St. Quentin and Plappeville. The hollow through which the highway
ran was bordered with vineyards, and near to Metz villages and houses
clustered thickly astride of the road. On the right of Frossard were
the four divisions forming the Corps of Lebœuf, extending as far as
the farm of La Folie, opposite Vernéville. Here the ground was high
and open, yet also sloping to the rear as well as the front, and its
chief strength lay in the strongly-built farmsteads of St. Hubert,
seated on the roadside just above Gravelotte, in those of Moscow and
Leipzig, standing on the bare hill-side; and in the Bois de Genivaux,
a thick wood, which filled the upper part of the Mance ravine. Beyond
the 3rd Corps lay the 4th, under De Ladmirault, having its left in
the farm and château of Montigny le Grange, and its right at, and a
little north of, Amanvillers, a considerable village, planted in a
depression at a point where one of the roads from Metz quits the deep
defile of Chatel St. Germain, and bends suddenly westward to join,
at Habonville, the road to Briey. The track of the railway, then
unfinished, ascends this wooded gully, and winds on to the open ground
at Amanvillers. The country in front of the ridge, from that place to
Roncourt, is an extensive open descent, which has been compared to
the glacis of a fortress, at the foot of which stand the villages of
Habonville, St. Ail, and St. Marie aux Chênes. On the southern edge of
this succession of bare fields is the Bois de la Cusse, which was not,
strictly speaking, a continuous wood, but a sort of common irregularly
strewed with copses; and on the north were the valley of the Orne and
the woods bordering its meandering course. The 6th Corps, Canrobert’s,
occupied and guarded the right flank, having an outpost in St. Marie,
and detachments in the villages beyond Roncourt; but placing its main
reliance on St. Privat, which, looked at from the west, stood on the
sky line, and, being nearly surrounded by garden walls, had the aspect
of a little fortress. The Imperial Guard, considered as a reserve, was
drawn up in front of the fort of Plappeville, on the east side of the
deep ravine of St. Germain. The fort of St. Quentin looked well over,
and protected the whole of the French left, and served especially as a
support to Lapasset’s Brigade at St. Ruffine, which faced south. Here
the edge of the position touched the suburbs of Metz, and was within
cannon-shot of the right bank of the Moselle, opposite Jussy.
It will be seen that the battlefield may be divided into two portions,
differing from each other in their external aspects. The bold curved
ridge held by Frossard rose between two and three hundred feet above
the bed of the Mance, having in rear ground still higher, and was
backed by the mass upon which stands Fort St. Quentin. It was, indeed,
a natural redoubt open to the rear, covered along its front by the
steep sides of a deep ravine, and accessible only by the viaduct built
over the brook, a solid embankment, except where a vaulted opening
allowed the stream to pass. On the French side of the bridge was the
strong farmstead of St. Hubert, well walled towards the assailant; and
further north the thick woods of Genivaux, which ran near to and beyond
the farm of Leipzig; so that while a deep gully protected Frossard,
Lebœuf had defensive outposts in the wood, which he intrenched in a
series of recessed field works, and in the stout farm buildings, which
stormers could only reach by passing up gentle acclivities, every
yard whereof could be swept by fire. The right half of the line was
different in every respect from the left—for there was no wood, and the
whole front, from Amanvillers to Roncourt was, for practical purposes,
though not so steep, as free from obstacles as the slope of the South
Downs. The left and centre were supplied with artificial defences, but
the right, which did not rest on any natural support, and might be
turned, was not fortified by field works, because Marshal Canrobert’s
intrenching tools had been, perforce, left behind at Chalons. The
great defects of this “inexpugnable” position were that it had bad
lateral communications, no good lines of retreat, and a weak right
flank. Marshal Bazaine, who misjudged the formidable strength of his
left wing, and gave his opponent the credit of contemplating an attack
on that side, had taken post in Fort Plappeville, where he placed the
reserves, and whence he could not see the right, which it does not
appear that he had ever examined. The penalty for so grave an error was
the loss of the battle.
_The German Plans._
Before starting from the hill over Flavigny for Pont à Mousson on
the afternoon of the 17th, General von Moltke had issued an order to
Prince Frederick Charles and Von Steinmetz, indicating the operations
which were to begin the next morning. Their purport was that while
the 7th Corps stood fast, and the 8th leant towards the right of the
Second Army, the Corps composing it should move forward, left in front,
facing north. It was a general direction, intended to place the troops
in such an array as would enable them to strike and stop the French,
if they still sought to reach Chalons by the northern roads, or by a
right wheel bring the whole German force to bear upon the enemy if he
were found in position before Metz. By six o’clock on the morning of
the 18th, King William and his staff were once more on the height near
Flavigny, soon after which time the whole Army was in movement, and a
sputter of musketry had begun on the extreme right between Frossard’s
foreposts and those of the 7th Corps in the woods. The 8th had come
up near to Rezonville; the 9th was moving between that village and
St. Marcel; the Guard was passing Mars la Tour; and the 12th was on
the road to Jarny. Behind, in second line, were the 10th and 3rd, the
5th and 6th divisions of cavalry being attached to the latter Corps
respectively; while the 2nd Corps, which had bivouacked at Pont à
Mousson, had started on another forced march, in order, should there
be a battle, to enter the field before dark. The morning wore away,
and, except on the right where his left was visible and his skirmishers
active, no evidence of the enemy’s presence could be found. The Saxon
cavalry division, scouting northward and westward, lighted only on
stragglers and patrols; the horsemen and staff officers out in front
of the other Corps watching as well as they could the movements of
the French, sent in divergent statements, leaving it doubtful where
their main body was, and what it was doing or intended to do. Great
uncertainty, in short, prevailed until after ten o’clock, and even
then General von Moltke and the staff were under the impression that
the French right was near Montigny la Grange; but, believing that the
adversary would fight, an order went forth at 10.30 a.m., which finally
brought the German Armies into line facing eastward. Meantime Prince
Frederick Charles had, by degrees, also arrived at the conclusion that
the French would accept battle, and, at half-past ten, he likewise
instructed General von Manstein to move towards La Folie and begin an
attack with his artillery, provided the enemy’s right was not beyond
Amanvillers. Immediately afterwards, while Von Moltke still believed
that the flank he wished to turn was at the last-named village, the
Prince acquired certain information, from a Hessian cavalry patrol,
that the French right rested on St. Privat la Montagne. By such slow
degrees was the long-sought flank discovered. Orders were then given
directing the 12th and the Guard to wheel to the right and move on
St. Marie aux Chênes and Habonville; but before they could come into
line, Manstein’s guns were heard, and Von Moltke became apprehensive
lest the exciting sounds of conflict would carry away the impetuous
Steinmetz, lest the First Army, always so eager for battle, might
strike in prematurely and injure a combination which depended so much
upon a simultaneous onset. Accordingly, the rein upon that General
was tightened, and he was told that he might use artillery, yet not
do more with his infantry than attract the notice of the enemy and
keep his attention on the strain. But so thoroughly were the chiefs
of the German Corps imbued with the same principles of conduct, that
the Prince Royal of Saxony and Prince Augustus of Würtemberg had
already, in anticipation, prepared to play the part which was to be
assigned them. Having learned, from their own scouting parties, where
the French right stood, and having heard the guns at Vernéville, they
had both wheeled their divisions to the eastward, and pushed out their
advance Guards. Thus they were ready to march at the moment when the
order arrived; in fact, the order was in course of execution before it
reached the officers to whom it had been addressed. Meantime, acting
on the first instructions from the Prince, drawn up when he believed
the right rested on Amanvillers, General von Manstein, a little before
noon, had begun
_The Battle of Gravelotte._
At this moment, it should be noted, the French camps on the right
centre and right did not know that an enemy was within a long mile
of their bivouacs. The usual patrols had been sent out and had
returned—even scouts selected by the local officials for their
knowledge of the country—to report that they had not seen anybody.
