VON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND.
Weary of his task, weakened in body by a painful malady, depressed in
mind by a series of disasters, and worried by advice from Paris, the
Emperor Napoleon, on the evening of the 12th of August, transferred
to Marshal Bazaine the burden which he could no longer bear. Whatever
may have been his other aptitudes, he was not born to command Armies
in the field nor had he that power of selection which may enable an
inferior to choose and clothe with his authority a superior man. Had a
Radetzky, instead of an Emperor, commanded the Austrian Army in 1859
it is probable that the stability of the “dynasty” would have been
tried by defeat and the unity of Italy deferred until a later day.
Whether the Emperor Napoleon recognized his incompetence, or whether,
as he often did, he yielded to pressure, matters little except to the
students of character. He nominally gave up the command, yet retained
a certain indefinite control, and he placed at the head of his Army
a Marshal who, although the senior in rank to the recently promoted
Marshal Lebœuf, the late Chief of the Staff, was still the junior of
Marshal Canrobert; both, fortunately, were loyal men, and the latter
ready to serve under his junior. Yet it is doubtful whether Bazaine
ever exercised that moral ascendency which is essential at all times,
and never more so than at a crisis when the fate of Armies depends
not only on wise direction, but prompt and willing obedience. The
Marshal, appointed on the 12th, did not take up his command until the
next day, and then he was required to remedy in less than twenty-four
hours the deep-seated mischief produced by a fortnight of terrible
blundering. His special task was to transport the Army over the
Moselle. Four days earlier that might have been done without a shot
being fired, because even if the German horse had come up to look on
they must have been idle spectators as their infantry comrades were
far in the rear. The fatal error was committed when the Emperor did
not overrule all opposition, and, adhering with unswerving firmness to
his first thought, neither halt, ponder, nor rest until the Moselle
flowed between him and his foes. The military position on the morning
of the 7th dictated that step; his adversaries believed or surmised
that he would take it, because it was the right step to take. Nor can
we doubt that, as Commander-in-Chief, Louis Napoleon, who had a little
of “le flair militaire,” saw at once the proper course, but that, as
Emperor, he dared not, on reflection, run the risk. It was a false
calculation, even from a political standpoint, because, so long as he
was in the field with, or at the head of an Army, his republican and
monarchical enemies would not have moved, and time would have been
gained. By retiring promptly over the Moselle, and leaving Metz to
defend itself, he might have been defeated in battle or manœuvred back
upon Paris; but there would have been no Sedan and no Metz, and even
the Parisians would have hesitated to plunge headlong into civil war
when a French Army was still afoot, and a formidable host of invaders,
pressing on its weaker array, was “trampling the sacred soil.” The fate
of the campaign about Metz was, then, really decided when the Emperor
did not avail himself of the days of grace, beat down all opposition,
and compel his Marshals and Generals to march their troops over the
Moselle. Neither Bazaine nor any one officer present with the Army is
entitled to be called a great captain; but whatever he was, the blame
of failure does not rest on him alone; it must be shared, in a far
greater degree, by those who preceded him in command. It is necessary
to insist on this fact, because one of the most valuable lessons taught
by the campaign would be lost were the capital error committed by
the Imperial Staff, when the order for retreat was countermanded and
five days were wasted in abortive operations, not described with the
emphasis it deserves. Campaigns have been lost as much by postponed
retreats as by rash advances; and it was the ill-fortune of the French
Generals in August, 1870, to present egregious examples of both forms
of fatal error.
