Walker had not been many hours at Masaya before he received letters from

Col. Natzmer relating strange events at Leon. On the morning of the 12th

the military governor of the department, Escobar, had asked a detail of

Americans to guard the _Principal_—a strong building on the Plaza where

the arms and ammunition were stored—and no sooner was the sentry from the

Rifles posted than a singular movement was perceptible in the town. The

President and the Ministers hastily left the government house near the

Principal, and Mariano Salazar on horseback rode through the streets,

proclaiming that the Americans were about to make Rivas prisoner and to

assassinate the Ministers and chief men of the city. The excitement soon

became intense; the barriers of San Felipe, one of the most turbulent

quarters of the town, began to send forth its unquiet residents, some

of them armed and all endeavoring to increase the popular ferment.

Then it was reported Rivas had left the city; and the women, regarding

the movement as a revolution and the signal of war, commenced packing

their trunks and closing their doors and windows. Natzmer, seeing the

threatening aspect of the men at the barriers, called the Americans to

the Plaza and placing them under arms, prepared for defence.

At once a courier was despatched to Chinandega with orders for Lieut.

Dolan—who was there with a company of Rifles—to march immediately for

Leon. Dolan was but a short distance on his march, when he met Rivas

and Jerez riding toward Chinandega. The singularity of the fact made

him suspect something was wrong, and he thought of arresting them on

their way; but the surgeon with him, Dr. Dawson, who had lived for many

years in Nicaragua, suggested that it would not be proper for a simple

lieutenant to arrest the President and one of his Ministers. Dolan,

therefore, marched on without molesting them, and soon joined Anderson in

the Plaza.

As soon as these tidings reached Walker, he ordered Col. Jaquess, then

in Masaya with his command, to prepare for a march; and Jaquess with the

Rangers was in a short time on the road to Managua. Couriers met Walker

every few hours on his way toward Leon; and when near Nagarote he was met

by Ferdinand Schlessinger—a man to whom Rivas had given a commission to

fortify the harbor of Realejo. Schlessinger told the general-in-chief,

that Rivas and Jerez were at Chinandega, barricading the town, and

pressing natives into military service; also, that they had given him

orders to stop the works at Point Ycaco, and in consequence of his

suspicions he had made good his escape. At the same time, letters from

Natzmer informed Walker that Jerez, as Minister of War, had issued orders

to him to disoccupy the towers of the cathedral, where riflemen had been

placed, in order that troops of the country might be stationed there.

Natzmer forwarded the order to Walker, awaiting his instructions on the

subject.

As soon as Natzmer’s letter reached Walker, he sent the order to obey the

command of Jerez, and to withdraw the whole American force from Leon to

Nagarote. The designs of Rivas and Jerez were now apparent to everybody;

and they had, on their arrival at Chinandega, gone so far as to send a

commissioner to invite the troops of Carrera into the State, and to urge

their immediate approach to Leon. Jerez had given the order to Natzmer,

supposing it would not be obeyed, thereby hoping to make the movement

against the Americans turn on their disobedience to a lawful authority.

But Walker was not disposed to have the coming struggle occur on any such

issue. He determined to have the contest made on more formal grounds.

Not knowing, either, how far the defection of the native leaders had

spread, he was anxious to concentrate his force scattered on a long line

from Leon to Castillo; therefore military no less than political reasons

led him to await with Jaquess at Nagarote the arrival of Natzmer and

Anderson, and then to march with the united force toward Granada.

A number of the native residents about Leon and some families accompanied

the Rifles to Nagarote, and among them were D. José Maria Valle and

D. Mateo Pineda. The latter was a man of rare truth and fidelity for

a Central American—in fact, his virtues would make him remarkable in

any country. With a name so pure that it has escaped the malice of

his enemies during all the civil disturbances of Nicaragua, he stands

almost a solitary example, in that distracted land, of spotless faith

and unshaken loyalty. He has required no defence save his high honor and

stainless character to protect him from the persecutions of political

enemies; and if other proofs were lacking of the devotion the Americans

in Nicaragua yielded to right and justice, they might find ample evidence

in the single fact that Mateo Pineda adhered to their fortunes in each

extremity of good and evil.

When the Rifles reached Nagarote they, with the Rangers and the new

infantry battalion, took up the line of march for Masaya. At Managua they

found the commandant of the post, José Herrera, firm in his faith to the

Americans, and he remained true until death, in spite of a brother’s

efforts to seduce him from the path of military duty, being executed by

the allies, under the sentence of a court-martial some time afterward,

for his adhesion to the Americans.

On arriving at Granada, the general-in-chief published the decree

re-constructing the provisional government by virtue of the treaty of

the twenty-third of October. That treaty guaranteed the naturalized

Nicaraguans equality of privileges with the native born; but the

President and his ministers had violated it by attempting to create

distinctions to the prejudice of the naturalized citizens. Walker had

sworn, not only to observe the treaty himself, but to cause it to be

observed. He remained the sole sponsor for Rivas before Nicaragua and

before the world; and he would have deserved to be branded as a perjured

man had he permitted Rivas with impunity not merely to excite the

passions of the people against the Americans, but to invite the foreign

foe into the State with a view of expelling the naturalized soldiers. In

addition to the duties devolved on Walker by his oath to cause the treaty

to be observed, he had been invested with unlimited authority to protect

the Oriental and Meridional Departments from the foreign enemies of the

Republic; but how could such protection be afforded if the orders of the

political power, giving the enemy free entry into the State, were to be

respected? Therefore, the commissioner for the Oriental and Meridional

Departments, D. Fermin Ferrer, was named Provisional President until the

people might select their own ruler, under the decree issued by Rivas on

the 10th of June. The same day the decree was published Walker issued an

address to the people of Nicaragua, and after reciting the acts of the

Rivas government, he concluded: “With such accumulated crimes—conspiring

against the very people it was bound to protect—the late provisional

government was no longer worthy of existence. In the name of the people

I have, therefore, declared its dissolution, and have organized a

provisional government, until the nation exercises its natural right of

electing its own rulers.”

Under the decree of the 10th of June the election for President took

place on the fourth Sunday of the month and the two succeeding days. The

voting was general in the Oriental and Meridional Departments; but as D.

Patricio Rivas rescinded his own decree after reaching Chinandega, and

as the Guatemalans had already passed the northern frontier of the State

there were no ballots cast in the Occidental Department. A large majority

of the votes polled were for the general-in-chief; and the Provisional

President, Ferrer, declaring the result of the election by decree,

fixed on the 12th of July for the inauguration of the President elect.

Accordingly, on the appointed day, with due observances, both civil and

religious, Walker took the oath of office on the Plaza of Granada, and

was installed as Chief Executive of the Republic of Nicaragua.

A few days after the decree of the 20th of June was published, the

Costa Rican schooner, San José, commanded by Gilbert Morton, entered

the port of San Juan del Sur. She had been purchased from her former

owner, Alvarado, by Mariano Salazar, and he had made Morton nominal

half-owner of the schooner, supposing she might thereby get the right

to carry American colors. The American vice-consul at Realejo, one

Giauffreau, gave the schooner what Morton called a sailing letter; and

the vice-consul, according to all accounts, was either so ignorant or

so neglectful of his duties as to permit the vessel to fly the American

flag and to be cleared from the port of Realejo under this pretended

sailing letter. The commandant at Chinandega, a Cuban, by the name of

Golibard, had been ordered away by Rivas because he refused to forsake

the Americans; and Golibard was aboard the San José when she arrived

at San Juan del Sur. Morton, thinking he could impose on the port

authorities with his sailing letter from Giauffreau, had not hesitated to

enter the harbor; and he, as well as Salazar, supposed they might, under

the American flag, drive a profitable trade with the schooner during

hostilities between Nicaragua and the other States.

But the San José had not been many hours in the port of San Juan before

she was seized, the charge against her being that she was without a flag

and without lawful papers. The schooner was American-built and had passed

from the flag of the United States to that of Costa Rica. Even if she had

then been re-sold to an American citizen she could not have recovered her

original character without an act of Congress. Morton, after the seizure,

appealed for relief to the U. S. States Minister at Granada: but on a

careful examination of the subject Mr. Wheeler was satisfied that the

schooner, far from being entitled to protection by American authority,

was really amenable for an abuse of the American flag. The San José was,

therefore, condemned by a court of admiralty jurisdiction at the port

of San Juan; and being forfeited to the government of Nicaragua, she

was converted into a schooner-of-war, bearing the flag of the Isthmian

Republic.

The Granada was armed with two six-pound carronades and was placed in

charge of Lieutenant Callender Irvine Fayssoux. This officer was a native

of Missouri, and had served for a time in the Texan navy under the orders

of Commodore Moore. He had also accompanied Gen. Lopez in his expedition

to the Island of Cuba in May, 1850; and at Cardenas he had contributed

essentially to the successful landing of the force from the steamer

Creole, by swimming ashore with a rope in his mouth when there was much

embarrassment as to the means of getting the boat up to the wharf.

His high qualities will hereafter appear when we come to relate the

history of the schooner; and it is only necessary here to say, that his

system and order were such, the Granada was ready for service in a very

short time. The men detailed from different companies of the army for

service on the schooner were soon brought under good discipline by their

efficient commander; and all of them felt they were subject to the orders

of one capable of command, and determined to have each man do his duty on

all occasions.

On the 29th of June, Col. John Allen of Kentucky arrived at Granada

with one hundred and four men for the service of the State; and on the

6th of July about the same number were landed coming from New-York,

from New-Orleans and from California. A day or two after the latter

arrival, Major Waters, with about a hundred Rangers, marched to Leon and

reconnoitred the town. He found it barricaded in every quarter, and the

Guatemalans under General Paredes were occupying the main Plaza. On the

approach of Waters all the pickets of the enemy were drawn in, and their

whole force was put under arms for action. But no portion of the enemy

ventured to leave the barricades. After passing through the suburbs of

the city and examining the preparations of the enemy for defence, Waters

returned to Granada with a report showing the inability of the Allies—as

they called themselves—to move until they had received large additions of

force.

After the inauguration of Walker on the 12th of July, his cabinet was

formed by the appointment of D. Fermin Ferrer as Minister of Relations,

D. Mateo Pineda as Minister of War, and D. Manuel Carrascosa as Minister

of Hacienda and Public Credit. The organization of the new government

was duly communicated to the American Minister; and on the 19th of July

Mr. Wheeler was received by the President at the government house in

Granada. The Minister opened his address to the Executive of Nicaragua,

saying: “I am directed by the President of the United States to notify

you that I am instructed to establish relations with this State.” Mr.

Wheeler thus showed himself far bolder and more decided than Mr. Pierce

had been at Washington. It is true the government at Washington had

instructed its minister “to establish relations” with the government of

Nicaragua; but at the time the order was given it was thought Rivas would

be in power at Granada. Mr. Marcy had also instructed Mr. Wheeler to ask

explanations concerning the revocation of the charter of the Accessory

Transit Company, and to request the discharge from the Nicaraguan army of

two or three boys—among them a son and nephew, I think, of Senator Bayard

of Delaware—who had run off from school and gone to Central America in

search of novelty and adventure. Of course the explanations of the decree

of revocation and the discharges of the boys could be obtained only from

Walker; and hence the minister had either to disregard the orders of Mr.

Marcy or to recognize the government of the lately-elected President.