Marshal Canrobert, in his evidence on the Bazaine court-martial,
expressly testifies to the fact, and adds that the first intimation
he received came from the boom of hostile guns on his left front. The
troops of Ladmirault’s Corps, encamped on both sides of Amanvillers,
were peacefully engaged in cooking their noontide meal, when General
von Manstein, who seems to have been endowed with some of the
impetuosity of his namesake, who figured in the wars of Frederick II.,
riding ahead of his corps, caught sight of the quiescent camp. The
temptation could not be withstood. From the hills near Vernéville he
could not see the troops at St. Privat, but he had been informed by
the Hessian Cavalry that the French were there. He had been formally
enjoined to attack if the enemy’s right was near La Folie; it was
much to the north of that farm; yet Manstein, unable to neglect the
opportunity of startling a negligent camp by an outburst of fire, sent
the solitary battery which had accompanied him into instant action
from a rising ground east of Vernéville. The first shot was fired at
a quarter to twelve, and its successors roused the French line from
St. Privat to the centre, for Frossard and Lebœuf seemed to have
been on the alert. General von Blumenthal, with the leading infantry
battalions, was at that time moving on the farm of Chantrenne, and
he was stopped by the lively musketry salute which greeted his men.
Manstein, seeing that his guns were too distant from their living
targets, now ordered the battery forward, and it was soon joined,
first by the divisional then by the corps artillery; the whole finally
forming a long line of fifty-four pieces, each battery having, as it
dashed up, wheeled to the right and opened fire. The movement was a
grave error, for the long rounded hill on which the batteries stood
faced south-east, offered no shelter except on its low right shoulder,
and the guns were exposed to a fire from the front, the flank, and
even from the left rear. Two batteries were slewed round to the left,
but that did not remedy the original mistake. There were no infantry
at hand to keep down the fire of the French foot, which, lurking in
the hollows, sent a hail of bullets among the guns. Committed to this
false position, the superb German artillerymen did their utmost to make
it good; but no heroism could avail against its cruel disadvantages.
General Blumenthal, indeed, had carried the Chantrenne farm, but the
enemy, at the first shot, had thrown a garrison into another homestead
named Champenois, whence the chassepots smote the front of the
batteries. The Hessians, also, had developed a powerful attack through
the Bois de la Cusse towards the railway embankment and Amanvillers,
thus taking off some of the severe pressure from the devoted gunners.
But the French infantry crept nigher and nigher; under the rush of
shells, shrapnel, and bullets, officers, men, and horses fell fast and
faster. By concentrating their aim the Germans crushed one or silenced
another battery; by using shell they sometimes scattered oncoming
infantry; still the penalty of haste and a wrong direction had to be
paid. The left battery, disabled, was caught in the tempest and borne
down by a rush of French foot. Two pieces were dragged away by hardy
men and wounded horses; two were left on the field; and two were
captured. Yet this astonishing artillery, though horribly shattered,
continued to hold its ground. It was saved, at a later moment, from a
persevering attack on its vulnerable flank by the steady onset of an
infantry battalion, which lost nearly half its strength in succouring
the guns. Then, for the position was really untenable, all the
batteries, except three on the right, where there was a little shelter,
at length drew reluctantly, in succession, out of the shambles and went
rearward to refit. It was half-past two; they had been more than two
hours in the jaws of death, and had lost no fewer than 210 officers and
men and 370 horses. So audaciously, if sometimes unwisely, was this
grand arm employed in battle that no one need be astonished to learn
how Canrobert, who loved a picturesque phrase, called his dreaded and
admired opponents, “_tirailleurs d’artillerie_.”
_Prince Frederick Charles at the Front._
Manstein, who was to have attacked the French right, had dashed
somewhat impetuously against the right centre, and for some two hours
his Corps sustained the brunt of the engagement, for the Guards and the
Saxons were still on the march, the first heading for Vernéville and
Habonville, the second on St. Marie aux Chênes, into which Canrobert
had hurried three battalions. North of the artillery, whose bloody
adventure has been described, the Hessian division, under Prince
Louis, posted astride of the railway embankment, which, running from
Amanvillers to Habonville, cut the line of troops at right angles, held
the copses of the Bois de la Cusse, and, supported by thirty guns,
formed the backbone of the German attack in that exposed quarter.