_The French Propose to Move._
When Marshal Bazaine took over the command, on the morning of the
13th, he was required to do in haste what his superiors might have
done at leisure. The prolonged indecision of the Imperial mind, held
in suspense down to the last moment and against its better judgment,
between the alternative of attack or retreat, was disastrous; no
margin was allowed for error of design, error in execution, and—the
unforeseen. The Emperor had ordered Coffinières, the Governor of Metz,
to build as many bridges as he could above and below the place, and
the General declares, what no one disputes, that he did construct from
twelve to fifteen bridges, which provided seven lines of march over
the stream. He also mined the permanent bridges above the fortress, so
that on the 12th facilities for crossing abounded, and the means of
destruction were prepared. Then came in the unforeseen. Rain had fallen
heavily, and consequently the Moselle rose, flowed over the trestle
bridges, damaged the rafts, disconnected the pontoons with the banks,
and spread far and wide over the approaches. In short, the increase
in the volume of water was so great and unusual, if not unparalleled,
that the calamity was attributed to the Germans—they must, it was said,
have destroyed the sluices near Marsal and have allowed the lake water
of that region free access to the Moselle—as if they did not wish to
cross the river themselves! Be the cause what it might, there was the
obstruction; so that the first information received by the Marshal
was that the retreat, which he had been ordered to execute, could not
begin until the next day, except by Canrobert’s 6th Corps, which was
near permanent bridges. Consequently, the Army remained another day
on the right bank. The Corps were in position between forts Queleu
and St. Julien, Frossard on the right, Decaen in the centre, and De
Ladmirault on the left, the Guard being in rear of the centre behind
Borny, where Marshal Bazaine had set up his head-quarters. Practically
the line was a curve extending from the Seille to the banks of Moselle
below Metz; and the defensive obstacles were a watercourse with steep
banks, patches of dense woods, two châteaus, or country houses, which
were readily made defensible, and of course the villages and farms
scattered over the pleasant fields. The main body of the Army was
covered throughout its front by outposts thrown forward towards the
Metz-Saarbrück railway on the right, beyond the brook in the centre,
and about Vremy, Nouilly, and Servigny on the left. So they stood all
day, some of them aware that the Germans were dangerously near; more
who were anxious to get over the river; and yet others who would have
staked everything upon the risk of a battle, so intolerable is suspense
to men of ardent and excitable temperaments. The night passed over
quickly, and on the 14th, yet not until a late hour in the forenoon,
the Corps began to file off to the rear. Canrobert was already across;
Frossard sent his guns and horsemen over the town bridges, while his
infantry splashed through the meadows and over the partially submerged
temporary constructions; and leaving Grenier’s division to cover
his retreat, De Ladmirault set out for the left bank over the Isle
Chambière. The Marshal at Borny, with his old Corps, now under Decaen,
and having the Guard in support, remained to protect the extensive and
perilous movement to the rear in the face of a watchful and intrepid
enemy.
Released on the evening of the 12th from the imperative orders which
held him fast, and directed to move forward upon the French Nied,
General von Steinmetz advanced the next day with characteristic
alacrity. Two Corps, the 7th and the 1st, were posted on a short line
between Pange and Les Etangs, the 8th being held back at Varize on
the German Nied, and the two cavalry divisions being thrown round the
flanks, General von Golz, who commanded the twenty-sixth brigade,
took the bold step of transferring it to the left, or French, bank
of the stream, and he thus came into contact with the outposts of
Decaen’s 3rd Corps. Nevertheless, along the whole line, on the evening
of the 13th and morning of the 14th, each side maintained a strictly
observant attitude, and held aloof from hostile action; the French
because they wished to glide off unassailed, the Germans because
their Commander-in-Chief desired to secure a solid footing for the
Second Army on the left bank of the Moselle before the French retired.
Watched as these were by keen-sighted horsemen, they could not stir
without being seen; and so soon as the state of the Moselle permitted
a movement to the rear, the fact was reported to the German chiefs.