The message Mr. Pierce sent to Congress, touching the reception of Father

Vigil, was strongly marked with the weakness and hesitation of American

diplomacy. The whole tone of the message was apologetic; and the American

President was throughout overcome by the false idea many people in the

United States had formed as to the Nicaraguan movement being one of

annexation to the Republic of the North. The representatives of France,

Spain, Brazil, and the Spanish American States, at Washington, seeing the

weakness of the United States, combined for the purpose of driving Father

Vigil from the country. So well did they succeed, that the Minister of

Nicaragua withdrew from the Federal Capital not many days after his

reception, and thus Mr. Marcy, aided by the intrigues of the foreign

representatives, might be able to take advantage of any opportunity

circumstances afforded to relieve the American cabinet from the awkward

position in which he fancied it had been placed. Hence the vexation of

the Secretary of State may be imagined when he heard Mr. Wheeler had, in

literally carrying out his instructions, recognized the government which

displaced that of Rivas.

Mr. Wheeler, being on the ground, and seeing the actual condition of

affairs, was never in doubt as to the policy his country ought to pursue

toward the parties contending in Nicaragua; but the Secretary of State

at Washington, remote from the scene of trouble, constantly wrought

on by the ministers of foreign countries, and dreading the effect the

new Nicaraguan movement would have on old political organizations in

the United States, was always averse to any action which might favor

the Americans in Nicaragua. Not many days, however, after Mr. Wheeler

recognized the Walker government, facts occurred showing in a strong

light the good policy of the American minister.

Lieut. Fayssoux, as soon as he was ready for sea, received orders to

sail northward from San Juan and cruise about the Gulf of Fonseca. It

was well known that the enemy were communicating with San Salvador and

Guatemala by bungos from Tempisque to La Union, and it was hoped the

Granada might intercept letters showing the state of affairs at Leon and

the relations of Rivas with the other States. The presence, too, of the

schooner in those waters could not fail to alarm the enemy and embarrass

the reinforcements going toward Leon. It was also reported that the enemy

were preparing vessels to send after the Granada in order to capture

her, and that these vessels were being fitted out at La Union, in the

State of San Salvador.

On the evening of the 21st of July, the schooner hove anchor and put to

sea, and on the afternoon of the 23d she was cruising off the entrance of

the Gulf of Fonseca. “At 3h. 30m.,” so the log runs, “saw a sail standing

out of the gulf: made chase. At 5h. 30m. brought her to with a shot from

the port gun. Capt. De Brissot (a passenger on the schooner) boarded her.

She proved to be the Italian brig Rostan, from La Union, bound to San

Juan del Sur. She reported two Chilian brigs and one Sardinian schooner

lying at La Union, and the French frigate Embuscade at Tiger Island.

At 7, took in flying-jib and foresail, and stood off and on, on the

lookout for a schooner that the Rostan reported due from the northward

and westward.” Then, on the 24th: “At 9h. 15m. A.M., saw a sail standing

out from La Union. At 2 P.M. light breezes from S. and W. At 4, standing

to the E., passed, on opposite tracks, the French frigate Embuscade. At

4h. 30m., saw a number of small craft to the E.: called all hands to

quarters. At 5, boarded the launch Maria, Capt. Braganda. She proving to

be French, and her papers all right, she was allowed to proceed on her

course to Tempisque. Capt. Braganda reported the same as the brig Rostan,

therefore, as there were none of the enemy’s vessels in the gulf, we

concluded to go out to look for the schooner from the N. and W.”

Nothing, however, was seen of the vessel expected from the northward and

westward, and on the 26th, the Granada again stood up the gulf. On the

27th, a bungo, with several passengers, was captured, and on the 28th, a

large boat from Tempisque was taken, and one of the passengers proved to

be Mariano Salazar. When Salazar was brought aboard the Granada he gave

his name as Francisco Salazar, but De Brissot had seen him at Realejo,

and, although not certain of the fact, told Fayssoux he thought the

prisoner was Don Mariano. In the same bungo with Salazar were several

letters for persons in San Salvador. The day after Salazar was taken, the

Granada sailed for San Juan del Sur, whence the prisoner and the letters

were immediately, on the schooner’s arrival, despatched for Granada.

Salazar was executed as a traitor on the Plaza of Granada late in the

afternoon of the 3d of August. It was Sunday, and the people of the town

gathered in numbers to witness the execution. They regarded Salazar as

the author of most of the misfortunes they had undergone during the civil

war. It was his money had fitted out the democratic bands which had

burnt the Jalteva, and robbed the shop-keepers of the suburbs; and they

regarded it as a special providence that he should be taken by a schooner

he had himself owned, and be executed by the Americans he had first used

and then attempted to betray. There was the same joyful feeling shown

by the old Legitimists at the death of Salazar as had been shown by the

Democrats at the execution of Corral.

Among the letters taken in the gulf was one from Manning, the British

vice-consul at Realejo, to his correspondent at San Miguel, D.

Florencio Souza. It was dated at Leon, on the 24th of July, and is so

characteristic that the most of it deserves insertion as an instance of

British conduct and British policy. He pathetically begins: “Dear Friend;

I am here without knowing where to go, since Walker will not give us a

passport to pass through Granada. I understand the man is furious against

me, attributing to me the change. It is certain that all his acts are

rapid: and we have not passed here without great apprehensions that he

will make an attack on Leon. He came as far as Managua, and all we know

is that he returned to Granada. If this man receives forces and money,

I assure you it will not be so easy to drive him out of the State; for

as the forces come from the other States in handfuls of men nothing is

accomplished, and the expenses and sacrifices are made in vain. I am

much afflicted to think that under these circumstances no more activity

is used in so serious an affair. At the present there are 500 men from

San Salvador, 500 from Guatemala, and 800 belonging to this place, and

according to my judgment double that number is required.” Then from

public affairs the wily trader comes to business. “Altogether affairs are

wretched in Nicaragua and very distressing, and if I remain here much

longer I shall not have a shirt I can put on. Already you can suppose how

much I have suffered by these convulsions.” He prepares to make Souza

useful to himself by seeming to have a care for the interests of the

Salvadorian: “It is known,” he writes, “that a certain Fabens has sailed

to Boston with the gold quartz, and that with one Heiss he has bought the

mine from Padre Sosa. You need not be afraid but I will do all I can

for your interest in this affair with all earnestness; and you should

write to Davis in Boston via Omoa, inquiring whether the ore Fabens and

Heiss took was from the mines of Bestaniere.” At last, and like a lady’s

postscript, comes the gist of the letter: “The troops here are altogether

naked. If you have any drilling you can sell at 12½ cents per yard, I

will take ten bales. Don’t forget my request in favor of my adopted son,

Mr. George Brower, to have him appointed to represent San Salvador in

Liverpool.” Much as the vice-consul sympathized with the cause of the

allies, he could not let the chance slip of making some money from the

drilling the soldiers required.

When the friends of Salazar at Leon heard of his capture in the gulf,

they immediately arrested Dr. Joseph W. Livingston, an American long

resident in Nicaragua, and sent a courier to Granada saying they would

hold him as a hostage for Salazar’s safety. The British vice-consul did

not disdain to write a letter to the American Minister entreating him

to save the life of Salazar in order that Livingston might go unharmed.

But the courier arrived several days after the execution of the Leonese

traitor; and Mr. Wheeler was not a man to be startled from his propriety

by the cunning devices of Mr. Manning. In his reply to the British

vice-consul the American Minister draws the distinction between Salazar

and Livingston in such words as probably little suited his correspondent.

“Salazar,” he writes, “was one—and a most prominent one—of a faction

revolting against the lawful government of the Republic, and a general in

their forces. He knew that he was liable to the penalty of treason. Dr.

Livingston is an American citizen, much loved and respected, and owes no

allegiance to the authorities of Nicaragua, much less to a disappointed

faction; nor has he ever been mixed up with the parties by any overt or

belligerent act.” At the same time he answered Mr. Manning’s letter, Mr.

Wheeler wrote to General Ramon Belloso, commanding-in-chief the Allied

forces, informing the latter that if any harm befell Dr. Livingston, the

government of the United States would promptly hold the governments of

San Salvador and Guatemala to a strict accountability. He concluded by

saying, that “if one hair of Dr. Livingston’s head is injured, or his

life taken, or that of another American citizen, your government and that

of Guatemala will feel the force of a power which, while it respects the

rights of other nations, will be ready and is able to vindicate its own

honor and the lives and property of its citizens.” Brave words these; and

they might have resulted in worthy deeds if Mr. Wheeler had controlled

the necessary force; but when read with the gloss of after events, they

are turned into a biting sarcasm on the government he represented. The

life of Livingston was, however, probably saved by the energetic words of

the Minister; though he was ordered from the State in which he had been

living for ten years.

Some days after these events occurred, Hon. Pierre Soulé arrived at

Granada. He went thither with the object of securing some modifications

in a decree which had been published by Rivas a few days before his

flight from Leon to Chinandega. The decree authorized commissioners to

negotiate a loan of five hundred thousand dollars, to be secured by a

million of acres of the public lands. The modifications suggested by Mr.

Soulé were soon made, and S. F. Slatter and Mason Pilcher became the

commissioners to act under the decree. The bonds issued under this decree

are the only legal bonds of the Republic ever sold in the United States,

and the common impression that large quantities of Nicaraguan obligations

are afloat is altogether erroneous.

But, although the decree for the loan was the immediate object of Mr.

Soulé’s visit, his presence in Nicaragua had other beneficial results.

His fine head and noble air made a deep impression on the people of the

country, peculiarly sensitive as they are to the charms of feature and

of manner; and then he spoke the Castilian with such lofty elegance,

and addressed the common people with so much kindness and insight into

their wants and feelings that all listened to him with mingled delight

and reverence. The docility of the native Nicaraguans, especially of the

Indians, is great, and when approached with gentleness and persuasion

they may be led in almost any direction. The influence of such words as

Mr. Soulé spoke to them remained for a long time, and often after he left

they used to ask when His Excellency, a title they give to persons they

consider of rank, would return to Nicaragua.

During the month of August not many persons arrived in the country,

either for military service or for civil pursuits. A new and more

dangerous disease, also, began to make its appearance in the army;

desertion, more fatal than cholera, commenced its ravages in the ranks.

The first notable desertion was that of one Turley with a whole company

of Rangers. They were sent from Managua by the commandant, Capt. Dolan,

with orders to examine the road along the southwestern shore of the

lake, as far as Tipitapa. For several days Dolan anxiously awaited their

return; but news reached Granada of their being seen on the Malacatoya

river. It was not until many days, however, that their purposes and fate

were known. They appear to have deserted with the intention of proceeding

through Chontales, robbing and plundering as they went, and of finally

reaching the sea by the Blewfields river. Some circumstances indicate

that the plan was formed before Turley and his men reached Nicaragua; for

on their arrival they were very urgent in the request to remain a company

by themselves, and they had been in the service only a few weeks when

they deserted. Their plan, however, whether long meditated or the result

of sudden resolution, met with the punishment it deserved.