Further south, the other half of the 9th Corps, the 18th Division, had
its reserves near Vernéville, with troops established in Chantrenne
and L’Envie; but they could make no way, because the French were
solidly planted in Champenois, in the Bois de Genivaux, in a spinney
projecting to the westward of La Folie, in that farm and on the higher
ground above. About half-past two the contest in the centre had become
defensive on the part of the 9th Corps, and the energies of the leaders
and the troops alike were taxed to retain the ground already occupied
and extricate the artillery. Prince Frederick Charles, on learning just
before noon, from the cavalry reports, where the French right actually
stood, became anxious when he heard at St. Marcel the uproar of a hot
artillery engagement, and he rode off at once towards the sound and
smoke which rose in clouds above the woods. On reaching Habonville he
was able to survey the conflict, and also discern, in outline, the
enemy’s position at St. Privat. The great head-quarters were still
imperfectly informed, yet they wished to restrain precipitate action
and prevent a home-thrusting central attack until strong bodies could
be launched against the French right. The Prince, however, saw that
the combat could not be broken off, and he set himself to make all
secure by placing a brigade of the Guard, as a reserve, to assist the
9th Corps, which was all that Manstein requested, and by ordering up
four batteries from the 3rd Corps, the infantry masses of which were
not far from Vernéville. Prince Augustus of Würtemberg had preceded the
Guard Corps, and as soon as General Pape, commanding the 1st infantry
division, arrived with the advanced guard it was arranged that his four
batteries should go into action to the south-west of Habonville, that
is on the left of the much-tried Hessians, and cover the march of the
Guard towards St. Marie. The spot first selected for the guns was found
defective, and the batteries, at a gallop, took up new ground further
to the left, to the south-west of St. Ail. Thereupon, that village was
occupied by the Guard; Prince Augustus sent for the corps artillery,
and soon nine batteries were arrayed between the two villages, on a
diagonal line pointing to the north-west, that is, so disposed as to
bring to bear a heavy fire on St. Privat, a succour which gave further
relief to the gunners of the 9th Corps. For not only Canrobert’s
cannon, but his infantry, lurking in the shallow valleys along the
front, now directed their shells and bullets upon the Guard batteries.
Although the French did not attempt any heavy stroke, they were
active and enterprising, and kept their swarms of skirmishers within
a thousand yards of the guns, but, as the official historian remarks,
over and over again, beyond the range of the needle-gun. Before three
o’clock the Guard Corps was up, and the 12th, or rather half of it, had
approached near St. Marie. Such was the condition of the battle on that
side; and it is now necessary to describe the daring operations of the
First Army, on the German right wing.
_Steinmetz Attacks the French Left._
It will be remembered that the 7th and 8th Corps, commanded by Von
Steinmetz, upon whom it was necessary to keep a tight hand, had been
brought up to the south and west of Gravelotte, the left of the 8th
touching Manstein’s right. The 7th provided the outposts which lined
the fringe and salient of the Bois de Vaux, and these troops were
engaged in an intermittent and bickering contest with the French
infantry thrown out upon that flank. The 1st Division of Cavalry, from
the right bank, crossing the Moselle at Borny, rode up about noon
as a support, and General von Fransecky, preceding the 2nd Corps,
assured the King, whom he found near Flavigny, that one division would
arrive in time to form a reserve for the First Army. Von Steinmetz,
on a height near Gravelotte, nervously observed the French, sent in
repeated information that they were moving off, and evidently desired
to adopt the tactics which he had applied on two previous occasions.
He was ordered to be still, and when the guns spoke at Vernéville,
Von Moltke, knowing their effect upon the veteran warrior, intimated
afresh that he must stand expectant yet awhile. Permission was given,
as already mentioned, to use his guns; but when the despatch was handed
to Steinmetz he had already opened fire with the batteries of the 7th
Corps, arrayed to the south, and of the 8th to the north of Gravelotte;
and the infantry had been moved eastward to the edge of the region
just clear of the French fire. The troops in the Bois de Vaux were
reinforced, the mill of the Mance and the gully itself were occupied,
and an ample force was posted above the ravine to protect the line of
guns.
The expectant attitude, always distasteful to Von Steinmetz, was not,
and in the nature of things could not be long maintained by the First
Army. The generals on the spot knew more accurately what had occurred
in the centre than the Great Staff when the order to look on was
written. General von Goeben, knowing how deeply Manstein had committed
the 9th Corps, felt bound to attack in order that he might detain and
provide employment for the French left. From a point near Gravelotte
he could see the masses of troops held in reserve by Lebœuf and
Frossard, and, with the ready assent of his immediate chief he pushed
forth columns from both his divisions. On the south of the high road
the soldiers disappeared in the deep gully of the Mance, their path
marked by puffs of smoke as they drove back the French skirmishers, and
reappeared climbing the opposite slope leading to the huge quarries
below Point du Jour; but here, struck and repelled by the defenders,
they vanished again into the depths, where they held on to the gravel
pits in the bottom. Nearer the high road, one battalion wedged itself
in to the quarries close to St. Hubert; while beyond the highway, the
Germans dashed through the wood, established themselves on its eastern
border above and about the farmstead, and stormed the stone parapets
set up by the French foreposts at the confluence of the two streamlets
which form the Mance. Farther they could not go, because Lebœuf’s men
stiffly held the eastern patch of woodland, while the open ground
towards the Moscow farm was swept by musketry fire from the deep banks
in the cross-roads, from the shelter trenches above, and from the
loopholed buildings of the farm. But the attack on the Bois de Genivaux
aided the men of the 9th Corps, who, from Chantrenne, had entered its
northern border, and compelled the defenders of the lines in front of
Moscow to turn upon the new assailants. Then the companies which had
gathered about St. Hubert became engaged in a destructive contest, for
the walls were high and well garnished, and the northern point of
attack was more or less commanded by the higher ground towards Moscow.
On the south front, however, there proved to be more chances of success.
Relying, perhaps, on Frossard’s infantry and guns, the discharges from
which commanded the high road, the garrison had forgotten to barricade
the gates, doors, and windows; and when the place had been cannonaded
by the southern line of guns, the assailants, who had suffered great
loss with unflinching hardihood, came on with an irresistible rush,
and carried the farm by storm. The feat was accomplished about three
o’clock; and the work done gave a solid support to the German right
wing. At this time, the German guns, so well fought, having taken
more forward positions, had mastered the French artillery, which sank
into comparative silence. There were seventy-eight pieces in action
on the south of the high road, and fifty-four on the north, and their
superiority is admitted and recorded by Frossard himself, who saw his
batteries idle or withdrawn, his reserves smitten, and its defenders
literally burnt out of the farm buildings at Point du Jour. Yet the
French left was not shaken, it was hardly touched, by a vehement attack
which had given the Germans a better defensive position, indeed, but
still one only on the verge of Frossard’s stronghold, and affording no
facilities for a rush against the fortified lines occupied by the 3rd
French Corps, in the thickets of Genivaux and on the brow of the bare
hills.