A Hussar party notified, about eleven, that Frossard’s outposts were
falling back; a little later that the tents were down; and then that
columns of all arms were retiring. So it was in the centre and on the
left; Decaen’s Corps remained, but two divisions of De Ladmirault’s
Corps, it was noted, were no longer on the ground they had held in the
morning. General von Manteuffel, inferring that De Ladmirault might
have gone to join in an attack upon the 7th Corps, at once put two
divisions under arms, a fortunate precaution, though suggested by an
erroneous inference. In front of the 7th Corps, the facts admitted of
no misinterpretation. The enemy was plainly in retreat, and General von
Golz felt that it was his duty to interrupt the process. Therefore,
about half-past three, notifying his intention to the Divisional
Commanders of his Corps, and requesting support from the 1st, a request
promptly granted, Von Golz sprang forward to attack the French, in full
reliance upon the readiness and energy with which his superiors and
comrades would follow him into the fray. His bold resolve did stop the
retreat, and his onset brought on, late in the afternoon,
_The Battle of Colombey-Nouilly._
The scene of this sharp but severe conflict was the gentle uplands
immediately to the eastward of Metz, and a little more than cannon-shot
beyond the forts which forbid access to that side of the place. The
village of Borny, indeed, is nearly on a line with the Fort des Bordes,
and no point of the area within which the action raged is more than
three miles from the fortifications. The ground slopes upward from
the Moselle, rising into undulating hills, the summits of which are
two or three hundred feet above the bed of the stream. Near to Metz
these elevations are clothed with copses devoid of underwood, the great
patches of verdure extending on a curve from Grimont close to the
Moselle, as far as the right bank of the Seille. To the northward are
more woods just outside the battlefield, the area of which was, from
north to south, included between them and the railway to Saarbrück. A
little to the north of this line, near Ars-Laquenexy, a village on the
road from Sarreguemines, were the sources of a rivulet which flowed
northward along the whole front of the French position, receiving on
its way brooks which trickle down the hollows in the hills to the
eastward. The heights east of the stream were bare of wood, and the
most prominent objects were the village and church tower of St. Barbe
on the crown of a rounded hill to the north-east. From this elevated
hamlet another brook rose, and found its way along the bed of a gully
to Lauvalliers, where all the watercourses united, and, under the
name of La Vallières, ran thence to the Moselle. The French troops,
four divisions of Decaen’s Corps, were posted in the woods, and on
the heights above the first-mentioned rivulet from the neighbourhood
of Ars-Laquenexy to the point where all the streamlets joined. The
outposts were in Mercy le Haut, sometimes called Mercy les Metz, in the
woods facing Ars-Laquenexy, in the Château D’Aubigny and Montoy, beyond
the brook, in Colombey, a village on the south bank, and in Nouilly,
a large village in the St. Barbe ravine. Beyond the confluence of the
hill streams stood a division of De Ladmirault’s Corps upon the high
ground east of Mey, and it was this body which had its outguards in
Nouilly. Although it was divided by the brook Vallières on the left,
the French position was strong, chiefly because the approaches were
through defiles, over open ground, or up steep banks, but also because
the woods afforded shelter to the infantry of the defenders. Three
great roads intersected the field—one from Pange, through Colombey, to
Borny, a second from Saarbrück, which, after passing La Planchette,
ran, at Bellecroix, into the third, which came from Saarlouis, and
passed through Lauvalliers, entering Metz near the fort called Les
Bordes. The Germans, early in the morning, were on the hills to the
eastward, the 1st Corps being beyond St. Barbe, and the 7th near,
and west of, Pange, with outposts well forward, and both cavalry and
infantry in practical contact with the enemy, into whose position they
looked from all sides.
_Von Golz Dashes In._
It was the spectacle of a departing and decreasing host which made the
eager Von Golz, without awaiting permission, dash impetuously forward
with his brigade. So energetic was the onset that the French were at
once driven out of the Château d’Aubigny, Montoy, and La Planchette.
The usual tactics were applied, the companies working together, turning
a flank where the front was too strong, and following up a success
until the weight of fire brought them to a halt, or even thrust them
back. The batteries attached to the brigade came at once into action
and persisted, though they were hard hit by the French. But the
advance of Von Golz was not to be arrested, and the impetus of his
first movement forward carried part of the brigade over the ravine and
watercourse, and into the village and inclosures of Colombey. That
point, however, was the limit of his progress, for the French developed
strong lines of skirmishers in the woods, and although they were
unable to expel the audacious intruders, these were obliged to expend
all their energy upon holding what they had won. On the right, that is
to the north of Colombey, the assailants were brought to a stand on the
eastern edge of the ravine, and at this early stage the farms, gardens
and houses of Colombey formed a salient offensive angle exposed to the
brunt of the French fire from the side of Borny.