Many days after Turley’s disappearance a French trader, from the mining

town of Libertad, came to Granada to inform Walker of the fate of the

deserters. When they first appeared in Chontales the people supposed they

were on duty, but their violent and rapacious acts soon betrayed their

true character. They passed into the mining district, and near Libertad

they tied up and flogged a Frenchman, in order to make him disclose the

place where he kept his gold. Then the French of the district, composed

mostly of those discharged from the army at Rivas in the March previous,

acting together, raised a number of the people of the country and

attacked the robbers. Turley’s party was, it seems, short of ammunition,

and they finally agreed to give up their arms if they were furnished with

a guide to conduct them to the Blewfields. Their arms were given up,

and soon thereafter, while they were being marched, by their captors,

toward the town, fire was opened on them, and they were all, except two,

slaughtered on the spot.

With the exception, however, of Turley’s company, desertion among the

Americans was, at that time, rare. The desertions, though not many,

were principally confined to the Europeans in the ranks. Many of these

Europeans had gone to Nicaragua with the idea of enlisting for the mere

pay they were to get; and without the foresight or patience which might

enable them to wait for time to enhance the value of the lands they

were to receive, they became dissatisfied with the scarcity of money,

and sought means of leaving the army and the country. New-comers, also,

were frightened by the reports constantly circulated as to the number

and strength of the enemy; and it was among those who knew least of the

land that the disposition to despond was greatest. In addition to these

causes, tending to diminish the strength of the army, a large proportion

of the men going to Nicaragua at the expense of the State, were found

unfit for military service. As they could not be examined surgically in

the United States, their defects were not known until they came under

the eye of the surgical staff at Granada. Those familiar with medical

statistics, may readily imagine how many of the men were rejected for the

single disease of hernia.

The enemy, however, were not without causes of weakness and dissension.

Some of the faults of their force arose from its allied nature. The

soldiers in Leon were drawn from Guatemala and San Salvador; and besides

these, Rivas had pressed numbers of laborers about Leon and Chinandega

into the ranks. The Guatemalan contingent was made up entirely of

Indians, and fierce was the feud between them and the Leoneses. Not

unfrequently collisions would occur between the Guatemalans and the

people of the town, at the numerous liquor shops scattered through the

suburbs of Subtiaba; and in the quarrels knives would be drawn, and blood

spilled. So pressing was the evil that the Guatemalan soldiers were

finally ordered to remain in their quarters, and it was necessary to keep

them out of the streets, in order that the insults of the people might be

avoided. The Salvadorians were tolerated by the Leoneses; but the local

authorities could not prevail on the latter to regard the former as their

deliverers from tyranny and oppression.

The allied troops had not been many days at Leon, before fever and

cholera attacked them. The Guatemalans especially suffered from this

disease; and so great was their loss, that many among the soldiers, and

some even of the officers, attributed the malady to poisonous substances

mixed in their food. But it was easy for a medical eye to perceive

sufficient causes for the mortality of the troops in their sudden removal

from the highlands of Guatemala to the plains of Nicaragua, and in the

total want of comfort and cleanliness about the quarters and persons of

the soldiers. As Manning wrote, the troops were almost without clothing;

and this was a severe deprivation to the Guatemala Indian, accustomed to

the use of the thick woollen jacket, which protects him from the cold of

his native hills. And woollen covering at night is indispensable to the

health of the soldier in Nicaragua. The warm days, followed by the clear

cold nights, render blankets necessary at all seasons of the year; and

it was the want of care in sleeping which produced much of the disease,

not only among the Guatemalans at Leon, but also among the Americans

at Granada. When you add to these causes, the little attention Central

American officers pay to the health of their soldiers, and the small

skill of their surgeons and physicians, it is not difficult to understand

the mortality among the Allies.

While disease was destroying the soldiers and dissensions were spreading

between the people and the troops, the leaders were not more friendly

in their feelings toward each other than were their followers: the

consequences were divided counsels and conflicting conduct. The chief

command of the allied force had been given by the provisional government

of Rivas to General Ramon Belloso, the commander of the San Salvador

contingent. But Paredes, who commanded the Guatemalans, was little

disposed to obey the orders of a man he regarded as altogether his

inferior in knowledge and capacity, and he also thought it unworthy of

his Republic to yield the control of her forces to the general of a

much feebler State. The Guatemalans consider theirs the best organized

and the leading State of Central America; and the pure Spanish race,

which maintains its supremacy at the seat of the old captain-generalcy

by the aid of Carrera and his Indians, regards, with some disdain,

the irregular governments the mixed races attempt to establish. On the

contrary, the self-styled liberals throughout Central America have a

bitter hatred toward Carrera and his minions, as they call the Aycinenas

and the Pavones, who really direct the affairs of the Republic, under

the nominal presidency of the illiterate Indian. And it was jealousy of

Guatemala which induced Rivas and Jerez to place the command in the hands

of the Salvadorian general. Paredes, however, seems to have retained the

privilege of refusing to obey Belloso whenever he thought proper, and the

latter was not in the position to enforce obedience or to dispense with

the services of the Guatemalans.

Besides the dissensions in the allied camp, there were two authorities

in the upper part of Nicaragua claiming the supreme executive power.

At Leon, D. Patricio Rivas and his cabinet asserted their right to be

esteemed by the Allies the sovereign authority of the Republic; while

at Somoto Grande, in Segovia, D. José Maria Estrada had set up his

government, and issued orders in the name of the people of Nicaragua.

Each of these cabals ridiculed the claims of the other, and their

contentions were like to involve the allied States in new difficulties.

Estrada had sought refuge in Honduras after the treaty of the

twenty-third of October, and had published a pamphlet, claiming a right

to be chief executive of Nicaragua, because he had written a private

decree, declaring null and void the treaty made by Corral under the

absolute power he had conferred. Everybody laughed at the idea of giving

force to a decree which was unheard of until published in Honduras; but

when the defection of Rivas took place, Estrada entered Segovia under

the protection of a few Legitimists, commanded by Martinez. The latter

proceeded toward Matagalpa, in order to press the Indians of that region

into his service, while the Senator-president, as Estrada called himself,

remained at Somoto Grande.

The Legitimist pretender was now in the way of his own party. He had not

the discretion to perceive that by thus placing himself as an obstacle to

the union of the two factions against the Americans, he made his removal

from Nicaragua an object with his friends as well as his enemies. The

idea of his being purposely left at Somoto Grande without any adequate

guard, seems not to have entered his mind. But the fact of Estrada’s

defenceless condition was soon known at Leon—known in so short a time as

almost to preclude any explanation, save that the information was sent by

some of his own adherents. Immediately, a violent Democrat, who had been

imprisoned at Granada during the civil war and was released by Walker on

the thirteenth of October, 1855, collected a band of some forty-five or

fifty armed men and hurried on toward Somoto Grande. This man, by name

Antonio Chavis, could scarcely have acted as he did without the knowledge

and assistance of the Rivas administration. Chavis reached Somoto Grande

without Estrada hearing of his approach, and while the Granadino was

indulging his dream of regaining power in the Republic, the Democrats

from Leon surprised and murdered him in the streets of the mountain

village.

The murder of Estrada reminds us of the dark craft which marks the

history of the Italian Republics during the thirteenth, fourteenth,

and fifteenth centuries. The same causes which in Italy produced the

Carraras of Padua, the Viscontis of Milan, and finally the master-piece

of the school, Cæsar Borgia, Duke of Urbino, have brought forth the

same type of character in the politicians and soldiers of the Spanish

American Republics. It is true, there is wanting in the latter the

exalted intellect and refined taste of the former, and the mixed race

of Central and South America could never produce a Machiavelli capable

of depicting with terrible truth the principles, if such they may be

called, controlling the political action of his countrymen. But the

Spanish American is as dark, though not as deep and wise, in his craft

as the Italian. And long civil war seems to have the power of creating

this type of politicians, even among races least affected toward it; for

the English wars of the Roses produced the subtle genius of the third

Richard, who vied with the best Italian of them all in his adherence to

the maxims of the illustrious author of The Prince.

Thus, by the death of Estrada, the old Legitimists who had emigrated

after the treaty of the twenty-third of October, were led to acknowledge

the authority of D. Patricio Rivas. Thenceforth Martinez who had, with

a few men and some arms, penetrated as far as Matagalpa acted under the

orders of the provisional government at Leon. It was easier, however,

for the leaders to settle their differences and to agree on a common

plan of action than for them to extinguish the hatreds and animosities

they had kindled and fed among their respective followers. They did not

venture for some time to place Legitimists in the same camp with the

Democrats they had either inveigled or forced into their service, and it

was necessary, during the war, for them to keep the soldiers of the two

factions as widely apart as possible.

Toward the close of the month of August the arrangements of the Walker

administration with Garrison and Morgan, for bringing Americans to

Nicaragua, were completed. The commissioners appointed to investigate the

indebtedness of the old Canal Company to the government had reported in

July; and the dues from the company, according to the report, amounted

to more than four hundred thousand dollars. Some payments, had, however,

been made, but the report did not estimate them, because the company

had failed to appear, and the judgment against them was by default.

After deducting all payments, still the indebtedness was upward of three

hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and this was much more than the value

of all the property on the Isthmus. The property was, therefore, sold to

Garrison and Morgan, they paying therefor in the bonds they had received

for advances made to the Rivas government. In the meantime the American

minister, obeying the instructions of his chief, examined the facts which

led to the revocation of the charters of the Canal and Accessory Transit

Companies. Besides the explanations given by the Nicaraguan government,

and the facts brought out in the report of the commissioners, Mr. Wheeler

examined a number of witnesses, whose depositions he forwarded to the

State Department at Washington. The facts reported by the minister were

so conclusive as to the legality and justice of the proceedings against

the companies, that Mr. Marcy never wrote another word on the subject.

In fact the Accessory Transit Company had itself furnished the American

government with the most satisfactory evidence of its own unscrupulous

and criminal character. On the 8th of April, while Mora was yet in

Nicaragua, Thomas Lord, the vice-president of the company, wrote to Hosea

Birdsall, authorizing him “to ask for the assistance of the commander

of any man-of-war of Her Britannic Majesty’s navy in the port of San

Juan.” “The object of the Transit Company,” so its vice-president wrote,

“is to prevent accessions of filibusters to Walker’s force, pending his

hostilities with Costa Rica, and to effect this purpose, no pains must

be spared or effort left untried.” In conclusion he adds: “Unless our

boats are seized by the filibusters on the Orizaba and Charles Morgan

they cannot get into the interior, and without large accessions Walker

must fail and Costa Rica be saved. To this result Her Majesty’s officers

in San Juan can materially contribute, by protecting American property in

the manner indicated.” It was made clear, by such acts, that the company

was afraid to trust the justice of its own government.

It was the necessity for completing the arrangements about the Transit,

no less than the rainy season, which kept Walker from moving against the

Allies. It would have been folly to advance against Leon without having

the Transit secure and communication with the United States certain.

Leon was well barricaded, and the Americans had not numbers to spare

for an assault; neither had they artillery to aid their attack, even if

the roads had admitted of its easy transportation. Besides, disease and

dissension were weakening the Allies; and it was only after the death of

Estrada that they got even an appearance of unity. It was early in the

month of September that events occurred to encourage the Allies in an

advance toward Granada. But before narrating these events, it may be well

to mention the celebration of the 1st of September, at the capital, as it

displays an element which entered into the war in Nicaragua.