The capture of St. Hubert was nearly coincident with that stage in the
heady fight before Vernéville which saw the Hessians embattled on the
Bois de la Cusse, the exposed artillery of the 9th Corps in retreat
from a false position, and the opportune appearance of the Guard about
Habonville and of the Saxons to the north-west of St. Marie. In front
of their main line the French held the latter village, were well
forward in the hollows west of Amanvillers, stood fast in the farms of
La Folie, Leipsic, Moscow, Champenois, and that portion of the Bois
de Genivaux which covered the eastern arm of the Mance. The fight had
raged for more than three hours, and they had only lost possession of
the L’Envie and Chantrenne, places distant from their front, and St.
Hubert, which, no doubt, was a dangerous-looking salient within a few
hundred yards of the well-defended ridge where the high road turned at
right angles towards the blazing farm of Point du Jour. From end to
end, therefore, and it was between seven and eight miles in length,
measured by an air-line, the whole of Bazaine’s formidable position was
intact. The Imperial Guard, the effective reserve, still stood on the
heights east of Chatel St. Germain, behind the left, and six miles from
the right where the battle was to be decided.
_Operations by the German Left Wing._
The two Corps, forming the left wing of the German Army, had been
guided far more by the reports brought in by daring cavalry scouts,
than by the orders received either from Prince Frederick Charles or Von
Moltke, because these latter were necessarily less well-informed than
the Corps commanders who were the first to receive the information.
Yet the latter, of course, while taking their own line conformed to
the governing idea, which was that the French right flank, wherever it
was, should be turned. Moving eastward from Jarny, with the 12th Corps
the Crown Prince of Saxony learned before two o’clock, that Roncourt
was the extreme northern limit of Canrobert’s Corps, and he, therefore,
varied a head-quarter’s order to march upon St. Marie, by directing
one division, the 23rd, under Prince George, to march down the right
bank of the Orne, through Auboué, and turn to the right upon Roncourt.
One brigade of the 24th Division he directed on St. Marie, keeping the
other back as a support. About the same time the whole of the Guard,
except one brigade detached to back up the 9th Corps, had formed up
near Habonville, and their batteries, as we have seen, had taken up
a position which enabled them to smite St. Privat. When, therefore,
General Pape had moved up the Guards by the ravine west of St. Marie
he found the Saxons ready to co-operate with him in driving out the
French battalions occupying the pretty village which has the air of a
small rural town. It sits at the foot of the long bare incline leading
down from St. Privat, traversed by a straight road bordered, as usual,
by tall scraggy trees; and nestling amid gardens and walled inclosures
shines out a cheerful white spot in the diversified landscape. From
this point, St. Privat looms dark and large on the hill-top, larger and
darker looking than it really is. To the southward of that village,
beyond a dip, down and up which the cottages creep, stands the
farmstead of Jerusalem, and further south the ground rolls away towards
Amanvillers. More than a mile of open country separates St. Privat
from St. Marie, affording no lurking places to either side, except
such as can be found in the gentle swelling and falling of the fields;
indeed, to the casual observer the smoothness of the surface seems
broken only by the poplars on the highway. West of St. Marie there is
a shallow ravine, and beyond it copses, and south, as we know towards
Vernéville, more copses, ruddy brown farmsteads, and white villages.
At this moment the battle-smoke puffed out, curled, rose in fantastic
clouds, or rolled along the ground, upon the hill-sides and above
the thickets and barns; about St. Marie, however, the air as yet was
untainted by the sulphurous mists of combat so rank a mile away, but
the garrison stood painfully expectant of the coming fray. For though
the Guards were hidden the Saxon brigade to the north-west was visible,
and the skirmishers driven from St. Ail, told how the “Prussians” were
mustering for the onset.
Suddenly lines of skirmishers appear, gun after gun drives up, the
Saxon artillery reinforcing the pieces which the Guard can spare,
until three distinct lines of batteries are formed and open on the
village. The German Generals, who judged the place to be stronger and
more strongly garrisoned than it was, had brought to bear overwhelming
forces—probably also to save time; so that, after enduring a hot
cannonade from seventy-eight guns, the French battalions, who had
borne the bombardment and had spent abundance of ammunition in return,
did not await the shock of the storming columns sent against them,
but fled by the eastern outlet to their main body. The Guard and the
Saxons, who had come on with ringing hurrahs, swept into the place
on all sides; some prisoners were taken, but the greater mass of the
defenders and the French battery which had kept up a flank fire on the
approach to the south face of the village, got safely up the hill.
When they were inside St. Marie the assailants were able to see that
“the adversary had done nothing to increase, by artificial means, the
defensive value of a post, naturally strong; and had even neglected to
barricade the roads and paths by which it is entered.” The truth is
that the occupation of St. Marie by the French was an after thought,
and that although defensible in itself the place was far too remote
from the main French line of battle to be supported; and the garrison,
which no doubt, in a different temper, might have died fighting in the
streets and houses, yielded when they felt the hail of shells and saw
the impending storm-cloud of infantry ready to burst upon them. The
defenders hastened towards Roncourt and St. Privat, losing men from
the fire of their exulting enemies, who followed on the eastern side
until stopped by the chassepot and the guns on the hills. Thus a point
of support was secured in that quarter, about half-past three, but no
advance could be made until the artillery had prepared the way, and the
turning column had made further progress in its march.
Nevertheless, the Saxon troops on the north of St. Marie and some who
had been engaged in its capture, carried away by their ardour and
the sight of a retreating foe, pursued so far and were so promptly
reinforced that a fierce infantry fight ensued. For a French brigade,
led by General Péchot, dashed out of their lines, struck roughly on the
front and turned the left flank of the Saxons who, being obstinate,
held the slightly uneven meadow lands with great difficulty and much
loss. Although they were aided by their own batteries and those of the
Guard which had been moved forward on the front between St. Ail and
Habonville, and whose fire smote diagonally the French columns rushing
out of Roncourt and St. Privat, yet the Saxons were overmatched; and,
after much labour, as they were nearly all spread out in skirmishing
order, General Nehrdorff, who comprehended the situation, and saw
the waste of effort, gradually drew them back to the original line.
