Venice.
Many people are surprised, that, in a Government so very jealous of its
power as that of Venice, there is no military establishment within the
city to support the executive power, and repress any popular commotion.
For my own part, I am strongly of opinion, that it proceeds from this
very jealousy in government, that there is no military garrison here.
An arbitrary Prince is fond of a standing army, and loves to be always
surrounded by guards; because he, being the permanent fountain of honours
and promotion, the army will naturally be much attached to him, and
become, on all occasions, the blind instruments of his pleasure; but at
Venice, there is no visible permanent object, to which the army can
attach itself. The Doge would not be allowed the command of the garrison,
if there was one. The three State Inquisitors are continually changing;
and before one set could gain the affections of the soldiers, another
would be chosen; so that Government could not be supported, but much more
probably would be overturned, by a numerous garrison being established in
Venice; for it might perhaps not be difficult for a few of the rich and
powerful nobles to corrupt the garrison, and gain over the commander to
any ambitious plan of their own, for the destruction of the constitution.
But although there is no formal garrison in a military uniform, yet there
is a real effective force sufficient to suppress any popular commotion,
at the command of the Senate, and Council of Ten. This force, besides the
Sbirri, consists of a great number of stout fellows, who, without any
distinguishing dress, are kept in the pay of Government, and are at the
command of that Council. There is also the whole body of the gondoleers,
the most hardy and daring of the common Venetians. This body of men are
greatly attached to the nobility, from whom they have most of their
employment, and with whom they acquire a certain degree of familiarity,
by passing great part of their time, shut up in boats, in their company,
and by being privy to many of their love intrigues. Great numbers of
these gondoleers are in the service of particular nobles; and there is no
doubt, that, in case of any popular insurrection, the whole would take
the side of the nobility and Senate, against the people. In short, they
may be considered as a kind of standing militia, ready to rise as soon as
the Government requires their services.
Lastly, there is the Grand Council itself, which, in case of any violent
commotion of the citizens and populace, could be armed directly, from
the small arsenal within the Ducal palace, and would prove a very
formidable force against an unarmed multitude; for the laws of Venice
forbid, under pain of death, any citizen to carry fire-arms; a law which
is very exactly executed by the State Inquisitors.
By those means the executive power of Government is as irresistible at
Venice, as at Petersburgh or Constantinople, while there is a far less
chance of the Government itself being overthrown here by the instruments
of its own power; for, although a regular army, or garrison, might be
corrupted by the address of an ambitious Doge, or by a combination of a
few rich and popular nobles, in which case a revolution would take place
at once; it is almost impossible to conceive, that all the different
powers above mentioned could be engaged to act in favour of one man, or a
small combination of men, without being detected by the vigilance of the
Inquisitors, or the jealousy of those who were not in the conspiracy. And
if we suppose a majority of the nobles inclinable to any change in the
form of the Government, they have no occasion to carry on a secret plot;
they may come to the Council Chamber, and dictate whatever alterations
they think proper.