After Walker reached the Plaza, he ascertained that Zavala had attacked

the town early the day before, and that the little garrison had been

fighting the Allies for nearly twenty-four hours. The citizens of the

place acted with commendable courage, and some of them received wounds

they will carry to their graves in defence of their new homes. Major

Angus Gillis, acting recorder of the Oriental Department, had gone to

Nicaragua to revenge the death of a noble son who fell fighting at Rivas

on the eleventh of April; and while with all the vigor of youth he was

acting against the hated foe which had robbed him of his son, he received

a severe and painful wound in the face, injuring permanently the sight of

one eye, if not of both. John Tabor, the editor of the _Nicaraguense_,

had his thigh broken while defending his right to print and publish

his opinions in Central America. Douglass J. Wilkins had defended the

hospital, threatened almost every instant with assault, and he had

infused something of his own unquailing spirit into the weak and wasted

forms of those stretched on the beds and gathered up in the hammocks of

the several wards. The officers, too, attached to the several departments

of the army had been very serviceable in repulsing the attacks of the

Allies. Colonel Jones, paymaster-general, had directed the defence of

the government house on the corner of the Plaza; while Major Potter, of

the ordnance, was serviceable at many points, and particularly at the

guard-house near the church. It was on this occasion, too, that Captain

Swingle first displayed the skill and courage which made him so useful in

future operations.

Nor did those, whose usual avocation was to preach peace, deem it

unworthy of their profession to strike a blow in defence of a cause

reviled and persecuted of men, but just and sacred in the eyes of those

familiar with the facts of the contest. It may not appear singular that

the judge of the Court of First Instance, Thomas Basye, used his rifle in

defence of the authority by which he held his commission; but the conduct

of Father Rossiter, a Catholic priest who had lately been appointed

chaplain of the army, is more likely to attract attention and inquiry.

But when we ascertain the acts of the Allies on their entrance to the

town, it will not surprise us to see even a priest of the church arm in

defence, from the attacks of those who acted like savages. This brings us

to some incidents which occurred during the attack on Granada, indicating

the character of the war the Allies were waging.

Among the old American residents at Granada was John B. Lawless, a

native of Ireland but a naturalized citizen of the United States. He had

been for a number of years engaged in trade on the Isthmus, principally

in the purchase of hides and skins for export to New-York. Of a mild

temper and inoffensive manner he had conciliated even Granadian jealousy

by the honesty of his dealings and the integrity of his character.

During the first weeks of the occupation by the Americans he had been

of much service to the Legitimists by bringing their little grievances

and complaints to the attention of the general-in-chief; and his

intercessions were uniformly in favor of the native race, and in order to

protect them from the thoughtless conduct of the new-comers. So entire

was his faith in the good will of the Legitimists toward him, so perfect

was his confidence in the protection of his American citizenship, that

he refused, when opportunity offered, to repair to the Plaza to seek

the safety afforded by Nicaraguan arms. He remained in his house when

the soldiers of Zavala entered the town; and he was in the very act of

unfolding the American flag before his door, when the Guatemalans tore

him from his house, took him to the Jalteva, and there riddling his body

with bullets, vented their savage passions in stabbing the lifeless body

with their bayonets.

Nor was Lawless the only victim of their violence. An agent of the

American Bible Society, Rev. D. H. Wheeler, was taken from his house and

murdered after the same fashion as Lawless. Rev. Wm. J. Ferguson, also,

a preacher of the Methodist denomination, was torn from the arms of his

wife and daughter, and met the same fate as Lawless and Wheeler. Not

satisfied with murdering these harmless persons, the brutal soldiers of

Carrera had robbed them of their clothes and thrown their naked bodies,

like dogs, into the public places. And in the house where Father Rossiter

was quartered, a crime even darker still was committed by the followers

of Zavala. When the Guatemalan troops entered the town the children of an

Englishman, who had lately arrived at Granada from New-York, were seated

at dinner. The group at the table consisted of a boy six years old, two

girls one four and the other two years old, and their nurse. A soldier

passing by the window pointed his musket at the innocent party, and

firing deliberately, killed the boy instantly. The nurse saved the girls

by flight to the next house, while the soldiers were forcing the doors

and windows of the room, where the dead boy lay.

These injuries were done to persons claiming the protection of the

American flag; but that flag itself was the scoff and scorn of the

soldiers an unlettered savage had let loose on the plains of Nicaragua.

The American Minister, when the Allies attacked the town, lay nigh unto

death from the effects of a sudden illness, which had seized him a few

days previously. The ladies and other non-combatants had been sent to

the Minister’s house at the first moment of alarm; but it was well that

a small body of riflemen was also sent to protect them. The Minister was

not in a condition to take charge of the helpless persons at his house;

but his flag was waving its ample folds in front of the door, and this

was deemed sufficient protection from the Guatemalans. When the enemy,

however, got possession of the houses near the American legation, they

began firing at the “star-spangled banner,” and called on Mr. Wheeler to

come forth into the street. All the choice phrases of Spanish ribaldry

were poured over the name of the _Ministro filibustero_—the filibuster

Minister; and no epithet of hatred or contempt for the race of the North

was left unuttered by the old Legitimists of Granada. It was well for Mr.

Wheeler that the American Secretary of State about this time gave him

leave to return to Washington in order to report the condition of affairs

in Nicaragua—a civil way of telling the Minister his government had no

further need of his services.

The loss of the Americans during the action of the 12th and 13th at

Masaya and Granada, was something upward of a hundred—twenty-five killed

and eighty-five wounded. The loss at Masaya was very slight: most of

the casualties occurred at Granada. A few were missing, principally

those belonging to the party Col. Fisher had taken from Masaya on the

evening of the 12th. Fisher returning toward Masaya by a different road

from that Walker took on the morning of the 13th, was surprised when he

reached the outskirts of the town to find himself in the presence of a

large detachment of the enemy. Hastily taking a side path toward Diria

and Diriomo he succeeded for a time in evading the enemy; but it was

not long before he again fell in with them, though not in such force as

previously. Then the Rangers and officers with Fisher found that the

heavy night-dew had made the Sharp’s carbines they carried unreliable,

the moisture getting in between the chamber and the barrel. Finally

the party separated, some soon finding their way to Granada, while it

was several days before others returned. Lieutenant-Colonel Lainé,

aide-de-camp to the general-in-chief, was taken prisoner by the Allies

and shot. As soon as his execution was certainly known at Granada two

Guatemalan officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Valderraman and Captain Allende,

were there shot in retaliation.

The loss of the enemy at Granada was heavy. On the night of the 12th they

probably buried their dead of that day, as many new graves were found in

the neighborhood of the houses the Allies occupied. In addition to these,

nearly a hundred bodies were buried by the Americans after Zavala retired

to Masaya. The reports also stated that there were large numbers of

wounded not only carried from Granada but also of those hurt at Masaya on

the morning and afternoon of the 12th.

The lake steamer, La Virgen, was lying near the wharf at Granada during

the action of the 12th and 13th; and late in the evening of the 13th

she left for Virgin Bay, carrying several officers who were returning

to the United States, and also Father Vigil for San Juan del Norte. The

curate of Granada was wiser in the ways of Central American warfare than

the Bible Society’s agent, Mr. Wheeler, or the Methodist preacher, Mr.

Ferguson: for as soon as he heard the Guatemalans were in the Jalteva he

fled into a swamp near the town and remained hid away until the retreat

of the enemy was entirely certain. Late in the afternoon of the 13th he

came to congratulate the general-in-chief on the victory obtained over

the Allies; and his congratulations ended in a request for a passport

to go aboard the steamer about to leave for Virgin Bay. Nor did the

good father feel easy until he was safely on the steamer beyond, as he

thought, the reach of the dreaded _Chapines_.

A few days after the action of the 13th, the army received a valuable

accession in the person of Col. C. F. Henningsen, who arrived at Granada

in charge of arms and ordnance stores from New-York. When not more than

nineteen, Col. Henningsen had commenced his military career under the

Carlist leader, Zumalacarregui; and his service in Spain was well fitted

to qualify him for war in Nicaragua. Although an Englishman by birth, he

had spent most of his life on the continent of Europe; and after the

death of Zumalacarregui he had resided for some years in Russia. Finally

in 1849 he espoused the cause of Hungarian independence and came about

the same time as Kossuth to the United States. A day or two after he

reached Granada he was appointed brigadier-general, and charged specially

with the organization of the artillery and with directing the practice

with the Minié musket. Much dissatisfaction was evinced by many officers

at the rank given to Henningsen; nor were efforts wanting to create

prejudices against him because he was not an American. But his own worth

and merits soon overcame most of these prejudices, though in the breasts

of some officers jealousy lurked to the last. Walker, however, never

had reason to regret the confidence he early placed in the capacity of

Henningsen.

The efficiency of the new brigadier-general was soon felt in the

organization of two companies of artillery and of a company of sappers

and miners. Full and detailed instructions for the use of the Minié

musket were written by Henningsen, and practice with this arm was carried

on for some days under his supervision. He had much to combat in the

idleness and indifference of the officers, too many of whom valued their

rank more as an excuse for indulging their ease than as an incentive

to difficult and arduous duty. He was more successful in the artillery

practice than with the new rifle-muskets; for among the officers of

artillery were several who had much pride of profession. The skill and

experience of Major Schwartz have been mentioned, and besides him, Capt.

Dulaney and Lieut. Stahle deserve mention. Capt. Ferrand had courage and

little else; his laziness was intolerable. Stahle was particularly useful

in the practice with howitzers and cochorn-mortars. The proper carriages

for the howitzers having arrived they were more fit for service than

before, and the mortars, being light and easy of transportation, carried

the same shell as the howitzers. The practice with the mortars was much

simplified by always using the same charge, and determining the distance

the projectile was to be sent entirely by the angle of elevation of the

piece.

Meantime the Meridional Department was unprotected save by the schooner

Granada, lying in the port of San Juan del Sur. During August and

September Lieut. Fayssoux had been cruising first about the gulf of

Fonseca and then in the gulf of Nicoya, and finally off Realejo; but

he had not been able to see anything with a hostile flag. The presence

of the schooner at several points on the coast had kept the enemy in

constant fear, and the Granada had, in many ways, embarrassed the action

of the Allies. As the time, however, for the arrival of the steamer

from San Francisco approached it became necessary to send a guard for

the specie across the Transit and also to afford protection for the

passengers on the Isthmus. Hence Gen. Hornsby was, on November 2d, sent

from Granada to Virgin Bay with one hundred and seventy-five men. He

reached the Transit just in time to guard the specie brought down by the

Sierra Nevada.

It was known that a detachment had been sent from Masaya for the purpose

of occupying Rivas; while the reports of a fresh force from Costa Rica,

with a view of co-operating with the Allies in the Meridional Department,

were frequent and continued. Therefore Hornsby was ordered to remain at

Virgin Bay with a view of holding the wharf, so that a force from Granada

might at any moment be landed; while Fayssoux remained in the port of

San Juan del Sur to keep the enemy uneasy in case they attempted the

occupation of that place. The log of the Granada shows how she performed

her part. On the 7th of November, “At 4.30 P.M.,” so the log reads,

“received a notice, dated 4 P.M. at one mile from San Juan, and signed

José M. Cañas, commanding vanguard of Costa Rican army, to surrender the

post without firing a shot; if I did so the citizens should be protected,

if not, no protection would be given; to which I paid no attention. At 5

P.M. Mr. G. Rozet—United States inspector at San Juan—came on board with

a message that Gens. Bosque and Cañas were in the Plaza with six hundred

Costa Ricans; that they demanded the surrender of the schooner without

my firing a shot; if I did not the citizens would not be protected. I

replied I would not surrender, but not having the power to drive them

from the town I thought it would be prudent to run out of the harbor.