The French counter attack, swift and sharp, was well sustained, and
the bold Saxons paid a heavy price for their temerity. While this
combat was in progress, the Crown Prince of Saxony from a height in
front of Auboué, gazing intently towards Roncourt, made an important
discovery—he saw troops in movement to the north of that village, and,
in fact, Canrobert’s outposts extended nearly to the Orne. Thus, after
a long search, yet not before four o’clock, the extreme right of the
French Army was at length found, and thereupon the turning column of
horse, foot, and guns, one-half Prince George’s division, was ordered
to take a still wider sweep northward ere it wheeled in upon the
French rear. As it marched stealthily on its way, the Saxon artillery
developed a long line of batteries pointing towards Roncourt, protected
by Craushaar’s brigade, which made a lodgment in the western block of
a deep wooded ravine on the left of the guns, and stood ready to dash
forward when their comrades emerged from the villages and copses behind
the French right. In the centre the troops of the 9th Corps had stormed
and occupied the farm of Champenois, had tried again, without success,
to win the eastern tracts of the Bois de Genivaux, and, supported by
106 guns, had maintained a sanguinary contest with Lebœuf’s steady
brigades, ensconced over against them in the farms, thickets, and
hollow ways. About five o’clock the fury of the battle diminished for a
moment, in the centre, on the left, and even on the right, where, down
to that hour, it had raged with a spirit and vigour which must now be
described.
_General Frossard Repels a fresh Attack._
The enormous defensive strength of the position held by General
Frossard’s Corps does not seem to have been thoroughly understood by
anyone except that accomplished engineer. Marshal Bazaine did not
perceive its value, for he was perpetually afraid that the Germans
would break in upon it, either from the Bois de Vaux or by the high
road, and his apprehensions or prejudices were confirmed when a column
of troops was seen to be ascending the river-road from Ars towards
Jussy, near St. Ruffine. General von Steinmetz, on the other hand,
who had peered out from every available height between the Bois des
Ognons and Gravelotte, although each attack which he had directed had
been repelled, thought he discerned symptoms of weakness and even of
retreat. The truth is that Frossard’s men were well hidden, not less
by the natural features of the ground than by the trenches which he
had dug and the breastworks which he had thrown up. If his batteries
were silent or withdrawn it was because, although overpowered in the
gun fight, they were yet still able to arrest the onsets of infantry;
and if the French fantassins were invisible, it was because they were
lying down or arrayed on the reverse of the ridge. The hot-tempered
General of the First Army, however, surmised, after the capture of St.
Hubert, that troops had been detached to aid the distant right, or that
a moment had come when, if pressed home by an attack of all arms, Point
du Jour could be carried and the French driven headlong into Metz.
Under the influence of this delusion he rode up to General von Goeben,
who was watching the battle near Gravelotte. Captain Seton, an Indian
officer who was present, noticed the violent gestures and rapid talk
of Steinmetz because they offered so strong a contrast to the steady
coolness of the younger warrior. At that moment he was expounding
opinions and issuing orders which brought on one of the most brilliant
and destructive episodes in the battle. Goeben had already sent forward
Gneisenau’s brigade, partly on and partly north of the road, but they
were needed to feed the combat, support the weakened and scattered
companies, and secure St. Hubert.
What Steinmetz now designed was a home-thrust on the French position;
and, accordingly, he ordered several batteries of the 7th Corps and
Von Hartmann’s cavalry division to cross the Gravelotte defile and
plant themselves on the gentle acclivities to the south of the road.
Now the highway runs first through a cutting, is then carried on an
embankment, and only near St. Hubert are the gentle southern slopes
above the gully accessible to horses and guns. But this narrow track
swarmed with troops, into the midst of which came the cavalry and
artillery. The infantry gave way and four batteries arrived on the
opposite side of the defile, followed by the 9th Uhlans. But so
deadly was the storm of shot which burst from the French position—for
cannon, mitrailleuse, and chassepot went instantly to work—that two of
the batteries were at once driven into the ravine below. The Uhlans
actually rode out into the open, took up a position, and remained
until it was plain to all that the lives of men and horses were being
uselessly sacrificed. The other regiments, “well peppered,” had already
gone “threes about” before clearing the defile, and the Uhlans, who
were dropping fast, rode back, as well as they could, to Gravelotte
or the sheltering woods. A more extravagant movement has rarely been
attempted in war, or one less justified by the evident facts of the
situation as well as by the deadly results. Yet two batteries actually
remained, one, under Captain Hasse, in the open, about seven hundred
yards from the French lines of musketry; the other, commanded by
Captain Gnügge, covered in front by the low wall of the St. Hubert
garden, but lending a flank to the adversary at the top of the road.
Captain Hasse and his gunners were stubborn men; they fought their
battery for two hours, in fact, until nearly all the men and horses
were down. Even then Hasse would not retire, and one of his superiors
was obliged to hurry up fresh teams and forcibly drag the guns away.
But the battery under the wall held on, and did good service by firing
on the French about the Moscow farm.
The failure of these mistaken attacks and the retreat of guns and
horsemen seems to have shaken the constant German infantry, for they
gave ground everywhere but at St. Hubert, and the French came on with
such vigour that General Steinmetz himself and his staff were under
a heavy fire. Fortunately three fresh battalions plunged into the
combat; but they could not do more than sustain it; for every attempt
made to approach the French, either towards the Moscow farm or Point
du Jour, met with a speedy repulse. Indeed, down to five o’clock,
the point of time at which we have arrived, along the whole line, no
progress whatever had been made by the German right wing, which held
on to St. Hubert, the ravine of the Mance, and the western portion of
the Bois de Genivaux, but could not show a rifle or bayonet beyond in
any direction. It was only the powerful German artillery which still
remained the superb masters of the field, so far as their action was
concerned.
It was at this time that King William and his staff, which included
Prince Bismarck, rode up to the high ground above Malmaison, where he
established his head-quarters in the field, and whence, until nearly
dark, he watched the battle. Over against him, concerned respecting his
left, and ignorant of the state of the battle on his right, was Marshal
Bazaine, in the fort of Plappeville, whither he had returned from St.
Quentin, which commanded a wide view to the south and south-west.
He says that he gave General Bourbaki discretion to use the Guard
wherever it might be wanted. But that officer knew little more than
the Commander-in-Chief. An hour or two earlier, taking with him the
Grenadier Division of the Guard, he had started towards the north,
following a hilly road east of the St. Germain ravine. He had seen the
immense mountain of white smoke which towered up in the north-west, but
the current of air, hardly a wind, apparently blew from the south-east,
since at Plappeville he could not hear the roar of the guns, and the
view was so obstructed that he could not obtain even a glimpse of the
country about St. Privat. He had to leave behind him the Voltigeurs and
Chasseurs of the Guard, who were partly in reserve and partly posted to
support Lebœuf, who called up one regiment from Brincourt’s brigade.