At different times a number of Cubans had found their way to

Nicaragua; and after Lt. Col. F. A. Lainé was appointed aide-de-camp

to the general-in-chief, they were formed into a body-guard for the

President. The Cuban company consisted of about fifty members, and

their familiarity with the two languages—Spanish and English—made their

services valuable. Early in the year the Cuban element in Nicaragua had

attracted the attention of the Spanish authorities in the island; and

in June, 1856, General Morales de Rada, who naturally disliked those

called “filibusters,” because his running away from them had made him

the laughing-stock of all the Havana wits, was sent to San José for the

purpose of advising with President Mora in reference to the war against

the Americans of Nicaragua. The Cubans with Walker were well known for

their devotion to the cause of independence. Two of the aides of the

general-in-chief, Lainé and Pineda, had been engaged in revolutionary

schemes on the island, and the prefect of the Oriental Department, D.

Francisco Aguëro, was a native of the disaffected district of Puerto

Principe. Hence the interest with which Spain watched affairs in

Nicaragua.

On the 1st of September, a mass for the repose of the soul of Lopez was

celebrated in the parish church at Granada, and the day was in other

respects observed by the Cubans in the service. The ardent minds of these

southern youths dreamed, however, more of the future than they meditated

the past; they thought more of the time when they should sail for the

island to avenge the death of Lopez and his followers, than of the

dark and painful scenes which attended their execution. And it is this

reluctance of the southern imagination to dwell on the gloomy side of

affairs which fits its possessors less for the real work of revolution,

than the robust children of the North, whose fancies do not fly from the

grave and its surroundings.

Chapter Eighth.

THE WALKER ADMINISTRATION.

The policy of the Walker government was, of course, the same as

that of Rivas, so far as the introduction of the white race into

Nicaragua was concerned. But the administration of Rivas was, from

its nature, transitional. It sought to increase the American element

without inquiring what place the new people were to occupy in the old

society. Rivas and his cabinet felt that Nicaraguan society required

re-organization, but they knew not how it was to be accomplished,

nor would they have adopted the means necessary for the end even if

the proper measures had been pointed out to them. Hence, when the

re-organization, not merely of the State, but of the family and of labor,

became necessary, another executive than Rivas was not a matter of

choice. Not merely the secondary form of the crystal was to be modified,

but the primary form was to be radically changed, and for this a new

force was to be brought into play. It may be that the re-organization in

Nicaragua was attempted too soon; but those who have read the foregoing

pages may judge whether or not the Americans were driven forward by the

force of events. Sooner or later the struggle between the old and the new

forms of society must inevitably have occurred.

The difference of language between the members of the old society

and that portion of the white race, necessarily dominant in the new,

while it was a cause keeping the elements apart, afforded also a means

of regulating the relations between the several races meeting on the

same soil. In order that the laws of the Republic might be thoroughly

published, it was decreed that they should be published in English as

well as in Spanish. The reason of this was apparent to every one; but

the object of another clause in the same decree, “That all documents

connected with public affairs shall be of equal value whether written

in English or Spanish,” was not noticed except by the careful observer.

By this clause the proceedings of all the courts, and the record of all

the deeds in the State, might be made in English. It was not necessary

to decree that all such records should be in English—the mere permission

was sufficient to accomplish the object. Lawyers will readily see what an

advantage such a clause gave to those speaking both English and Spanish,

over those acquainted only with the latter language.

The decree concerning the use of the two languages tended to make the

ownership of the lands of the State fall into the hands of those speaking

English. But in addition to this, a decree was published declaring the

property of all enemies of the State forfeited to the Republic, and

a Board of Commissioners was named “to take possession of, direct,

determine upon, and sell all such confiscated or forfeited properties.”

The Board was given the ordinary power of courts for citation, for

examining witnesses, and for enforcing obedience to its orders. All

property declared confiscated was to be sold soon after the rendition of

the judgment, and military scrip was to be received in payment at the

sale of such property, thus giving those who had been in the military

service of the State an opportunity to secure their pay out of the

estates of the persons engaged in the war against them.

The land titles in Nicaragua were in a very unsettled condition, and

the same system prevailed there as in other Spanish American States.

The limits of grants were indeterminate, and there was, of course, no

registry law. Accordingly, in order to fix the number of outstanding

grants from the Republic, a decree was published requiring all claims to

land to be recorded within six months, and it was further decreed that

after a certain date no conveyance or mortgage should be valid against

third parties, unless duly recorded in the district where the land lay.

This was a substitution of the English and American system for the rules

of the Roman and Continental law. The recording of titles is undoubtedly

for the public advantage, and those possessed of good titles to land in

Nicaragua would in virtue of this decree have held their possessions by

a tenure more certain than ever. But the system was fatal to the bad or

uncertain titles. It also gave an advantage to those familiar with the

habit of registry.

The general tendency of these several decrees was the same; they were

intended to place a large proportion of the land of the country in the

hands of the white race. The military force of the State might, for a

time, secure the Americans in the government of the Republic, but in

order that their possession of government might be permanent, it was

requisite for them to hold the land. But the natives who had held the

lands for more than a generation admitted that the cultivated fields had

diminished in number and extent every year since the independence, for

the want of a proper system of labor; hence, according to the admission

of all parties, the re-organization of labor was necessary for the

development of the resources of the country.

In order to command the labor already in the country a decree was issued

for enforcing contracts for terms of service. A stringent decree against

vagrants was also published, and this was a measure of military caution

as well as of political economy. When Martinez set about recruiting in

Matagalpa the men scattered on the farms of Chontales and Los Llaños

repaired to Granada in order to escape the press-gang. But these men had

nearly all been in the employ of Legitimist masters, and when gathered

in the city there was danger of their being used for bad purposes. Few

of them had any visible means of livelihood, and hence most would have

come under the provision of the decree concerning vagrants. As they had

little disposition for work they soon disappeared after the publication

of the decree, and thus a population which at the time might have proved

dangerous around Granada was got rid of.

The decree of the 22d of September was, however, the measure from which

most was to be expected for organizing the labor of the country. This

was the act around which the whole policy of the administration revolved;

and as it has been much criticised it may be well to give the decree

entire. It reads:

“Inasmuch as the Constituent Assembly of the Republic, on the

30th day of April, 1838, declared the State, free, sovereign,

and independent, dissolving the compact which the Federal

Constitution established between Nicaragua and the other States

of Central America:

“Inasmuch as since that date, Nicaragua has been in fact free

from the obligations the Federal Constitution imposed:

“Inasmuch as the Act of the Constituent Assembly, decreed on

the 30th of April, 1838, provides, that the federal decrees

given previous to that date shall remain in force unless

contrary to the provisions of that act:

“Inasmuch as many of the decrees theretofore given are unsuited

to the present condition of the Republic, and are repugnant

to its welfare and prosperity as well as to its territorial

integrity: Therefore it is

“DECREED:

“ARTICLE 1. All acts and decrees of the Federal Constituent

Assembly, as well as of the Federal Congress, are declared null

and void.

“ARTICLE 2. Nothing herein contained shall affect rights

heretofore vested under the acts and decrees hereby repealed.”

One of the earliest acts of the Federal Constituent Assembly was the

abolition of slavery in Central America; and as this, among other acts,

was repealed by the decree of the 22d of September, it was generally

supposed the latter re-established slavery in Nicaragua. Whether this

be a strictly legal deduction may be doubted; but the repeal of the

prohibition clearly prepared the way for the introduction of slavery.

The spirit and intention of the decree were apparent; nor did its author

affect to conceal his object in its publication. By this act must the

Walker administration be judged; for it is the key to its whole policy.

In fact the wisdom or folly of this decree involves the wisdom or folly

of the American movement in Nicaragua; for on the re-establishment of

African slavery there depended the permanent presence of the white race

in that region. If the slavery decree, as it has been called, was unwise,

Cabañas and Jerez were right when they sought to use the Americans for

the mere purpose of raising one native faction and depressing another.

Without such labor as the new decree gave the Americans could have played

no other part in Central America than that of the pretorian guard at Rome

or of the Janizaries of the East; and for such degrading service as this

they were ill suited by the habits and traditions of their race.

The difference between the colonial system of the English and Spanish

Crowns explains the different results of the English and Spanish

settlements in America. The colonies of Great Britain founded their own

forms of society; they made for themselves all the rules and regulations

their new situation required, and hence they built firmly the foundation

of a peculiar and original civilization. Their institutions sprang from

their necessities, and were hence adapted to the climate and the soil

they found on the new continent. But it was far otherwise with the

Spanish possessions. The laws of the Indies were decreed by the Crown;

and the regulations, sometimes for good but oftener for evil, were

the result of monarchical will. In the case of Cuba the resolution of

Isabella was swayed by the counsels of the benevolent Las Casas; and

Spain owes her possession of the island at the present moment to the wise

philanthropy of the simple-hearted priest. Negro-slavery is, without

doubt, the cause of the present prosperity of the island as well as of

its continued colonial government; and Cuba offers a fine contrast to

Jamaica and St. Domingo, and displays to advantage the superior wisdom of

Spain when compared with the false humanity of France and England. On the

continent, however, Spain was not so fortunate as on the ever-faithful

isle. Her conquest of force was there followed by no radical and

permanent change in political organization. She carried thither the Roman

law; but it did not inform the new society or breathe a fresh spirit into

its institutions. The only real changes in Mexico and Peru, for example,

were wrought by the church. The pagans of the continent were converted

to Christianity and the mission fathers reclaimed the wild tribes from

their savageism, teaching them agriculture and the ruder arts of life.

Beyond the protection the Crown afforded the church in its labors for

the re-construction of society, the Spanish government did little for

its vast continental possessions. Slavery on the continent was not more

than what the physiologists call a “trace;” and it soon yielded to the

passions which followed the independence of the colonies.

The men who framed the Constitution of the United States were not

beyond the control of the influences which in France led to the horrors

of Hayti and in England to the miseries of Jamaica. The wits and

philosophers of the constitutional convention—the strong reason of

Franklin and the brilliant genius of Hamilton, as well as the lofty

soul of Washington—were not unaffected by the errors of the French

reformers of the period. The mad rhapsodies of Rousseau, the sharp keen

sarcasm of Voltaire, had infected the readers of that time with a sort

of hydrophobia—a mortal aversion to the word _slavery_. Hamilton and

Washington, though struggling against French notions, were still under

the influence to some extent of the Genevese ravings about equality

and fraternity. Mr. Jefferson not only yielded to the French fashions

of thought and feeling, but actually cherished them as if they were

the fruits of reason and philosophy. While such causes operated on the

American leaders of the time, the people of the period were tainted

with the notions of the English Buxton and Clarkson. The dissenters

of Great Britain infused their opinions about the slave-trade into

their religious brethren in America; and thus, by the union of French

philosophy with English humanitarianism, the constitution of 1787 was

burdened with clauses of which the evil effect is now constantly felt by

the slaveholding communities of the United States.

If the strong, broad minds of the constitutional convention of 1787 were

not able to resist entirely the opinions prevalent in France and England

concerning slavery, how much less were the poor, imitative creatures

Spanish policy left to her American colonies after their independence

able to withstand the prejudices of the European world. Spain had, in

fact, left them with too little slavery to preserve their social order.

Instead of maintaining the purity of the races as did the English in

their settlements, the Spaniards had cursed their continental possessions

with a mixed race. Hence it would have been little less than a miracle if

the Spanish American States had at the moment of independence decided to

retain slavery in their midst. It is only of late years that the really

beneficial and conservative character of negro-slavery has begun to be

appreciated in the United States.