At 5.45 P.M. cast loose from the buoy, ran out and lay off the harbor.”

Then on the 8th the log proceeds: “Lying-to off the harbor. At 3.30

P.M. received letters from the officer in command of San Juan, Guardio,

offering protection to all citizens that would deliver up their arms to

him, and from Mr. Rozet praying me not to come in, that if I did all

Americans would perish. My answer to Rozet was that I did not intend

to come in and for him to say to Guardio that I would not communicate

with the enemy. The persons who came off to me reported that the Costa

Ricans were looking hourly for a bark and two brigs, the latter armed and

carrying troops, the former with provisions and troops.” On the 10th: “At

12 M. close in the mouth of the harbor. Saw a number of mounted men, and

apparently about one hundred and fifty foot soldiers leave the town.” The

cause of their departure will appear by returning to the movements of

Gen. Hornsby at Virgin Bay.

Although the nominal numbers of the infantry at Virgin Bay was 175,

their real strength was much less; and when, on the 10th, Hornsby

was reinforced by Sanders with 150 rifles and a howitzer under Capt.

Dulaney, he was not able to march against the enemy with more than 250

men. Cañas had taken up a position on the hill over which the Transit

road passes about a mile beyond the Half-way House toward San Juan del

Sur. Just beyond the Half-way House there is a deep cut in the road, and

some hundred and fifty yards farther on there is a slight bridge thrown

across a deep ravine. The enemy had barricaded near the bridge, and thus

commanded a long stretch of the road, flanked on one side by rising

ground and on the other by the ravine. Captain Ewbanks, with a detachment

of Rifles, turned the right flank of the Costa Ricans defending the

bridge; and thus Hornsby was enabled to reach the foot of the hill where

the main body of Cañas was posted. When, however, the American general

reconnoitred the hill the Costa Ricans occupied, and saw the effect

produced on his men by the fire they had just passed through, he deemed

it prudent to retire without hazarding an attack. He therefore withdrew

to Virgin Bay, and repairing to Granada reported in person to Walker the

result of his march against Cañas.

It was all-important to keep the Transit clear of any formidable force of

the Allies. The enemy were well aware of its importance to the Americans

when they styled the Transit the “highway of filibusterism.” Accordingly,

on the 11th, Walker repaired with 250 Rifles to Virgin Bay, taking also a

howitzer, a mortar, and a squad of sappers and miners. General Henningsen

accompanied the force with a view of directing the new corps which had

been formed under his supervision. The Artillery had not acted well on

the 10th, and the general was anxious for it to redeem its character.

Walker landed on the afternoon of the 11th; and marched the same night to

the Half-way House, which he reached just before daybreak. After a short

rest, the advance resumed its march and had proceeded as far as the cut

in the road when the enemy opened fire from the same barricades near the

bridge they had occupied on the morning of the 10th. Captain Ewbanks,

being familiar with the ground, was ordered to make a large detour to the

left, and he thus succeeded as before in dislodging the Allies from their

barricades. The whole column then pushed forward without interruption

to the foot of the hill where Cañas held his whole force, probably 800

strong.

The enemy, chiefly Costa Ricans, occupied the very ground on which the

Democrats, a little over a year previously, had awaited in ambush the

approach of Corral from Rivas toward San Juan del Sur. Colonel Natzmer,

acting as aide to Valle in September, 1855, was therefore acquainted

with the sides of the hill on which the Democrats had then been placed.

Accordingly he was ordered to take the sappers and miners along the

hill-side to the right of the road and cut a path toward the top of

the hill and in the rear of the first barricades of the enemy. Captain

Johnson, with a company of Rifles, followed and protected the working

party. Captain Green was also sent in the rear of Johnson’s company; but

getting separated from those in advance, Green lost his way in the thick

undergrowth and was not seen for several hours afterward.

The movement of Natzmer was covered by advancing the howitzer toward the

curve in the road fronting the first barricades of Cañas, and by sending

several shells into the works of the enemy. The fire of the allies was,

however, so fierce and well-directed as to make it prudent to withdraw

the howitzer, under cover, after a few rounds. On this occasion, the

artillerymen behaved with commendable coolness, and recovered, by their

steadiness under fire, some of the reputation they had lost on the 10th.

In the meanwhile, the Costa Ricans kept up an irregular fire of musketry

and rifles—for they had a number of riflemen with them—and Capt. Stith

lost his life by exposing his tall person for a moment in the middle of

the road.

In the course of an hour and a half Col. Natzmer had succeeded in

reaching the point at which he aimed; but in the meantime the enemy,

becoming aware of his movement and fearful of its effects, prepared for

retreat. When Johnson and the Rifles reached the barricades, they were

already deserted, and Cañas was on his way toward San Juan del Sur. The

Americans then pushed on in pursuit, and as some of the Rangers were

well mounted, they, acting under the orders of Henningsen, pressed on

the rear of the enemy. Cañas conducted his retreat with deliberation

as far as San Juan, taking advantage of several points in the road to

delay the progress of the Americans; but, finally, near where the little

stream that runs into the sea on the edge of the town crosses the Transit

road, Henningsen, followed by Capt. Leslie, Lieut. Gaskill, and a few of

the Rangers, charged on the retreating foot soldiers and breaking them

completely, drove them at a rapid pace through San Juan and across the

river up the coast trail to Rivas. The enemy were so scattered after

passing San Juan that further pursuit would have been fruitless.

Numbers of the Costa Ricans had, in the confusion of the retreat, escaped

from their ranks and taken the road to Guanacaste. Thus Cañas reached

Rivas with a force not only thinned by deaths and desertions, but also

discouraged and demoralized by defeat. It was evident, therefore, that he

could not soon take any measures to trouble the Transit; he could scarce

venture to show himself out of the barricades of Rivas. Hence Walker was

anxious to return immediately to Granada and again attack Belloso, while

Cañas was calling on him for aid in the Meridional Department. On the

13th, then, Walker marched from San Juan to Virgin Bay, and embarking

his force on the lake steamer, arrived the same night at Granada. Col.

Markham, with the First Infantry, was left at Virgin Bay.

On the morning of the 15th, the Americans were again on the road from

Granada to Masaya. The force consisted of Sanders’ Rifles, and a company

of 2d Rifles, together with Jaquess’ Infantry, a body of Rangers, under

Waters, a few sappers and portions of the two companies of Artillery.

The whole strength was about 560 men. The Artillery consisted of a

twelve-pound howitzer, two small brass pieces, taken from the Allies,

and two of the small mortars. As the train of pack-mules, carrying the

ammunition, was long, and the day hot, the march was slow and fatiguing;

nor had the force passed over more than half the distance to Masaya, when

Walker ascertained that Jerez had marched toward Rivas with seven or

eight hundred men. In consequence of this information Jaquess, with his

Infantry, was ordered to return to Granada, and take a lake steamer for

Virgin Bay. Thus Walker reduced his own strength to less than 300 men.

Major Henry, although scarcely able to walk, had mounted his mule and

followed the column marching on Masaya. Two or three miles from the edge

of the town he and Col. Thompson succeeded in passing the advanced guard,

and coming on a picket of the enemy charged it at full gallop. The picket

fled like deer, one of them leaving his hat, with a hole made by a bullet

from Henry’s revolver, and the blood sprinkled over the coarse straw of

the crown. This incident, while it shows the excess of courage animating

some of the officers in Nicaragua, also proves how difficult it was to

restrain their valor within the limits of order and regularity; though it

is probable Henry and Thompson were not aware of the fact that they had

passed the guard, owing to the neglect of the officer in charge of the

advance to perform his duty.

As the Rangers in front approached the small huts on the edge of Masaya,

the enemy opened a heavy fire of musketry, and Waters drawing his men to

the right of the road, in order to cover them with the heavy tropical

vegetation, gave room for the Rifles to pass. In entering by the plazuela

of San Sebastian, the road passes through a cut, on each side of which

are scattered small reed huts, in the midst of plantain patches. The

Allies, posted in the plantain patches, poured a most destructive fire

into the Rifles as they advanced. Sanders, however, contrived to move

toward the plazuela, deploying his men on each side of the road; while

Henningsen, pushing the howitzer close to the enemy, poured into them a

rapid rain of canister. For several minutes the fighting was furious;

but finally the firing became less and less, and the enemy falling back

into the main part of the town, left the Americans in possession of the

suburbs.

But the ground had not been gained without severe loss. The Nicaraguans

had lost more than fifty-six killed, and more than forty wounded. Lieut.

Stahle, a valuable officer of artillery, had fallen beside his gun,

and Major Schwartz had been wounded. Besides this, several of the best

officers of the Rifles had been severely hurt. Capt. Ewbanks and Lieut.

C. H. West had received painful and dangerous wounds; and Col. Natzmer

was struck down by a spent ball hitting him back of the ear. The approach

of night, too, no less than the nervous state of the command, exhausted

by the excitement and heavy loss, made it expedient to encamp on the high

ground abandoned by the enemy. Hence orders were given to unpack the

mules, and post the pickets for the night.

In the condition, however, of the force, it was far easier to issue

orders than to have them executed. Owing to the darkness, it was some

time before the wounded could be got together near the centre of the

camp, and the surgeons had some difficulty in dressing their wounds in

the dark. As the general-in-chief passed from one point to another, in

order to see his commands executed, he found so many of the officers

in such a state of languor and exhaustion, that they were incapable of

controlling their men. Some of them during the long march had taken a

great deal of liquor, and this, as well as the excitement of the conflict

dying out, left them utterly deprived of moral strength. It was only by

his personal exertions that Walker obtained any security for the camp;

and never, during the whole time he was in Nicaragua, did he find it so

difficult, as on that night to have his orders executed. The will of the

force seemed to be momentarily paralyzed by the fierce fire through which

it had passed.

The night was long and tedious; but finally day broke, and the men

somewhat refreshed by the short and interrupted sleep they had procured,

were again ready for action. Major Schwartz, with admirable accuracy,

threw a few shells from the howitzer into the houses near the plazuela

of San Sebastian; and then Major Caycee advancing with a few of the

Second Rifles, got possession of the little square apparently just

abandoned by the Allies. Soon the wounded were comfortably quartered in

the small church of San Sebastian; and after the troops had taken a

hearty breakfast, their spirits were as good as ever. The sappers began

their work cutting through the houses on each side of the street running

into the right-hand corner of the main Plaza as you approach from San

Sebastian. The cuts made through the adobe houses, during the attack of

the 12th of October, were also found serviceable.

The work of the sappers was, however, slow; and while they were advancing

in front under the protection of a company of Rifles, it was several

times necessary to defend the plazuela from the attacks of the Allies.

But the enemy, after several repulses with loss, seemed to conclude that

they were exhausting their strength fruitlessly by these demonstrations

against the rear of the Americans. Then, too, the front having got so far

toward the Plaza that it was inconvenient to keep up communications with

San Sebastian, Walker pushed his whole available force close up to the

enemy, burning the houses behind him so as to protect his rear. Moving

thus during the 16th and 17th, the Americans had on the evening of the

latter day, got within twenty-five or thirty yards of the houses on the

Plaza held by the enemy.