Bazaine had also sent some guns to support Lapasset in his contest with
the troops which Von Golz had marched up from Ars to the woodlands and
vineyards opposite St. Ruffine. The French at this stage were still in
good spirits. If Lebœuf was a little anxious behind his farmsteads, his
woods, and skilfully-disposed re-entering echelons of shelter trenches;
Frossard, who soon after relieved his front ranks from the reserve,
was content; and De Ladmirault, as was usual with him, believed that
he might be almost considered victorious, and only required a few
battalions of the Guard to insure his success. The ammunition on both
sides was running out here and there; indeed, Canrobert declares that
he was compelled to borrow from De Ladmirault; still there was enough
to last out the day. Over the seven or eight miles of flame and smoke
and tumult, for a brief interval, came what may be called a lull
compared with the deafening tempest of sounds which smote on the ear
when the rival combatants raged most fiercely.
_The last Fights near St. Hubert._
For some time longer the German right wing did little more than defend
its somewhat irregular line of front. The 2nd Corps, which had been
marching every day since it quitted the Saar, had attained Rezonville,
and King William placed it under the orders of Von Steinmetz. As the
minutes flew by, the head-quarter staff on the hill near Malmaison were
impressed by a fact and an appearance—the increase of the vivacity
and volume of fire towards the north—where the Guard had begun its
onset on St. Privat—and the symptoms of wavering which seemed, and
only seemed, to be visible on the French left. The King, therefore,
sanctioned a fresh and formidable advance upon Frossard’s brigades by
all the troops which Von Steinmetz could spare for the enterprise.
But the main object of Von Moltke, we infer, was to prevent, by
striking hard, the despatch of any assistance to Canrobert, and thus
assist, by a resolute advance, upon one wing, the decisive movement
then approaching its critical stage on the other. The 2nd Corps was,
therefore, brought up to Gravelotte, and all the available troops
of the 7th and 8th were held in readiness to assail, once more, the
enemies beyond the Mance.
But the French, who, though wearied, were still undaunted, anticipating
their foes, became the assailants. Their silent guns spoke out in
thunder, the heights were shrouded in a canopy of smoke, and the bolts
hurled from the batteries fell like hail on the woods, and sent such
an iron shower as far forward as the hill-top where the King and his
great men stood, that Von Roon prevailed on the King to ride further
back. The lively French skirmishers dashed forth into the open, strove
hard to reach St. Hubert, drove the German foreposts headlong down
the steeps into the Mance gully, filled the high road with a rushing,
clamorous crowd of fugitives, and even caused terror and commotion in
the rear of Gravelotte, so vehement and unexpected was the stroke.
Fortunately for the Germans, the principal bodies of troops in St.
Hubert and the woods were unshaken, and their rapid fire, as well as
the responses sent from the artillery, checked the violent outfall.
Then, as the sun was getting low, the fresh German brigades struck in.
The men of the 7th Corps went down into and over the Mance valley,
and stormed up the eastern bank. The 2nd Corps, eager to win, pressed
along the highway, with their drums and trumpets sounding the change,
or moved on the south side. They passed onward in a tumult, and boldly
tried to grapple with the strong lines of the defence. Not only their
commander, Fransecky, and Steinmetz, but Von Moltke himself rode into
the defile to witness and direct this huge and uproarious column of
attack. But neither their numbers, and they were many, nor their
valour, which was great, nor the unfaltering devotion of their officers
could resist the smashing fire of cannon and mitrailleuse and chassepot
which the French brought to bear upon them. Some daring spirits pressed
close up towards the ditches and breastworks, a few clung to the banks
and bushes on the brow of the slope near Point du Jour. A dense mass
collected near St. Hubert, where Fransecky and Steinmetz, in the thick
of the throng, saw the bands who had hurried to the front break off,
turn and hasten rearward, while fresh troops still pressed upward
through the confused crowds of fugitives. So for some time, in the
twilight, the strange fight went on. As it grew darker, the outlines
of Lebœuf’s cleverly-designed shelter trenches near the Moscow farm
were drawn in lines of musketry fire, and gradually nothing, save the
flashes of guns and rifles, could be seen in the gloom. At length,
when friend could not be distinguished from foe, when no breach
could be made in the French line, which, except the outpost of St.
Hubert, remained what it had been in the morning, the Generals placed
strong guards on their front, and stood prepared to renew the battle
with the dawn. General Frossard, who had engaged all his reserves,
was proud of his achievement, and not less of the foresight he
displayed in providing artificial cover for his men. That had made the
position, from the Great Quarries to the farm and copse of La Folie,
impregnable, and renders it all the more difficult to comprehend how
Marshal Bazaine could have shown such manifest distrust of the fastness
which protected his left wing. The attack on St. Ruffine by Von Golz
was merely a diversion shrewdly designed to increase the Marshal’s
alarms, and its relative success shows how correctly Von Moltke
estimated his adversary’s abilities as a soldier. He reaped an ample
reward, since long before the last shot was fired in the neighbourhood
of St. Hubert, the French had been worsted at the other and distant
extremity of the vast field of battle.
_The Prussian Guard on the Centre and Left._
It may be said, indeed, that not one, but several battles were fought
on the 18th of August, in the long space between the Bois de Vaux and
the Forest of Moyœuvre. They were inter-dependent, because one mass of
combatants held fast another, and the essence of the German plan was
that three-fourths of the French Army should be nailed to the positions
they had taken up, while the remainder were crushed by the pressure of
superior forces. The original design of Von Moltke was framed on the
supposition that the French right stood near Amanvillers, and that he
would be able to fling upon an exposed flank two Corps d’Armée. Before
the error was discovered, several hours had been consumed; the Guard
had been obliged to prolong the front fighting line; only a part of
the Saxon Corps could be spared to engage in the turning movement,
and the ground which they had to traverse grew longer and longer as
the day waxed shorter. The extent of country over which the various
armies operated, and the smoke which obscured the view, prevented a
correct appreciation of the situation of affairs at a given moment,
and the German commanders were liable to be deceived, and were
deceived by appearances. The knowledge that so brief an interval of
daylight remained, and an anxiety to make the most of precious moments,
quickened the tendency to decisive action, and thus brought about the
rash and premature attack which was so destructive, and nearly proved
so fatal to the Prussian Guard.