For a long time it was the fashion, and with many it still is, to

regard the Northern States of the Federal Union as the conservative

element of American society. It is true that the Northern States

are the conservative element of the federal government; because the

Union is nearly altogether the creature of their will and of their

interests. Therefore, on all occasions they have sought to strengthen

the federal power through tariffs and banks and large schemes of

internal improvement. But such conservatism as this does not touch the

organic structure of society; it merely determines its external form and

appearance. The conservatism of slavery is deeper than this; it goes to

the vital relations of capital toward labor, and by the firm footing

it gives the former it enables the intellect of society to push boldly

forward in the pursuit of new forms of civilization. At present it is the

struggle of free labor with slave labor which prevents the energies of

the former from being directed against the capital of the North through

the ingenious machinery of the ballot box and universal suffrage; and it

is difficult to conceive how capital can be secured from the attacks of

the majority in a pure democracy unless with the aid of a force which

gets its strength from slave labor.

The Spanish American States, after their independence, aimed to

establish Republics without slavery; and the history of forty years of

disorder and public crime is fertile in lessons for him who hath eyes

to see and ears to hear. Carried away by his imagination, or rather

by his sensibilities, Mr. Clay pleaded the cause of Spanish American

independence, and anticipated good government as the result of the

movement. The policy he urged was undoubtedly wise both for the United

States and for England, inasmuch as it opened the old Spanish colonies to

other commercial nations. But the effects of independence have not been

beneficial on the people of the colonies themselves. Spain gave order, at

least, to the possessions she held in the New World; and order, attended

as it was by exaction, sometimes even by extortion, was better than the

anarchy of so-called Republican rule. In Nicaragua whole tracts which

were cultivated under the Spanish dominion have gone to waste since the

independence; and the indigo of the Isthmus, which even ten years ago was

a valuable article of export, has disappeared almost entirely from trade.

If Spain, then, failed to leave her colonies with the internal force or

the system capable of re-organizing their independent society, the plan

immediately suggests itself of applying to them the rules which have

constructed a firm and harmonious civilization where the Anglo-American

has found himself on the same soil with one of the colored races. The

introduction of negro-slavery into Nicaragua would furnish a supply of

constant and reliable labor requisite for the cultivation of tropical

products. With the negro-slave as his companion, the white man would

become fixed to the soil; and they together would destroy the power of

the mixed race which is the bane of the country. The pure Indian would

readily fall into the new social organization; for he does not aim at

political power, and only asks to be protected in the fruits of his

industry. The Indian of Nicaragua, in his fidelity and docility, as well

as in his capacity for labor, approaches nearly the negroes of the United

States; and he would readily assume the manners and habits of the latter.

In fact the manners of the Indian toward the ruling race are now more

submissive than those of the American negro toward his master.

Some, however, may urge that the climate of tropical America is

unfavorable to the African negro. This idea has been set afloat by

some statistics a British officer has published in reference to the

comparative vitality of the European and negro regiments in Jamaica. The

figures, as given, go to show, that the average mortality is greater

among the negro than among the European regiments; and even Dr. Josiah

C. Nott has been led to quote the statistics with approval, and to infer

that tropical America is not suited to the African. But the figures of

the British officer may be read in another sense, and probably with

a nearer approach to natural laws. It is not the climate, but the

profession of soldier, which destroys so rapidly the negro regiments

of Jamaica. No avocation of life requires so much intelligence, so much

knowledge of the laws of life, and so much resolution and self-denial in

adhering to them, as that of the soldier. The great difference between a

veteran and a raw recruit is, that one knows how to take care of himself,

and the other does not. But you never can make a veteran of the negro;

he remains always in the condition of recruit, and hence negro regiments

will have the health and vitality of regiments of recruits. No one, who

has seen the negro in tropical America, will, for a moment, allow the

accuracy of the deduction, hastily drawn from the regimental returns of

Jamaica.

In Nicaragua the negro seems to be in his natural climate. The blacks who

have gone thither from Jamaica are healthy, strong and capable of severe

labor. They were much employed by the Accessory Transit Company on the

San Juan river and at Virgin Bay; and even on the bungos of the lake and

river, they bore the toil and exposure to the sun as well as the natives

of the country. In fact, the negro blood seems to assert its superiority

over the indigenous Indian of Nicaragua. Some of the negro and mulatto

officers in the Legitimist army were remarkable among their fellows for

courage and energy, though with these qualities were generally joined

cruelty and ferocity.

The advantage of negro slavery in Nicaragua would, therefore, be

two-fold; while it would furnish certain labor for the use of

agriculture, it would tend to separate the races and destroy the

half-castes who cause the disorder, which has prevailed in the country

since the independence. But there are many who, while admitting the

advantage of slavery to Nicaragua, think it was impolitic to have

attempted its re-establishment at the time the decree of the 22d of

September was published. This brings us to consider the decree in its

relation with the question of slavery in the United States.

At the time the decree was published it was clear that the Americans in

Nicaragua would be called on to defend themselves against the forces of

four Allied States. Their cause was right and just, but it then appeared

to touch themselves only. Up to that time there was no American interest

in the country, save that of the army and of the Transit Company; hence

it was expedient by some positive act to bind to the cause for which

the naturalized Nicaraguans were contending some strong and powerful

interest in the United States. The decree, re-establishing slavery while

it declared the manner in which the Americans proposed to regenerate

Nicaraguan society made them the champions of the Southern States of the

Union in the conflict truly styled “irrepressible” between free and slave

labor. The policy of the act consisted in pointing out to the Southern

States the only means, short of revolution, whereby they can preserve

their present social organization.

In 1856, the South began to perceive that all territory hereafter

acquired by the federal government, would necessarily enure to the use

and benefit of free labor. The immigrant from the free labor States

moves easily and readily into the new territories; and the surplus of

population being greater at the North than at the South, the majority

in any new territory would certainly be from the anti-slavery region.

Besides this, the South has no surplus labor to send westward or

southward. On the contrary the Gulf States are crying out for more

negroes; and the uneasiness of Southern society results from the

superabundance of its intellect and capital in proportion to its rude

labor. It is impossible, in the present condition of affairs, for the

South to get the labor it lacks; and the only means of restoring the

balance to its industry is to send its unemployed intellect to a field

where no political obstacles prevent it from getting the labor it

requires.

There are, however, some people in the Southern States who condemn every

effort to extend slavery, because they say, it irritates the anti-slavery

sentiment, and thus feeds and strengthens hostility to Southern society.

With them, the great cure for abolitionism, is rest and inaction on the

part of slaveholders. But such are the shallowest of thinkers. It is

impossible to keep down the discussion of the slavery question in the

United States. The question is one which touches the whole labor of the

country, and involves the vital relations of capital with labor.[1] And

this is the question which in all ages, and in all countries, has divided

states and societies. Hence it is idle to speak of the question being

settled; from the nature of things the contest between free and slave

labor is “never ending, still beginning.”

In September, 1856, the canvass for the presidency was developing the

passions and the prejudices of the several sections of the Union; and

one of the great parties of the country, in convention assembled, had

declared its sympathy and pledged its support to the efforts then being

made to regenerate Central America. These promises and pledges were made

by the party which relied on the slave States for its success, and it

should have looked with favor on a measure which tended to strengthen

slavery in the Southern States. But the manner in which the free labor

democracy of the North received the decree re-establishing slavery in

Nicaragua, is a proof of the hollowness of its professions of friendship

for Southern interests. There was scarcely a voice raised in defence

of the measure north of the Potomac; though the free-labor States may

find, when it is too late, that the only way to avoid revolution, and a

conflict of force between the Northern and Southern States of the Union,

is by the very policy Nicaragua proposed to establish.

It is true the author of the slavery decree was not aware, at the time it

was published, of the strong and universal feeling which exists in the

Northern States against Southern society. He did not know how thoroughly

anti-slavery sentiments prevail in the free-labor States; that they are

taught in the schools, preached from the pulpit, and instilled by mothers

into the minds of their children from infancy upward. But the knowledge

of such a state of feeling would have made the publication of the decree

a matter of sacred duty no less than of policy. To avert the invasion

which threatens the South, it is necessary for her to break through the

barriers which now surround her on every side, and carry the war between

the two forms of labor beyond her own limits. A beleagured force, with no

ally outside, must yield to famine at last, unless it can make a sally

and burst through the enemy which confines it.

While the slavery decree was calculated to bind the Southern States to

Nicaragua, as if she were one of themselves, it was also a disavowal of

any desire for annexation to the Federal Union. And it was important, in

every respect, to make it appear that the American movement in Nicaragua

did not contemplate annexation. This idea constantly haunted the minds

of the public men of the Union, little accustomed to regard political

questions except from party points of view. It disturbed the mind of Mr.

Pierce, when he wrote his message at the reception of Father Vigil; it

worried Mr. Marcy, when he contemplated the future fate of the democratic

party. And it was, without doubt, the uncertainty the Secretary of State

felt in regard to the effect the Nicaraguan movement might have on party

action in the United States which prompted him to frown on the enterprise

from the beginning. Mr. Marcy was an old man, ambitious of yet higher

station than he had held under the federal government; and his long

experience enabled him to calculate with nice accuracy the weight of old

party issues in conventions and popular elections. But here was a new

element about to be thrown into the politics of the Union; and to the

distrust of new things common to age, was added the inability of the

Secretary to estimate precisely the force and direction of the Nicaraguan

movement. To show the spirit of Mr. Marcy, it is only necessary to state

when the decree repealing the acts of the Federal Constituent Assembly

and Federal Congress was published in Nicaragua, Mr. Wheeler advised his

government of the fact, and merely remarked that he thought it a measure

of advantage for the Isthmus. The despatch of Mr. Wheeler was, according

to excellent authority, discussed in a full meeting of Mr. Pierce’s

cabinet. Mr. Marcy and Mr. Cushing insisted on the immediate recall of

the minister; while Mr. Davis and Mr. Dobbin defended Mr. Wheeler, saying

he had done nothing but his duty in advising his government of the decree

published in Nicaragua, and of the effect it was likely to produce on the

country. The Secretary of State insisted on the dismissal of Mr. Wheeler

to the last; and only the day before he left office, he required of the

President, as a personal favor, that he should procure the resignation of

the minister.

The decree of the 22d of September was intended to destroy the delusion

of the public men of the United States as to the desire of Nicaragua for

annexation. To a thinking mind it was apparent that to enter the Federal

Union would be to defeat the object of the decree; for the federal law

prohibits the introduction within the limits of its authority of any

persons held to labor for a term of years. Nicaragua could not expect to

draw her negro labor from States already complaining of the deficiency of

their own supply; and the Southern States would themselves have opposed

the annexation of a territory which might drain from them the labor they

so much need. In the heat of party passion, however, such views were

not appreciated by the politicians, of whom Mr. Marcy was a type. They

were too much absorbed in watching the currents of popular opinion and

in distributing the spoils of party warfare, to devote any time to the

consideration of the public weal or of a true and just public policy.

So far were the politicians of the Union from perceiving it was Walker’s

policy by the slavery decree to declare his hostility to annexation, that

some of them supposed they had achieved a discovery by the publication of

certain letters instructing Goicouria as to the course he should pursue

in England. The intendente-general was authorized by Walker to proceed to

London in order to impress on the English cabinet the fact that Nicaragua

had no desire for admission into the American Union; and it was supposed

that he, being a Cuban, might more readily get the ear of the British

Ministry on the subject than a native of the United States. The letter

of Walker to Goicouria instructed him to explain that the necessities

of Nicaragua required “a republic based on military principles,” such

a republic being clearly unfit for admission into the northern Union.