General Henningsen had established a mortar battery in a hut near the

enemy, and a few shells thrown from it were quite effective. But the

fuses were, as before noticed, too short-timed, and the shells at the

disposal of the Nicaraguans were too few to justify any lavish use of

them. This, in fact, was a main reason for the small effects produced by

the mortars and howitzers (when shells were used in the latter) during

the whole campaign. In addition to the defective fuses, and the small

supply of shells, the effects of three days’ labor and fighting were

seen in the lassitude of the men and the almost utter impossibility of

having guard duty properly performed. Although the Allies were clearly

disheartened by the approach of the Americans, it would have required

some time longer to drive them from the town; and Walker, anxious about

the Transit, resolved to retire to Granada, preparatory to an abandonment

of the Oriental Department.

Accordingly, near midnight of the 17th, after a few hours’ rest in the

early part of the evening, the Americans silently abandoned the houses

they held and took up the line of march for Granada. In the darkness

of the night the force was divided for a little while, but it was soon

re-united and pursued its way toward the lake. The loss during the

three days was nearly a hundred—one third of the whole number which

attacked Masaya; and the long line of the wounded mounted on horses,

necessarily impeded the march to Granada. But in spite of the exhaustion

of the command, the march was regular and the force was kept compactly

together. General Henningsen, with a howitzer, kept the rear well closed

up, and secured it from any annoyances the enemy might have attempted.

The Allies, however, did not trouble the retiring Americans; they were

probably glad enough to be rid of such troublesome neighbors. On the

morning of the 18th, Walker again entered Granada; and he soon after

announced to Henningsen his determination to abandon the place.

Chapter Tenth.

THE RETREAT FROM GRANADA.

The obstinate resistance of the Allies at Masaya was due mainly to the

fact that they had received a reinforcement of about eight hundred

Guatemalans the very day they were attacked. It was these Guatemalans who

had been placed in the plantain patches a few hours after they reached

Masaya; and ignorant of the effects of American rifles they had kept

their ground longer than any other portion of the allied force would have

maintained it. During the three days’ fighting, however, the fire had

been taken from the new men of Belloso; and his losses had been such that

it was supposed he would scarcely be able to move without fresh troops.

Hence Walker imagined the evacuation of Granada might be effected without

any interruption from the enemy. He had, however, determined to destroy

as well as abandon Granada; and as this duty required skill and firmness,

he decided to intrust the task to Henningsen.

Preparations for the retreat from Granada were begun on the 19th.

The sick and wounded in the hospital were placed on a steamer for

transportation to Omotepe Island. In order to make the movement as rapid

as possible, both the lake steamers, the San Carlos and La Virgen, were

engaged for the service. On the 20th Walker repaired to Virgin Bay with

the view of having all ready for a march to San Jorge or to Rivas, after

the destruction of Granada. He supposed that the government property and

stores would be at Virgin Bay on the 21st or the 22d, at latest: but

several causes delayed the movement. There was a great deal of property

scattered through Granada, belonging to officers and soldiers, and each

one tried to save everything he owned. Besides, as soon as the idea got

abroad that the town was to be destroyed the work of plunder began, and

liquor being abundant, nearly every man able to do duty was more or

less under its influence. Henningsen found it impossible to restrain

the passions of the officers, and these, in turn, lost all control over

their men. On the 22d, however, Fry had removed the women and children,

as well as the sick and wounded, to the island, and had with him a guard

of about sixty men. Henningsen had removed most of the ordnance stores

to the steamer, and was proceeding with the destruction of the city. As

the burning went on the excitement of the scene increased the thirst

for liquor, and soldiers thought it a pity to waste so much good wine

and brandy. In spite of guards and sentries, orders and officers, the

drunkenness went on, and the town presented more the appearance of a wild

Bacchanalian revel than of a military camp. Of course, Belloso soon knew

the state of affairs at Granada, and on the afternoon of the 24th the

town was attacked by the Allies.

At Virgin Bay the Infantry of Markham and of Jaquess were in a very

disorganized condition. It being the close of the rainy season there

was much fever in the camp; and the contrast between the quarters at

Granada and at Virgin Bay, as well as the scarcity of vegetables in the

rations at the latter point, depressed the spirits of the officers no

less than of the soldiers. There were some choice men who seemed more

cheerful at the prospect of difficulty and danger and privation; but such

organizations are rare in every time and among every people. They are,

unfortunately, the exceptions and not the rule.

To add to the general gloom, on the morning of the 23d, news came from

San Juan del Sur that the schooner Granada had gone out of the harbor to

engage a Costa Rican brig, and the people of the town had watched the

fight by the flashes of the guns, until a broad bright light, accompanied

by a loud noise as of thunder, led them to suppose one of the vessels had

been blown up. Couriers arrived at Virgin Bay from time to time during

the night of the 23d, announcing it as the general impression at San

Juan that Fayssoux had blown up his schooner rather than let her fall

into the hands of the enemy. This report, while it shows the opinions

held by the people as to the inevitable result of a conflict between a

vessel of the size of the Costa Rican brig and the little schooner, also

indicates the idea they had formed of the character of the commander of

the Granada. The failure of the schooner to enter the harbor during the

night confirmed the impression of the townspeople; and at Virgin Bay few,

besides the general-in-chief, doubted the correctness of the conclusions

drawn from the light and the explosion.

On the morning of the 24th, however, the schooner was seen coming into

port, and although her deck seemed covered with more than her complement

of men, she cast anchor as usual in the harbor. In a little while the

news spread that it was the enemy’s vessel which had been blown up the

night before. The log of the schooner for the 23d tells the story thus:

“Commences with light breezes from the N. and E., and pleasant. At 4 P.M.

saw a sail off the harbor; hove up anchor, and stood out to her. At 5h.

45m. she hoisted Costa Rica colors. At 6, within four hundred yards of

her; she fired round shot and musketry at us. At 8 we blew her up. At 10

we had taken from the sea her captain and forty of her men. Her name was

Once de Abril, Capt. Antonie Villarostra; crew, 114 men and officers;

guns 4, 9 lbs. calibre. The captain states that he was about surrendering

when she blew up. All were lost and killed but those that I picked up. I

had one man, Jas. Elliot, killed; Mathew Pilkington dangerously wounded,

Dennis Kane seriously, and six others slightly. Light breezes; stood in

for the harbor.”

The simplicity of the narrative reveals a feature in its author’s

character; but it needs the commentary of the schooner’s size, and

crew, and armament, to make its fall force felt. The Granada was about

seventy-five tons burden, and had on board during the action with the

Once de Abril twenty-eight persons all told, and among them were a boy

and four citizens of San Juan. She carried two six-pound carronades,

and had not more than 180 rounds of ball and canister. No wonder the

people on shore imagined that a fight of two hours at close distance (for

they knew, they said, Fayssoux would bring the brig to close work), had

disabled the Granada to such an extent as to induce her commander to blow

her up.

The destruction of the brig was caused by a ball fired into her from the

schooner, the shot probably striking some iron or caps in the magazine.

The Costa Ricans, however, and the people of Nicaragua, imagined it was

effected by some new missile the Americans had invented. Many of the

prisoners were badly burned; and they appeared grateful and somewhat

surprised at the care the surgeons bestowed on their wounds. The captain

was badly hurt, but after some time his burns were healed, and passage

was given him on the steamer to Panama. The prisoners who could walk

were soon released, and passports were given them for Costa Rica. When

they reached home their reports did much to correct the prejudices the

Moras had created against the Americans; and the released prisoners were

finally silenced by the orders of the government. None of them, however,

could ever be forced to march to Nicaragua.

The day after the action with the Once de Abril, Fayssoux was promoted to

the rank of captain, and the estate of Rosario, near Rivas, was bestowed

on him for the signal services he had rendered the republic. The result

of this first sea-fight with the enemy, the disparity of numbers and

guns, as well as the decisive character of the contest, gave new life to

the men at Virgin Bay. Even the mean quarters and scanty rations of the

village were, for a while, forgotten in the new glory the Granada had

won for the red star flag of Nicaragua. And when, late in the evening of

the 24th, news came that Henningsen was attacked at Granada, it did not

interrupt the cheerfulness inspired by the success of the schooner off

San Juan.

About three o’clock in the afternoon of the 24th the Allies attacked

Henningsen at three points almost at the same moment.[4] One body of the

enemy appeared in the Jalteva, another on the side of the San Francisco

church, while a third body attacked the Guadalupe church on the street

leading from the main Plaza to the Playa of the Lake. Major Swingle with

a few cannon-shot soon caused the force in the Jalteva to disappear;

while O’Neal resisted the advance of the enemy on the side of San

Francisco. At the Guadalupe, however, the Allies were more successful.

They not only gained possession of the church of Guadalupe, but also

commanded the church of Esquipulas, about half way between the former and

the Plaza. Thus a small body of men at the fort and on the wharf engaged

in sending freight aboard of the steamers were entirely cut off from

Henningsen and the main body of Americans.

Soon after the enemy appeared around Granada Lieut. O’Neal had fallen;

and his brother Calvin, half frantic from the loss, called on Henningsen

to permit him to charge the enemy forming near the church of San

Francisco. The Allies were between four and five hundred strong; but

O’Neal, in his fury, thought not of numbers, and every other feeling

was drowned in grief for a brother’s death. At a convenient moment the

general gave him thirty-two picked Rifles and let him loose on the enemy.

O’Neal, barefooted and in his shirt sleeves, leaped on his horse, and

calling on his Rifles to follow, dashed into the midst of the Allies as

they formed near the old church. The men, fired by the spirit of their

leader, followed in the same fierce career, dealing death and destruction

on the terrified foe. The Allies were entirely unprepared for O’Neal’s

sudden, dashing charge, and they fell as heedless travellers before the

blast of the simoom. The slaughter made by the thirty-two Rifles was

fearful, and so far were O’Neal and his men carried by the “rapture of

the strife” that it was difficult for Henningsen to recall them to the

Plaza. When they did return it was through streets almost blocked with

the bodies of the Guatemalans they had slain. This charge well closed the

fighting on the first day of the attack.

At daybreak on the 25th, Henningsen had concentrated his force and was

able to ascertain his real strength. He had only 227 men capable of

bearing arms, and was encumbered with 73 wounded and 70 women, children,

and sick persons. Twenty-seven had been cut off on the wharf, while Capt.

Hesse with 22 men had been lost, either killed or taken prisoners, at

the Guadalupe church. Henningsen had also seven guns and four mortars;

but his supply of ammunition for these was so short as to make them of

much less service than they might have been. This force was, during the

night of the 24th, concentrated near the Plaza, and it held the adobe

houses on each side of the principal street leading from the main square

by the churches of Esquipulas and Guadalupe to the lake. A breastwork was

built from the parish church on one side of the mouth of this street to

the guard-house on the other side; and the Americans were also partially

protected from the enemy by the burning buildings around and near the

main Plaza.

During the 25th, Henningsen, while repelling the advances the enemy were

constantly attempting to make, pushed on toward the Esquipulas, driving

the Allies from the huts and small houses of the neighborhood; and in

the afternoon he succeeded in getting possession of the church. The hot

embers had prevented the enemy from occupying Esquipulas; but they had

loopholed several huts near, and thus, for some time, kept the Americans

from getting possession. After a second charge, however, the Allies were

driven from their barricades in the brush as well as from the huts they

held; and thus the way was open for the advance of the Americans toward

Guadalupe. The losses during the day were small; and the wounds slight.