At the first indication of a combat, General von Manteuffel, two of
whose divisions were already under arms, sent their advance guards down
the hills and through the hollow ways from St. Barbe; joined his line
of battle on to the right of Von Golz and fell smartly on the outpost
of Grenier’s division which De Ladmirault had left about Mey to cover
his retrograde march upon the Moselle. The noise of combat, also, and
the appeals sent in from the daring brigadier, put the rest of the 7th
Corps in motion, so that the 14th as well as the 13th Division sprang
to arms and approached the fight. General von Zastrow, however, did not
quite approve of the temerity of his subordinate; but seeing that the
Corps was committed to an engagement, he permitted General von Glümer
to use the twenty-sixth brigade on the right and General von Woyna to
employ the twenty-eighth on the left while he held the twenty-seventh
in reserve. In like manner, the French turned fiercely on their
adversaries. Canrobert and Frossard were over the Moselle, but Decaen’s
four divisions were speedily arrayed; the Guard behind them fell in and
marched Brincourt’s brigade towards the Seille to protect Montaudon’s
right; and De Ladmirault instantly counter-marched his two divisions,
moving De Lorencez towards the north-east, hoping to turn the right
of Manteuffel, and ordering De Cissey, who had partially crossed the
Moselle, to reinforce Grenier at Mey. About five o’clock, then, in
consequence of the hardihood of a brigadier, a furious action raged
along the whole French front, towards which comrades were hurriedly
retracing their steps, and upon which adversaries were hastening
forward with equal ardour.
The rapid development of an attack, which had in it some elements of a
surprise, alike unwelcome and unexpected, and the tenacity with which
a few battalions clung steadfastly to the advantage gained, astonished
but did not disconcert the French, who frankly answered the challenge
of their foes. Nevertheless, the opening movements of the 1st Corps
were as successful as those of Von Golz. The artillery, always foremost
in this campaign, going straight and swiftly to the front, soon had
batteries in position, protected by cavalry, while behind them on the
roads from Saarlouis and Saarbrück the infantry were quickly moving up.
The leading battalions of the 1st Division poured through and round
Noisseville and Nouilly, pressing back the French skirmishers and,
following them fast, actually stormed the barricaded village of Mey,
directly under Grenier’s main position in the wooded hill above. The
2nd Division directed upon Montoy, Lauvalliers and the mills at the
confluence of the streams, fell on with alacrity; but the resistance
was so keen that although they soon wrested the eastern, they suffered
great loss and were once promptly repulsed by the defenders, when
attempting to master the western bank. Yet, aided by the fire of
batteries concentrated south of the St. Barbe ravine, these persistent
troops ultimately crowned the ascent, and established the front of
battle on the French side of the brook throughout its length. From
one point, however, the French could not be dislodged. There was a
cross road leading from Colombey to Bellecroix. It was a hollow way,
bordered by trees two or three deep, and having in front, by way of
salient, a little fir wood. This position effectually frustrated every
effort of the Germans either to debouch from Colombey or push forward
towards Bellecroix. Naturally strong and valiantly held, it was not
carried until nearly seven o’clock, and then only by the repeated
onsets of the twenty-fifth brigade which Von Zastrow, about half-past
five, had permitted to take a share in an engagement which he did not
like, but which he was bound to sustain. Thus was Von Golz succoured
and partially relieved from the heavy pressure put on him; a pressure
further mitigated by the advance of the twenty-eighth brigade, 7th
Corps, on his left, and the capture of the wood of Borny. Still further
to the left the 18th Division of the 9th Corps, which had marched up
from Buchy on hearing the cannonade, and some cavalry appeared on the
field towards dark and thus added to the disquietude of Montaudon on
the French right who, however, held fast to his main position above
Grigy.