The English would readily perceive that the growth of such a republic

toward the southern limits of the United States would tend to restrain

the territorial extension of the latter power. Walker conceived that by

such a policy he would promote the welfare of his native no less than

of his adopted country; for the acquisition by the United States of any

territory covered by a Spanish-American population would be fertile

of troubles and dangers to the confederacy, as well as of suffering

and oppression to the inhabitants of the new territory. Above all, the

acquisition of territory on the south would be fatal to the slaveholding

States; for it would complete the circle of free-labor communities now

girdling them on almost every side.

In France it would have been easier than in England to make the

anti-annexation character of the slavery decree apparent. M. Ange de

St. Priest, a savant who has published a large and valuable work on

the antiquities of Mexico and Central America, accepted the office of

consul-general for Nicaragua at Paris; and it was hoped through him to

establish relations with the Imperial government. The steady policy

of Napoleon the Third has been to increase the tonnage of France, and

thereby to enlarge her facilities for educating sailors. It was hoped

that such a treaty might have been made as would lead to the employment

of French bottoms for bringing African apprentices to the ports of

Nicaragua, thus furnishing labor to the latter republic, and increasing

the trade of French ships. The Emperor has himself written a work on the

subject of the inter-oceanic canal through Nicaragua; and his familiarity

with the country would enable him to perceive the advantages of carrying

negro labor thither. Next, too, to the possession of the isthmus by

France, he would desire to have the canal route in the hands of a power

bound to the empire by strong ties of interest and trade.

In fact it is the decided interest of all the continental powers of

Europe, to favor the policy the Americans proposed to pursue in

Nicaragua. By this policy they would secure tropical products at a much

cheaper price than at present; and Russia, particularly, needs a supply

of such articles from a country not under the control or influence of

England. Even Great Britain, if she would look beyond the immediate gains

of her grasping merchants, might perceive permanent advantages from the

security and order negro labor would give to Nicaragua. Now that the

Crown has taken the government of India from a trading corporation,

it might disdain to be moved by the narrow commercial jealousy which

sacrificed Jamaica to the East India Company.

But, it may be said, England will never permit anything which looks like

the revival of the African slave-trade. They, however, who watch closely

the phases of British politics, know that the influence of Exeter Hall

is on the wane. The frenzy of the British public against the slave-trade

has exhausted itself, and men have begun to perceive that they were led

into error by the benevolent enthusiasm of parsons, who knew more about

Greek and Hebrew than they did about physiology or political economy, and

of middle-aged spinsters, smit with the love of general humanity, though

disdaining to fix their affections firmly on any objects less remote than

Africa. All the arguments used by the adversaries of the slave-trade

were drawn from its abuses; and the true remedy was, not to abolish but

regulate the trade. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it

was styled “a commerce for the redemption of African captives;” and if

the old name, descriptive as it is of the true character of the trade,

were revived, many of the prejudices against the business would be

removed.

It was the alliance of a skeptical philosophy with a purblind religious

zeal which generated the opinion of Europe in regard to the African

slave-trade. Confining their attention to the abuses of the system, the

opponents of the trade failed to raise their eyes toward any large views

of the subject. If we look at Africa in the light of universal history,

we see her for more than five thousand years a mere waif on the waters

of the world, fulfilling no part in its destinies, and aiding in no

manner the progress of general civilization. Sunk in the depravities of

fetichism, and reeking with the blood of human sacrifices, she seemed a

satire on man, fit only to provoke the sneer of devils at the wisdom,

and justice, and benevolence of the Creator. But America was discovered,

and the European found the African a useful auxiliary in subduing the

new continent to the uses and purposes of civilization. The white man

took the negro from his native wastes, and teaching him the arts of life,

bestowed on him the ineffable blessings of a true religion. Then only do

the wisdom and excellence of the divine economy in the creation of the

black race begin to appear with their full lustre. Africa is permitted

to lie idle until America is discovered, in order that she may conduce

to the formation of a new society in the New World. A strong, haughty

race, bred to liberty in its northern island home, is sent forth with

the mission to place America under the rule of free laws; but whence

are these men, imbued with love of liberty and equality, to derive the

counterpoise which shall prevent their liberty from degenerating into

license, and their equality into anarchy or despotism? How are they,

when transplanted from the rugged climate where freedom thrives to

retain their precious birthright in the soft, tropical air which woos to

luxury and repose? Is it not for this that the African was reserved? And

is it not thus that one race secures for itself liberty with order, while

it bestows on the other comfort and Christianity?

But man, ever the dupe of his vain desires, always oscillating between

the extremes of opinion, and never fixed in the possession of truth,

was not content with the place assigned the African in the plan of

creation and of Providence. The preachers of the new gospel of equality

and fraternity were not satisfied with descanting on the horrors of the

middle passage, or of weeping over the miseries of men redeemed from the

captivity of savage masters. If the slave-trade be criminal, slavery,

which is the cause of it, should be extirpated. Therefore the trial is

made on St. Domingo, and the slave, suddenly loosed from the restraints

the law had put around him, goes forth to murder and destroy. Then they

determine on another experiment more cautiously conducted and more

narrowly watched. Slavery is abolished in Jamaica, and forthwith the

island goes to waste. The time seems to be approaching when man, guided

by a less vain philosophy, will seek truth in some other direction than

Haytian massacres or Jamaican impoverishment.

If the views above expressed of the uses of the African in the economy

of nature and Providence be correct, slavery is not abnormal to American

society. It must be the rule, not the exception. But to keep it so

requires effort and labor. The enemies of the only original form of

American civilization are many and powerful. They are resolute in their

determination not merely to limit but to extirpate slavery. The man who

leads the free-labor myriads of the United States—he, whose firm will

and far-reaching mind do not quail either at the doctrines or the acts

to which his political philosophy logically conducts him, has already

declared that he hopes to see the time when the foot of not a slave shall

press the continent. Yet the sluggards of slavery say, “a little more

rest, a little more folding of the arms to slumber.” Strafford sleeps

though the axe of the headsman is whetted for his execution.

The contest between free and slave labor in the United States not only

touches the interests and destiny of those immediately engaged in the

struggle but it affects the fate of the whole continent. The question

involved is whether the civilization of the western world shall be

European or American. If free labor prevails in its effort to banish

slave labor from the continent, the history of American society becomes a

faint reflex of European systems and prejudices, without contributing any

new ideas, any new sentiments, or any new institutions, to the mental and

moral wealth of the world. The necessary consequence of the triumph of

free labor will be the destruction, by a slow and cruel process, of the

colored races which now inhabit the central and southern portions of the

continent. The labor of the inferior races cannot compete with that of

the white race unless you give it a white master to direct its energies;

and without such protection as slavery affords, the colored races must

inevitably succumb in the struggle with white labor. Hence a Nicaraguan

can not be an indifferent spectator of the contest between the two forms

of labor in the United States; and deeper yet must be his interest in the

matter if born and educated in a slave State of the Union, he revolves in

his mind the results which will ensue to the home of his childhood, and

the firesides of the friends of his youth, in case victory smiles upon

the soldiers of free labor. Do not, therefore, men of the South, deem

it the voice of a stranger, or of one without a stake in your country’s

welfare, which urges you to strike a blow in defence of your honor, no

less than of your hearths and your families, ere the blast of the enemy’s

bugle calls upon you to surrender your arms to an overwhelming force.

The tongue of truth and friendship is not that of undue praise or fawning

flattery, and the soft songs of the suitor too often woo to danger and

destruction. Therefore, be not displeased, sons of the South—for it is

to you I now speak—if the criticism on your acts and policy appear harsh

or severe; but examine your conduct and that of your public servants for

the last three years and see whither it has led you. It is now but little

more than three years since you elected the President of your choice, and

in your simplicity you thought this success a great victory. What fruits

have you reaped from it? Where are the rewards of your campaign? In what

triumphs of policy have all your toils and all your efforts ended?

Your President—for he is the work of your hands—went into office pledged

to your policy in Kansas and in Central America. He attempted to deceive

you in Kansas, and your leaders drove him to the course he was forced to

pursue. Like sheep to the slaughter he and his Northern friends were led

to the support of Southern policy in Kansas; but what has resulted from

their sacrifice, or from all the efforts the Southern leaders made to

drag them to the altar? Was Kansas admitted into the Union? Did you have

even the empty pleasure of boasting over a barren victory? The Kansas

contest was made, as all admitted, for an abstract right. Your leaders

were true to you, because you were true to yourselves, when contending

for an “abstract right”; let us see whether you and they were equally

faithful to your honor and your interests when contending for a right not

abstract.

The President was pledged to your policy in Central America even

more explicitly than to your Kansas measures. The resolutions of the

Cincinnati Convention on the Central American policy were drawn by no

trembling or unsteady hand.[2] They were not couched in the Delphic

sentences behind which timid politicians shrink when they seek the

support of their constituents. Clear, distinct, and unmistakeable, they

could not be read in a dozen senses by the jugglers, who fancy all

political wisdom consists in deceiving the people with words which seem

other than they are. Have the pledges given at Cincinnati been redeemed?

Have those words, so full of meaning and of resolution, taken shape in

acts; or have they died into the sobs and sighs and moans of a party

which aspired to greatness yet dared not its accomplishment?

It needs no new word to tell you how basely the pledges made at

Cincinnati have been violated. It was not enough to trample under foot

the promises made, in the name of a party, to the country; it was

necessary also to disregard all the principles of public law, and to

proclaim before the world that the end justified the means. Violated

faith excused violated law: and when the message of the President,

excusing the acts of Commodore Paulding at Punta Arenas, in December,

1857, was sent to the senate, Mr. Seward might well say, in a double

sense, that his Excellency had become a convert to the “higher law”

doctrine.

And how did the leaders of the South act in the emergency? It was just at

the time the news of Paulding’s act at Punta Arenas reached Washington

that the adoption of the Lecompton Constitution was ascertained. Then the

President besought the men who were driving him on the Kansas question

not to press him on the Central American policy, and the Southern

leaders, giving up the substance, fled in pursuit of the shadow.[3] The

Lecompton Constitution would not give another foot of soil to slavery,

and the movement in Nicaragua might give it an empire; yet the latter was

sacrificed to the former, and the insults of Paulding and the President

have gone unrebuked by the South up to the present time.

Is it not time for the South to cease the contest for abstractions

and to fight for realities? Of what avail is it to discuss the right

to carry slaves into the territories of the Union, if there are none

to go thither? These are questions for schoolmen—fit to sharpen the

logical faculty and to make the mind quick and keen in the perception

of analogies and distinctions; but surely they are not such questions

as touch practical life and come home to men’s interests and actions.

The feelings and conscience of a people are not to be called forth by

the subtleties of lawyers or the differences of metaphysicians; nor can

their energies be roused into action for the defence of rights none of

them care to exercise. The minds of full-grown men cannot be fed on mere

discussions of territorial rights: they require some substantial policy

which all can understand and appreciate.