Their magnificent divisions of Infantry, it will be remembered, stood
between St. Ail and St. Marie, except one brigade which had been
annexed to the 9th Corps. It was intended that they should remain
quiescent until the Saxon column broke out upon the French right in the
direction of Roncourt, and for a brief interval of time, after five
o’clock, the action in the centre as well as on the left was confined
to a deliberate cannonade. Prince Augustus of Würtemberg, who was then
near St. Ail gazing alternatively on the ebb and flow of Manstein’s
battle in the Bois de la Cusse and towards the Bois de Genivaux, and
on the aspect of the field about St. Privat, thought he saw French
troops moving south from Roncourt. Combining this impression with the
fact that, as we have already stated, a long line of Saxon guns had
been arrayed due north of St. Marie, he rapidly formed the opinion
that the turning column was on the point of striking the enemy, and
that the moment had come when the Guard should be employed. He was
also somewhat affected by the condition of the combat in the centre,
and, perhaps, as much by the waning day which left so narrow a margin
of time for decisive activity. He appealed to Prince Frederick Charles
and easily converted the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army to
his views. So the order went forth that the Guard should attack,
and having set Budritzki’s division in motion from St. Ail, Prince
Augustus rode to St. Marie. There General von Pape revealed to him
his misconception—the turning column was not even then in sight, and
unless preceded by bombardment from all the batteries, a front attack
on St. Privat, Pape said, would have but a slight chance of success.
Why, then, was it delivered? Because the other division of the Guard
was actually at that moment under fire and losing men by scores on the
open slope. It was a bitter moment for Prince Augustus, whose error
was to cost the Guard losses which are counted by thousands. Moreover,
General Manstein, seeing Budritzki in motion, and De Cissey, whose
division formed De Ladmirault’s right, wheeling up diagonally on the
flanks of the new foe, determined to despatch his Brigade of Guards,
the 3rd, straight upon Amanvillers, to resume the offensive with his
Hessians, and support, by all the means he possessed, the daring onset
initiated on his immediate left. Practically, therefore, although other
troops were engaged at different points on the front of the 9th Corps,
the battle on the northern half of the field was thenceforth fought out
by the Saxons and the Guard.
The character of the unequal combat was the same from end to end of
the line—superb, because it proved the steadfast valour of Prussia’s
chosen infantry; awful, because the bare fields in the track of the
onslaught were soon literally strewed with thousands of dead and
wounded. The charge of the 3rd Brigade towards Amanvillers was pushed
with such unwavering velocity that, although the ranks were thinned
at every stride, the hardy survivors, spread out in skirmishing
order, carried their front to the brow of a hill within half a mile
of Amanvillers. There they were stopped by the fire which smote them
in front and flank. Yet there they stayed undaunted, and maintained a
steady contest with antagonists who, if they tried to dash forward,
could not reach the unyielding line of the 3rd Brigade. On their left
the Hessians moved up on both sides of the railroad cutting, and
finally captured a house built for the watchman at a level crossing.
Comrades of the 9th Corps, from the Bois de la Cusse, soldiers who had
been toiling for many hours, essayed to reach the Guard, but they had
not strength enough left, and retired when they suddenly discerned,
above Amanvillers, two regiments of Grenadiers—it was Bourbaki who
had led Picard’s battalions on to the plateau, but who, distrusting
appearances visible about and beyond St. Privat, feared to plunge into
the fight at Amanvillers. Looking out from his hill, Bourbaki may have
seen the devoted march of Budritzki’s troops up the gentle slope in
front of St. Ail; for these, what was left of them, were closing on the
spur which lies south-west of St. Privat, and stretching out as far as
the high road to St. Marie, a long dark streak of fire and smoke and
the broad fields behind them black with the dying and dead. For the
constant Guards, undismayed, the remnant of a splendid division, not
only persevered and won the little rounded hill, but rooted themselves
under its shelving terraces, while the left companies, next the high
road, found shelter in its ditches. They had suffered most when beyond
the effective range of the needle-gun, in the belt where the chassepot
had rained balls as thick as hail. They could now retort the fire, and
at least keep their opponents at bay. These battalions, like those of
the 3rd Brigade, had dared all the deadly perils of the open ground;
they had bought a relative success at a heavy price, and were resolved
to retain what they had won, their line of fire extending from the high
road to the rounded eminence, or long hillock, south-west of Jerusalem.
Three batteries had driven up to aid the infantry; the main body of the
Guard Artillery had advanced eastward; and the Hessians and 3rd Brigade
prolonged the front of combat to the south.
During part of the period thus occupied General Pape, holding one
brigade in reserve at St. Marie, attacked with the other on the north
of the high road. Starting at a quarter to six o’clock, this body
of Guardsmen crossed the road facing north, and then wheeling in
succession to the right, went obstinately forward. The French fire,
from the outset, was close and deadly; officers of all ranks fell fast;
companies were reduced to straggling groups or scattered files; the
whole line was soon dispersed here and there; but they still pressed
on. One moiety trended to the right another to the left, and General
von Pape, watchful, active, and fortunate, for he was not hit, led
fresh battalions to fill up the gaping intervals. Soon after the
foremost bands had got within seven hundred yards of St. Privat, where,
in places, at least, the slope afforded shelter, the reinforcements
arrived; and it may be said that thenceforth a continuous, yet thin
line, curved inwards at the northern end, and fringed with smoke and
fire, stretched irregularly over the vast glacis-like declivities from
opposite Amanvillers to the outskirts of Roncourt, where the Saxons
prolonged the ragged and shapeless, but redoubtable array. Against this
mere thread of riflemen, not even when they were weakest, the French
directed no bold attack, perhaps because they had no reserves and stood
in respectful awe of the hostile artillery which drew nearer and nearer
as the evening wore on, until the black batteries formed a second line
to the intrepid infantry.
It was about seven o’clock. St. Privat was in flames, the black and
tawny smoke of the burning village, boiling upwards, stood out against
the obscured sky in strong contrast to the swelling clouds of white
vapour, through which leaped incessant sparkles from hundreds of
rifles, and the broader flashes of the cannon. At no preceding period
of this dreadful day had the battle raged with such intensity; for
now along the whole front of eight miles there was a deafening roar
and crash and tumult, and a murky atmosphere concealing the ghastly
sights which make these fields of carnage so appalling to the lively
imagination, which seeks in vain to realize its multitude and variety
of horror. Yet there was an element of grandeur and sublimity in the
exhibition of courage, constancy and fortitude upon such a stupendous
scale. “It is a good thing that war is so terrible,” said General
Robert Lee, “otherwise we should become too fond of it.” Here, among
these woods and villages of Lorraine, war showed in abundance its
attractive and repulsive forms.