The action on the French right and centre may fairly be regarded as an
indecisive combat, although the front occupied in the morning had been
driven inwards, and the daring assailant had won some ground. On the
French left the combat had been equally fierce, but less favourable
to the defenders. General de Ladmirault, indeed, when obliged to turn
and succour his comrade and subordinate, Grenier, had at once resolved
to assume the offensive. It was a timely determination, for Grenier’s
troops had been pushed back and shaken, and, if left without aid, they
would have been driven under the guns of St. Julien. But the approach
of De Cissey, and the threatening direction imparted to De Lorencez,
at once altered the aspect of affairs: for De Cissey struck in with
vigour, and the German troops which had entered Mey retreated fast
upon Nouilly; then General von Manteuffel, hastening the march of his
brigades which were still on the way to the field formed his line
to the north-west, between Servigny, Nouilly, and the mills at the
confluence of the brooks, with a reserve at Servigny. As the guns, like
the troops, arrived successively, they were arrayed on the new line,
and, before De Ladmirault could develop his flank attack effectively,
the 1st Corps had ninety guns in position between Lauvalliers and Poix,
which enabled them to bar any infantry advance upon St. Barbe. The
effect of this disposition was to frustrate the aggressive designs of
De Ladmirault, but he is entitled to the credit of having saved his
exposed division, and also of having made the only movement during
the day which had the semblance of a real endeavour to strike for
victory against a foe whose troops and artillery were plainly coming
up in detachments along the whole line. Nor can it be denied that his
vehement onset drove back the Germans, and recovered a large extent
of ground up to the skirts of Nouilly and the water mills. Moreover,
it gave great assistance to Aymard’s Division of Decaen’s Corps, and
enabled it, at one moment, to scatter the companies operating in the
angle formed by the streams, and drive them headlong over the ravine
upon Lauvalliers. But the advent of German battalions, and the action
of the guns, finally restored the combat, and as the twilight deepened
into darkness the German right once more gained the ascendency, and the
French divisions retired to their bivouacs nearer to Metz.
Long after the sun had set, portions of the 1st Corps still arrived on
the scene; but then the battle was over. General de Ladmirault, three
years afterwards, naturally proud of his conduct, insisted that the
French had won the day. The German accounts, however, place the fact
beyond dispute, since they show that the leading troops of the 1st
Corps did reach Vautoux, Mey, and Villers l’Orme, which proves that
the adversary must have retired towards Bellecroix and the banks of
the Moselle. No doubt the Germans were wisely drawn back, at a late
hour, and on that ground the French put in a claim to the victory. For
General Steinmetz had ridden on to the field just as the contest was
coming to an end. He was angry because a battle had been fought, and
apprehensive lest a counter-attack in force should be made at dawn;
so he ordered the 1st and 7th Corps to retire upon the positions they
occupied on the 13th. Nevertheless, Von Zastrow, who did not receive
the order, insisted that his Corps should bivouac under arms on the
battlefield, so that the wounded might be collected, and the honour of
the Army vindicated.
_The End of the Battle._
In this action the French lost not quite four thousand, and the Germans
nearly five thousand men; on both sides more than two hundred officers
had been killed or wounded, General Decaen, commanding the 3rd Corps,
mortally, while Bazaine and Castagny were slightly hurt. The French
had actually on the field, including the Guard in reserve, with one
brigade in the front line, three Corps d’Armée; for, though Lorencez
did not press far forward, still the whole force under De Ladmirault
was present, and in action. The Germans brought up successively two
Corps and one Division, but a large portion of the 1st could not reach
the scene of actual fighting until dark. It is impossible to ascertain
exactly, and difficult to estimate the numbers engaged; but one fact
is manifest—that the German assailants were numerically inferior,
especially during the first two hours; that the disproportion was only
lessened between six and seven; and that, at no time, were the French
fewer in number. Marshal Bazaine emphatically states, in his report to
the Emperor, that he held his position without employing the Guard,
which is true, but it is not less true that the whole front of his
line was driven in; and that he stood at the close within the range of
the heavy guns in the forts. The French fought well, but they fought
a defensive battle, and that is why they exacted from the assailant
a much heavier penalty than he inflicted on them. The retreat of the
Imperialists was delayed; but in the Great Head-quarter Staff serious
misgivings began to spring up, and a fear lest the habit of bringing on
improvised battles might not become a real source of danger. An able
and enterprising General in command of the French at Spicheren and
Borny would have read a severe lesson to German advance-guards, and
would have made them pay for their temerity.
Not until a late hour did the news of the battle reach the king, who
had established his head-quarters at Herny, on the railway. Prince
Frederick Charles, at Pont à Mousson, was only informed of the event
the next morning. His Army, the Second, had been engaged in marching
up to and towards the Moselle, and at eventide the several Corps
halted at these points. The 4th Corps was over the Seille, and not far
from Custines and Marbache, places just below the confluence of the
Meurthe and Moselle; the Guard had one division a little lower down
at Dieulouard; the 10th Corps, entire, was at Pont à Mousson, with a
brigade to the westward; the 3rd, the 9th, and the 12th, were facing
the Moselle between Pont à Mousson and the left of the First Army,
prepared either to frustrate a French advance up the right bank—a
possible movement always present to the mind of Von Moltke—or cross the
river. The 2nd Corps had come up to Falquemont; and a Reserve Landwehr
Division, under General Kummer, was being organized at Saarlouis. To
complete the survey, it should be added that Gneisenau’s Brigade, sent
to surprise Thionville, an enterprise which failed, was returning
to rejoin the First Army; and that on the evening of the 14th, the
foremost troops of the Crown Prince’s Army were some squadrons of
cavalry in Nancy, and an infantry brigade in Lunéville.