On the 26th, all the houses on the Plaza were destroyed, except the

church, the guard-house, and one or two others. Still the operations were

delayed by the too free use of liquor; and it was difficult to get work

done at the time and in the way it was ordered. The general commanding

found himself unable to keep together a sufficient force to aid in the

attempts he made against the Guadalupe church. In the efforts to gain

this point much of the slender supply of shot and shell were exhausted

without making any impression on the defences of the enemy; and the

Americans, on the contrary, were somewhat discouraged by the success of

the Allies in knocking away the works they hastily built. About sunset

Henningsen gave up the attempt on Guadalupe, with a loss of sixteen

killed and wounded. In addition to this loss several officers had been

hurt during the day at different points; and Col. Jones had received a

wound which kept him on his back for many weeks afterward. Fortunately,

after this, the supply of brandy in the American camp was scanty; and the

allied soldiers having got some of the liquor left in the town, it is

probable, that Belloso found difficulty in managing its distribution.

Soon after giving up the attempt on Guadalupe, Henningsen heard heavy

firing, as he supposed toward the north; and then prolonged shouts coming

apparently from the same direction. He fancied, at the time, it might

be a relieving force, which had been landed to the north of the town;

but it was really the firing and shouts of the Allies at the attack they

made on the men at the old fort, which had been partially destroyed for

the purpose of building a wharf. This point was held for two days by

the captain of police, Grier, assisted by some twenty-five of his men

and of other civil employees of the government. On the evening of the

25th, Walker hearing no news from Granada after the attack, took the

steamer San Carlos, which anchored off the wharf early on the morning

of the 26th. The general-in-chief seeing the red-star flag flying on

the parochial church, and the smoke of the burning houses constantly

rising in new directions, inferred that Henningsen, not having completed

the destruction of the town at the time of the attack, was delayed on

the Plaza more through choice in the complete execution of orders, than

by any necessity the Allies had imposed. But perceiving the importance

of holding the fort for Henningson’s ready communication with the lake,

Walker sent to the wharf in order to ascertain the state and the wants

of its defenders. Grier sent word that his men were in good spirits,

confident of holding the position, and that all they wished was, after

a while, some provision and ammunition. At dark, a boat was sent from

the San Carlos to the wharf with the articles required; but then the

aide, who went in the boat, reported, on his return, that the spirits

of the men were failing. The change was due to the desertion of a young

Venezuelan, Tejada, who had been released from chains by the Americans,

on the 13th of October, 1855. The consciousness that their exact number

and condition were reported to the enemy by Tejada, made the men nervous

of an attack on the fort. By their courage and skill in the use of their

weapons they had given the Allies the idea, that they were much stronger

than they really were; but now, the deserter, by destroying the delusion

of the enemy, also destroyed the confidence of drier and his men.

Scarcely had the aide-de-camp returned to the San Carlos before the heavy

firing Henningsen heard on the evening of the 26th was also heard aboard

of the steamer. The frequent flashes of discharging small arms formed

a circle of fire around the wharf, and the deep, prolonged volleys of

musketry, so distinct from the short, sharp crack of the rifle, told

that the enemy were doing most of the work; nor were the shouts from

the shore such as come from the lusty lungs of defiant or triumphant

Americans. In a short time, too, a man swam to the steamer, and saying he

had escaped from the wharf, told the story of its capture by the allies.

The deserter, Tejada, had not only given the number of Grier’s men to

the enemy, but had also pointed out how the wharf in the rear of the

Americans might be reached with a large iron launch on the beach. At the

same time Grier was assailed in the rear, a large force attacked him in

front, and, paralyzed by the combined assault as well as by the number

of the enemy, the Americans were nearly all killed or wounded, and taken

prisoners without a serious struggle. Well does the conduct of these men,

before and after the desertion of Tejada, illustrate the oft-repeated

remark of the great captain, “that in war the moral is to the physical as

three to one.”

On the 27th, Henningsen moved his wounded from the parochial church, and

the difficulty with which the labor was begun shows the indisposition of

his force to do any work except fighting. Some of the Jamaica negroes,

who had been at work on the lake steamer, and were caught in the town

accidentally, were of service for fatigue duty; nor were prisoners from

the guard-house entirely useless. After the wounded had been removed, a

few hundred pounds of damaged powder were put under one of the towers of

the church, and all the houses remaining on the Plaza were fired. The

enemy tried to press on the Americans as they left the main square,

but they were kept back by a few riflemen in the church towers until

Henningsen was ready to withdraw. When all was prepared, the Americans

abandoned the Plaza, and as they retired put a match to a train reaching

the damaged powder under the church. The fire reached the powder, blowing

the tower high into the air just as the too eager enemy were crowding

into the Plaza, of which they had so long strove to get the mastery.

The town was now almost entirely destroyed, and Henningsen having got

his force completely together, determined to make another attempt on

the Guadalupe church. He was now able to control sixty good men for the

assault, and the spirits of his command were raised by the success of

previous operations. Besides the sixty riflemen for the attack, there

were twenty-four artillerymen at the three six-pounders, and after seven

rounds from each of the guns, rapidly fired into the Guadalupe, the

Rifles rushed to the assault. But the enemy had abandoned the church

before the Americans reached it, and thus the most important point

between the Plaza and the Lake was carried without the loss of a single

man. Immediately the wounded, ammunition, stores, and guns, were moved

to the Guadalupe, and Major Henry was ordered, with twenty-seven men, to

take possession of two huts in the low ground between the church and the

lake.

Henry forthwith executed the order, and soon reported that, from

appearances, he expected an early attack by the enemy. He also advised

the abandonment of one of the huts, adding that he could hold the other

during the night. Henningsen urged him to hold the single hut as long as

possible, and promised reinforcements; but the confusion of the move to

the Guadalupe not being yet over, only ten riflemen, with Col. Schwartz

and his howitzer, could be sent to Henry’s assistance. Nor was it long

after dark when the enemy, under the shade of the thick plantain walks

and mango trees, crept up toward the huts, with the hope of surprising

the Americans. But a vigilant eye was watching their movements, and

Henry, sending a few rifle shots among them, discovered their position

and strength by the answering volleys of musketry. Then the howitzer

threw its canister into the allied ranks, spreading death and confusion

among the numerous body attacking Henry’s position. The enemy were driven

back with severe loss.

After this repulse of the Allies Henningsen re-organized his force and

found it stronger than he had supposed. He formed forty of the best men

into a main guard, holding them in reserve for immediate and urgent use.

A company of fifteen were detailed to guard the doors and windows of

the Guadalupe church; while twenty were selected for the defence of the

enclosure in the rear. Ten men were assigned to each of the six guns

at the church, and besides these it was found there were yet thirty to

spare. The latter were formed into a lower main guard and sent to report

to Henry at the hut in the low ground. It will thus be seen that the

fighting men, then for duty, numbered two hundred and ten.

Nor was the increase of strength by the new and more efficient

organization the only added force Henningsen now had. The men recovering

from the effects of debauchery in the town and seeing the necessity for

laborious effort were more willing to work than they had hitherto been.

During the night of the 27th, they worked with a vigor which surprised

their commander, and by daybreak of the 28th, they had finished an

adobe breastwork the general had scarcely hoped to see completed. Major

Swingle, by his industry and intelligence, did much to forward the labors

of the men, and it would have been difficult for Henningsen to find a

man more capable than Swingle of directing the execution of any orders

he might issue. But the concentration of the force at the Guadalupe,

while it enabled Henningsen to complete an organization whereby his

men were more readily handled, had its inconveniences and dangers. The

crowding together of more than three hundred persons, many of them sick

and wounded was calculated to affect the health of the camp; and the

exposed nature of the ground where Henry was posted, commanded as it was

by several points in the hands of the enemy, made it impossible to move

non-combatants thither until it was properly entrenched.

On the 28th the enemy, under cover of a flag of truce, sent into the

American camp a renegade by the name of Price, together with an aide

of Zavala, bearing a letter to “the commander-in-chief of the remains

of Walker’s forces.” This letter invited the commanding officer, for

humanity’s sake, to surrender himself and soldiers prisoners-of-war,

promising them safety and passports to leave the country. Price, too,

at his entrance into the camp urged the men to give up their arms

as they were surrounded by three thousand of the Allies, but Price

was immediately arrested and silenced, and a defiant reply to their

insulting invitation was forthwith despatched to the leaders of the

hostile forces. The aide was evidently sent as a spy, for he entered

without being blindfolded or duly introduced, and Henningsen showed his

contempt for the Allied leaders by telling the officer he might pass

through his camp and observe all his defences.

The enemy, finding it was necessary to use more vigorous means than

words in order to get the Americans out of the positions they held, made

several efforts to regain the church of Guadalupe. At three o’clock in

the afternoon of the 28th, they tried to storm the church, but were

repulsed with severe loss. Then at eight the same evening they attempted

to surprise the position. The night was dark, and a large force got

within eighty yards of the breastwork in the rear of the church before

they were discovered. Major Swingle with two six-pounders poured canister

rapidly into the approaching columns, and the blaze of the enemy’s

musketry showing their position, the guns were used with deadly effect.

In a short time the Allies were again repulsed, and without the waste of

rifle caps, now becoming scarce in Henningsen’s camp. Several other faint

attacks were afterward made on the church, but it was clear that the

officers of the Allies could not drive their soldiers to an assault.

The entrenchments near Henry’s position were not sufficiently advanced to

admit of the removal of the sick and wounded until the 1st of December.

In the meanwhile cholera and typhus broke out in the Guadalupe. The

crowded state of the church, the numbers of sick and wounded, and the

bad air from the decaying bodies of the enemy’s dead, tended to produce

sickness; and the tendency was increased by the exposure to night air

and rains. The camp was now subsisting on mule and horse meat with small

rations of flour and coffee; but this diet, sufficiently wholesome, had

little to do with the disease which appeared. The Allies also perished

in large numbers by cholera and fever; yet they had an excellent quality

and great variety of subsistence. Among the allied officers who died of

cholera was the commander of the Guatemalan forces, Gen. M. Paredes. His

death left Zavala in command of the Guatemalan contingent.

The cholera was a more fearful enemy to the Americans than any by which

they were surrounded. Hence it was important to hasten the removal of

the sick and wounded to the entrenchments in the low ground; and after

they left the Guadalupe disease diminished and the cholera almost

entirely disappeared. About seventy men remained in the church; but its

garrison was gradually reduced to thirty rifles under the command of

Lieut. Sumpter Williamson. His steady courage and cheerful spirits made

him competent, even with the small force at his disposal, to hold the

position against any attempts of the enemy; and it was always easy for

Henningsen, in an emergency, to strengthen him with fresh men.

But the cholera did not leave until it had taken off some of the most

useful persons in the American camp. Among these was Mrs. Bingham, the

wife of Edward Bingham, the actor. While the disease was worst in the

Guadalupe, she had been constantly employed in the care of the sick;

and her unwearied kindness and attention had probably enabled many to

overcome the fatal epidemic. But she was herself finally seized and

carried off by the disease in a few hours.

After moving the main part of his force to Henry’s position, Henningsen

endeavored to work his way to the lake while keeping open his

communications with Williamson in the church. For several days the enemy

strove constantly to interrupt these communications. But all their

attempts failed; and while the Americans held their ground against the

enemy, the ordnance officers were increasing the supplies of ammunition.

Major Rawle, one of the original fifty-eight, was possessed of untiring

industry; and Major Swingle was fertile in resources and most ingenious

in all mechanical contrivances. They made round shot by piling up small

pieces of iron in sand hollowed on a six-pound ball, and then pouring

lead over the iron pieces so as to hold them together. Thus the effective

strength of the artillery was much increased; and the general was enabled

to count on it as a means for breaking through the enemy’s lines in case

such a step became necessary or advisable.