_The Capture of St. Privat._
Marshal Canrobert had discerned the approaching Saxons, who were now
marching from the north upon Roncourt, Montois, and Malancourt. He felt
that his right had been turned, and looked in vain for the expected
succour. Bazaine, he says, had promised to send a division of the
Guard. Bourbaki, astounded by the spectacle which met his eyes, when he
emerged from the wooded defiles west of Saulny, had, as we have seen,
allowed himself to be attracted, for a moment, towards De Ladmirault,
had then retraced his steps, and had taken a position to cover the high
road to Woippy, the so-called northern road from Metz which goes to
Briey. He had with him, according to his own statement, three or four
thousand Grenadiers and some artillery; but he did not arrive in time
to frustrate the Saxons and Prussian Guards. The Marshal, a little
after seven, or even before, felt that he could not stand. He complains
of failing ammunition, declares that the German artillery had obtained
a complete mastery over his guns, and that his flank was turned. “At
this moment,” he says in his own picturesque fashion, “a valiant
officer, who has since been killed before Paris, and who was called
Péchot, arrived at St. Privat [from Roncourt] with the 9th battalion of
Chasseurs, the 6th and 12th of the Line. He dashed forward to stop the
enemy; but, as the enemy flung at us masses of iron, and did not come
himself, as it was shells which came instead, we could not hold on.
Péchot warned me, and we were obliged to retire. We did so by moving in
echelon from the centre, and, in good order, I emphasize the phrase,
we gained the heights beside the wood of Saulny.” The German Staff
acknowledge that the rearward movement was admirably done; but the
succinct narrative vouchsafed by the Marshal to the Court which tried
Bazaine, gives only a vague glimpse of the closing scene.
When the “valiant Péchot” retired from Roncourt before the Saxon
inroad, he skilfully put his brigade into the forest of Jaumont, on
the right rear of the original line. Colonel Montluisant, the gallant
artilleryman, having received a welcome supply of ammunition, sent up
from St. Quentin by the order of Bazaine, posting his batteries in
lines one above the other on the terraces near the wood of Saulny,
opened a sustained fire to cover the retreat. Bourbaki, although
Canrobert did not know it at the time, such was the confusion and
so thick was the air, had moved his batteries and Grenadiers near
enough at dusk to bring both musketry and cannon-shot to bear upon the
Germans. In St. Privat, glowing like a furnace, and as the darkness
became deeper, shedding a wild light upon the scene, there were still
stout and obstinate soldiers who either would not, or could not, follow
the retiring brigades. Upon these devoted troops, as the sun went down
behind the dark border of woods beyond the valley of the Orne, the
much-tried Prussian Guards and the leg-weary Saxons threw themselves
with all their remaining vigour; and in rear of them, yet far down the
slope, stepped one Division of the 10th Corps. The guns reinforced
had again been dragged forward, some overwhelming St. Privat, others
pounding Montluisant, or facing south-east, and smiting the French
about Amanvillers. Then, with loud hurrahs, the assailants broke into
St. Privat, pursued the defenders amid the burning houses, captured
two thousand prisoners, who were unable to escape from the buildings,
and developed their lines in the twilight on the plateau beyond. The
capture of St. Privat enabled the German artillery to press on once
more, each battery striving to gain the foremost place. For Canrobert’s
retreat exposed the right flank of De Ladmirault’s Corps, and, under a
scathing fire, he was obliged to throw it back, protected by Bourbaki
on the hill, and supported by a brigade promptly despatched towards
that side by Lebœuf, who, all through the eddying fight, showed a fine
tactical sense and great decision. How far the Germans were able to
push their advantage it is difficult to say, since General Gondrecourt,
who was near the place, maintains that some of De Ladmirault’s soldiers
remained through the night in Amanvillers; whereas the Germans assert
that they broke into part of the village. Be that as it may, Montigny
la Grange, La Folie, and the posts thence to Point du Jour, for
certain, were held by the French until the morning. Marshal Lebœuf has
stated that he summoned his Generals in the evening, and said to them:
“The two Corps on our right, crushed by superior forces, have been
obliged to retire. We have behind us,” he added, “one of the defiles
through which they (‘cette troupe’) may retreat. If we give back a step
the Army is lost. The position, doubtless, is difficult, but we will
remain.” He declares that the attack continued until midnight, and that
not one of his men budged a foot, which is true; but Canrobert’s men
did fly in disorder to Woippy, and De Ladmirault confessed that there
was “some disorder” in his Corps, and that what remained of them in
the wood of Saulny stood to their arms all night. The General states
his case in an extraordinary manner. “Night,” he says, “surprised us
in this situation, having gained the battle, but not having been able
to maintain our positions.” What he meant to assert was that he, De
Ladmirault had won the battle, but that the defeat of Canrobert had
obliged him to retire. The truth was that some troops remained in
Montigny la Grange, but that the rest, or nearly all of them, where
huddled together in the wood of Saulny, whence they retreated at dawn.
During the night each Corps commander received from Marshal Bazaine an
order to occupy certain positions under the guns of Metz. Canrobert,
De Ladmirault, and the Guard, marched in the night, or very early in
the morning, to the places assigned them; Lebœuf began his movement at
dawn, but Frossard kept outposts on his front line long after daylight.
During the forenoon, however, the Army of the Rhine had gained the
shelter of a fortified town, which they were not able to quit until
they marched off to Germany as prisoners of war.
The effective strength of the German Armies present on the field of
Gravelotte was 203,402 men, and 726 guns; it would not be easy to
calculate how many were actually engaged in the fight, but the forces
held in reserve were considerable. The number on the French side has
been put as low as 120,000, and as high as 150,000 men, and probably
about 530 guns. The loss of the Germans in killed and wounded was
20,159, and 493 missing. The French loss is set down at 7,853 killed
and wounded and 4,419 prisoners, many of whom were wounded men. The
disproportion is tremendous, and shows once again that, armed with the
breechloader, the defender is able to kill and injure nearly two to
one. There were killed or mortally wounded in the German ranks no fewer
than 5,237 officers and men, while the aggregate for the French is only
1,144. The loss of officers and men in the Prussian Guards, nearly all
inflicted in half an hour before St. Privat, reached the dreadful total
of 2,440 killed or mortally injured, and of wounded 5,511!