Nor is it wise for the weaker party to waste its strength in fighting for

shadows. It is only the stronger party which can afford to throw away

its force on indecisive skirmishes. At present the South must husband

her political power else she will soon lose all she possesses. The same

influence she brought to bear in favor of the position she took in Kansas

would have secured the establishment of the Americans in Nicaragua. And

unless she assumes now an entirely defensive attitude, what else is

left for the South except to carry out the policy proposed to her three

years ago in Central America? How else can she strengthen slavery than

by seeking its extension beyond the limits of the Union? The Republican

party aims at destroying slavery by sap and not by assault. It declares

now that the task of confining slavery is complete and the work of the

miner has already commenced. Whither can the slaveholder fly when the

enemy has completed his chambers and filled in the powder and prepared

the train, and stands with lighted match ready to apply the fire?

Time presses. If the South wishes to get her institutions into tropical

America she must do so before treaties are made to embarrass her action

and hamper her energies. Already there is a treaty between Mexico and

Great Britain by which the former agrees to do all in her power for

the suppression of the slave-trade, and in 1856 a clause was inserted

in the Dallas-Clarendon Convention, stipulating for the perpetual

exclusion of slavery from the Bay Islands of Honduras. This clause

was suggested (as the writer was informed by the person himself who

proposed it) by an American, for the purpose of securing the support of

England to a projected railway across Honduras; and thus the rights of

American civilization were to be bartered away for the paltry profits

of a railroad company. And while Nicaragua was to be hemmed in by an

anti-slavery treaty between England and Honduras on the north, Costa

Rica made an agreement with New Granada that slavery should never be

introduced within her limits. The enemies of American civilization—for

such are the enemies of slavery—seem to be more on the alert than its

friends.

The faith which Walker had in the intelligence of the Southern States

to perceive their true policy and in their resolution to carry it out,

was one of the causes which led to the publication of the decree of the

22d of September at the time it was given forth. Nor is his faith in

the South shaken; though who can fail to be amazed at the facility with

which the South is carried off after chimeras? Sooner or later, however,

the slaveholding States are bound to come as one man to the support of

the Nicaraguan policy. The decree of the 22d September, not the result

of hasty passion or immature thought, fixed the fate of Nicaragua and

bound the Republic to the car of American civilization. For more than two

years the enemies of slavery have been contriving and plotting to exclude

the naturalized Nicaraguans from their adopted country. But as yet not a

single additional barrier has been interposed; and the South has but to

resolve upon the task of carrying slavery into Nicaragua in order that

the work may be accomplished.

If other appeals than those of interest are required for stimulating the

Southern States in the effort to re-establish slavery in Central America

they are not lacking. The hearts of Southern youth answer to the call of

honor, and strong arms and steady eyes are waiting to carry forward the

policy which is now the dictate of duty as well as of interest. The issue

between slavery and anti-slavery has been made in Nicaragua, and it is

impossible for slavery to retire from the contest without losing some

of its courage and character. Nor is the issue one of mere words. It is

not a tilt of sport, a joust of reeds; but the knights have touched the

shields of their adversaries with the points of their lances, and the

tourney is one of mortal strife. And may fortune most favor them who best

do their duty in the fray.

Something is due from the South to the memory of the brave dead who

repose in the soil of Nicaragua. In defence of slavery these men left

their homes, met with calmness and constancy the perils of a tropical

climate, and finally yielded up their lives for the interests of the

South. I have seen these men die in many ways. I have seen them gasping

life away under the effects of typhus; I have seen them convulsed in the

death agony from the fearful blows of cholera; I have seen them sink to

glorious rest from mortal wounds received on honorable fields; but I

never saw the first man who repented engaging in the cause for which he

yielded his life. These martyrs and confessors in the cause of Southern

civilization surely deserve recognition at its hands. And what can be

done for their memories while the cause for which they suffered and died

remains in peril and jeopardy?

If there, then, be yet vigor in the South—and who can doubt that there

is—for further contest with the soldiers of anti-slavery, let her cast

off the lethargy which enthrals her, and prepare anew for the conflict.

But at the same time she throws aside her languor and indifference,

let her, taught by the past, discard the delusions and abstractions

with which politicians have agitated her passions without advancing her

interests. It is time for slavery to spend its efforts on realities

and not beat the air with wanton and ill-advised blows. The true field

for the exertion of slavery is in tropical America; there it finds the

natural seat of its empire and thither it can spread if it will but make

the effort, regardless of conflicts with adverse interests. The way is

open and it only requires courage and will to enter the path and reach

the goal. Will the South be true to herself in this emergency?

Chapter Ninth.

THE ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES.

In the beginning of September, 1856, the army of Nicaragua was organized

in two battalions of Rifles, two of Light Infantry, one of Rangers, and

a small company of Artillery. The First Rifles was the fullest as well

as the best corps of the army, and it scarcely mustered two hundred

effective men. The Second Rifles was a mere shadow of a battalion,

and its discipline was almost entirely neglected. The Light Infantry

battalions were larger than the Second Rifles, and some companies of

these, as, for example, the company of Capt. Henry, of the Second

Infantry, were in good order and condition. The Rangers consisted of

three small companies, under the command of Major Waters, and were

capable of effective service. Capt. Schwartz, with a few artillerymen,

had shown capacity for organizing his corps, and possessed knowledge in

his profession, he having served for some time as an artillery officer

in Baden during the revolutionary troubles of 1848. The whole effective

force scarcely amounted to eight hundred men.

Gen. Hornsby was in command of the Meridional Department, having his

headquarters sometimes at San Jorge, sometimes at Rivas, and sometimes at

San Juan del Sur. He had with him some companies of the First Infantry

and the artillery squad—it could scarcely be called a company—of Capt.

Schwartz. The First Rifles were at Granada, while the Second Rifles,

under Lieut.-Col. McDonald, were at Tipitapa. The Second Infantry were

at Masaya, and, in the absence of Col. Jaquess, it was commanded by

Lieut.-Col. McIntosh. Capt. Dolan had been in command of a company of

Rifles at Managua, but about the middle of September, Major Waters

was sent thither with his Rangers. The principal depot of commissary,

quartermaster, and ordnance stores, and all the work-shops of the army,

were at Granada. The San Juan river was guarded by two companies of

infantry, and Lieut.-Col. Rudler was placed in charge of that frontier.

The main strength of the enemy was at Leon, under the orders of Gen.

Belloso, and in the month of August Martinez began to collect men in

Matagalpa, and even as far down as Chocoyas and Trinidad. The troops

under Belloso were kept closely about Leon, and Rangers from Managua were

in the habit of scouting beyond Pueblo Nuevo without meeting any signs of

the enemy. Martinez, however, was collecting the herdsmen and servants

attached to the Legitimist owners of cattle-estates in the upper part

of Chontales and Los Llaños, and these being familiar with the country

were easily able to provide their chief with any news in that region

of country. A large proportion of the cattle used by the Americans was

drawn from these districts, and they were generally driven to Granada

by native officers, accompanied by small detachments of riflemen mounted

for the occasion. One of the most efficient of these native officers was

Ubaldo Herrera, whose services during the civil war have been heretofore

related.

In the latter part of August, Herrera, with a few Americans, was sent to

one of the cattle-estates of Los Llaños, and while carelessly driving

cattle toward Tipitapa he was attacked and slain by a small band of

Legitimists. This incident occurred not many miles from Tipitapa, and

in consequence of it Lieut.-Col. McDonald received orders to cross the

Tipitapa river, and marching toward Los Llaños, to ascertain whether any

traces of the enemy were to be seen in that direction. The roads were,

at the time, difficult, and all movements were necessarily slow and

uncertain, owing to the heavy rains of the season. McDonald, however,

with Capt. Jarvis, and about forty men, proceeded in the direction of San

Jacinto, a large cattle-estate a few miles east and north of Tipitapa. It

was reported that some of the enemy were quartered at the country-house

belonging to the estate, and McDonald, arriving near the house before

daybreak, postponed a nearer approach until he might be able to see the

strength of the enemy. Soon after daylight he drew up his force for an

attack, but while proceeding at a quick pace he was received by such a

sharp, steady fire that he deemed it prudent to withdraw. Capt. Jarvis

was brought off mortally wounded, and McDonald had ascertained that the

enemy were in larger numbers than he expected, and strongly barricaded

behind adobes.

The presence of the enemy at San Jacinto was a serious inconvenience to

the commissariat, and when it was known at Granada there were numerous

volunteers who proposed to drive the Legitimists from the house they

occupied. The state of the roads made it almost impossible to send

artillery against San Jacinto, even had there been the round shot or

shell requisite for rendering a gun useful in an attack on adobes. There

was a general impression at Granada that McDonald’s Rifles had retired

too soon, and the impression was due to the utter want of discipline

in the corps. Seeing the enthusiasm of some officers and citizens, and

desirous of ascertaining more exactly the strength of the enemy beyond

Tipitapa, Walker consented that volunteers should be engaged for an

attack on San Jacinto.

The volunteers were principally Americans who had been in the army, and

who had been discharged or had resigned; and these had their numbers

swelled to about sixty-five or seventy by the officers at Granada and

Masaya. Among the officers who joined the expedition were Major J. C.

O’Neal, Captains Watkins, Lewis, and Morris, and Lieutenants Brady,

Connor, Crowell, Hutchins, Kiel, Reader and Sherman. They left Granada

on the afternoon of the 12th of September, and passing through Masaya

reached Tipitapa on the morning of the 13th. At Tipitapa they offered

the command of the party to Lieutenant-Colonel Byron Cole, who had been

visiting several points in Chontales with a view of procuring cattle for

the army, and Cole agreed to accept the offer. Wiley Marshall, a citizen

of Granada, was named as second in command. The spirit of adventure

which controlled not only these men but many others in Nicaragua can

be judged of by the fact that under this improvised organization Major

O’Neal consented to receive orders from a simple citizen, Marshall.

Cole and his command arrived before San Jacinto about 5 o’clock, on

the morning of Sunday the 14th of September. They found the house well

situated for defence on a gentle elevation commanding all the ground

about it. Near the house was a corral, the sides of which afforded

protection against rifle or musket balls. Cole halted a few minutes to

arrange his plan of attack; and dividing his small force into three

bodies, placed the first in charge of Robert Milligan, an ex-lieutenant

of the army, the second under Major O’Neal, and the third under Captain

Watkins. The attack on the enemy was to be made at three several points,

and the weapons to be used principally were revolvers. These arrangements

being made, the order to charge simultaneously the points assigned to

each division was given. The order was gallantly obeyed, and Cole with

Marshall and Milligan had already gained the corral when they were struck

down by the well-directed fire of the enemy. O’Neal was more fortunate,

receiving only a wound in the arm, while Watkins was disabled by a shot

in the hip. Thus, almost at the same instant, and when the men were

within a few rods of the house, all of the leaders and nearly one third

of the whole force were either killed or wounded. Then the others, seeing

nothing was to be accomplished with their numbers, withdrew, carrying

off their wounded; and in a few minutes they were in full retreat toward

Tipitapa.

Thus in the bold but fruitless charge he made on San Jacinto perished

Byron Cole, whose energy and perseverance had done so much toward

securing the presence of the Americans in Nicaragua. It was the first

opportunity he had for being under fire; and he had scarcely seen the

flash of an enemy’s musket before he met his fate. For months preceding

the arrival of the Americans at Realejo, he had travelled and toiled in

their behalf; and the only reward of all his labor and anxiety was death

on the first field where he met the foe of the principles he had aided to

advance. Nor was Cole the only loss of note on that fatal day. Marshall

died of his wounds after reaching Tipitapa; and among the missing was

Charles Callahan, who had been appointed collector of customs at Granada.