_The French Retreat._
Throughout the night the wearied French divisions, which had been
either engaged in combat or standing under arms, filed over the
Moselle, and the Emperor took up his quarters at Longeville, outside
the town. Marshal Bazaine’s order, dated the 13th, directed the whole
Army on the road to Gravelotte, whence one portion was to continue
by Mars la Tour, and the other turn off to the right and march on
Conflans. The rigorous construction of the Marshal’s order yields
that interpretation, but he contended, at his trial, that he merely
indicated the general lines of retreat upon Verdun, and that the Staff
and Corps Commanders should have used any and every road or track
which would have served the main purpose. There are, or at least were,
in 1870, only two roads out of Metz available for the march of heavy
columns of troops of all arms and large trains—the excellent highway
to Gravelotte, which is a long defile, and the road through Woippy,
turning the uplands on the north. All the intermediate lanes or
cross-roads are rugged and narrow, and only one, that passing by Lessy,
has or had any pretension to the character of an inferior village
road. Guns and carts can move along and up them in Indian file, but
not easily if numerous, and nowhere at a good pace. Thus, even, on the
14th, the Corps of Frossard and Canrobert, who both started late, found
the Gravelotte road so encumbered by trains that they could only make
their way slowly, and did not arrive at Rozerieulles until after dark.
The Emperor was still at Longeville, anxiously awaiting the issue of
the fight which revived all his apprehensions. Metz was excited and
alarmed, and the streets were crowded during the afternoon and evening,
with passing soldiers, guns, baggage waggons and provision carts. Night
brought no rest, for the Guard and the 3rd Corps came hastily over the
river, and were densely packed inside the town and outside the ramparts
in the space between the walls and Mount St. Quentin; while General de
Ladmirault was engaged until morning in passing his divisions across
the Isle Chambière, and Metman had also strayed from Bellecroix to that
side of the town.
Marshal Bazaine had quitted Borny at dusk. He rode through Metz “with
difficulty,” and made his way to the Imperial head-quarters. Here
Napoleon, who was in bed, welcomed him with his usual kindness, and
when the Marshal explained his fears lest the Germans should cut in
on his line of retreat, and referring to his wound, begged to be
superseded, the Emperor, he writes, “touching my bruised shoulder
and the fractured epaulette, gracefully said, ‘It will be nothing,
an affair of a few days, and you have just broken the charm.’”
Apparently, Napoleon still clung to the belief that the allies he had
sought would come to his aid. “I await an answer from the Emperor of
Austria and the King of Italy,” he said; “compromise nothing by too
much precipitation, and, above all things, avoid fresh reverses.” He
counted on one sovereign whom he had defeated in battle, and another
whom he had helped to enlarge his kingdom, and he counted in vain,
partly because he was unsuccessful, but chiefly because the national
political interests of both countries prevailed over the gratitude felt
by Victor Emmanuel, and the desire to turn the tables on the House of
Hohenzollern which was still strong in the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine.
“You will drag us out of this hornet’s nest, Marshal, won’t you?”
exclaimed an officer, as Bazaine quitted the Imperial quarters. It was
a task beyond his strength. When day dawned a thick fog shrouded the
valley of the Moselle, and before the camp at Longeville was astir, a
shell from the opposite bank burst near a tent, “cut a Colonel in two,”
to use the soldatesque language of Marshal Canrobert, “carried off the
leg of a battalion commander, and wounded two officers standing near a
drummer.” The lucky shot came from a patrol of German cavalry, which
had ridden forward as far as the railway station, unopposed, and its
commander, observing a camp at Longeville, had brought his guns into
action, and proved, once again, that the hornets were abroad and making
a bold use of their offensive weapons. A battery hastily ran out, and
the heavy metal of St. Quentin drove off the intruders; but they had
learned that the foe was over the river before they retired. Soon
afterwards, by Bazaine’s order, a mine was fired, and one section of
the railway bridge was destroyed.