On the 8th Zavala sent another letter to Henningsen, imploring him to

surrender, and saying that he need expect no assistance from Walker,

as the steamers had arrived at San Juan del Sur and San Juan del Norte

without bringing any passengers for Nicaragua. But the Nicaraguan general

did not condescend to give a written reply to the Guatemalan officer.

He merely sent the message that he could parley only “at the cannon’s

mouth.” The men now began to be discouraged at the frequent appearance

of the steamers on the lakes without the landing of a relieving force;

and the enemy not moving it was necessary to send the Americans to

attack some indigo vats on their right to keep them from dwelling on the

condition in which they were placed by the Allies. The provisions were

nearly exhausted; and the men had commenced discussing among themselves

the necessity of breaking through the enemy’s lines, when, on the morning

of the 12th, the steamer, La Virgen, again appeared off the port.

While the retreat from Granada was thus embarrassed by the large and

constantly recruited force the Allies had brought against Henningsen, the

troops in the Meridional Department were not prepared to relieve their

beleagured comrades. Walker was almost constantly on the lake, watching

the progress and attempting to ascertain the position of Henningsen; and

when, at intervals, he returned to Virgin Bay, he usually found the force

there nervous and apprehensive of an attack from Cañas and Jerez who

then held Rivas. Jaquess, commanding at Virgin Bay, had more knowledge

of tactics than of other branches of the military art more important

in the operations of irregular war; and he permitted the most alarming

reports as to the strength and resources of the enemy to be circulated in

his camp. His men were worn out by heavy guard duty, and all the spirit

was taken out of them by being kept in a state of constant anxiety and

watchfulness.

Nor was the camp at Omotepe, whither the main hospital of the army had

been temporarily removed, in a less uneasy mood than the Infantry at

Virgin Bay. Fry had some sixty men capable of duty, and there were with

him several efficient officers. It was impossible for the enemy, in any

numbers, to reach the island, even if they had been able to spare the

force from the position they held. But there were constant rumors of

barges passing from San Jorge to Omotepe with arms for the use of the

Indians on the east side of the island. Knowing well that but few of

the Indians on Omotepe could be used against the Americans, even if the

Allies had been able to furnish them all with arms, Walker felt confident

that no serious attack could be made on the little village where the

hospital had, for the time, been fixed.

On the morning of the 2d of December the general-in-chief went aboard

of the lake steamer, with a view of visiting Granada. Just before the

anchor was hove, a courier from San Juan del Sur announced the arrival

of the Orizaba with eighty men for Nicaragua. The steamer was getting

under weigh when a small canoe, with three men in it, approached the

vessel from the direction of Omotepe. The men from the canoe were taken

aboard the steamer, and they reported that the Americans on the island

had been attacked the night previously by a large body of Indians. The

tale of these three persons was indistinct, but as they had been out

during the night and were shivering from exposure to the damp, chilly

air, it was more charitable to impute the confusion of their story to

cold than to fear. The steamer was forthwith ordered to the island, and

the general-in-chief took the most intelligent of the three fugitives to

the cabin and dosing him with a half-tumblerful of whiskey, tried to get

out of him the true state of affairs at Omotepe. All he could get out of

the man was that every soul on the island, sick and wounded, women and

children, had probably been murdered. The cowardly fellow was not ashamed

to live and tell the tale.

As the steamer approached the island one of the large iron launches

used by the Transit Company for loading freight and passengers was seen

drifting in the lake, without sail or rudder, and filled with a crowd

of men, women, and children, in all varieties of dress and humor. It

was some comfort to see that everybody on the island was not killed;

though the forlorn condition of the launch’s passengers was well fitted

to excite pity and compassion. Among them, two or three ladies who had

been delicately brought up, bore their trials and sufferings with more

patience than the stoutest men; while some of the women, viragos in

appearance, as soon as they were safely aboard the steamer, loosened

their tongues and gave free play to their long-restrained feelings. Soon

the steamer anchored off the village where Fry was quartered; and he

immediately reported that the Indians had attacked the Americans merely

to get a chance of rifling their trunks, and that they had disappeared

not long after daylight. Some of the men capable of bearing arms, and

even some officers, had disgraced themselves by deserting women and

children, as well as the sick and wounded, at the first alarm. Two or

three of these men, as they might by courtesy be called, escaped to the

main land before the passengers by the Orizaba left Virgin Bay; and thus

the report was sent to the United States that all the people of Omotepe

had been massacred by the Indians.

Leaving the island and going to Granada, Walker remained there only long

enough to see that Henningsen had reached the huts half way between the

Guadalupe and the lake; then, returning to Virgin Bay, he proceeded to

organize the new men who had arrived from California on the Orizaba. The

spirits of Jaquess’ men had been revived by the arrival of these fresh

recruits; and in a short time the main portion of the troops at Virgin

Bay were ready for a march to San Jorge. On the afternoon of the 3d

December, the Americans occupied San Jorge, without any opposition from

Cañas, then at Rivas with some seven or eight hundred men. The sick at

Virgin Bay, as well as the army stores and government property collected

there, were carried to San Jorge on the lake steamers; and the fine

air of that village, together with the improved quarters and rations,

diminished the sick list and increased materially the effective force of

the several companies.

When nearly the whole American strength in the Meridional Department had

been concentrated at San Jorge, the hospital at Omotepe, together with

the women and children there, were removed to the main land. Many of

the native women and families had followed the army in its retreat from

Granada, and many of these were supplied with quarters and rations by

the proper officers of the Nicaraguan forces. The trunks and chests of

most had suffered from the foray the Indians made on the island; but the

delightful air of the isthmian December rendered the loss less severe

than might be imagined.

In the meanwhile the steamer from New-Orleans arrived at San Juan del

Norte with nearly two hundred and fifty passengers for Nicaragua. On

the afternoon of the 6th these persons reached Virgin Bay; and on the

morning of the 7th they arrived at San Jorge. They were mostly under

the direction of Lockridge, who had gone to the United States during

the previous summer to encourage emigration to Central America. A small

company of these men, commanded by Captain G. W. Crawford, was assigned

to the Rangers; while the remainder were organized into a new corps,

called the Second Rifles, (the old Second Rifles being dissolved,) and

placed under the command of Major W. P. Lewis. Crawford’s company were,

for the most part, supplied with saddles and revolvers they had brought

from the United States; and the rifle, commonly called Mississippi, was

issued to them. Major Lewis’ men were armed with Minié muskets.

Lockridge had brought to San Jorge about 235 men; and these, together

with the men from California, raised the number of recruits to more than

300. The men from California were, for the most part, distributed into

two companies, commanded respectively by Capt. Farrell and Capt. Wilson.

Farrell was ordered to report to Waters for duty with the Rangers; while

Wilson was attached to the new command of Lewis. These fresh men were in

good spirits, and all anxious to see some fighting. Nor had they long to

wait for active service. Sanders was ordered to take Higley’s company,

the strongest of Lewis’s command, and proceed to Granada with a view of

ascertaining Henningsen’s position. It was supposed that Henningsen had

probably been able to reach the lake; and if such were the case, Higley’s

company would suffice to aid his embarkation. But Sanders returned and

reported that Henningsen appeared not to have advanced further than the

position he held between Guadalupe and the beach on the 2d; and it was

certain that he was altogether unable to communicate with the lake shore.

Rumors also came by the way of Nandaime, through native channels, to the

effect that the Americans were suffering from disease and famine in the

church of Guadalupe.

Accordingly on the 11th, Higley’s and Wilson’s companies were ordered

to report to Waters; and these, together with Leslie’s, Farrell’s, and

Crawford’s companies of Rangers, formed a body of 160 men. Waters soon

had his men embarked on the steamer La Virgen; and the general-in-chief

accompanied the command. Besides the Rangers and the two companies of

Rifles, several volunteers requested leave to act under Waters. Lockridge

appeared anxious for action; and although no definite rank was assigned

him, he was, for the occasion, placed next in command to the chief of

the Rangers. Early on the morning of the 12th, the steamer was anchored

off Granada, out of range of the enemy’s shot; and the officers were

instructed to keep the men carefully concealed in the lower part of

the vessel. During the day, the positions of the enemy were as far as

possible observed; and the anxiety of the Allies to prevent a landing,

was proved by their parading soldiers in numbers along the beach. These

soldiers would march and counter-march; and the effort was manifest to

arrange them in such a manner as to make them appear more numerous than

they really were.

Between eight and nine o’clock in the evening, the steamer quietly and

with all her lights covered, moved up the lake to the same point where

the Democrats landed on the night of the 12th of October, 1855. This

point was more than a league from the fort and wharf of Granada; and the

depth of water was such as to allow the steamer to approach near the

shore. The disembarkation was immediately begun; and when the first boat

reached the beach, a picket of the enemy fired a single volley and fled.

In about two hours the whole force was ashore; and Waters received orders

to proceed to the relief of Henningsen, keeping as close as possible

to the beach, in order not to lose his power of communicating with the

general-in-chief who remained aboard the steamer. Then the La Virgen

withdrew, and resumed as nearly as possible the anchorage she held during

the day.

Not long after the steamer anchored off the wharf, and near midnight of

the 12th, the long lines of fire from small arms followed by the reports

of heavy volleys of musketry and answered by quick and angry retorts

from the rifles announced that the conflict of Waters with the enemy had

begun. Then the flashes and the reports ceased; but in a short time the

fires again appeared and the sounds yet louder and more distinct told

that the bold chief of the Rangers was driving the enemy before him. For

several minutes the flashes and the reports were even fiercer and heavier

than before; but they soon ceased, and their sudden cessation again told

the tale of the yet advancing Americans. Soon after the last firing

was heard, a noise from the water, crying as if for help, announced a

messenger with news. A small boat was let down, and in a few moments a

dusky form was seen scrambling over the rail of the steamer. At first

Walker was apprehensive the news might be from Waters, and, it being dark

and the messenger not a white man, the general-in-chief commenced his

questions in Spanish. But the answer was English, and spoken in the thick

broken accents of a Kanaka boy who had come to Central America on the

Vesta in 1855. Kanaka John had been for several hours in the water, and

bore, in a sealed bottle, a note from Henningsen, giving information of

the state of his force and indicating certain signals to be made in case

a landing was attempted. The signals were made as soon as the note was

read; but they were not seen by those for whom they were intended.

After landing Waters proceeded along a narrow strip of land with the lake

on his left and a lagoon on his right. As he approached a point where the

lagoon reaches within thirty or forty yards of the lake, he was fired on

by the enemy, who were stationed behind a barricade they had built from

one body of water to the other. The heaviness of the volleys showed that

the Allies were in force; and the Americans for a moment wavered. Waters

had ordered Leslie to assault the barricades with his company; but his

men hesitated, and some confusion arising, Leslie took the first who

offered and leading them up to the barricades drove the enemy from their

position. The march toward Granada was resumed; but when Waters reached

a place called the “coal pits” he was again arrested by a large body

of the Allies. The numbers of the enemy were greater than at the first

barricade; the position, however, was not so good and they were soon

driven from it by the vigorous charge of Higley and his company.

Waters, as he approached the town, turned to the right in order to gain

the Tipitapa road which passes over higher ground than that nearer the

lake. About daybreak he had gained the suburbs and was approaching some

small cane huts when he again received the fire of the Allies. The enemy

were behind strong barricades; but Capt. Crawford, passing with his

company to some rising ground on the right, was enabled to turn the left

flank of the Allied lines. A prisoner taken at this point gave Waters

such information as decided him to proceed at once to the Guadalupe.

