Venice.
There is unquestionably much reflection, and great depth of thought,
displayed in the formation of the political constitution of Venice;
but I should admire it much more, if the Council of Ten, and State
Inquisitors, had never formed any part of it. Their institution, in my
opinion, destroys the effect of all the rest. Like those misers who
actually starve themselves, by endeavouring to avoid the inconveniencies
of poverty, the Venetians, in whatever manner it is brought about,
actually support a despotic tribunal, under the pretext of keeping out
despotism. In some respects this system is worse than the fixed and
permanent tyranny of one person; for that person’s character and maxims
would be known, and, by endeavouring to conform themselves to his way
of thinking, people might have some chance of living unmolested; but
according to this plan, they have a free-thinker for their tyrant to-day,
and a bigot to-morrow. One year a set of Inquisitors, who consider
certain parts of conduct as innocent, which, in the sight of their
successors, may appear State crimes; men do not know what they have to
depend upon. An universal jealousy must prevail, and precautions will
be used to avoid the suspicions of Government, unknown in any other
country. Accordingly we find, that the noble Venetians are afraid of
having any intercourse with foreign ambassadors, or with foreigners of
any kind; they are even cautious of visiting at each other’s houses,
and hardly ever have meetings together, except at the courts, or on the
Broglio. The boasted secrecy of their public councils proceeds, in all
probability, from the same principle of fear. If all conversation on
public affairs were forbid, under pain of death, and if the members of
the British Parliament were liable to be seized in the night-time by
general warrants, and hanged at Tyburn, or drowned in the Thames, at the
pleasure of the Secretaries of State, I dare swear the world would know
as little of what passes in either House of Parliament, as they do of
what is transacted in the Senate of Venice.
It is not safe for a noble Venetian to acquire, in a high degree, the
love and confidence of the common people. This excites the jealousy of
the Inquisitors, and proves a pretty certain means of excluding him from
any of the high offices. A Government which displays so much distrust
and suspicion where there is little or no ground, will not fail to shew
marks of the same disposition where, in the general opinion, there is
some reason to be circumspect. Ecclesiastics, of every denomination, are
excluded, by the constitution of Venice, from a place in the Senate, or
holding any civil office whatever; nor is it permitted them, directly or
indirectly, to intermeddle in State affairs. In many instances, they are
deprived of that kind of influence which, even in Protestant countries,
is allowed to the clergy. The Patriarch of Venice has not the disposal of
the offices belonging to St. Mark’s church: all the Deans are named by
the Doge and Senate.
Though it is forbid to the nobility, and to the clergy, to hold any
conversation with strangers upon politics, or affairs of State; yet it
is remarked, the gondoleers are exceeding ready to talk upon these, or
any other subjects, with all who give them the smallest encouragement.
Those who are not in the immediate service of any particular nobleman,
are often retained by Government, like the Valets de place at Paris, as
spies upon strangers. It is said, that while those fellows row their
gondolas, in seeming inattention to the conversation, they are taking
notice of every thing which is said, that they may report it to their
employers, when they imagine it any way concerns the Government. If
this is true, those are to be pitied who are obliged to listen to all
the stuff that such politicians may be supposed to relate. As soon as a
stranger arrives, the gondoleers who brought him to Venice immediately
repair to a certain office, and give information where they took him up,
to what house they conducted him, and of any other particulars they may
have picked up. All those precautions recalled to my memory the garrison
of Darmstadt, of which I gave you an account in a letter from that place,
where the strictest duty is kept up by day and night, in winter as well
as summer, and every precaution used, as if an enemy were at the gates;
though no mortal has the smallest design against the place, and though
it is perfectly understood by all the inhabitants, that if an army was
in reality to come with hostile intentions, the town could not hold
out a week. In the same manner, I cannot help thinking, that all this
jealousy and distrust, those numerous engines set a going, and all this
complicated system for the discovery of plots, and the defence of the
constitution of this republic, serves only to harass their own subjects.
Their constitution is certainly in no such danger as to require such an
apparatus of machines to defend it, unless, indeed, the Emperor were to
form a plot against it; and, in that case, it is much to be feared, that
the spies, gondoleers, lions mouths, and State Inquisitors, would hardly
prevent its success.
Exclusive of this State Inquisition, my abhorrence to which, I perceive,
leads me sometimes away from my purpose, all ranks of people here might
be exceeding happy. The business of the various courts, and the great
number of offices in the State, form a constant employment for the
nobles, and furnish them with proper objects to excite industry and
ambition. The citizens form a respectable body in the State; and, though
they are excluded from the Senate, they may hold some very lucrative
and important offices. By applying to the arts and sciences, which are
encouraged at Venice, they have a fair chance of living agreeably,
and laying up a competency for their families. Private property is no
where better secured than at Venice; and notwithstanding she no longer
enjoys the trade of Asia without competitors, yet her commerce is still
considerable, and many individuals acquire great wealth by trade. The
manufactories established here employ all the industrious poor, and
prevent that squalid beggary, that pilfering and robbery, one or other,
or all of which, prevail in most other countries of Europe.
Their subjects on the Terra Firma, I am informed, are not at all
oppressed; the Senate has found that mild treatment, and good usage,
are the best policy, and more effectual than armies, in preventing
revolts. The Podestas, therefore, are not allowed to abuse their power,
by treating the people with severity or injustice. Those Governors know,
that any complaints produced against them, will be scrutinized by the
Senate very carefully. This prevents many abuses of power on their part,
and makes the neighbouring provinces which formerly belonged to this
State, regret the chance of war which ravished them from the equitable
government of their ancient masters.