The latter was correspondent of the New-Orleans Picayune newspaper, and

his genial nature secured for him a large circle of friends who regretted

his untimely loss. The thirst for action led him to exchange his business

in Granada for the excitement of the attack on San Jacinto; and he never

returned to fill the duties he had so well begun a few weeks previously.

The retreat of the volunteers from San Jacinto was irregular and

disorderly; and on such a command as that of McDonald at Tipitapa the

arrival of the defeated party had an alarming effect. So great was

the panic that the bridge across the river was torn up to prevent the

expected enemy from using it. But no enemy appeared and the alarm

gradually subsided. The news, however, of the defence at San Jacinto

encouraged the Allies greatly; and soon after the news of the affair

reached Leon, Belloso, urged on by some of the more resolute of his

officers, determined to advance toward Granada.

A few days after the affair at San Jacinto, about two hundred men

arrived at Granada from New-York for the Nicaraguan service. They were

soon organized into companies; but they showed from the beginning how

worthless they were for military duty. A very large proportion of them

were Europeans of the poorest class, mostly Germans who cared more for

the contents of their haversacks than of their cartridge-boxes. With the

exception of Captain Russell and Lieutenants Nagle and Northedge, the

officers were as trifling as the men; and these New-York volunteers, as

they called themselves, had not been in the country ten days before they

began to desert in numbers. The promise of free quarters and rations

seemed to have carried the most of them to Nicaragua; and the idea of

performing duty could scarcely have entered their minds when they left

the United States. Of course such trash as these men proved to be were

far worse than no men at all; for their vices and corruptions tainted the

good materials near them.

While these recruits were arriving at Granada, Belloso, having received

reinforcements from San Salvador and Guatemala, was marching from Leon

toward Managua with a force of about eighteen hundred men. He was

accompanied by General Zavala, the second in command of the Guatemalan

officers, Paredes remaining sick at Leon. Jerez also followed the allied

camp; nor was he unattended by such Leoneses as Mendez and Olivas, eager

for any disorder which held out the prospect of plunder. Valle, having

ventured back to the Occidental Department after the June changes, with

the view of raising the people against the Rivas authority, was arrested

and afterward kept under the eye of the police. He waited at Chinandega

hoping for the turn in affairs which might render his presence there

useful to the Americans. By remaining in the Occidental Department he

aided to keep the people of that region from joining in the crusade the

Allies preached against the “filibusters.”

Major Waters watched closely the advance of the Allies, and by the firm

front he showed at Managua delayed them for several days on the road

between that place and Leon. When, however, Belloso approached within a

few miles of Managua Waters received orders to fall back to Masaya. At

the latter place, Lieutenant-Colonel McIntosh was commanding, and the

garrison consisted of about two hundred and fifty men; these had been

increased in numbers, though not much in strength, by the Second Rifles

from Tipitapa. Subsistence for many days was collected at Masaya, and the

commandant began to build barricades and other defences near the main

square of the city. While these works were going on, Captain Henry, who

had been confined to his bed for many weeks from a painful wound received

in a duel, came out, and by the skill he evinced inspired the soldiers

with confidence in his judgment and sagacity. The commanding officer,

Lieutenant-Colonel McIntosh, was sadly deficient both in knowledge and

force of character; and the effect of his irresolution was such that it

was clear the force at Masaya could not be depended on for holding the

town against the advancing enemy. Had Henry been in command the condition

of the garrison would have been far different; and it was unfortunate

that his long confinement had prevented his capacity from being known

until the last moment. As will be seen hereafter, his disposition to get

into danger, kept him on the list of wounded nearly the whole time he

was in Nicaragua. During the war in Central America, there was no better

soldier engaged in it than Henry; and by reading and study, as well as

by practice and habit, he was familiar, not only with the details of

military administration, but also with the deeper and more difficult

principles of the art of war.

After halting a short time at Managua, Belloso continued to advance;

and at Nindiri, a league from Masaya, he was joined by Martinez and his

followers from Chontales and Matagalpa, thus swelling the allied force

to twenty-two or twenty-three hundred men. The moral condition of the

command at Masaya was such that McIntosh received orders to retire on

Granada; and the state of his men may be judged from the manner in which

they left Masaya. Such was the haste and confusion that Capt. Henry

was left behind, and his safety was the result of accident, being due

to the good-will of the women who attended him during his illness. A

brass six-pounder was left on the road, about three miles out of Masaya,

and the enemy afterward got possession of it. McIntosh might have been

deliberate, even slow in his movement with entire safety; for Belloso did

not enter Masaya for some hours after it was abandoned by the Americans.

Walker, had he desired it, might probably have prevented for a time, or

at least much embarrassed the junction of Martinez with Belloso. But a

war against scattered guerillas was more exhausting to the Americans

than a contest with the enemy gathered in masses. The Allies were less

formidable when united than when acting in detached bodies at several

distant points. Hence, no obstacle was put in the way of Martinez

in his march toward Belloso. In fact, the best manner of treating a

revolutionary movement in Central America, is to treat it as a boil, let

it come to a head, and then lance it, letting all the bad matter out at

once. It was an object for the Americans to let all the dissatisfied

elements in Nicaragua gather about the Allied force, so that the question

at issue might be decisively determined. The accession of Martinez really

added little, if any, to Belloso’s military strength.

Meanwhile the force in Granada was increased by the arrival, on the

4th of October, of Col. Sanders, with Capt. Ewbanks, and about seventy

recruits from California. Three days after, Col. John Allan landed with

nearly one hundred fresh men; and at the same time two twelve-pound

mountain howitzers, with a small supply of shells, and four hundred

Minié rifles were received from New-York. By some blunder, however, the

carriages of the howitzers did not accompany them; and several days

elapsed before Capt. Schwartz was able to have temporary carriages

prepared. The arrival of the howitzers and shells had been anxiously

expected, since it was hoped with their aid to drive the enemy more

readily from the towns they were in the habit of barricading with

adobes, thus making it difficult to carry them by assault, unless with

the loss of large numbers of men.

General Hornsby, with his command, was ordered from the Meridional

Department to Granada; and thus nearly the whole force of the Republic

was concentrated at this point. The effective strength was about a

thousand men, including those employed in the several departments of the

army, as well as those in the line. A very large proportion of these,

however, were newly arrived in the country; many of them had no military

training whatever and still more had never seen an enemy during the whole

course of their lives. Nevertheless it was necessary to strike a blow at

the Allies, if for no other purpose than to show them that the Americans

were not thrown entirely on the defensive. Accordingly, as soon as the

howitzers were mounted on their rather clumsy carriages, and the new

men, suitably armed and equipped, were distributed in the several corps,

orders were issued for a march.

On the morning of the 11th October, Walker marched to Masaya with about

800 men. It was near midday when the First Rifles formed in the Jalteva

and thence proceeded along the middle road to Masaya. In advance of the

Rifles was Major Waters, with two companies of Rangers, and in their rear

was the Cuban body-guard of the general-in-chief. Next after the guard

came Capt. Schwartz with the howitzers; then the ammunition mules. The

Second Rifles followed; and after them were the two Infantry battalions,

under command of Gen. Hornsby. A small body of Rangers brought up the

rear. The march was quiet and uninterrupted; and a little after nine

o’clock in the evening the force encamped on the edge of the town of

Masaya, occupying the high ground flanking each side of the Granada road

as it enters by the plazuela of San Sebastian. Some irregular firing took

place during the night, between mounted scouts of the enemy and some of

the American pickets, but the skirmishing was slight and unimportant.

Soon after daybreak on the 12th, Capt. Schwartz threw a few shells into

the plazuela of San Sebastian, and then Capt. Dolan, with his company

of rifles, proceeded at a brisk pace, to occupy the square, finding it

entirely abandoned by the enemy. Belloso had withdrawn his whole force

into the houses near and around the main Plaza; and the mouths of all the

streets leading into the large square were strongly barricaded. After the

main body of Nicaraguans had reached the plazuela of San Sebastian, a few

sappers and miners who had been hastily organized by a civil engineer,

Capt. Hesse, were ordered to cut through the walls of the houses on both

sides of the main street leading from the plazuela to the Plaza. Hesse

worked quite vigorously, supported by the Rifles on the right side of

the street and by the Infantry on the left. From time to time Capt.

Schwartz tried to throw shells into the midst of the main Plaza, but the

fuses were too short-timed, and the shells, for the most part, burst in

the air. Besides the unfitness of the fuses, one of the howitzers was

dismounted after a few discharges, and the carriage of the other was

ill-adapted for its purposes.

The Rifles and Infantry, however, preceded by the working party,

steadily advanced toward the Plaza, sometimes encountering the enemy

in their progress through the houses, and always driving them back.

Capt. Leonard, with Capts. McChesney and Stith, were the foremost and

most active among the Rifles; while on the left of the street, Dreux,

of the Infantry, took and kept the lead. By dark the houses fronting

on the Plaza were all that divided the Americans from the enemy; and

then the men, tired out by their labors of the day were obliged to

suspend work until morning. In the meanwhile, also, the Rangers on the

Granada road reported heavy firing in the direction of the lake, and

it became necessary to ascertain the meaning of it. Col. Fisher, the

quartermaster-general, accompanied by Lieut.-Col. Lainé and Major Rogers,

with an escort of Rangers, was sent to Granada in order to procure some

stores, and also to ascertain whether or not the road was clear of the

enemy. Not long after midnight Rogers returned, with the report that the

enemy had attacked Granada, and were occupying much of the town, with the

hope of getting entire possession of the place.

It seems that when Zavala, who, with his Guatemalans and some

Legitimists, was occupying Diriomo, a small village between Masaya and

Nandaime, heard of Walker’s march from Granada, he determined to attack

that place, supposing it to be left entirely defenceless. Gen. Fry had,

however, command at Granada; and although the regular force under his

orders was small, the citizens of the town, and the civil employees of

the government, brought the number of the Americans to about two hundred.

The force of Zavala was not less than seven hundred when he entered the

town, and it was probably swelled to nine hundred before the morning

of the 13th. Among his followers was a renegade named Harper, who, in

the previous April, had fled from Granada to join the Costa Ricans,

because his known character of pardoned convict from the California

penitentiary had prevented him from securing the position he expected in

the Nicaraguan army.

When Walker heard of the attack on Granada he immediately ordered his

whole force to prepare for marching, and early on the morning of the 13th

he was proceeding with rapid steps to the relief of Fry and his little

garrison. Not long after nine o’clock, A.M., the returning Americans

heard frequent volleys of small arms in the town; and, on approaching

the Jalteva, they found a strong body of the enemy, with a small brass

gun, occupying both sides of the barricaded road. Colonel Markham, with

the First Infantry, was in advance; and the fire of the Allies was so

sharp and well-directed that, for a time, it arrested the progress of

the Infantry. In a few minutes, however, the Americans were brought to a

charge, and then the enemy disappeared, scattering in all directions and

leaving their gun behind them. Then the main body of the Nicaraguan force

proceeded rapidly toward the main Plaza, where they saw their flag yet

flying, and the town was soon cleared of the Allies. Zavala left another

piece, besides the one taken at the Jalteva, behind him: and the streets

were strewn with the bodies of his dead. Several prisoners of rank and

some wounded remained in the hands of the Nicaraguans.