He was encumbered with thirty wounded and it became an object to join

Henningsen without further loss. Leslie was, therefore, sent in advance

to advise Henningsen of Waters’ approach; and thus early in the morning

of the 13th the Americans in the Guadalupe were strengthened by the

entrance of the force landed the night previously.

It was well for Henningsen that Waters arrived; for the commissary stores

of the former were nearly exhausted, and, as fearful a plague as cholera,

desertion, had begun to thin his enfeebled ranks. Even after Waters’

arrival, the difficulties of Henningsen’s position were not slight. But

the vigorous fighting of the Americans during the night had impressed

the Allies with an exaggerated idea of their strength; and Belloso

was discouraged by the fierceness with which his barricades had been

assailed. He began to think that wood and earth were no safe protection

from the soldiers who had carried three well-defended positions in the

course of almost as many hours; and the movements of his force soon

showed his weakness and irresolution. The fort was abandoned, and the

sheds built on it were set afire. Of course, as soon as Henningsen

discovered the fort was given up by the enemy he took possession of it;

and thus, without further difficulty, communication with the steamer was

established.

Preparations were immediately made for embarking the whole command on the

La Virgen. The number of sick and wounded made the movement slow; and the

men for duty were exhausted, some by their long fatigues and exposures,

and others by the march and actions of the previous night. Of the 419

under Henningsen when Granada was surprised, 120 died of cholera and

typhus, 110 were killed or wounded, nearly 40 deserted, and 2 were made

prisoners. Of Waters’ force, 14 were killed and 30 wounded. Leslie was

unfortunately shot in the head after he reached the Guadalupe, and his

death was a loss not easily repaired, for his services as a scout were

inestimable. Lieut. Tayloe, who was absent, by leave, from his post at

San Carlos, had obtained permission to march with Waters, and he fell at

one of the barricades outside the town.

It was near two o’clock on the morning of the 14th before everything

was aboard the steamer. At leaving, Gen. Henningsen stuck up on a lance

the words “_Aqui fué Granada_”—“Here was Granada”; and these were well

calculated to re-kindle the passions of party, not yet extinct among the

old Legitimists and Democrats. While the voice of one party was that

of wailing and woe, at the loss of its cherished city, the other party

could not suppress its feelings of triumph and exultation. Nor has the

destruction of Granada failed to call forth censure elsewhere than in

Central America. It has been denounced as an act of vandalism, useless in

its consequences to the authority which ordered it. As to the justice of

the act, few can question it; for its inhabitants owed life and property

to the Americans in the service of Nicaragua, and yet they joined the

enemies who strove to drive their protectors from Central America. They

served the enemies of Nicaragua in the most criminal manner; for they

acted as spies on the Americans, who had defended their interests, and

sent notice of all their movements to the Allies. By the laws of war, the

town had forfeited its existence; and the policy of destroying it was as

manifest as the justice of the measure. It encouraged the Leonese friends

of the Americans, while it gave a blow to the Legitimists from which they

have never recovered. The attachment of the old Chamorristas to Granada

was strong and peculiar. They had for their chief city a love like that

of woman; and even after years have passed tears come to their eyes when

they speak of the loss of their beloved Granada. And well did it become

them to have such affection for the town; because it furnished them with

the resources which enabled them to maintain power, and to keep under

the excitable passions, as they called them, of the Leonese Democrats.

The destruction of Granada was, therefore, a long step toward the

destruction of the Legitimist party; and thus the Americans of Nicaragua

were able to cripple their most bitter and consistent foe.

As the steamer left her anchorage a strong north-easter rose, and the

vessel was obliged to seek the shelter of Omotepe, and to lie for several

hours under the lee of the beautiful volcano which springs, as it were,

from the waters of the lake. When the wind fell the La Virgen ran across

to San Jorge, and everything was soon got ashore. The enemy at Rivas,

hearing of the relief of Henningsen, and fearful of the artillery now

at the disposal of the Americans, stealthily abandoned the place, and

marched hastily to join Belloso at Masaya. On the morning of the 16th the

Americans were again in possession of Rivas.

Chapter Eleventh.

OPERATIONS ON THE SAN JUAN.

In the retreat from Granada much of the type and printing materials, as

well as the paper belonging to the office of the _Nicaraguense_, had

been destroyed or lost. Hence, a few days after the headquarters of the

army were moved to Rivas, the sub-secretary of Hacienda, Rogers, went to

San Juan del Norte for the purpose of purchasing the materials necessary

for the publication of the suspended newspaper. A number of officers, on

leave of absence, went down the river on the same steamer with Rogers.

Lockridge also, who had shown himself active in procuring emigration to

Nicaragua, was aboard the steamer on his way to New-Orleans. He seemed

anxious to serve the cause of the Americans in Nicaragua, and as there

was no place in the army he could suitably fill, he was sent to the

United States with the hope that he might be useful there. Emile Thomas,

too, and his brother Carlos, repaired to San Juan del Norte at the same

time.

As these passengers for the mouth of the San Juan steamed down the river

they saw some suspicious looking rafts floating out of the San Carlos,

and Emile Thomas, a watchful and discreet man, familiar with the country

and its people, advised a scrutiny into the meaning of the singular

appearance. Some have sought to place on Rogers the whole blame of the

neglect to follow the advice of Thomas, and there were not wanting

persons who attributed the negligence to design. But whatever may have

been the previous faults of Rogers, it must be admitted that he served

the cause of Nicaragua with a singleness of purpose and honesty of action

which might have shamed the conduct of those who spoke evil of him. And

on this occasion there were aboard the steamer officers whose duty it was

to ascertain the meaning of the rafts, whereas such was no part of the

duty specially pertaining to Rogers’ office or orders. The responsibility

of neglecting the rafts must rest on other shoulders than those of the

sub-secretary of Hacienda.

It was not long after the steamer passed the mouth of the San Carlos

before the meaning of the rafts became apparent. On the 23d of December,

while the company stationed at the mouth of the Serapaqui were at

dinner, they were surprised by a body of Costa Ricans about 120 strong,

led on by a man named Spencer. When Thompson, who commanded at the

Serapaqui, was attacked by Spencer, he had no sentries posted, and the

arms of the men were at some little distance from the place where they

were dining. Spencer had got to the rear of the American camp, and by

placing a soldier in the top of a tree he was able to know accurately

the state of Thompson’s camp. The surprise was complete, and most of the

Americans were either killed or wounded. Thompson was made prisoner; his

conduct and courage were praised by the Costa Ricans, and he himself was

liberated soon after being taken to San Juan del Norte. Well might the

Costa Ricans afford to laud Thompson, for it was his criminal neglect

of duty which enabled them to get possession of the point at the mouth

of the Serapaqui, and thereby secured the success of their subsequent

operations.

Spencer had marched with his Costa Ricans from San José to a point on

the San Carlos river, some miles above its mouth, and had thence floated

his men on rafts down to the mouth of the Serapaqui. In addition to the

force which attacked Thompson on the 23d, a large body of soldiers had

been marched to the San Carlos, under the orders of General José Joaquin

Mora, brother of the President, Juan Rafael Mora, and commander-in-chief

of the Costa Rican army. The march was very difficult from the nature

of the country through which it was made, the region between San José

and the San Carlos being entirely uninhabited, and wholly destitute of

subsistence. The road over which Mora marched was a mere trail, and his

soldiers had at times to cut their way with machetes through the thick

undergrowth. The results of the march depended wholly on the success of

Spencer’s efforts to get possession of the river San Juan and of the

boats plying on it, and Spencer, as we have seen, owed his first and most

important success to the gross and criminal negligence of Thompson at the

Serapaqui.

After the surprise of Thompson, Spencer again took to his rafts and

floated to the harbor of San Juan del Norte. He reached there during the

night of the 23d, and on the morning of the 24th he had possession of all

the river steamers at Punta Arenas. The United States commercial agent

at San Juan del Norte called on the commander of the English forces off

that port to protect American interests from the soldiers of Costa Rica.

To this request Capt. Erskine of the Orion replied that “he had taken

steps, by landing a party of marines from one of Her Majesty’s ship,

to protect the persons and private property of Capt. Joseph Scott, his

family and all citizens of the United States of America;” but as regards

the capture of the steamers he adds: “To prevent all misapprehension, I

think it, however, right to state that the steamers and other property

belonging to the Accessory Transit Company being at this moment the

subject of a dispute between two different companies, the representatives

of which are on the spot, and one of them authorizing the seizure, I do

not feel justified in taking any steps which may affect the interests

of either party. With respect to the participation of a force of Costa

Ricans in the seizure and transfer of the steamers alluded to, I must

observe that these steamers having been for some months past employed

in embarking in this port and conveying to the parties with whom Costa

Rica is now carrying on active hostilities, men and munitions of war, it

appears that as a non-belligerent I am prohibited by the law of nations

from preventing the execution of such operations by a belligerent party.”

Of course it was a mere act of comity for a British officer to protect

American property at Punta Arenas; but the subtlety of distinguishing

between American property in dispute and that not in dispute, was a

convenient invention for the occasion. If Capt. Erskine desired to

protect American property his plain course was to maintain those in

possession. As to the question of the right of Costa Rica to seize the

steamers it will more properly come up when we inquire why the United

States had, at this time, no naval force at San Juan del Norte.

When Spencer had secured the river boats in the harbor of San Juan he

proceeded to the mouth of the San Carlos and communicated to General

Mora—then at the embarcadero, some miles up the latter river—the success

of the operations below. As the small steamer Spencer sent up the

San Carlos approached a picket of Costa Ricans posted on a raft, the

soldiers, frightened by the noise and appearance of such a boat as they

had never before seen, plunged into the river and were drowned in their

efforts to reach the shore. At the embarcadero Mora had, according to

Costa Rican accounts, eight hundred men, with a rear guard of three

hundred more expected each moment to arrive. To supply this force with

subsistence six hundred men were employed in carrying provisions from the

capital to the river. Much of the transportation between those points was

done on the backs of men, as the trail is difficult for even mules.

Castillo was forthwith occupied by the Costa Ricans; and Spencer,

taking the steamer which runs over the Toro Rapids, easily succeeded,

by concealing his men, in getting possession of the lake steamer, La

Virgen, then lying at the mouth of the Zavalos, awaiting the return

of Rogers from San Juan del Norte. Then proceeding to Fort San Carlos

he lured aboard the steamer Capt. Kruger, commanding that post. The

first-lieutenant of Kruger had been sent to headquarters on business

connected with the garrison at San Carlos; and his second lieutenant,

Tayloe, had been killed at Granada, while marching as a volunteer under

Waters to the relief of Henningsen. Hence, after Kruger’s capture by

Spencer, the post was in charge of a sergeant, and Kruger so far forgot

his duty as to permit Spencer, under a threat of death, to extort from

him an order directing the sergeant to surrender the post to the enemy.

The sergeant, taken by surprise, was less to blame for obeying the order

than was the captain for signing it.

Thus the Costa Ricans were in possession of the San Juan river from

Fort San Carlos to the sea, and they also held the smallest of the lake

steamers, the La Virgen. On the latter steamer they had also taken some

arms and ammunition intended for the service of Nicaragua. But the

occupation of the river and the seizure of the La Virgen would have been

comparatively useless to them and harmless to Walker without the capture

of the steamer San Carlos. The loss of the river might have been easily

repaired by the force then at Rivas, but the loss of the control over

the lake was a much more serious event. Spencer well knew that he could

not venture on the lake with the La Virgen as long as the larger and

faster steamer remained in the hands of the Americans, and, therefore, he

prevailed on Mora to keep his Costa Ricans quiet until the San Carlos got

into the river with passengers from California for the Atlantic States.