Then the retreat was continued. Finding the road obstructed by an
endless stream of carts and waggons, Marshal Lebœuf turned aside, and
struggling on, amid transport vehicles, threaded his way by Lessy and
Chatel St. Germain to Vernéville, where about seven in the evening he
had assembled the tired infantry Divisions of Castagny and Montaudon;
but his cavalry and reserve artillery did not reach the bivouac until
night; while Aymard’s Division was forced to halt in the defile, and
Metman was at Sansonnet in the Moselle valley. Frossard, followed by
Canrobert, had marched during the day as far as Rezonville, where both
halted; and the Guard with the Emperor and Prince Imperial attained
Gravelotte. General de Ladmirault did not stir at all on the 15th,
he put a strict construction on Bazaine’s orders, and affected also
to be uncertain whether he was to continue his retreat or not. But
he had allowed Lorencez to press through the town and thrust himself
into the Lessy defile, where his troops, unable to get on, had to pass
the night. These disjointed and irregular movements testify to the
confusion of a hurried retreat, to the flurry which had got the upper
hand, and to the absence of anything like a firm control over troops
and generals. How could it be otherwise? The Emperor still commanded,
or was believed to command, and it is plain that at no time did the
Marshal secure prompt and cheerful obedience, or inspire confidence,
always essential to success, and never more so than when an Army has
to be extricated from what the Imperial Guardsman graphically called a
“hornet’s nest.”
_The Germans cross the Moselle._
Far otherwise had the hours been employed by the German host. Early in
the morning King William had ridden from Herny to the heights above the
battlefield, and there the Head-quarter Staff, from actual observation,
were able to form a correct judgment on the actual state of affairs.
At first they took precautionary measures against a possible counter
attack, and it was not until eleven o’clock that, evidence sufficient
to convince Von Moltke having come in, decisive steps were taken. All
the Corps of the Second Army were directed upon or over the Moselle,
the 1st Corps was moved to Courcelles-Chaussy; and the 7th was posted
at Courcelles sur Nied to guard the railway line and the depôts; and
the 8th was on its left, echeloned on the Lunéville road. At nightfall
the 3rd Corps had crossed the Moselle between Pagny and Novéant,
where they found the bridge intact; the 10th had one division at Pont
à Mousson and one westward at Thiaucourt; the Guard was at Dieulouard,
and the 4th Corps astride the river at Marbache-Custines. The 2nd Corps
had come up to Han sur Nied. The Crown Prince’s advanced troops were at
Haney, St. Nicholas on the Meurthe, and Bayon on the Upper Moselle.
_The Cavalry beyond the Moselle._
But the most interesting and effective operations were those carried
out by the 5th Cavalry Division, commanded by General von Rheinbaben.
They had traversed the Moselle on the 14th, and were directed to gain
the Verdun road in order to ascertain the exact whereabouts of the
French. At the same time the 3rd Cavalry Division attached to the First
Army was instructed to pass the river below Metz and push out towards
Briey; but the French had removed all the boats, no crossing could be
effected, and the division was employed elsewhere. No such obstacles
arrested the 5th Division. It consisted of three strong brigades under
Von Redern, Von Barby, and Von Bredow, in all thirty-six squadrons, and
was accompanied by two batteries of horse artillery. Leaving Barby at
Thiaucourt to await the arrival of Bredow coming up from the Moselle,
Redern marched through the fog at four in the morning to La Chausée,
whence he detached two squadrons towards the Verdun road. During their
absence Von Redern, riding on towards Xonville, discovered and was
fired on by a body of French cavalry on the hills about Puxieux. These
were French dragoons detached from De Forton’s division, then _en
route_ for Mars la Tour, and they were reinforced from the main body as
soon as the vedettes had opened fire. The French, led by Prince Murat,
ascended the hill, and soon after the Germans had brought a battery to
bear Murat withdrew his men, followed by Von Redern. On crowning the
ridge De Forton’s division was plainly seen moving in the valley, or
halting near Mars la Tour, supported by twelve guns. Von Redern, who
did not think it prudent to attack, retired until a fold of the hills
gave him protection. Here he was joined by two squadrons of hussars,
which had approached Rezonville, captured nine prisoners, and when
pursued had got deftly away. The sound of the cannon had attracted the
rest of the brigade, and Von Redern again moved towards Mars la Tour,
and again drew off without a fight. But by this time the cannonade had
called up both Barby and Bredow, so that there were soon thirty-four
squadrons and two batteries on the ground. The French General, De
Forton, who believed erroneously that German infantry occupied Puxieux,
was of opinion that he had fought a successful skirmish; yet instead
of closing with enemies who were actually close to the line of retreat
upon Verdun, he fell back as far as Vionville, and went into camp.