Early in the afternoon of the 2d of January, 1857, the Sierra Nevada

arrived at San Juan del Sur from San Francisco. Her passengers were

in a few hours aboard of the San Carlos ready to cross the lake. Some

anxiety had been felt at Rivas on account of the long delay of the La

Virgen in the river, but it was easy to imagine causes why she had not

yet returned to Virgin Bay. Therefore the steamer San Carlos, with the

passengers aboard, unsuspectingly approached Fort San Carlos and passed

into the river without seeing any cause for alarm on shore. But when the

steamer had passed the fort, Spencer, who was aboard a river boat with a

force of Costa Ricans, hailed the San Carlos, demanding her surrender.

There were a number of Nicaraguan officers on the San Carlos, going to

the United States, but in the midst of the confusion, created by the

surprise, Spencer got aboard of the lake steamer and soon had possession

of her. The captain of the San Carlos, a cool, bold Dane, proposed to

run the steamer back into the lake under the guns of the fort, and the

movement might have been made without any great danger or loss of life.

But Harris, jointly interested with his father-in-law, Morgan, in the

transit contract across Nicaragua, happened to be aboard the steamer, and

he refused to permit Capt. Ericsson to make the attempt. By the surrender

of the San Carlos the Costa Ricans got control of the lake, and thus

they were enabled to communicate rapidly and readily with the Allies at

Masaya, while Walker was cut off from any direct communication with the

Caribbean sea.

It is clear that the success of Mora’s movement to the San Juan river was

due to the skill and daring of Spencer. The march to the San Carlos with

all its expense and all its fatigues would have been useless without

the aid of the bold hand which got possession of the river steamers.

And the success of Spencer was the reward of a rashness which, in war,

sometimes supplies the place of prudent design and wise combinations. The

fortune which proverbially favors the brave certainly aided Spencer much

in his operations. Mora afterward Attempted to depreciate the value of

the services Spencer rendered him; and the brutality of the man toward

the soldiers soon made it an object for the Costa Rican General to get

rid of him. But it would be difficult to overestimate the advantages

the Allies derived from the services of the base and murderous man who

did not scruple for the sake of lucre to imbrue his hands in the blood

of countrymen straggling to maintain the rights of their race against a

cruel and vindictive foe.

Unfortunately for the honor of human nature, Spencer was not the only

American who co-operated with the Costa Ricans for the purpose of robbing

the naturalized Nicaraguans of the rights they had in Central America. As

to Spencer’s immediate employers their conduct need not excite surprise;

for gain is the god of their idolatry, and at Ephesus they would have

persecuted the Apostle to the Gentiles for teaching a religion which

destroyed their trade in shrines. From such as these he is but a fool

who expects aught high in principle or unselfish in action. But we are

entitled to expect loftier sentiment and nobler actions from the men who

aspire to govern states and control policies. As Spencer’s operations

closed the American transit across Nicaragua, it is not unimportant to

ascertain if any public persons besides the Moras of Costa Rica and

their Allies in Central America are directly or remotely responsible for

the act. Especially is this becoming in view of the fact that no less a

person than the President of the United States[5] has, in a grave annual

message to the Houses of Congress, declared with most indecent inaccuracy

that the Transit was closed in February, 1856, by the revocation of the

charters of the Ship Canal and of the Accessory Transit Companies.

As early as the month of April, 1856, the American Secretary of State,

Mr. Marcy, had been advised by the Costa Rican government that it

meditated the seizure of the river and lake steamers and the consequent

destruction of the Transit. At that time Mr. Marcy replied such an

act would not be regarded with indifference by the United States. The

language of the Secretary implied that the American government would deem

it a duty to prevent such acts. And such a position was worthy of an

American Minister. Undoubtedly Costa Rica, at war with Nicaragua, had a

right not only to prevent the latter from using the property of neutrals

for the purpose of transporting military persons and stores; and she

might also take possession of such property and use it, as lawfully as

Nicaragua, for the conveyance of her own troops and military equipments.

But this did not involve the right of Costa Rica to confiscate the

property of neutrals used by her enemy for purposes of transportation.

Neutral ships at sea are liable to capture by a belligerent if they are

found having aboard military stores or persons belonging to the enemy;

for at sea, such an act on the part of a neutral is one of choice and

not of compulsion. But on land, or within the territory of a country at

war, where the property of neutrals is entirely under the control of

the belligerent sovereign, the involuntary act of the neutral certainly

cannot subject him to the loss of his property. Hence Mr. Marcy was right

when he told Costa Rica, to all intents and purposes, that the use of

American property by Nicaragua did not make it forfeit if taken by the

enemy; and still less could it justify the destruction of a franchise,

such as the Transit across the Isthmus, held by the owners of the lake

and river steamers. When Walker saw the declaration Mr. Marcy made to

the Costa Rican Minister, he felt assured the Allies would not attempt

to interrupt the Transit and thus risk a rupture with the United States.

Nor, in the face of this declaration, is it probable that Costa Rica

would have attempted to break up the Transit without assurances of the

act not provoking active hostilities from the American Republic.

Heretofore we have seen the decided opposition of the Secretary of

State to the American movement in Nicaragua. But he was reluctantly

compelled to give way to the President in reference to the reception of

Father Vigil. Mr. Pierce was, in May, 1856, seeking the nomination of

the democratic party for a re-election; hence he was able to resolve

on a policy displeasing to his chief minister. After the Cincinnati

Convention, it was easier for the Secretary to manage the President; and

the departure of Father Vigil from Washington having been procured,

Mr. Marcy was relieved from the presence of a Minister of Nicaragua. He

immediately ordered Mr. Wheeler to demand the causes of the revocation

of the Accessory Transit charter; but in August he was disappointed at

a reply which entirely justified the act of the Rivas administration.

If, however, Mr. Wheeler proved not pliant to the purposes of the

Secretary, it was easy to secure British aid for getting the Americans

out of Nicaragua. And if Mr. Marcy would silently permit British power to

accomplish this object, he might hope for a strong interest in the city

of New-York to aid his ambitious schemes.

It is difficult to imagine that an American Secretary of State would

thus connive at a plan for driving his countrymen from the Isthmus; but

pride of opinion and desire for office were Mr. Marcy’s leading passions,

and one of these had been hurt by the reception of Father Vigil and the

other was pleased at the hope of conciliating a strong influence in his

own State. The evidences, too, of this connivance, are too palpable to

escape the notice of the least observing. By the middle of September,

1856, the British had stationed off San Juan del Norte a strong fleet,

of eight vessels, carrying several hundred guns, and evidently with a

view of influencing the result of the war in Central America. No United

States vessels were sent thither to watch the movements or ascertain

the intentions of the British fleet. The objects of the fleet had been

foreshadowed in the previous April by the attempt of the British vessel

Eurydice to prevent the passengers of the Orizaba from going up the

river. At that time the commodore of the American squadron in the

Caribbean had been instructed to show the United States flag at San Juan

del Norte; and if it was expedient for the American flag to be displayed

when only a single British man-of-war was in the harbor, how much more

pressing the necessity when several hundred British guns were pointed at

the Isthmian transit.

Not only did the American Secretary of State quietly permit a strong

British fleet to take its station off San Juan del Norte and there await

a favorable opportunity to act against the naturalized Nicaraguans; but

he was also advised by Costa Rica of her intention to close the transit

if she had the requisite military force. On the first of November the

President of Costa Rica published a decree, declaring in its second

article: “The navigation of the river San Juan del Norte is prohibited

to all kinds of vessels while hostilities against the invaders of

the Central American soil continues.” And the fourth article of the

same decree orders: “The officers and military forces of the Republic

will carry out this decree, using for that purpose every means within

their reach.” Here was a public and explicit declaration to Mr. Marcy

notifying him that if he desired to keep the Transit from being closed

during the hostilities between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, he must have

United States vessels at San Juan del Norte to resist force with force.

The United States had a consul in Costa Rica to advise it of the acts

of the government there; and so well aware was her Britannic Majesty’s

consul, Allan Wallis, of the movement against the Transit that with

evident reference thereto he published, at San José, on the 26th Nov.,

the following notice: “All persons residing in this Republic, claiming

to be British subjects, are requested to send into this office with as

little delay as possible, and not later than the 20th prox., their names,

professions or occupations and places of residence, with the names of

the members of their family, if any.” Singular, too, as it may seem, the

Secretary of State did not, after the order of Mora’s decree of the first

of November was executed, take any steps to re-establish the Transit or

protect those who were aiming to re-open it from the interference of the

British naval forces. These facts, together with others to be hereafter

related concerning the acts of American naval officers on the Pacific

coast of Nicaragua, lead irresistibly to the conclusion that Mr. Marcy

co-operated with the British government in its Central American policy.

An insight into the policy of the American Secretary of State is

necessary to a due understanding of the events which followed Spencer’s

operations on the San Juan river. The Costa Rican soldiers who

accompanied the passengers from California to Punta Arenas were scarcely

able to leave on their return up the river before the steamer Texas

arrived in the port of San Juan del Norte with nearly two hundred men for

the service of Nicaragua. But these men not having been received by the

State could not act in the name of the government. Hence Mr. Harris, the

agent of the owners of the lake and river steamers, selected Lockridge,

who was at San Juan del Norte, as a proper person to regain possession of

their property for the Transit contractors. As before stated, Lockridge

had been ordered to New-Orleans on special duty; and had the task of

re-opening the Transit been a strictly military enterprise, the duties

of command would naturally have devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Rudler, the

senior officer present at San Juan del Norte, and lately charged with the

defence of the River frontier. Rudler had a leave of absence to visit

the United States; but he had only to tear up his leave and resume his

right to command on the river in order to have full authority over any

expedition attempted in the name of Nicaragua. But merit is modest and

unobtrusive, while pretension is forward and presumptuous; therefore,

Lockridge was put in command of the men who were expected to clear the

river of the Costa Ricans, and Rudler left for New-Orleans. In addition

to the men by the Texas, General C. R. Wheat, and Colonel Anderson, with

some forty others from New-York, arrived at Punta Arenas on the ninth of

January by the James Adger. Arms and ammunition were not wanting for the

whole of Lockridge’s command; and the supply of provisions was abundant.

Lockridge remained for some days at Punta Arenas, engaged with Joseph N.

Scott in fitting up one of the old disused river steamers for purposes

of transportation. But he was not allowed to work without interruption

by the British naval officers. On the morning of the 16th of January,

Capt. Cockburn, of H. B. M.’s ship Cossack, went ashore at Punta Arenas,

and inquired for the commander of the armed men occupying the point. On

meeting Lockridge, Capt. Cockburn informed him he had received orders

from Capt. Erskine, of Her Majesty’s ship Orion, and “senior officer

of Her Majesty’s ships and vessels employed on the coasts of Central

America,” to offer protection to any British subjects who might be

detained and compelled to bear arms against their will. In accordance

with his instructions, Capt. Cockburn demanded a list of all the men at

Punta Arenas, and required them to be paraded in his presence, that he

might read to them the orders of Capt. Erskine. The men were accordingly

drawn up on the beach, and Cockburn read to them the order of Erskine.