Three French divisions of horse in the van of the retiring Army allowed
a German division to sit down within a short distance of the Verdun
road and many miles from all infantry support. On the other hand, a
squadron of Uhlans pushed almost to Conflans, and stumbling on Du
Barail’s division, was smartly punished; but a captain of hussars,
during the evening, rode towards Rezonville and halted close enough
to see Frossard’s fantassins cooking their suppers. Meantime, the
Prussian Guard Cavalry, moving north-west from Dieulouard, had placed
its advanced brigade at Thiaucourt; and a squadron of Guard Uhlans
had audaciously summoned the Governor of Toul to surrender. No such
memorable examples of activity can be found in the record of the
French cavalry, which had forgotten the traditions of Napoleon the
Great.
_Orders for the Flank March._
That evening General von Moltke issued a set of memorable instructions
to General von Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles. The First Army
was to leave a corps at Courcelles sur Nied, and place the others at
Arry and Pommérieux, between the Seille and the Moselle. “It is only by
a vigorous offensive movement of the Second Army,” wrote Von Moltke,
“upon the routes from Metz to Verdun by Fresne and Etain that we can
reap the fruits of the victory obtained yesterday. The commander of
the Second Army is intrusted with this operation which he will conduct
according to his own judgment and with the means at his disposal, that
is, all the Corps of his Army.” It was further announced that the King
would transfer his head-quarters to Pont à Mousson in the afternoon
of the 16th. Preparations were thus made to place the whole force on
the left bank of the Moselle, except the 1st Corps, the 3rd Division
of Cavalry, and the 2nd which was still two marches from the river. In
this way Von Moltke hoped to keep the whip hand of his opponents, and
cut them off from the shelter they sought beyond the Meuse.
_The Emperor Quits the Army._
Before narrating the battle which the French style Rezonville and
the Germans Vionville-Mars la Tour, we may turn to the Imperial
head-quarters at Gravelotte at dawn on the 16th, because the scene
presents so vivid a contrast to that in the German camp. When Marshal
Bazaine saw the Emperor on the preceding evening walking meditatively
up and down before his quarters, he was surprised by the question,
“Must I go?” The Marshal frankly admitted that he had not been informed
respecting the situation in front, and asked him to wait. “The answer,”
writes Bazaine, appeared to please him, and turning to his suite he
said, loud enough to be heard by all, “Gentlemen, we will remain, but
keep the baggage packed.” The troops, sad and depressed, continued to
defile before the inn; no shout, no vivat was evoked by the sight of
the sovereign and his son. Yet that night the Emperor had made up his
mind. In the morning he summoned Bazaine, who found him in his carriage
with the Prince Imperial and Prince Napoleon. The baggage had already
gone on in the night, and the lancers and dragoons of the Guard,
commanded by General de France, were in the saddle ready to serve as
an escort. Bazaine rode to the side of the carriage, and the Emperor
said, “I have resolved to leave for Verdun and Chalons. Put yourself
on the route for Verdun as soon as you can. The gendarmerie have
already quitted Briey in consequence of the arrival of the Prussians”—a
singularly erroneous statement, but one showing how ill-informed the
head-quarters were from first to last. The Emperor then drove off from
Gravelotte by the road to Conflans, through the wooded ways which were
so soon to be the scene of a sanguinary encounter. Three hours after he
started Von Redern’s guns opened suddenly on the French cavalry camp
near Vionville, and began, by a stroke of surprise, the most remarkable
and best-fought battle of the campaign.