The concluding sentences of the order were: “Should any of the party in

question claim protection as British subjects, and their claims appear to

you to be well founded, you will acquaint the officer commanding, that

these men must be permitted to withdraw from their present position;

and you will (in the event of his acquiescence) either give these men

a passage to Greytown, or take them on board Her Majesty’s ship under

your command, to await my decision as to their disposal, as they may

desire. In the event of the aforesaid officer resisting such a course

as I have pointed out, you will inform him that, in the first place,

no person whatever under his command will be permitted to leave their

present position, to proceed up the river or elsewhere, until my demands

shall be complied with; and, secondly, that I will adopt such measures

to enforce the rights of British subjects as I may think best adapted

to the purpose.” Ten men claimed and received protection under the

order of Erskine, and were taken from the point in Cockburn’s boat. The

instructions of Her Majesty’s government must have been indeed stringent,

when they induced honorable officers to degrade themselves to the work

of inciting men to desert a cause they had voluntarily embraced; for

Cockburn, not satisfied with reading Erskine’s orders, had also advised

the whole of Lockridge’s command of the dangers they ran in attacking the

large force the Costa Ricans had concentrated on the river.

Thus the demoralization of Lockridge’s men was commenced before they

left Punta Arenas. The Americans—at least the good men among them—were,

of course, indignant at the course the British pursued; but all the

Europeans were more or less affected by this English interference. Nor

is it in the nature of men long to respect those claiming authority

over them, when they see such persons humbled by the actions of others.

Hence it was all-important for Lockridge to get beyond the reach of

British interference. Not only was he daily losing men by the policy the

British practised; but the effectiveness of those remaining with him was

constantly diminished. Finally the small steamer was got ready for going

up the river, and Lockridge moved his whole force to a point several

miles below the mouth of the Serapaqui.

On the morning of the 4th of February the Texas again arrived from

New-Orleans at San Juan del Norte, having aboard H. T. Titus, known in

Kansas as Col. Titus, in charge of about one hundred and eighty men.

Many of the persons with Titus had been his companions in Kansas, and

probably most of them were made of better stuff than their leader. But

his swaggering air had imposed on many people; and the contest in which

he was said to have been engaged, gave him a sort of newspaper notoriety,

thus making his name familiar as the leader of the “border ruffians.”

Lockridge organized Titus and his men in a separate body, and soon a

jealousy rather than rivalry sprang up between the new-comers and those

acting under Anderson. Attached to the command of the latter was Capt.

Doubleday, formerly of the Nicaraguan service; and several others who

were yet in the service, acted under Anderson’s orders. All of Titus’ men

were entirely new to the country.

Soon after Titus arrived, Lockridge, by a sharp skirmish, got possession

of Cody’s Point, a piece of high ground just opposite the mouth of the

Serapaqui; and Wheat thence opened a cannonade on the defences the Costa

Ricans had built on the opposite side of the San Juan river. But the

fire of Wheat’s guns was not of such a character as to make a serious

impression on the enemy; and it was only after Col. Anderson had crossed

the river and succeeded in harassing the Costa Rican flank and rear with

riflemen, that the Americans drove the enemy from the Serapaqui, and

got possession of both sides of the river. The Costa Ricans left behind

a number of killed and wounded, besides two guns, some small-arms and

ammunition, and a supply of military clothing. A yet more important

portion of the articles captured were certain letters from General Mora

detailing the condition of his force on the San Juan, and urging the

necessity for fresh troops, in order to hold his position on the river.

The Costa Ricans were driven from the mouth of the Serapaqui on the

morning of the 13th of February; and the next day Titus, with some

hundred and forty men, ascended the river on the little steamer Rescue

with the view of attacking Castillo. Anderson was placed in charge

of Hipp’s Point; and the contest between him and Titus, as to rank,

had increased the disorganization and disorder already existing in

Lockridge’s command. Desertions were frequent, and were, of course,

encouraged by the protection and assistance the English gave to the

deserters. The heavy rains made camp life disagreeable, and its duties

arduous; and much labor was necessary in order to protect the men from

the weather. Thus the movements were impeded; and much care was necessary

to keep the ammunition in a state fit for use. Numbers were sick with

fever; but considering the exposure and fatigues to which the men were

subjected, their health was not bad.

On the other hand the difficulties of the Costa Ricans were not slight.

After getting possession of the San Juan and of the lake, Mora had

communicated with the Allies at Masaya; and movements were undertaken

which will be more particularly described hereafter. Suffice it to say

here, that these movements entailed heavy draughts on the force Mora held

on the river; and in addition to this the Costa Ricans coming from the

high lands about San José, suffered much with fever when they reached the

low country on the San Juan. Thus by the necessities of the Allies for

troops in the western part of Nicaragua, and by the effects of disease

in the force occupying the river, the garrison at Castillo was reduced

to a trifling figure; and when Titus appeared before the fort Cauty, an

Englishman commanding at Castillo, had, according to some, twenty-five,

and according to others, fifty men.

When Titus landed near the fort of Castillo Viejo, he found the houses

of the village in flames, and the small steamer Machuca also rapidly

burning. He succeeded, however, in cutting loose the steamer J. N.

Scott, and although her machinery was somewhat damaged, it was easily

repaired in the course of two or three days’ work. Soon after he appeared

at Castillo, Titus sent to Cauty a demand to surrender the fort; and

the reply was a proposal for an armistice of twenty-four hours, with

a promise of surrender in case the garrison were not relieved by the

expiration of that time. Strange to say the proposal of Cauty was

accepted; and it was not difficult for him to send a courier to Fort

San Carlos with news of his position. Of course, before the armistice

expired, reinforcements for Cauty were landed a short distance above the

fort; and on the appearance of the fresh Costa Ricans, Titus retreated

in great disorder and confusion. The retreat was made before the number

of the relieving party was even approximately ascertained; and the fact,

that the Americans were able to escape without any protection to their

rear, shows the enemy did not arrive with much force.

After the Americans withdrew, or rather fled, from Castillo, they

halted at San Carlos Island, a few miles below the fort. On this island

Lockridge threw up some works for defence from the enemy, and also built,

with much labor, sheds for protection from the weather. The repulse at

Castillo, shameful in its character, added to the demoralization of the

whole command on the river, and desertions accordingly increased. Such,

too, was the feeling against Titus that he gave up his command and left

for San Juan del Norte, with the intention of going by Panama to Rivas.

When he arrived at San Juan del Norte his insulting language to one of

the British officers led to his arrest and detention for a few hours. At

the same time Titus was arrested the steamer Rescue was detained; but she

was soon released when the U. S. sloop of war Saratoga was seen coming

into port. This single fact shows how different might have been the

conduct of the British naval forces had there been a few United States

vessels stationed off San Juan del Norte.

In the latter part of February Walker sent an aide, Major Baldwin,

from Rivas by Panama, to Lockridge, confirming the latter in his

command on the river, and also informing him of the importance of early

communication either around or across the lake. The orders sent to

Lockridge were, if he found it impossible to take Castillo and San Carlos

without great sacrifice, to cut a road from the river either to Chontales

or the southern shore of the lake, and march by land to Rivas. The cause

of these orders will hereafter appear; and it is sufficient here to say,

that one chief reason for Walker’s holding Rivas was, the apprehension

that Lockridge, reaching the Meridional department, might be placed

in an awkward position by finding the town in the possession of the

Allies. Baldwin arrived at San Juan del Norte about the middle of March,

and nearly at the same time with some hundred and thirty fresh men,

principally from Mobile and Texas, and directed respectively by Major W.

C. Capers and Captain Marcellus French.

With this reinforcement under Capers and French, Lockridge’s numbers

had been so reduced by desertion and sickness, that his effective force

scarcely reached four hundred. The men, however, were for the most

part of excellent quality, and in other hands might have accomplished

much. French’s command particularly was, by general consent, composed

of fine materials. But these men arrived too late; and they met on the

river bands which had been disorganized by bad conduct and ill fortune.

Lockridge, however, determined to make another effort to get possession

of Castillo Viejo; and with this purpose he prepared nearly his whole

command for an attack on the fort.

Landing his force a short distance below Castillo and out of sight of

the enemy, he led his men by a trail through the woods to a position

near an elevation, known as Nelson’s Hill. This elevation commands the

fort, and the Costa Ricans having entrenched it were occupying the

summit. Along the sides of the hill they had cut some trees and formed

a sort of chevaux-de-frise; and by clearing away the undergrowth for

some distance around the summit, they had made the approach difficult

and dangerous. After reconnoitring the position of the enemy, Lockridge

deemed it imprudent to hazard an attack; and calling the principal

officers together and asking their opinions, he received the concurrence

of all as to the expediency of retiring without engaging the enemy. The

resolution was wise, for defeat would almost inevitably have been the

result of an attempt on the Costa Rican defences. The opportune moment

for taking Castillo had been lost through the incapacity of Titus, and

with a month to prepare for a second attack, the enemy had not been

idle. Even if the Costa Ricans had been less strongly posted, the moral

condition of Lockridge’s force was not such as to warrant ordering them

on any hazardous service.

After Lockridge retired from Castillo the men began to discuss plans

for the future, and all appear to have agreed on the propriety of

abandoning the river. It was clear that the effort to re-open the

Transit had entirely failed, and the leader of the enterprise drawing

up the men informed them that he proposed to try to reach Rivas by the

Isthmus of Panama, and called on all who wished to follow him to step

from the ranks. Near a hundred persons agreed to take this course; and

the remainder of the men were deprived of their arms and virtually

discharged. Then the disarmed men sought means to reach the mouth of the

river. Not waiting for the steamer they took the boats they could put

their hands on, and some floated on logs to the harbor of San Juan del

Norte. The panic-stricken crowd thought the Costa Ricans were hot in

pursuit; and each over-anxious for his own safety added to the fright of

his fellows.

The men who had agreed to go with Lockridge to Rivas descended the

river more leisurely than the fugitives; but ill luck pursued them to

the last. On the way to San Juan del Norte, the steamer J. N. Scott was

blown up, and several of those proposing to go to Panama were killed and

others were painfully and dangerously scalded. This accident entirely

discouraged the men who yet adhered to Lockridge, and forthwith the idea

of crossing the New-Granadian Isthmus was abandoned by them. It was an

absurd plan at any rate; for it was folly to suppose, under the existing

circumstances, that known enemies of Costa Rica, either armed or unarmed,

would be permitted in numbers to cross the territory of a neutral State,

or rather of a Republic, hostile to those called “filibusters.”

Of course the English were glad to furnish means to all the men who

reached San Juan for leaving Central America. Accordingly a large number

of the destitute and disappointed expeditionists were sent to New-Orleans

on H. B. M.’s steamer, Tartar; and the passages of others were paid with

drafts drawn by Capt. Erskine who held the arms of Lockridge’s command

to secure himself against the loss on the drafts. In a few days nearly

all the remains of Lockridge’s force had left the shores of Nicaragua;

and most were bitter in their expressions concerning the weakness and

incapacity of the man who attempted to lead them up the river. It may

not be amiss, however, while concluding the narrative of Lockridge’s

operations on the San Juan to say that Walker refused to listen to the

censure passed on the unfortunate commander until he heard fully the

facts of the case; and it was not until he heard from Lockridge himself

the story of his undertaking that Walker formed an opinion as to the

merits of the leader of the San Juan expedition.

During the attempt of Lockridge to open the Transit the efforts of the

friends of Nicaragua in the United States were more active and fruitful

than at any previous period. The Southern States, satisfied of their

inability to carry slavery into Kansas, were then prepared to concentrate

their labors on Central America; and not only were the men who went to

the San Juan of good quality, but they were also furnished with excellent

supplies and equipments. Had the same effort and expenditure been made

three months earlier, the establishment of the Americans in Nicaragua

would have been fixed beyond a peradventure.